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Explanatory note
The Handbook on Access to Justice under the Aarhus
Convention was developed by the Regional Environmental
Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) with the par-
ticipation of the following partner organisations: the
American Bar Association/Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), European ECO Forum, the
Environmental Law Association of Central and Eastern
Europe and the Newly Independent States (Guta
Association) and the Environmental Law Alliance
Worldwide (ELAW). Project funding was provided by the
government of the United Kingdom. Additional financial
support, including the translation of a first draft of the
handbook into Russian, was provided by ABA/CEELI. A
project Steering Committee was formed to support the
handbook’s development. Steering Committee member-
ship was open to all UNECE member states, as well as rep-
resentatives of partner organisations, the REC and the
UNECE Secretariat. The countries that participated in the
Steering Committee included Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The development of the handbook was designed with
a practical approach in mind, making use of actual cases as
far as possible. It drew upon the experience of a good
practice handbook on Public Participation in Making
Local Environmental Decisions developed during a work-
shop in Newcastle, UK (December 1999). Cases were gen-
erated in several ways. Most were developed after
announcements sent through existing networks, primarily
the network of government Aarhus focal points, and net-
works and databases of public interest environmental
lawyers. A number of cases from Central Europe and the
EECCA region were generated through a Sub-Regional
Case Study Development Meeting, held in Lviv, Ukraine,
June 4-5, 2001. Finally, several cases were identified
through research by the authors. The information in the
case studies is current as of July 2002. Further details con-
cerning the case studies can be found at the beginning of
Part III of the handbook. 
The handbook also contains analytical contributions
(Parts I and II). The framework for these parts was devel-
oped through numerous consultations involving the
Steering Committee. An important reference for the frame-
work was the report on Complaint Procedures and Access
to Justice for Citizens and NGOs in the Field of the
Environment within the European Union, discussed at the
EU-IMPEL Workshop held in the Hague, the Netherlands
(May 2000).2 While not covering all aspects of access to jus-
tice under the Aarhus Convention, the analytical parts treat
some of the more significant issues, as identified during the
Hague workshop, the Sub-Regional Case Study
Development Meeting, and in other relevant consultations.
Parts of the text draw from The Aarhus Convention: An
Implementation Guide (UN: Geneva and New York, 2000).
Further work certainly needs to be done. It is our hope that
this document will contribute to future collaboration to
develop the state of the art of access to justice in environ-
mental matters in the UNECE region.
Finally, this handbook is meant to expand and evolve
over time. It will be included on the official websites of the
Aarhus Convention, <www.unece.org/env/pp/a.to.j.htm>,
and of the REC, <www.rec.org>, and additional cases and
updates will be posted periodically.
12 H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 13
It has given me great pleasure to lead, on behalf of
Estonia, the Task Force on Access to Justice that was set up
by the UNECE Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention)
at its Second Meeting of Signatories in Croatia in 2000. 
It was agreed that the Task Force should focus on prac-
tical implementation means such as pilot projects and
measures to remove financial obstacles to those seeking
access to justice, as well as considerations of assistance
mechanisms, rather than to engage in efforts to extend or
refine the legal framework provided by the Convention. It
should gather information on good practices and provide a
forum for the exchange of experience. An effort should be
made to provide models, concrete solutions and problem-
solving approaches to the implementation of article 9. It
was agreed that representatives of ministries of Justice
should be invited to participate.1
The Task Force convened a number of fairly informal
discussions, including two in Geneva. The Regional
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
(REC) was commissioned to produce this handbook, and
began by gathering case studies that shed light on the ways
in which the provisions of article 9 could be implemented,
and on some of the potential pitfalls and obstacles that
have been encountered. The REC was assisted by support
from the European ECO Forum, the American Bar
Association/Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative
(ABA/CEELI), the Environmental Law Association of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent
States (Guta Association) and the Environmental Law
Alliance Worldwide (ELAW). A preliminary meeting was
held in Lviv, Ukraine, in June 2001 to review the collection
of material. 
Estonia hosted a workshop in Tallinn in September
2001, posing a series of questions that emerged from earli-
er discussions as a basis for this work: 
• What might constitute an “independent and impartial
body established by law?”
• What is “sufficient interest” and how does this relate
to the standing and status of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and other community neigh-
bourhood groups?
• What are adequate and effective remedies?
• How can injunctive relief be used to assist with effec-
tive remedies?
• How can appropriate financial assistance be provided
in an effective way?
• What other barriers to justice have been identified and
how have they been overcome?
The workshop was a great success. It was attended by
52 participants, acting in their personal capacity, from a
wide range of government institutions and NGOs. Its aim
was to focus on good practice and provide a forum for the
exchange of practical experience. 
Discussions took place in groups, each facilitated by
one of the participants, and the conclusions of the groups
were broken down according to articles of the Aarhus
Convention. Categories used were: procedures; remedies;
review bodies and other bodies; overcoming financial bar-
riers; overcoming other barriers; and other issues not
addressed in other sessions. 
It became clear during the course of discussions that
because of the wide geographical range of the United
Nations, the contexts in which access to justice under the
Aarhus Convention needs to operate are diverse in terms of
legal and democratic traditions, as well as social, cultural
and economic conditions. This diversity needs to be
remembered particularly when reading the case studies in
Part III of this handbook. An attempt was made to ensure
that different practices are adequately described through-
out, but it is accepted that these case studies do not cover
all good practices on environmental justice.
Throughout all our discussions it was clear that what
was needed was practical guidance and support rather
Preface
Rita Annus,
Chairperson of the Task Force on Access to Justice 
than academic or theoretical studies. Inevitably perhaps,
participants pressed for more things to be done than was
possible in the time available. We were asked, for exam-
ple, to make efforts to ensure that all good practices iden-
tified during the course of discussions were adequately
described in the final version of the handbook. These
included some excellent examples of review bodies, time-
frames, standing, citizen enforcement powers, injunctive
and interim relief, damages, legal aid schemes, waiving
fees and financial certainty. Following these up will
undoubtedly be valuable and provide parties to the
Convention with a wealth of the best concrete solutions to
a range of the most practical problems encountered when
implementing article 9 of the Convention. The workshop
also concluded that, while this handbook would be main-
ly addressed to government officials and others involved in
the implementation of the Convention, it would be impor-
tant for future Task Force activities to assess and address
the needs of other target groups such as the public, lawyers
and judges. 
I am very pleased to present this Handbook on Access
to Justice under the Aarhus Convention. It does not claim
to be the final and definitive word on all aspects of the
implementation of the justice provisions in the
Convention. However, I hope that this is a good start and
that its focus on real cases, real problems and real solutions
will make it an excellent resource for parties to the
Convention and others seeking to meet the requirements
of article 9. 
The handbook is organised as follows:
• Part I: Analytical chapters elaborating specific issues of
access to justice under the Aarhus Convention as dis-
cussed in Tallinn and illustrated by case studies in Part III.
• Part II: Some other issues related to access to justice in
the context of the Aarhus Convention.
• Part III: Case studies chosen to illustrate issues that
arise in implementing article 9 of the Convention.
I would like to conclude by thanking those who have
helped to make the Estonian leadership of the Access to
Justice Task Force a success, and to all those who have
contributed so generously to the handbook.
I also want to take this opportunity to welcome the
government of Belgium, which now leads the new Access
to Justice Task Force established during the First Meeting
of Parties to the Aarhus Convention in Lucca in October
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“Today we may speak just about the general principles
of access to justice in this or that country and compare
the experience of different countries. [O]ne may speak
only about development of the processes of democra-
tisation in court practice of countries [in terms of] appli-
cation of the principles of the Aarhus Convention [and
the] creation of possibilities.”
(Statement by the Kazakhstan focal point for the
Aarhus Convention in a note accompanying 
the submission of cases.)
This statement summarises the purpose of this hand-
book — to look at possibilities in the field of applying the
access to justice principles of the Aarhus Convention, as
expressed through real cases drawn from the UNECE region.
The approach of this handbook is to use cases to illus-
trate the obligations of the Aarhus Convention and how
they might be enforced or upheld through complaints pro-
cedures and other means of access to justice. In dealing
with issues such as the rules with respect to broader stand-
ing, and the application of those rules in particular circum-
stances, it is hoped that parties to the Convention will con-
sider different options in the adoption of implementing
legislation and in the development of rules of court and
rules of practice of other tribunals and similar bodies. It is
hoped that an exchange will be fostered resulting in the
development and broad adoption of best practices in the
field of access to justice in environmental matters in the
UNECE region. 
The first part of the handbook discusses specific issues
with respect to the implementation of the access to justice
obligations of the Convention, drawing upon, analysing
and evaluating the results of the case studies as much as
possible. While an attempt was made to identify case stud-
ies dealing with as many of the aspects of access to justice
in relation to the Aarhus Convention as possible, not all
such aspects could be covered by practical case examples.
Thus, the analysis also relies upon the authors’ research
and sometimes direct experience.
Case studies
Whereas environmental cases were virtually unheard
of a generation ago, courts and administrative tribunals are
today increasingly hearing environmental cases. While
some may say that more appeals from unsatisfactory deci-
sions indicate poorer decision-making, the root cause
would rather appear to be simply the large increase in
opportunities to access information, participate, and gain
access to justice. Whether courts, administrative appeals,
or other possible access to justice mechanisms are consid-
ered, three aspects of access to justice need to be exam-
ined. The first is a threshold issue — under what circum-
stances does a person have standing to invoke substantive
and procedural guarantees? The second is the question of
which specific procedures and remedies should be avail-
able once the threshold is crossed. The third is the extent
of judicial control through the procedures available, also
referred to as the standard of review. 
The UNECE region covers many legal traditions. Those
countries that require subjective rights to be impaired prior
to resort to judicial remedies may be reluctant to recognise
the rights of some, for example, environmental organisa-
tions. Other countries with more idealistic but less strictly
implemented legal traditions may have no trouble recog-
nising broad concepts of rights and interests. But such
recognition may result in a less strict application of norms
and remedies in a given case. Exchanges of experience on
access to justice help bring these strands together — on the
one hand, extending spheres of recognised rights and
interests into heretofore uncharted territories and, on the
other hand, requiring idealistic “rights” to be taken more
seriously. The result is to extend the scope of the law over
citizen-state interaction and to reduce the scope of govern-
ment action without criticism and oversight. 
Crossing the threshold is just the first step. The proce-
dures and remedies available depend on a plethora of cir-
cumstantial and legal factors that differ substantially in the
various countries. The length of proceedings and lack of
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information about access to justice are examples. The effec-
tiveness of access to justice procedures is heavily influ-
enced by the availability of interim measures and the possi-
bility to secure the status quo or prevent the continuation of
certain activities during the proceedings (see also chapter 6
on injunctions). Otherwise the environment may be long
lost even though the case is won. Perhaps the largest obsta-
cles are financial. These include not only the obligation to
provide financial security for procedural costs, but also the
prospect of civil lawsuits claiming damages for losses
incurred if projects are halted during the proceedings.
The scope or extent of judicial control also differs great-
ly from country to country. This scope can be viewed in
terms of both breadth and depth of inquiry. Breadth of
inquiry refers to the question of which laws are taken into
consideration when reviewing the legality of the challenged
act. By depth of inquiry, the intensity of judicial review is
considered in comparison with the margin of discretion
granted to the administrative authorities when making their
decisions, and the level of detail of facts reviewed. 
In practice, some countries like Italy and Germany
have fairly restrictive conditions regarding standing. They
require the applicant to prove that he or she has an
enforceable right to lawful administrative action or to
assert that the law he or she invokes is specifically aimed
at his or her protection. However, once this hurdle is
passed, the procedures and tools available to protect the
environment may be very effective and the extent of judi-
cial control rather wide. In Germany, for example, the
commencement of administrative review procedures auto-
matically has the effect of an order maintaining the status
quo, and the extent of judicial control in both Germany
and Italy is generally very broad. It is often the case that
countries with a low threshold for standing, such as
France, where it is sufficient to assert a legal, factual or
even idealistic interest, often have a more limited extent of
judicial control.3 Still other countries may have broad
standing rules, but financial barriers may lead to few per-
sons taking advantage of them. Thus when looking at
access to justice in different countries it is important not to
focus on one single issue such as standing, but to consider
all aspects of each country’s legal system, including cir-
cumstantial factors. In doing so, efforts to address barriers
to access to justice can be tailored to the specific situation
in each country.
These concepts have special relevance in a large part of
the UNECE region that has gone through a decade of tran-
sition from centrally planned economies and information,
and social control, to transitional or market economies
with greater pluralism. Inadequacies in the system of
administrative and judicial review come to the fore quite
readily in environmental protection, due to the higher level
of civic activism. As obstacles are encountered resort is
given to mechanisms for the administration of justice, an
occurrence that is becoming more frequent. Ultimately, the
call for access to justice shows the interest of the public in
trying to protect the environment, preferably but not nec-
essarily in partnership with the authorities. 
The fact that the elements of standing and judicial con-
trol are central to access to justice under the Aarhus
Convention is further evidence, if any is needed, of the
extent to which environmental protection serves as a moti-
vation for persons to use the law or to define rights, and
how it helps to promote and uphold the rule of law.
Moreover, through resort to the courts, the power and
independence of the judiciary are tested. The focus on jus-
tice in the growing body of international environmental
law is another indication of the role of environmental pro-
tection in empowering people and making authorities
more accountable. Where citizens fight for environmental
justice in access to information or the right to take part in
decision-making, they increase their ability to make use of
the same mechanisms for other purposes.
Access to environmental justice is one of the major
issues on the international agenda. The relationship of
access to environmental justice and good governance to
sustainable development is becoming increasingly appar-
ent. While the notion that environmental protection and
development are inseparable has been accepted for some
time,4 the connection between access to environmental
justice and governance is a relatively new idea. It is further
evidence of the special characteristics of international envi-
ronmental law,5 and its application in other areas of
domestic and international law, especially in the contexts
of human rights, sustainable development and intergener-
ational equity.6 Access to justice in national practice and
under the Aarhus Convention will undoubtedly prove to
be major drivers in the development of environmental gov-
ernance and the law of sustainable development on
domestic and international levels.
The cases generated for inclusion in this handbook
cover a wide range of problems and solutions relating to
access to justice within the framework of the Aarhus
Convention. Of course, these cases cannot actually be
regarded as examples of access to justice under the
Convention, as most of them predate the Convention’s
coming into force in October 2001. They deal with com-
plaints and disputes arising out of the handling of informa-
tion requests (article 9(1)), the substance and procedure of
environmental decision-making and other matters (article
9(2)), and attempts by members of the public to use vari-
ous legal tools to enforce environmental law (article 9(3))
(see Keyword index to cases). They also deal with the
kinds of matters that might be referred to as administration
of justice — that is, the minimum standards for due process
that are covered by article 9(4), including the availability
and enforcement of full and effective remedies, reducing
costs and eliminating other financial barriers to access to
justice, and limiting the misuse of legal process. Specific
lessons that can be learned from the case studies in con-
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nection with these provisions are drawn out in the follow-
ing chapters. Part II contains several additional chapters on
issues related to access to justice, including the right to a
healthy environment and examples from the practice of the
European Court of Human Rights and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
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According to article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention:
“Each Party shall, within the framework of its national
legislation, ensure that any person who considers that his
or her request for information under article 4 has been
ignored, wrongfully refused, whether in part or in full,
inadequately answered, or otherwise not dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of that article, has access
to a review procedure before a court of law or another
independent and impartial body established by law.
In the circumstances where a Party provides for such
a review by a court of law, it shall ensure that such a
person also has access to an expeditious procedure
established by law that is free of charge or inexpen-
sive for reconsideration by a public authority or
review by an independent and impartial body other
than a court of law.”
Failure to respond 
to an information request
The failure of a public authority to respond to a request
for information is common in many countries.7 Denying
access to information impacts upon an essential aspect of
participatory democracy. When public authorities hold
information on the environment and do not provide it
upon request, they disregard not only the information prin-
ciple, but also the participation principle. Lack of access to
information on environmental matters is a considerable
obstacle to effective public participation.
In many cases, after initially denying access to the
requested information, public authorities may decide to
provide it “voluntarily” following the initiation of a court
procedure, but prior to the court’s ruling, perhaps to avoid
a court judgement going against them. This is illustrated in
Hungary Case 2 (the Metal Plant Case) where a member of
the public requested information from a public authority
on emissions data for an enterprise. The Environmental
Inspectorate of Northern Hungary first refused to provide
the data on air pollution and noise emissions of this enter-
prise on the grounds that the citizen had no right to partic-
ipate in any government decisions relating to the enter-
prise. The individual in question filed a lawsuit at the local
City Court of Miskolc to oblige the inspectorate to provide
access to the requested information. During the process
the inspectorate “voluntarily” released a part of the
requested data. While a final court judgement was avoid-
ed, in the view of one of the authors of the case study, the
case proves that “the group of those who are entitled to
have access to environmental data of a facility is not limit-
ed to the group of those who have standing in a particular
case, which is the main idea behind public access to envi-
ronmental information.” 
Another interesting case demonstrating a successful
resolution where information was voluntarily released is
the Salisbury Bypass Case in the UK (see appendix B). The
Department of Transport refused to deliver a copy of an
“induced traffic assessment report” to Friends of the Earth,
arguing that the requested information was not related to
the environment according to both the provisions of
Directive 90/313/EEC8 and the UK’s domestic legislation.
Friends of the Earth brought a case for judicial review of
the department’s decision, and two weeks before the court
hearing was due, the department provided Friends of the
Earth with a copy of the report.
In some countries the obligation to provide informa-
tion and the grounds for possible refusal are laid down in
legislation. For example, in Hungary the public authority
holding requested information must justify the legality of
any refusal, and an appeal may be instituted against the
authority refusing to issue the information requested with-
in 30 days from the communication of the refusal (Act no.
63 of 1992 on Freedom of Information of Public Interest).
Almost the same provisions exist in Ukraine, where,
according to the Law on Information, the burden of prov-
ing the legality of any refusal is placed on the authority. If
refusal is legally groundless or the information is not pro-
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vided in time, the court is obliged to impose penalties on
the responsible authority.
The Aarhus Convention sets up a general time limit for
public authorities to make information available.9 The
requested information must be released “as soon as possi-
ble and at the latest within one month.” Consequently,
when the requested information is not released in time or
is released after the time limit has expired there is a failure
to respond by the public authority.10
The Convention provides for the possibility to extend
this time limit to two months when the volume and com-
plexity of the information justify such an extension, but as
Germany Case 5 (the Baltic Sea Motorway Case) shows, an
extended time limit should not be used as an excuse not to
release information promptly. In this case involving the EU
Access to Environmental Information Directive, authorities
in the state of Schleswig-Holstein interpreted the two-
month delay for responding to an information request as
applicable to a formal response (i.e. a simple acknowledg-
ment), rather than a substantive response. After attempts to
change this interpretation failed on the national level, a
complaint was made to the European Commission. The
Commission’s interpretation differed from that of the
German authorities, and it appealed to the European Court
of Justice in 1999 against the failure of the German author-
ities to respect the directive in practice.11
Concerning good practices for preliminary reconsider-
ation and administrative review procedures in cases where
access to information is denied, the question of timeframes
should be considered. The obligation of the European
Parliament, Council and Commission to reconsider inter-
nally an application for access to information within 15
days of the submission of a complaint (confirmative appli-
cation) is considered to be good practice. Furthermore, a
number of countries have a one-month timeframe for
administrative (non-judicial) reviews in general — this is
the case in the Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia
and some other countries. 
In terms of judicial review, six months from making an
appeal to the judicial system until the final decision by the
court, as is the target in England and Wales, seems to be a
good example of a timely judicial procedure. A good prac-
tice would be to reduce deadlines for refusal of informa-
tion to allow the applicant to proceed with the complaint,
or to appeal as soon as possible to the next instance.
The Constitution of Ukraine provides for a quick judi-
cial review procedure, which allows citizens to appeal
directly to the court on the grounds of a violation of their
rights. This procedure was developed to overcome the
bureaucratic delays during the administrative process of
the past regimes. As practice shows in Ukraine, the process
of judicial review in such cases is not expensive and takes
from one to three months, while pre-judicial, administra-
tive processes can only extend the process of getting infor-
mation one or several months more. 
Incomplete response
An incomplete response can be considered as a sub-
category of “failure to respond.” In fact, in such an event,
the public authority releases only a part of the requested
information. A synonym for “incomplete response” is
“unsatisfactory response,” as underlined in Ukraine Case 1
(the Ukrainian Right to Know Case). In this case, a citizen
expressed concern over the construction of a petrol filling
station and asked the Oblast Chief Sanitary Doctor to pro-
vide information about its activities. In particular, he
demanded an assessment and forecast of health indices for
Khmelnitsky residents and the results of laboratory
research on air pollution. He received an unsatisfactory
answer to his request. In fact, the doctor did not provide
any information on the essence of the matter. The court
declared the actions of the doctor illegal and obliged him
to satisfy the inquiry.
This case shows that, although it is generally difficult
for citizens and community organisations to obtain
requested environmental information from officials, they
can defend their entitlement to access to environmental
information in court through a juridical procedure.
Challenges to claims of exemption
Each country makes use of certain exemptions from
the general rule of access to environmental information.12
A number of these exemptions are common to all coun-
tries, but there are also differences between countries.
Some jurisdictions distinguish between mandatory exemp-
tions (the public authority must withhold the information)
and discretionary exemptions (the public authority may
withhold the information). 
Exempt categories common to virtually all countries,






• ongoing court proceedings or criminal and other inves-
tigations;
• personal privacy; and
• intellectual property rights.
Depending on how these categories are applied and
what other restrictions are in place, authorities have the
potential to limit substantially the transparency that laws
on access to information are supposed to ensure. As
shown in all three Spanish cases, the public authority con-
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sistently justified its refusal to give the requested informa-
tion by claiming that the information was included in draft
documents or data, or in internal communications. 
The appeal to the European Ombudsman14 by Friends
of the Earth (see appendix B) is a prime example of how
authorities may sometimes use exemptions to impede
access to information. In this case, the NGO asked the
European Commission (DG XI — now DG Environment)
for copies of two studies conducted for the Commission on
the UK’s transposition of the Habitats Directive and various
waste directives. The Commission provided copies of the
studies, but lines were blacked out with thick ink on page
after page, on the grounds of “protection of the public
interest (court proceedings, inspections and investiga-
tions).” The NGO appealed to the Secretary-General of the
Commission. After a negative decision, Friends of the Earth
decided to appeal to the European Ombudsman against
these refusals. The ombudsman stated that the exemption
referring to inspections and investigations should only be
applied when the requested documents were drawn up in
the course of an investigation connected to an infringe-
ment proceeding. Therefore, the ombudsman ruled that
the Commission was guilty of maladministration in refus-
ing to provide full copies of the reports. 
As a general rule, the Aarhus Convention requires that
exemptions are interpreted in a restrictive way. The
Friends of the Earth case illustrates that judicial or other
similar bodies will take a hard look at the way in which
authorities seek to interpret exemptions to disclosure, and
will invalidate administrative acts (or issue opinions with
similar effect) when the authorities make interpretations
that are too broad.
A category of exemptions derived from the definition
of state secrets can be found in the national legislation of
virtually every country. This usually includes information
that, if released, could adversely affect or endanger nation-
al security, public security or public order, international
relations, important economic interests, or national mone-
tary and currency policy.15 Russia Case 2 (the Nikitin Case)
deals with the issue of state secrets and access to informa-
tion. A private person was arrested and charged with trea-
son through espionage for having allegedly handed over
state secrets to a foreign organisation. After a long trial, the
court decided to acquit him of the charge of treason. The
court based its decision in part on article 29(4) of the
Russian Constitution, which states that each person has the
right freely to seek, receive, pass on, produce and dissem-
inate information by any legal method. This constitutional
provision was elaborated in the Law of the Russian
Federation on Mass Media. In examining the right to infor-
mation, the court took into consideration another require-
ment of the Russian Constitution that the list of information
on state secrets shall be determined by federal law. The
court stated that the information disclosed by Nikitin fell
into the category of information on ecological conditions
(accidents and catastrophes endangering the safety and
health of citizens, and their consequences) and, according
to the law, this information could therefore not be consid-
ered as secret. 
Most countries have an exemption for commercially
confidential information. In certain cases, this exemption is
used in a very broad way to suppress any information con-
nected with business. However, the exemption is some-
times restricted when such information concerns impacts
on the environment, as in Slovenia, or is related to pollu-
tion, as in Hungary. 
In the UK case of R v. Sec of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions and Midland Expressway Ltd.
(see appendix B), the issue was whether a document — in
this case an agreement for the construction of a toll-
financed road scheme — fell under the exemption of com-
mercial confidentiality. The court decided that the agree-
ment to construct the road was “information relating to the
environment,” and the fact that a document might contain
confidential information that is truly commercial could not
be used to prevent disclosure of the main body of the
agreement. Moreover, the purpose of seeking the informa-
tion was irrelevant. This case illustrates that courts will
examine the determinations made by public authorities
with respect to confidentiality and will require public
authorities to apply exemptions restrictively. In this case,
the information that was confidential could not be used to
justify the refusal to disclose other information that could
be separated from the confidential information.
The case on pesticides and genetically modified crops
(see appendix B) again illustrates that public bodies may
attempt to use several arguments — here commercial con-
fidentiality — to prevent making information available.
The former Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Foods
refused to specify what tests had been conducted on
genetically modified crops. As stated in EC Directive
91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection
products on the market, confidentiality shall not apply to a
summary of the results of tests to establish the efficacy and
harmlessness of the substance or product to humans, ani-
mals, plants and the environment. Thus, the court ruled
that the information had to be disclosed.
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Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention requires that:
“Each Party shall, within the framework of its national
legislation, ensure that members of the public concerned
(a) having a sufficient interest or, alternatively, (b)
Maintaining impairment of a right, where the administra-
tive procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondi-
tion, have access to a review procedure before a court of
law and/or another independent and impartial body
established by law, to challenge the substantive and pro-
cedural legality of any decision, act or omission subject to
the provisions of article 6 and, where so provided for
under national law and without prejudice to paragraph 3
below, of other relevant provisions of this Convention.”
This chapter deals with access to justice in examples of
alleged violations of both procedural and substantive types.
In the United States and Western Europe, courts issue
rulings more often about procedural illegality than about
substantive decision-making.16 In part this is because there
is rarely any substantive legal question about government
action, because laws are written to give a government
broad discretion. A legislative term like “protect the envi-
ronment” or “prevent harm” may sound like a standard for
substantive legality, but such a term, as an American judge
once wrote about a forest statute, “breathes discretion
through its every pore.”17 On the other hand, there is a gen-
eral reluctance by courts in some countries to stop a big,
important project on procedural grounds.18 In most of the
countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia
(EECCA), a court makes a decision usually on the basis of
substantive legality. If a procedure has not been respected,
the courts are not yet comfortable with ruling against gov-
ernments on what they consider “technical” matters. 
Judicial challenges to 
procedural illegality
An examination of article 6 of the Aarhus Convention
shows several procedural requirements that could become
the subject of a lawsuit or other appeal: 
• failure to provide access “to all information relevant to
the decision-making” process, including data, a non-
technical summary and alternatives;
• failure to provide early, timely and effective public
notice; 
• failure of the public notice to be clear about the activity,
possible decisions and the public authority responsible; 
• failure to provide notice of the procedure, including
participation opportunities, where information can be
obtained, and the nature of the information; 
• failure to provide an opportunity to submit comments,
or failure of the authority to take due account of com-
ments; and
• failure to inform the public (and to do so timely) of the
final decision “along with the reasons and considera-
tions on which the decision is based.”
These six requirements can be grouped into three cat-
egories of procedural errors:
• failure to disclose all information to the public relevant
to its participation;
• improper procedures for public participation, such as
timely or adequate notice, opportunity to comment,
timeframes, restrictions on “administrative standing,” or
other conditions; and
• inadequate response to comments received (failure to
take due account), or failure to reveal the reasons or
considerations for the decision.
It is likely to be easier to get judicial correction of some
categories of violations than of others. Regarding disclo-
sure, it appears to be difficult to persuade a judge that
undisclosed information was relevant to the decision-mak-
ing process. The second — improper participation proce-
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dures — asks courts to do the kind of work that is most
familiar to them. If a member of the public can show that
procedures were violated, courts can rule in their favour,
without thinking that they are making policy decisions
themselves about the environment. The third is the most
difficult: to ask a court to determine that the government
inadequately responded to a particular comment, or inad-
equately explained its reasons, requires the court to make
a somewhat subjective judgement rather than a clear
judgement about legal procedures. This is not to say that it
is wrong for the court to do this. It is simply observed that
judges may be reluctant to rule in such cases.
Justice regarding non-disclosure 
of documentation for participation
in decision-making 
It is a basic principle of public participation that all doc-
umentation and information relevant to a proposed deci-
sion should be open for examination by the public con-
cerned. Article 6(2)d) of the Aarhus Convention requires
that a proponent/applicant or public authority responsible
for decision-making must notify the public concerned
about public participation procedures, including “the pub-
lic authority from which information can be obtained and
where the relevant information has been deposited for
examination by the public.” This special aspect of “access
to information” is similar to, but somewhat different from
the more general access to information principles under
article 5 of the Convention. In this special case, denying
access to information not only harms the information prin-
ciple, but also the participation principle. 
Information relating to proposed decisions must be
available, according to article 6(2), “early in an environ-
mental decision-making procedure,” when all possibilities
and alternatives are open for consideration. This gives the
public a chance to be prepared and to participate effec-
tively. Furthermore, the information must be available “in
an adequate, timely and effective manner.” Lack of access
to documentation can make public participation ineffective
or even impossible. 
The question of the availability of documentation may
be easy or difficult for a court to rule on. On the one hand,
it is easy to rule that documents should be provided. This
seems basically procedural and a purely legal issue. Such
cases have become rather usual in court practice. On the
other hand, to rule that the absence of a document affect-
ed the decision-making process may be more difficult for a
court to deal with. Some of the cases included in this hand-
book illustrate these problems.
In Armenia Case 1 (the Victory Park Case), the con-
struction of a hotel complex started in a public park with-
out an environmental impact assessment (EIA). When citi-
zens saw trees being cut, the Environmental Public
Advocacy Centre (EPAC) tried to obtain information about
the project from the city. It asked whether an EIA existed,
whether any hearings had been held, and whether the
mayor of the city had given permission. But access to the
requested information was refused. Informally, EPAC dis-
covered that the mayor of the city had given permission to
start the construction, provided that an EIA first made a
positive conclusion. EPAC also discovered that, despite
this condition, and despite the absence of an EIA, the gen-
eral architect of the city made another order to start the
construction two days later. 
The court dismissed EPAC’s case, never addressing its
demand for information. EPAC also sued the prime minister
for failing to provide information, but the court proceedings
were delayed, and again no injunction was issued to stop
the ongoing construction. This case is also an example of
the lack of opportunities for participation in EIA or experti-
sa (see section on Participation rights and expertisa).
In Germany Case 2 (the Experts’ Documents Case) on
the construction of a new and extended section of railway
track between Erfurt and Leipzig/Halle, the courts were
more attentive to citizen participation rights. A nature con-
servation association recognised under federal law, NABU
Landesverband Sachsen-Anhalt (NABU), requested access
to various documents in order to comment on the propos-
al. These included, in particular, an expert report by the
planning office referring to a survey of the nature aspects of
the surrounding countryside. The public authority rejected
the NABU application to view the files. NABU sued. The
court ruled that the defendant public authority had
infringed the plaintiff’s participatory rights. The court reject-
ed an argument by the defendant that, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the denial of access to docu-
mentation was an insubstantial procedural error and there-
fore could not affect the legality of the development con-
sent. The court ruled that the Nature Conservation Act gave
a right of consultation of independent weight and absolute
character. This is an important statement, showing that
access and participation rights under more recently prom-
ulgated environmental laws have to be treated seriously.
Not all cases in Germany are this successful. Germany
Case 5 (the Baltic Sea Motorway Case) involved the ques-
tion whether documents were made available adequately
to allow public participation to occur properly. The recog-
nised conservation group, Bund fur Umwelt und
Naturschutz (BUND) and the regional group Schleswig
Holstein Association opposed the construction of a sub-
section of the A20 motorway, the so-called Baltic Sea
motorway. During the procedure to approve the plan, a
controversy arose about the extent of legal protection for
the Wakenitz valley. Since the conflict between the author-
ity and BUND could not be resolved, BUND filed a case
against the project.
The association made procedural and substantive
legal arguments in its suit. Procedurally, the association
complained that important documents were not made
completely accessible. The plan approval authority
refused the inspection of the requested documents during
the hearing procedure. The authority furthermore modi-
fied the documents several times, without allowing
BUND to comment again. 
The court ruled that BUND could only challenge sub-
stantive violations of the nature protection law, and not
violations of other laws, and apparently not procedural
inadequacies such as the failure to provide information.
Yet, adherence to proper procedures and the ability to
challenge violations in the courts are fundamental to both
the rule of law and the implementation of the principles of
the Aarhus Convention. 
Justice in events of improper procedures 
for public participation
According to article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, public
notification about a decision on specific activities should
be given early in the process and should be adequate,
timely and effective. Public participation should be real,
not just a formality. There should be a clear procedure for
the public to make comments and proposals and give
information or opinions in writing or during hearings.
When these procedural conditions are not met, access to
justice should be available to require correction.
Access to justice related to requirements 
for “administrative standing”
The system of prerequisites or qualifications to the
right to participate is sometimes termed “administrative
standing.” From another point of view, this can be called
the “right to participate.” 
In the cases submitted by NGOs and governments for
this handbook, restrictions on the ability of the public or
NGOs to challenge decisions through administrative
proceedings seem to be just as common as restrictions on
their ability to go to court. In Hungary Case 1 (the
Balaton Highway Case), the Somogy Nature Conser-
vation Organisation challenged a permit but was refused
“administrative” standing by the Ministry of Transport,
Telecommunications and Water Management. In Poland
Case 1 (the Highway and Housing Case), public authori-
ties argued against allowing residents to participate in
administrative appeals about a highway for some time,
but eventually relented. In Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, NGOs or ordinary citizens are being prevented
from participation in administrative procedures, such as
forest planning, as has been reported for a long time. 
A participant in an administrative proceeding has the
right, in many countries, to take an unsatisfactory decision
to court for a legal review afterwards. Conversely, prior
participation is sometimes a prerequisite to judicial chal-
lenge. The result of denying citizens or NGOs to participate
during the administrative stage, therefore, may be to pre-
vent them from challenging illegal actions later in court, on
the basis that they did not participate earlier. 
By keeping the public or NGOs out of public partici-
pation procedures in the first place, an opportunity may be
lost for the judicial system or an equivalent, independent
body to rectify violations of procedure or substance.
Therefore, blocking participation at the administrative
level also blocks independent judicial review of non-com-
pliance with laws by public authorities.
Participation rights in EIA and expertiza
The main and most powerful tools for public participa-
tion in decision-making are EIAs and “environmental
expertiza.”19 In EECCA countries, a combination of EIA and
expertise is used. Relevant laws have provisions on public
participation and public hearings, but they are declarative.
Special regulations are needed to enforce them. Countries
ratifying the Aarhus Convention without having procedur-
al regulations will have to establish such regulations in
national legislation to comply with the Convention.
It is often the case in the EECCA region that, even
where procedural regulations do exist, violations are not
taken seriously into account by courts. This practice leads
to a situation where investors and sometimes even govern-
ment authorities knowingly violate procedural require-
ments. Sometimes, however, courts are willing to enforce
procedural requirements. In a precedent in Ukraine, the
first instance court found the positive conclusion of the
state ecological expertise invalid in the Mineral Fertilizers
Terminal project mainly because of violations of procedur-
al requirements, including the public’s right to be informed
and to participate in the expertise process. 20
Other examples involving
the denial of participatory rights
Germany Case 2 (the Experts’ Documents Case) illus-
trates another issue that arises in access to justice in envi-
ronmental decision-making — defence of the rights of the
public to participate when important changes are made to
a proposal. Substantial amendments to the project affected
more than 50 percent of the total land area. Although the
project planners had made amendments to the planning
documents laid out for public inspection in order to coun-
teract the objections of the public concerned, the public
had no real chance to express its opinion on the new pro-
posal. The amended planning documents were sent to the
relevant authorities and private individuals who would be
affected by the amendments. They had been asked to sub-
mit their opinions, and the opinions received had been
dealt with. However, a new date for public discussion was
not set according to the development consent. The court
ruled that the participatory rights of BUND were violated
by the Federal Railways Authority.
Public participation should not be a mere formality,
checking off a list to ensure that some sort of comment is
allowed. Rather, it is supposed to achieve two goals:
improved decision-making by the authorities, and the
implementation of the rights of the public to influence
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decision-making through the expression of its demands.
To allow comments on one version of a proposal but to
deny the chance for comments or a hearing when the pro-
posal is changed in an important way does not achieve
either goal. The German court recognised this and provid-
ed for the enforcement of the rights to proper participation. 
Germany Case 6 (the Elbe Case) involved the ques-
tion whether the issuing of a permit should be dealt with
under one procedure (which required public participa-
tion) or another (which did not require it). The govern-
ment, according to the law, chose the second procedure
and NGOs appealed to the court. The court ruled that the
use of the second procedure was lawful. It made a dis-
tinction between a development project involving a
waterway, which had to be executed with public partici-
pation, and the maintenance of a waterway, which did
not. This illustrates that, even when procedures for par-
ticipation are available, they may contain exceptions that
may lead to the overriding of the general obligation to
allow public participation.
One of the necessary requirements for a proper public
participation procedure is that the public must be able to
understand the relevant environmental documents, as
illustrated in United States Case 1 (the Telephone Case).
Without comprehensible documentation, public participa-
tion will be merely a formality, without any chance of ben-
efiting either the public or public authorities. This case
illustrates how such an improper procedure can be chal-
lenged. The highly technical language of the EIA in this
case was difficult to understand by a layperson. Even a
Harvard University professor, who helped to prepare the
EIA, had difficulty explaining it. As a result, the court
issued a nationwide injunction against a pesticide spraying
programme, until proper procedures could be followed.
This case upheld the right of the public to demand clear
documents as part of their participation and commenting
in an EIA process, and showed that the court can be a bul-
wark in support of those rights.
Justice in events of an inadequate 
response to comments received 
(failure to take due account)
Aarhus Convention parties must ensure that a decision
takes account of the outcome of the public participation
process. This means that a public authority has to listen to
public opinion and take it into consideration during deci-
sion-making. It also means that, if a reasonable public sug-
gestion is rejected, there should be an explanation of the
reasons for such a rejection. 
In Poland Case 1 (the Highway and Housing Case), res-
idents of the Muchobor Maly housing estate in Wroclaw
claimed that a proposal to build a district highway near
their housing estate would be illegal. They separately
appealed the development consent and the building per-
mit. Comments on the inadequacy of the EIA by residents
living close to the new highway construction were rejected
administratively. On appeal, the Supreme Administrative
Court agreed with some of the residents’ comments, how-
ever, apparently requiring new conditions for building the
highway. This case illustrates the potential for judicial cor-
rection of a failure to take comments into account. In addi-
tion, there was an appeal to another independent body,
the EIA Commission of the Ministry of Environment, which
agreed that the EIA was not in compliance with the law,
but the lack of citizen appeals at an earlier time resulted in
allowing the EIA to stand. 
These cases suggest that citizens can challenge inade-
quate compliance with participation procedures in some
countries, under certain circumstances. The fact that such
cases are brought before the courts shows how important
access to justice is to environmental law.
Judicial challenges to 
substantive illegality
Arguments on procedural violations will sometimes
not be taken into account by a court. They may not be
sufficient, or the substance of a decision will be inade-
quate where there are no procedural violations. For
example, in Serbia and Montenegro Case 3 (the Cacak
Case) the procedure was formally upheld, but the public
was not satisfied with the decision. 
In some countries in the UNECE region, EIA legislation
allows for the review both of compliance with EIA proce-
dures and of the substantive merits of the decision through
the administrative review process. For instance, in Bulgaria
Case 1 (the Pirin Mountain Case), six environmental NGOs
appealed the substantive legality as well as the procedural
legality of an EIA decision. In EECCA countries, the envi-
ronmental expertise process brings substantive legality
even more to the forefront in judicial challenges.
In many cases, challenging the substantive legality of a
decision is not easy. It usually requires the involvement of
experts, which may lead to financial barriers (see Part I,
chapter 7, Costs of experts). In addition, there may be a
general lack of real independent experts. Such a problem
is illustrated by Kazakhstan Case 1 (the Petrol Plant Case).
In this case, state expertise was inadequate. The main
obstacle in the case was a lack of independent environ-
mental expertise. 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention states that:
“In addition and without prejudice to the review pro-
cedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each
Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if
any, laid down in its national law, members of the pub-
lic have access to administrative or judicial procedures
to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and
public authorities which contravene provisions of its
national law relating to the environment.”
The right to enforce environmental law under article
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention can include two concepts: 
• the right of government institutions, NGOs or people to
enforce the law against private persons outside the
government (for example, enterprises and others who
are subject to it); and 
• the right of the public (or perhaps an ombudsman) to
complain in court about a government act or omission.
Article 9(3) provokes many questions, including the
following:
• What can be reviewed?
• What can trigger the review procedure?
• Who can ask for review (standing)?
In this chapter, the focus is primarily on the last ques-
tion: who can ask for review? It is this question (often ask-
ing whether a party has a “sufficient interest”) that appears
most often in cases considered in this handbook.
What can be reviewed?
Contraventions of national law
relating to the environment
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention allows a person
to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and
public authorities “which contravene provisions of its
national law relating to the environment”. A wide number
of laws are likely to be considered in the category that
“relate” to the environment in some way. One scholarly
analysis concluded: “This provision allows the public to
enforce a broad range of environmental laws.”21
What can trigger the review
procedure? Acts and omissions,
private and public
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention allows a person
to challenge “acts and omissions” by “private persons and
public authorities” that contravene provisions of its nation-
al law relating to the environment. Obviously this covers
failures to take action required by law, as well as actions
that themselves violate the law. In addition, according to
the Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention:
“‘Omissions’ … includes the failure to implement or
enforce environmental law with respect to other public
authorities or private entities.”22 Another aspect is whether
members of the public could indirectly initiate criminal
actions, a matter which was discussed at the Workshop on
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters under the
Aarhus Convention, held in September 2001.23 The UK is
an example where this is possible.
Who can ask for the review?
Standing
The question of who has the right to enforce a statuto-
ry (or constitutional) obligation when a fellow citizen or
government official is disregarding that obligation is
labelled in many countries as “standing to sue” or locus
standi. The traditional law of standing in many countries
prohibited corporations, as well as citizens, from suing the
government unless they were “aggrieved” or a “legal right”
was violated. Corporations usually had no problem satisfy-
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ing such standards. This purportedly neutral rule, there-
fore, had the effect of allowing business interests into the
court to complain about violations of the law more readily
than members of civil society. 
Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention was designed to lib-
eralise the classes and categories of persons (natural or
legal) who can file lawsuits against public authorities and
others when they perceive there to be a violation of law.24
The liberalisations that have occurred mostly appear to
have been already in place before ratification of the
Convention and are discussed below.
A party must ensure that members of the public can file
challenges to actions of private persons as well as public
authorities that are alleged to contravene national environ-
mental law, or have official status in administrative proce-
dures leading to enforcement “where they meet the crite-
ria, if any, laid down in its national law.” The provision
does not state that members of the public can file lawsuits
if permitted by national law. Instead, it grants the right to
sue or complain and then permits parties to lay down “cri-
teria” if they wish to do so. If specific criteria are not laid
down in national law, the logical interpretation would be
that members of the public should be deemed to have the
right to go to court or to an administrative body. This obvi-
ously raises questions of determining whether any criteria
are laid down, whether they are laid down in “law,” and
what they determine. 
Judicial interpretation can play a significant role in
implementing the Aarhus Convention (see section on con-
stitutional interpretations expanding standing below).
Although article 9 of the Convention can be read as being
of little direct help to a prospective litigant, it can also be
read as modifying or overriding pre-existing national law
and thereby having direct effect.25
National legislation for expanded
enforcement/standing
Several broad legislative models are used with respect
to standing in the UNECE area: actio popularis; NGO stand-
ing; sufficient interest standing; and legal rights standing.
Actio popularis 
Some countries use a model in which legislation
declares that “any person” can sue the government when it
breaks the law — an actio popularis. This is fully consistent
with article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, even though it is
not required by the Convention. 
The Netherlands may well have the least restrictive leg-
islative criteria in Europe for accessing the courts.26
Furthermore, the Netherlands links administrative standing
and judicial standing by allowing “anyone” to participate in
the consultation process with a public authority and then
granting anyone who has lodged objections at the consul-
tation stage the right to ask a court for judicial review of the
decision.27 Additionally, the Netherlands also extends
standing to NGOs in civil lawsuits much like Italy,
Switzerland, or many German Lander.28 As explained in
Netherlands Case 2 (the “Indispensable” Pesticides Case): 
“Since 1987 environmental NGOs in the Netherlands
are ... recognised in every court to have an interest in
protecting the environment. This is a general interest
and there is no need for ownership or other more spe-
cific interests.”
These developments were largely the result of the
jurisprudence of court decisions and were codified in sec-
tion 3.305a of the Civil Code, which has been treated by
the courts as making no restrictive changes to the broad
Dutch jurisprudential rule of NGO standing.
Further provisions are found in the Dutch
Environmental Protection Act, adopted in 1993. This law,
which consolidates a number of previous statutes into a
comprehensive statute, controls licensing and other mat-
ters, sets out provisions for public participation, and pro-
vides for judicial review of such matters. The question of
standing for judicial review requires consultation of both
the General Administrative Law Act and the Environmental
Protection Act. Betlem explained this as follows:
“The combined effect of these two Acts entitles those
who have lodged objections in the consultation stage of
the decision making process to apply for judicial review
of the decision. Because ‘anyone’ has the right to make
reservations in the preparatory phase of the licensing
process, a two stage actio popularis accordingly applies.
In technical legal terms, in the main it [is] so-called ‘inter-
ested persons’ who have locus standi, including public
authorities and non-governmental organisations.”29
A well-known court case in the Netherlands also recog-
nised NGO standing. In the Reinwater case, the highest
Dutch court gave environmental organisations standing to
sue where (1) the stated purpose of an organisation has
been affected, (2) the interests in the lawsuit lend them-
selves to grouping, and (3) the interests served by the liti-
gation are protected by civil law.30
As a final note, environmental NGOs in the Netherlands
are allowed to appear in the administrative court (but not
the civil court) without being represented by a lawyer.
Thus, in practice, many cases in the administrative courts
are argued by economists, scientists and engineers.
Legislated NGO standing 
for recognised NGOs
The second model can be loosely termed NGO stand-
ing. Under this model, several countries grant a special
right to NGOs to file lawsuits without showing that they are
personally interested or in some way affected by a deci-
sion. Legislation either specifies the characteristics of
NGOs that are given standing, or it provides that a state
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authority will create and maintain a list of NGOs that are
automatically granted standing and permitted to take
claims of illegal acts by government to the courts. 
According to a 1992 study, Switzerland was the first
European country to legislate a right of action (or standing
to sue) for environmental NGOs.31 In Switzerland, article
12 of the Federal Nature and Heritage Conservation Act of
1966 allows appeals against administrative decisions to the
Supreme Court, for nationwide nature associations. The
same can be found in article 55 of the Environmental
Protection Act of 1983 for nationwide nature NGOs, pro-
vided they were founded at least ten years before the law-
suit and are officially recognised by the federal govern-
ment.32 A third law, the Trails and Footpaths Act of 1987,
also uses this accreditation procedure.33
In Italy, articles 13(1) and 18(5) of Law no. 349 of 1986
grant environmental associations the right to sue in admin-
istrative courts if they have been recognised for this pur-
pose in a ministerial decree.34
Sufficient interest: Flexible subjective
requirements for standing 
A third model, sufficient interest standing, grants legal
standing to those who are “affected” (sometimes “interests”
have to be affected). This may be granted either in general
terms for all persons, or as a part of granting legislated
NGO standing. 
The case studies included in this handbook often men-
tion standing as an issue. Standing is often governed by
legislation that requires the litigant to have an “interest” of
some kind, in order to be among those who are allowed to
bring a court case. 
What exactly is the “interest” of an NGO organised to
serve a broader public interest, and not the narrow interest
of its “owners?” Article 3.4 of the Aarhus Convention
answers that, unless there is national legislation imposing
special requirements, interest is simply the fact that an
NGO is devoted to environmental protection. 
In Belgium, legislation requires that a person have an
“interest.” The courts have generally interpreted the legis-
lation to require that a natural or legal person must show a
personal and direct interest in order to have access to any
courts.35 Belgium Case 1 confronted the question in 1981 of
determining whether an NGO’s definition of its “interest” in
its own statute (charter, or legal registration) could be used
in deciding whether it can sue to enforce environmental
laws. The Council of State (which hears administrative
cases) decided that protection of the environment was a
public interest and that an environmental group only
needs to represent a point of view that concurs with that of
a group interested in the environment. 
The Council of State’s broadened approach to standing
was not followed in the civil courts. In the same year as
Belgium Case 1, the Supreme Court ruled (and has since
reaffirmed on numerous occasions) in a civil case involv-
ing the same issue and plaintiff that a purpose in an NGO’s
“statute” cannot be considered a personal and direct inter-
est for the purposes of the civil courts. 
A second method of gaining access to the Council of
State to challenge administrative acts is for an NGO to
show that its “statutory purpose” is affected by the decision
that it is challenging. The question of NGOs satisfying the
“personal and direct interest” requirement before the
Council of State has continuously arisen in several cases. In
Belgium Case 3, the Council of State ruled that NGO pur-
poses such as promoting nature conservation and protect-
ing wildlife are only “general” interests and not “personal”
ones for the purposes of gaining access to justice; that an
interest in nature reserves is not a personal interest if the
act being challenged does not directly impact on one of the
reserves being operated by the NGO; and that an interest
in protecting birds is not sufficient to challenge a decision
that will harm frogs.36
This question was also fermenting in the Belgian legal
system because of legislation adopted in 1993 that sought
to broaden access to the courts by NGOs, using a “special
procedure.” One commentator notes that Belgium’s Right
of Action Relating to the Protection of the Environment Act
of 1993 “recognizes a restricted right in associations: they
must be registered as environmental protection associa-
tions for at least three years, can challenge specific ele-
ments in environmental statutes, and may request either
injunctive relief or imposition of preventive measures.”37
One judge in the civil courts has been willing to treat
the broadened standing approach of the 1993 legislation as
relevant even in cases not covered by it. Belgium Case 2
involved a challenge to night-time flights disturbing the
sleep of residents near an airport. The airport asserted that
the NGO had no standing to sue in the “normal” proce-
dure, because it lacked a “personal” interest. The court of
first instance decided, however, that the meaning of inter-
ests had, in effect, been broadened by the legislature to
include collective interests in the 1993 legislation (even
though the plaintiffs were not using the procedures in this
legislation). He stated that the legislation added some
meaning to the right to a healthy environment enshrined in
article 23 of the Belgian Constitution. Since the judge did
not suspend the flights, the interpretation is not likely to be
reviewed any time soon by the Supreme Court.
In Georgia, according to chapter XLIV of the Code of
Civil Procedure (1999), citizens are entitled to sue against
an administrative act only in cases where it directly affects
their legal rights. Georgia Case 2 (Vake Park Case) involved
NGOs proving that they had a “sufficient interest” to meet
this test. They were successful, showing that the “plaintiff
had no information about issuance of the administrative
acts [the permits were never published] — he even had no
chance to be involved in the decision making process.” In
Georgia Case 1 (Defence of National Park) NGOs found
themselves in the unusual position of arguing that the plain-
tiff (a group of farmers) in the case had no legal standing. 
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In some instances, where legislation recognises broad-
ened standing in environmental cases, the public authority
claims that the matter is not environmental, and the broad-
ened standing test therefore does not apply. This was the
situation in Hungary Case 1 (the Balaton Highway Case).
The Somogy Nature Conservation Organisation was
denied standing in cases opposing permits for a new road
that would cut through a forest. The courts, including ulti-
mately the Supreme Court, ruled that, even though envi-
ronmental NGOs have standing without doubt in “environ-
mental” cases, a case related to the construction of a high-
way is not an “environmental” case. The court apparently
ruled that a matter has to be explicitly classified as “envi-
ronmental” by the Act on Environmental Protection, such
as EIA and environmental audit cases. 
Legal rights or individual interests: 
restrictive subjective requirements 
for standing
Countries using the fourth and oldest model, legal
rights or legal interests standing, grant legal standing only
to those with economic interests, or similar very specific
interests, to protect. A variety of terms is used, such as a
requirement for a “direct and personal” interest, the “viola-
tion of a right,” or a “legal interest.” It is important to note
that a person with an economic interest will usually be
admitted into the court under the fourth model, while
those with an interest in non-economic values or enforce-
ment of the rule of law will often not be able to sue. 
The legislation in some jurisdictions appears to restrict
standing more explicitly on its face, granting standing only
for those with a “direct and individual” or “direct and per-
sonal” interest. Interpretations of these terms can vary dra-
matically, however, as can be seen when comparing deci-
sions of the European Court of Justice and the Council of
State of Greece. For those jurisdictions where courts have
issued restrictive interpretations that appear to deny rights
granted by article 9 of the Aarhus Convention, a significant
question arises: must the legislation be amended in the light
of the Aarhus Convention, or will it be interpreted differ-
ently by the courts, in order to give effect to the commit-
ments expressed by parties in ratifying the Convention? It
could be argued that both branches of government have an
equal obligation to take account of the rights in article 9.
The European Court of Justice refused to take a broad
view of standing in environmental matters in the 1998 case
Stichting Greenpeace Council et al. v. European
Commission (see appendix B).38 Several individuals and
NGOs brought suit in the European court of first instance,
contesting the legality of EC funding for two fossil fuel-
fired power plants being built by Spain in the Canary
Islands. The court denied standing. On appeal, the
European Court of Justice also denied standing. The rele-
vant provision of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community39 is article 230(4):
“Any natural or legal person may, under the same con-
ditions, institute proceedings against a decision
addressed to that person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual
concern to the former.”
The court of first instance said that the individual plain-
tiffs (including local residents, farmers and fishermen)
would not suffer from the decision in any way other than
that of other residents of the Canary Islands, and therefore
the matter could not be of “direct and individual concern.”
Furthermore, Greenpeace, as an NGO, could not have
standing since it did not simply represent individuals who
would have standing, nor did it have some special, indi-
vidualised interest of its own. Furthermore, participating in
prior proceedings was not enough to give Greenpeace a
special, individualised interest. The European Court of
Justice upheld the lower court. For individuals, it said:
“[T]he specific situation of the applicant was not taken
into consideration in the adoption of the act, which
concerns him in a general and abstract fashion and in
fact, like any other person in the same situation, the
applicant is not individually concerned by the act.”40
As for Greenpeace, its arguments for general public
interest standing and about the vacuum in enforcement of
EU laws created by restrictive interpretations of article 230
fell on deaf ears. So did its argument that the right to be
informed and consulted in an EIA procedure gives it a right
to go to court.41
In Greece administrative acts can be challenged in
front of the Council of State, which is the supreme admin-
istrative court in the country. The situation can be com-
pared to that in Belgium, as discussed above. According to
a professor of public law and environmental law at the
University of Athens, “[t]he jurisprudence of this court, on
environmental matters, has been very rich and very inno-
vative, since 1977.”42 The Council of State’s jurisdiction
over environmental law is based on the fact that article 24
of the Constitution of 1975 makes the protection of the
environment an obligation of the state. At the beginning of
the 1990s, the Fifth Section, a separate section of the
Council of State was created for environmental disputes.
The court has annulled illegal administrative acts, sus-
pended the execution of harmful administrative acts, and
formulated fundamental environmental principles that
have strongly influenced environmental legislation.43
Locus standi in front of the Council of State to annul an
administrative act is available to both natural and legal per-
sons (organisations and businesses), but only if they prove
“a personal, direct and present legal interest.”44 But this
“legal interest” has been interpreted by the Council of State
to be broader in environmental disputes than in other mat-
ters. If a natural person has “any kind of a territorial rela-
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tion with the area” of environmental damage, the person
can have standing. This allows an interest that need not be
strictly personal, may be only indirect, and can even be
merely potential rather than already in existence.45 This is
based on article 24 of the Constitution which, by creating a
duty on the state is considered to create a collective and
“supra-individual” right. 
Traditional legal doctrine in Germany has disfavoured
allowing the public to go to court to require the state to
abide by the law. As one writer has put it, “German stand-
ing doctrine is built on deeply-engrained principles against
the general legality view of access to court and the right of
citizen groups to challenge administrative action.”46 On the
other hand, many of the Lander, or states, have been
notably more progressive and open toward granting stand-
ing to sue, particularly for established environmental
NGOs. This openness at the legislative level has not neces-
sarily led to expansive court decisions, however. For
example, in a case in the 1980s, a public authority used an
informal procedure with no public participation, in order
to avoid the formal planning procedure that would have
clearly allowed public participation (with regard to certain
issues on a controversial extension of a runway at
Frankfurt Airport). An NGO sued and won in the trial court,
but the Court of Appeals ruled that the NGO could not
challenge the failure to use the formal procedures that
guaranteed participation, because its lack of participation
itself precluded court litigation concerning whether it
should have been allowed to do so.47 But as Germany Case
3 (the Windmill Case) shows, other German courts have
been receptive to NGO lawsuits under Lander legislation.
In this case, involving a nature conservation association
recognised in accordance with §29 of the Federal Nature
Conservation Act, the court ruled that an NGO could take
legal action in accordance with §42, paragraph 2, of the
Code of Administrative Procedure, without being required
to prove that its own rights had been infringed. 
Some countries with seemingly restrictive “legal inter-
est” tests have found a way to liberalise standing through
interpretation. For example, environmental protection
associations have had some success in gaining standing in
Norway even though it uses a “legal interest” test.48 As long
ago as the Alta case in Norway in 1979, Norges
Naturvernforbundet (Norwegian Society for the
Preservation of Nature) successfully achieved legal stand-
ing. The Norwegian Supreme Court stated:
“It has been accepted under the circumstances that a
plaintiff may have a legal interest in bringing an action
even though the decision has no direct influence on his
own legal position. Depending on the circumstances,
also an interest organization may have the required legal
interest even though the decision in the matter is of no
direct consequences to the organization’s or the mem-
bers’ rights. The need for judicial control of the public
administration may be the decisive factor here.”49
According to one scholar, “[t]he grounds in the Alta
case for accepting the organization’s legal interest were the
allegations concerning nature conservation interests.”50
Judicial interpretations 
and expanded standing
Legislative changes are not the only means for broad-
ening or narrowing categories of those who can enforce
environmental or other laws. The judicial system in many
countries has something important to say about standing
— whether it is the interpretation of statutes (discussed
above), the explicit common law reasoning of England,
Wales and Northern Ireland, or the use of constitutional
interpretation as a tool. 
Common law expansion of standing
A series of decisions made it clear how broad the right
of legal standing is in England, at least in environmental
cases. The environmental group Greenpeace was granted
standing in the Thorp Nuclear Case to challenge a pro-
posed licence for a nuclear power plant. The High Court
said that Greenpeace was a “responsible and respected
body with a genuine concern for the environment” and
that the granting of standing to pursue the litigation would
save the court’s time. Greenpeace would efficiently and
effectively represent the interests of 2,500 of its supporters
living in the area of the proposed nuclear plant. This may
be seen as a kind of “representational standing,” or per-
haps “third-party standing,” in lieu of others who would
have had ordinary standing.51 Judge Otton said:
“I reject the argument that Greenpeace is a ‘mere’ or
‘meddlesome busybody’ … I regard the applicants as
eminently respectable and responsible and their gen-
uine interest in the issues raised is sufficient for them to
be granted locus standi.”52
Ex parte Richard Dixon53 continued the liberalisation
and the exposition of the viewpoints that public law is
about duties, not rights. Justice Sedley wrote:
“Public law is not at base about rights, even though
abuses of power may and often do invade private
rights; it is about wrongs — that is to say, misuses of
pubflic power; and the courts have always been alive
to the fact that a person or organisation with no partic-
ular stake in the issue or the outcome may, without in
any sense being a mere meddler, wish and be well-
placed to call the attention of the court to an apparent
misuse of public power.”54
Constitutional interpretations 
expanding standing 
The constitutions of a growing number of countries
form the basis for increased access to justice through judi-
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cial interpretation. Sometimes constitutions are explicit in
their locus standi provisions, while others have been used
by judges to broaden standing. 
In Europe, some courts have found that the constitu-
tional rights to a safe environment embody implied rights
of access to justice. As the emerging democracies of the
CEE region rewrote their constitutions in the early 1990s in
the wake of the fall of Communism, they included two sig-
nificant types of provisions that are not to be found in the
older constitutions of the US or Western European coun-
tries. The first was the right to a safe or healthy environ-
ment, while the second proclaimed rights of access to
information, public participation and access to the courts. 
The development of the right to a healthy environment
in the UNECE region is discussed in Part II (chapter 1). It is
mentioned here in connection with opportunities for mem-
bers of the public to challenge acts or omissions in violation
of environmental law. At least two constitutional courts in
the CEE region have interpreted the right to a safe environ-
ment thus far. The Constitutional Court of Slovenia has stat-
ed that the right to a healthy environment guarantees at
least the right of access to the courts — an abolition of
restrictions on standing to sue in environmental matters.
The Constitutional Court of Hungary has gone even further.
Section 162 of the Constitution of Slovenia provides
that “[a]ny person who can show a proper legal interest, as
determined by statute” may bring a case before the
Constitutional Court.55 As recently as 1993, the
Constitutional Court explicitly rejected the idea of an actio
popularis that could allow any person to bring a case based
upon an interest in upholding the rule of law. In a typical
case the Court said:
“A general interest in ensuring constitutionality and
legality and implementing the principles of the Rule of
Law is insufficient to fulfil the constitutionally defined
condition for lodging an initiative, since such a wide
interpretation of legal interest could be invoked by
anyone in any case, whereby the limiting meaning of
the second paragraph of Article 162 of the Constitution
would be lost. The legal interest of the initiator himself
must thus be demonstrated, not just a general social
interest in ensuring constitutionality and legality.”56
Without actio popularis, however, another legal basis
had to be found for environmental matters to come to the
Constitutional Court. The question became, then, whether
a statute, explicitly or implicitly, has provided a person
with a “legal interest.”
The Constitutional Court of Slovenia granted standing
in a case brought by the Association of Ecologists of
Slovenia (see appendix B),57 a national NGO and 25 indi-
viduals.58 The NGO achieved standing in large part
because the Environmental Protection Act, which came
into effect in 1993, provided that the protection of the envi-
ronment is the responsibility of, inter alia, professional and
other NGOs committed to environmental protection.59 The
court therefore concluded that the NGO could bring law-
suits based on its stated purposes. Individuals were also
granted standing to sue. The Constitutional Court recog-
nised the legal interest of an individual in such a matter for
the first time, on the basis that article 72 of the Constitution
contains the right to a healthy environment in which to
live. The Court ruled that a person’s interest is not limited
only to the environment close to the place where he or she
lives. Essentially, a right that on its face is substantive was
converted by the Court into a procedural right giving
access to the judicial process. 
It is now increasingly apparent that NGOs devoted to
environmental protection can have the right to bring mat-
ters before the Constitutional Court. Legislation recognis-
ing the special responsibilities of NGOs to protect the
environment, and the existence of a constitutional right to
a healthy environment provide the basis on which the
court has been able to find a “proper legal interest.”
The Hungarian Constitution contains a “right to a safe
environment” that is similar to that of Slovenia. It is
asserted that this right can be used to obtain access to the
courts in Hungary.60 Article 18 of the Hungarian
Constitution confers the right to a healthy environment
to all persons, “without discrimination among nationali-
ties.” Thus this right may also be claimed by citizens of
other countries.61 This is obviously of some interest in
the light of article 3(9) of the Aarhus Convention, which
states that persons shall “have access to justice in envi-
ronmental matters without discrimination as to citizen-
ship, nationality or domicile.” 
Other experts have subsequently commented that the
Hungarian Constitutional Court has indeed provided
“open access to citizen petitions.” It was contended ear-
lier by Bandi that this would give the Constitutional
Court a greater sense of legitimacy among citizens.62
In fact, in the Protected Forest Case (see appendix B),
the Constitutional Court of Hungary held that articles 18 and
70/D of the Constitution demand a high level of environ-
mental protection, that citizens can enforce this right, and
that the court can overturn a law as unconstitutional if it
concludes that it has contravened this right (see Part II,
chapter 1). In a case involving a challenge to legislation
allowing the privatisation of cultivated forest land, the court
ruled that the legislation, which contained no special duties
to protect the forests and thus weakened protection in com-
parison to the status quo, was unconstitutional under the
environmental rights provisions of the Hungarian
Constitution.63 The court classified the environmental right
as a third-generation constitutional right, deserving of no
less protection than traditional rights. This remarkable rul-
ing raises the possibility of other court rulings against legis-
lation seen as environmentally inadequate. 
It is undoubtedly too early to predict where constitu-
tional litigation will go in the coming years under the envi-
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ronmental rights provisions of various European constitu-
tions. It is self-evident, however, that these provisions can-
not be dismissed as mere window-dressing.
The rule of law
The website of the European Court of Justice pro-
claims: “The great innovation of the European
Communities in comparison with previous attempts at
European unification lies in the fact that the Community
uses only the rule of law to achieve that end.”64 As the
Court of Justice says further, “any true legal system …
needs an effective system of judicial safeguards when …
law is challenged or must be applied.”65
Focus on the rule of law is, indeed, also the primary
message of article 9 of the Aarhus Convention. Parties to the
Aarhus Convention have a great deal of work to do if the
promise of article 9(3) to ensure access to justice is to be ful-
filled ,so that the law derived from the Convention’s obliga-
tions can be truly applied in the spirit of the rule of law.
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A complainant must resort to certain mechanisms, pro-
cedures and bodies for access to justice. Most legal systems
provide various means of access to justice, including
administrative review, judicial review of administrative
decisions, an ombudsman, arbitration and mediation.
Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention takes into account the
availability of such means of access to justice by providing
opportunities for both administrative and judicial review to
be made available to challenge actions of public authorities
with respect to matters under the Convention.
Administrative versus judicial appeal
Most UNECE countries have a general kind of adminis-
trative review process for decisions by public authorities.
This administrative process mostly functions more rapidly
than an appeal to a court and is often free of charge. The
administrative appeal system is not intended to replace the
opportunity to appeal to a court, where such an opportuni-
ty exists, but in many cases may resolve the matter expedi-
tiously and avoid the need to go to court. In the case of
challenges to decisions on access to information, according
to the Aarhus Convention,66 the administrative appeal pro-
cedure may take two forms — either a “typical” appeal to a
higher administrative authority, or a request for the same
authority to reconsider its decision, before going to court. 
The right to use the administrative system to appeal
against decisions resulting from an administrative proce-
dure is recognised for affected persons in all Western
European countries. In the majority of the countries in
Central Europe and the EECCA region, the right of admin-
istrative standing in the case of infringement of access to
information, as well as public participation rights are also
guaranteed constitutionally, and in administrative and
environmental legislation. Certain countries have adminis-
trative courts (e.g. Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia) or spe-
cific administrative institutions for this purpose (e.g. the
Czech Republic and Latvia). Only in Bosnia and
Herzegovina are there no administrative appeal provisions.
In all countries, standing in administrative appeal proceed-
ings is limited to interested and/or affected individuals and,
with the exception of Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Russia
and Ukraine, to interested and/or affected NGOs.67
In many countries it is necessary to exhaust all available
administrative review procedures before going to court.68 As
demonstrated by the three Spanish case studies, an adminis-
trative appeal can be reversed by the Supreme Court.69
In Germany Case 3 (the Windmill Case), for instance,
lodging an appeal for administrative review before bring-
ing a legal action for annulment is, in general, necessary,
according to the Code of Administrative Procedure.
In Denmark, on the contrary, ordinary courts deal with
administrative law cases, not necessarily only after the
administrative appeal possibilities have been exhausted.
However, ordinary courts show respect for the control
methods of the administration. It is considered desirable to
make use of the administrative appeal system before going
to the courts of law. The Danish courts generally respect
the administrative appeal system, though the administra-
tive appeal procedure is rather informal.70
In Spain, the possibility of an administrative appeal
depends on who issued the decision. If the issuing author-
ity hierarchically depends on another authority, it is the lat-
ter that will decide on the administrative appeal. After an
unsatisfactory decision of the higher authority, a com-
plainant may file a reconsideration appeal before this
authority prior to appealing before the courts, or may go
directly to the administrative court.71
In Georgia, according to the new Code of
Administrative Procedure, an administrative act can be
appealed in court only when this act has an impact on the
personal legal rights of the plaintiff. This means that the
plaintiff has to prove his or her sufficient interest in the case. 
In order to overcome the complications and length of
judicial procedures, the complainant in Russia Case 3 (the
Shrinking Park Case), for instance, chose the procedural
form of complaint under chapter 24-1 of the Russian
Federation Code of Civil Procedure, which appeared to be
a faster solution than a lawsuit. 
In Western European countries, the relative efficiency
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offered in practice by administrative review is well devel-
oped. In Denmark, for instance, there is an obligation on
each public authority that makes a legally binding decision
(whether concerning the environment or any other topic)
against a complainant to explain to the complainant how
he or she can appeal against such a decision. This is con-
sistent with article 9 of the Aarhus Convention.
Special environmental tribunals 
One solution to the general difficulty experienced by
judges and other legal professionals in dealing with the
complexity and peculiarities of environmental cases is to
establish specialised tribunals with jurisdiction and expert-
ise over environmental matters. On the national level, such
tribunals have been established in Australia, New Zealand
and, in the UNECE region, most recently in Sweden. On
the international level, several initiatives are under way to
establish an international environmental tribunal. 
The ombudsman
The institution of an ombudsman72 as an independent
and impartial review body for violations of administrative
law against citizens was developed in the Scandinavian
countries.73 Currently,74 this institution, or a similar one,
functions in many Western European75 and EECCA coun-
tries,76 as well as on the supranational level (see examples
of Denmark and Hungary, and the Friends of the Earth
case in appendix B). In Croatia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia, as well as many Western European countries, it is
specified that citizens have the possibility to appeal to the
ombudsman on environmental issues.
The ombudsman deals with complaints from the pub-
lic regarding decisions, actions or omissions by the public
administration. The ombudsman is elected by parliament
or appointed by the head of state or government after con-
sultation with parliament. The role of the ombudsman is to
protect the people against violations of rights, abuse of
powers, error, negligence, unfair decisions and maladmin-
istration, in order to improve the public administration and
make the government’s actions more open, and the gov-
ernment and its officials more accountable to the public.
The office of the ombudsman may be enshrined in a coun-
try’s constitution and supported by legislation, or created
by a separate act of the legislature. 
The ombudsman usually has the power to undertake
an objective investigation into complaints from the public
about the administration of government. The ombudsman
may also have powers to initiate an investigation even if a
complaint has not been received. To protect people’s
rights, the ombudsman has various tools:
• investigate whether the administration of government
is being performed contrary to law or unfairly; 
• if an objective investigation uncovers improper admin-
istration, make recommendations to eliminate the
improper administrative conduct; and
• report on his activities in specific cases to the govern-
ment and the complainant, and, if the recommenda-
tions made in a specific case have not been accepted
by the government, to the legislature. 
In most countries, the ombudsman also submits an
annual report on his or her work to the legislature and to
the general public. 
The ombudsman usually does not have the power to
make decisions that are legally binding for the govern-
ment, in contrast with judicial decisions. According to most
national legislation, approaching the ombudsman with a
complaint does not exclude a later judicial procedure. The
ombudsman has moral power and makes recommenda-
tions for measures to be taken, as supported by a thorough
investigation of the complaint. A vital characteristic of the
ombudsman’s office is its independence from the execu-
tive/administrative branch of government. Another advan-
tage is that the ombudsman can usually take rather quick
or even immediate action, and examinations initiated by
this office are free of charge. For the ombudsman’s investi-
gations and recommendations to be credible to both the
public and the government, the ombudsman maintains and
protects the impartiality and integrity of his office. 
The Aarhus Convention does not explicitly mention the
institution of ombudsman. The phrase, “another independ-
ent and impartial body established by law,” used in article
9(1) may possibly imply such an institution. Strictly speak-
ing, this would depend on its characteristics, but the
ombudsman typically does not grant a legal right to a
review procedure, supply binding decisions, or provide
injunctive relief.77 The four Scandinavian countries pre-
sented a common interpretative statement during the
negotiations relating to article 9 of the Aarhus Convention.
According to the statement, the institution of the ombuds-
man may correspond with the requirements of the
Convention in practical, but not in legal terms. Thus, it may
provide a practical means for access to justice in specific
cases that is often cheaper, quicker and just as effective as
proper judicial proceedings.
An example of how the institution of ombudsman can
work is provided in the case of Friends of the Earth (see
appendix B). In the first instance, the NGO appealed to the
Secretary-General of the Commission about the refusal to
disclose information, as required by the Code of Conduct
concerning public access to Commission and Council doc-
uments attached to Commission Decision 94/90/EC. The
Secretary-General upheld the Commission’s refusal.
Friends of the Earth then appealed to the European
Ombudsman,78 who ruled that the Commission wrongfully
refused to provide the requested information. It also
argued that the Commission was acting inconsistently with
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the Aarhus Convention. This case is a good example of
how a decision resulting from an administrative appeal can
be reversed in a fast and effective manner using instru-
ments other than a “traditional” judicial procedure.
Arbitration and mediation
“Alternative dispute resolution”79 is an activity that cov-
ers a variety of out-of-court bodies, which provide alterna-
tives to litigation through the courts. While this is not
appropriate for many matters under the Aarhus
Convention, it may be relevant especially where environ-
mental organisations involved in public participation pro-
ceedings have grounds for complaint and seek to negotiate
a settlement. In most cases, it is necessary to turn to such
alternatives because the traditional judiciary is often too
expensive and time consuming. In addition, by accepting a
decision through arbitration or mediation, public authori-
ties do not have to face the stigma of an adverse ruling. 
Alternative dispute resolution procedures may include,
but are not confined to arbitration, early neutral evaluation,
expert determination, mediation and conciliation.
Accordingly, the mechanisms for resolving disputes may
vary from binding decisions to recommendations or agree-
ments between the parties. The organisation and manage-
ment of these procedures may also vary: they may be pub-
licly or privately organised and take the form of an
ombudsman scheme, consumer complaint board, private
mediator, trade association or others. Which of the above
procedures is the most appropriate will depend on the
nature of the dispute to be resolved.
Procedures can be distinguished on the basis of
whether a neutral third party proposes or makes a decision
(arbitration) or whether the third party seeks to bring the
parties together and assist them in finding an agreement by
common consent (mediation). Arbitration may be binding
or non-binding (advisory), court-ordered or voluntary.
Binding arbitration involves having a neutral person (or a
panel of neutral persons) decide a dispute, after hearing
each party’s presentation of evidence and argument. The
parties agree in advance that the decision (award) of the
third party is to be final. Generally, there are no appeals
from an arbitrators award, though parties may seek judicial
relief from binding arbitration under certain circumstances.
These include if the arbitrator exceeds the authority con-
ferred under the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, denies a
party a fair hearing, or demonstrates bias or prejudice.
Parties may also sometimes seek judicial relief if there is an
obvious mistake, such as a calculation error, that appears
on the face of an award.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration has adopted
optional rules for arbitrating disputes relating to the envi-
ronment and/or natural resources,80 supplemented by
environmental conciliation rules adopted in 2002. These
rules are potentially available for application in a wide
range of disputes, including those among private parties or
between private and public parties.
Mediation is another process for resolving disputes
with the aid of a neutral entity. The third party’s role
involves assisting parties, privately and collectively, to
identify the issues in dispute and to develop proposals to
resolve the disputes. Unlike arbitration, the mediator is not
empowered to make decisions. Accordingly, the mediator
may meet privately and hold confidential and separate dis-
cussions with the parties to a dispute.
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Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention requires fair pro-
cedures for access to justice. Fair procedures, in turn,
require impartiality in the access to justice process.81 The
process should also be free from prejudice, favouritism or
self-interest.82 The independence of the judiciary is one of
the main preconditions in ensuring fairness in the access
to justice process, and its absence precludes the normal
exercise of the right of access to justice. A lack of judicial
independence has been found, especially in countries
where the judiciary has been a voice of government poli-
cy and politics. 
Judicial independence
Judicial independence, as defined by the Center for
Judicial Independence,83 is an ideal state of the judicial
branch of government that includes two complementary
concepts: individual independence and institutional inde-
pendence. The latter is normally ensured through the con-
stitutional separation of powers. The former is consider-
ably more complicated and is related to the independence
of a judge or other person exercising judicial power to
decide on each particular case solely on the merits of the
law and the facts of the case without undue influence from
the government, the parties or the public.
The institutional independence of the judiciary was
sometimes the victim of the traditional interdependency
between the branches of government that existed in most
Central European and EECCA countries until the early 1990s.
In some countries, it occasionally still becomes evident.
Russia Case 2 (the Nikitin Case) is an example of how the
influence and image of the Federal Security Bureau and the
Ministry of Defence (formerly major powers within the
Soviet system) could make the court return a case repeated-
ly for further investigation despite the fact that the prosecu-
tion lacked incriminating evidence throughout. In Armenia
Case 1 (the Victory Park Case) the Armenian court, unable
to reject the suit of an NGO against the prime minister, post-
poned the hearing of the case on a minor procedural point.
The individual independence of judges is closely relat-
ed to the issue of judicial corruption discussed below.
However, while there is evidence that corruption and
bribery do indeed take place, especially in countries with
weaker economic development, a judge can also be a tar-
get of political influence (e.g. through threats of or an actu-
al impeachment process, or elections), or can be depend-
ent on economic benefits.
As Fyodorov, advisor to the Investors’ Rights
Association, described in his interview on Radio Free
Europe, judges in Russia are usually under “administrative
pressure.”84 They most often depend on the local govern-
ment, especially in areas where the local municipality pro-
vides the judge with housing or sometimes pays him or her
bonuses as a supplement to rather meagre compensation.85
“It is almost impossible to win a case against the Moscow
City Government,” according to Fyodorov. Although the
phrase refers to the investment-related cases heard by the
Court of Arbitration, the same is often true for judges of
other courts in the Moscow region.
Some of the cases included in this handbook support
these observations. For example, in Russia Case 3 (the
Shrinking Park Case) it took three years for the plaintiffs to
get their suit accepted by the Moscow City Court. Two
rejections were appealed to the Supreme Court on the
basis of judicial bias.
Whatever the reason for rejecting a case in a given situ-
ation, these precedents might have a certain chilling effect
on the use of access to justice mechanisms by the public. 
Corruption
Another factor contributing to the poor functioning of
access to justice mechanisms is corruption in the judicial
branch. Countries with significant problems in access to jus-
tice are often known for a relatively high degree of corrupt
practices in all three branches of government: judicial,
executive and legislative. While corruption may occur to
some degree in all governments, it is likely to blossom more
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freely in countries with more       serious economic and
development problems. Judicial corruption is no exception. 
The European Civil Law Convention on Corruption
(Strasbourg, 1999)86 defines corruption as “requesting,
offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe
or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which
distorts the proper performance of any duty or behaviour
required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage
or the prospect thereof.” As with corruption in other
branches of power, judicial corruption is promoted by two
factors: the lack of a proper system of monitoring, and
poor compensation and other conditions of work.87
The first of these is related to the system of government
and its ability to ensure proper checks and balances on the
judiciary or another branch of government, or to provide
for accountability. The latter can be attributed to both the
poor legislative regulation of the conduct of the judiciary,
as well as to economic problems in society.
Some of the factors contributing to corruption in the
judiciary are related to:
• the lack of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
(see chapter 5);
• complicated and non-transparent judicial procedures;
• inconsistent and unclear legislation; and
• in some cases, the presence of organised crime.88
Systematic judicial corruption contributes to the growth
of public distrust of the justice system and therefore pre-
vents the exercise of rights to access to justice. Where a
lack of judicial independence, corruption in other branch-
es of government, and economic difficulties that draw the
attention away from environmental issues are also present,
access to justice in environmental matters might remain an
empty declaration.
There are currently many national and especially inter-
national efforts to prevent corruption. The newly devel-
oped Council of Europe Criminal Law on Corruption and
Civil Law on Corruption89 — the former already with ten
ratifications — the UN Declaration of 1997, and efforts by
many international organisations, including the UN and the
World Bank, will hopefully lead to a decline in corrupt
practices in the region. Long-term measures of institution-
al reform to ensure greater independence of the judiciary
are best supplemented by short-term benefits for public
officials (e.g. sufficient salaries, or increased staff and tech-
nical capacities).90
Countries like Spain and Finland have a “judicial
ombudsman” as a mechanism to ensure accountability of
the judiciary without influencing the course of justice. The
function of control vested in the institution of the ombuds-
man is considered by some to be fully justified in order to
counterbalance rather unlimited powers that might be vest-
ed in the judiciary.91
Civil society can play a significant role in preventing
corruption and supporting judicial independence. NGOs
and individuals can act as watchdogs.92 They can influence
the government and the judiciary both in individual cases
— Armenia Case 1 (the Victory Park Case), Russia Case 3
(the Shrinking Park Case) and especially Russia Case 2 (the
Nikitin Case) — and in general through media attention,
cooperation with the government and the negotiating of
more efficient monitoring regulations and procedures.
Knowledge and capacity
Another problem is the lack of judicial capacity and
knowledge of environmental law and public participation
procedures. The field of environmental law is still rather
new, especially in the eastern part of the UNECE region,
as are the procedures requiring public participation in
decision-making. With an overloaded judiciary giving pri-
ority to cases of traditional economic importance, the
complexities of environmental legislation are simply not
something an average judge or prosecutor pays attention
to. In Spain Case 2 (the Aznalcollar Waste Dam Case) not
only did the judge lack sufficient knowledge to under-
stand the merits of this complicated case, but the means
and resources available to the court (i.e. personnel,
equipment and technical support) also proved insuffi-
cient for the parties to work with the case records. Some
countries, such as Ukraine, have tried to solve this prob-
lem by setting up special “environmental” departments in
the office of the prosecutor. Some international organisa-
tions present specialised training programmes for the
judiciary (as well as for the public administration).
Sometimes the issue of environmental law is touched
upon in regular but infrequent mandatory training ses-
sions organised by the courts themselves. This is clearly
not enough, however, considering the complexity of
environmental law and public participation procedures.
The improved training of judges and prosecutors, as well
as reductions in their workload are (arguably) necessary
preconditions for efficient access to justice. 
Public support
In countries where corruption and a lack of independ-
ence are pervasive, the public tends to give little credence
or support to the justice system, even where public author-
ities and judges perform their duties in a progressive way
using contemporary legislation and international norms. 
This may be especially true with respect to environ-
mental cases, since the public is still preoccupied with
daily economic problems in many countries. It is often true
that the better the level of economic development, the
stronger the interest of the public and media in issues such
as environmental protection and human rights. In some
countries the public might even actively reject environ-
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mental considerations as an unaffordable luxury when
pressed with financial difficulties.93
Another reason for the lack of public support is the lack
of links between the public and conscientious public offi-
cials and judges. One of the practical solutions might be
greater media coverage not only of corruption scandals,
but also of innovative approaches and progressive judge-
ments by officials and judges.
Legal certainty
Unclear laws and underdeveloped procedures can
contribute to corruption and hinder the whole concept of
due process. Unclear, dubious and often conflicting provi-
sions, laws and regulations lead to lengthy court hearings
and multiple appeals and revisions. In many cases, rather
than go through multiple (sometimes conflicting) provi-
sions and dozens of acts, the judge simply hears both par-
ties and decides to his or her best knowledge. The lack of
training and a clear understanding of environmental law
and public participation rights and procedures, as dis-
cussed above, also contributes to the situation. 
The lack of procedural norms regulating public access
to information and participation in decision-making com-
plicates the matter significantly. It affects the public itself,
as well as government officials responsible for decision-
making. When a case is transferred to the court it is the
judge who has to clarify the matter, often having to rely on
conflicting norms.
Clarification of legal norms and especially the develop-
ment of detailed procedures are seen as priority tasks by
many government officials and judges. This will lead to
more efficient decision-making processes, reducing dis-
agreement and therefore the number of cases brought
before the courts. Finally, it will make interpretation and
adjudication easier for the judges themselves.
Right to counsel and presumption 
of innocence
As Russia Case 2 (the Nikitin Case) demonstrated,
problems occasionally appear with regard to such basic
due process elements as the right to counsel and the pre-
sumption of innocence. In this case, the defendant in a
criminal proceeding had to turn to the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation for a ruling that the denial of the
right to choose counsel of his own free will was unconsti-
tutional. The defendant had to appeal to the Constitutional
Court for a second time three years into the process when
the lower court sent his case back to the authorities for fur-
ther investigation in view of a lack of sufficient evidence.
The Constitutional Court ruled that such action was in vio-
lation of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Such approaches appear to violate fundamental con-
cepts of due process and therefore the basic human right to
a fair trial as defined by article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.94
Judicial consistency 
and use of precedent
Consistent application of the law is critical to social and
economic development. As citizens and legal entities turn
to the legal system to resolve disputes, they must perceive
that justice is distributed equally and impartially. In order
to make informed, law-abiding decisions, they must be
able to rely on past applications of the law to be informed
about the probable ways in which the law will be applied
in future circumstances. For this to occur, laws must be
interpreted consistently from case to case within the judici-
ary, regardless of the parties involved or the experience of
the judge. 
In the absence of proper legal regulation, the use of
precedent becomes inevitable even in systems that are not
generally based on precedent. In many countries, the
opinions and interpretations issued by higher courts have
to replace missing legal provisions for the use by lower
courts and sometimes by administrative authorities. In
EECCA countries, supreme courts often issue special bul-
letins containing their opinions in landmark cases. The
interpretations given in the rulings of constitutional courts
can and should in practice be used in future cases for
access to justice to become a truly efficient mechanism.
The rulings in Russia Case 2 (the Nikitin Case) discussed
above are good examples.
While the decisions of appeal courts play a major role
in ensuring consistency among courts of first instance in
both common and civil law systems, additional time and
expense are required to bring a case to appeal. It is there-
fore important that courts of first instance are properly
informed about norms of legal interpretation and have
access to the latest legal information and case practice.
One device that may assist in achieving judicial consisten-
cy is the advisory opinion (see below).
Advisory opinions95
In many civil law countries, higher courts issue adviso-
ry opinions. An advisory opinion sets forth the legal opin-
ion of a higher court on how to resolve a given legal ques-
tion properly, usually in a theoretical context. Such opin-
ions are distributed to lower court judges, as well as to
lawyers and the public, to develop a consistency of legal
interpretation as they try similar cases. Particularly in tran-
sition countries where judges often have incomplete
access to legal information, the specific recommendations
contained in the advisory opinions are critically important
to the first instance courts, and are routinely referred to by
judges as they prepare their legal decisions.
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The legal authority of advisory opinions varies from
country to country. In Moldova, for example, an advisory
opinion only guides lower court judges. The advisory
opinions of the Supreme Court are not “mandatory” for
judges, and do not “interpret the law.”96 Until recently,
however, the situation in Ukraine was the opposite. There,
an advisory opinion had universal binding effect.97
Common law systems, such as those of England, Wales
and the US, generally do not employ advisory opinions
due to the case or controversy requirement. 
Where advisory opinions are used, generally a single
body, such as the supreme court, has the authority to issue
them through a formal decision or plenary session. As
opposed to a constitutional court, the supreme court’s
jurisdiction extends to the application of the broad array of
laws and regulations within a country, thus enabling it to
issue advisory opinions on a wide variety of legal topics.
Supreme courts may issue advisory opinions on their
own initiative, to rule upon lower court decisions decided
inconsistently, cases imprecisely interpreting a new law, or
where certain lower court decisions are frequently
annulled by higher courts. In some instances, lower courts
also petition the supreme court for review of specific
points of law. Courts issuing the advisory opinions often
consult with experts in relevant fields.
In most countries, there is wide agreement within the
legal community on the importance and usefulness of advi-
sory opinions. Lawyers regularly use them to bolster and
sharpen their legal arguments, and judges view them as
essential guidance in their case decision-making processes.
Particularly in transition countries, a common complaint
among lawyers, judges and others is that laws are volumi-
nous, vaguely written and constantly changing. In such a
situation, advisory opinions play a critical role. Advisory
opinions typically address areas of law where inconsisten-
cy is greatest. In many countries, there are also few other
sources of legal information, thus affording the opinions all
the more deference and importance within the legal com-
munity. The opinions also stimulate and inform more in-
depth legal research within the academic community. 
Problems can be encountered with advisory opinions.
The most pressing problem identified by practitioners in
several countries is that the opinions are not binding as
law. In addition, advisory opinions are often poorly dis-
tributed. After independence, due to budget constraints,
the Supreme Court Bulletin of Moldova was only published
sporadically and did not even contain all advisory opinions
that were issued. In Ukraine, availability was somewhat
better for those with access to the Internet or commercial
databases. However, such resources were rarely available
to the legal community in smaller cities and rural areas.
Another problem is the lack of resources. The Supreme
Court of Ukraine typically issued 10-15 binding interpretive
opinions per year prior to June 2001.98 Moreover, environ-
mental issues seem to be avoided due to their complexity.
For example, the Moldova Supreme Court has issued only
one advisory opinion on environmental law.
Considering the important role played by advisory
opinions, especially in countries in transition, additional
resources should be made available to expand the number
of opinions issued per year, and to ensure their regular
publication and dissemination. 
Timeliness of procedures
The importance of the timeliness of access to justice
procedures is recognised in article 9(4) of the Aarhus
Convention. Procedural loopholes allowing for significant
delays in transferring cases between courts and adminis-
trative bodies make the option to use them less attractive.
This significantly reduces the proportion of cases where
public rather than personal interest is pursued. Even where
an individual right or interest is concerned, an expectation
of many years of hearings and appeals often discourages
affected individuals from pursuing their interests through
administrative procedures or the courts.99
In some countries, the time it takes to move a case
through the process may result in a ruling that, when it
finally comes, is not relevant anymore. In two of three cases
on access to information in Spain it took more than six years
to reach judgement. It took longer than four and a half years
for Nikitin to be acquitted in the criminal case in which he
was charged with treason and espionage. The delays were
caused by returning the case for further investigation in vio-
lation of the presumption of innocence, lengthy procedures
and the legal possibility of the prosecution to appeal a ver-
dict of not guilty given by the lower court. Among the rea-
sons usually given for delays in court procedures are the
lack of human and technical capacities of the courts, and
overburdened judges (e.g. the appellate chamber of the
Tbilisi Regional Court in Georgia has only six judges, and it
takes over a year to have an administrative case heard).
Another example of a delayed procedure is Moldova
Case 1 (the Sarmi Park Case) where the sessions of the court
were postponed twice due to the defendant’s non-appear-
ance. Insufficient penalties for contempt of court and the
lack of enforcement measures to ensure a defendant’s
appearance contribute to significant delays in already
lengthy court procedures. Solutions suggested by partici-
pants at a workshop for the Central Europe and EECCA
region100 included introducing stricter responsibility for
contempt of court, imposing higher fines for non-appear-
ance at court hearings, providing bailiffs with more efficient
enforcement authority, and looking at the existing mecha-
nisms in use in other counties (e.g. the US and the UK).
In addition, the use of other dispute mechanisms can
be a speedy alternative to a lengthy court procedure. Their
increasing use will have positive effects on court proce-
dures by way of example, and by offering a real alternative
(see chapter 4 above).
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Protection of persons exercising
their rights
Article 3(8) of the Aarhus Convention protects persons
exercising their rights as enshrined in the provisions of the
Convention from being penalised, persecuted or harassed in
any way for doing so. This protection extends to the exer-
cise of the right of access to justice, and applies to protection
against retribution by either authorities or private parties.
In parts of the UNECE region, the possibility that the
exercise of the right to access to justice might result in phys-
ical or other direct harassment is real, and is sometimes
related to the involvement of organised criminal groups.
One case study involved a successful attempt aimed to
make the plaintiff withdraw the suit. In Georgia Case 2 (the
Vake Park Case), the plaintiff withdrew the suit at a stage
when it appeared clear that he would succeed. According
to the plaintiff, he and his family received threats and
demands to withdraw the suit, which challenged the con-
struction of a hotel in a public park. Although there have
not been many such incidents identified for this handbook,
they certainly do occur, warranting clear legal guarantees of
protection for those who exercise their rights to access to
justice and for those who strive to ensure that the process
of access to justice is indeed fair, equitable and timely. In
some jurisdictions persons seeking to thwart the course of
justice are dealt with very severely indeed.
There is, however, another approach to harassment. It
is broader than direct interference with a particular case
and has a more strategic character. It is the increasing use
of collateral civil claims, counter-suits or in some cases
even criminal proceedings — sometimes on flimsy legal
grounds — against an individual or organisation related to
the exercise of rights or freedoms, or actions in the public
interest. Such strategic litigation (referred to as SLAPP suits)
could lead to the misuse of the judicial process to attack
persons exercising any right under the Convention. Trends
and examples related to this barrier to public participation
and access to justice are discussed in Part I, chapter 7.
Further obstacles
Taking due account of the issues considered in this
chapter can give rise to effective access to justice. Where
any element is missing, however, obstacles to access to jus-
tice will arise. These obstacles may be compounded by
other obstacles discussed elsewhere in the handbook, for
example, the general reluctance of the courts in some
countries to grant injunctive relief, and the high costs of
expertise and professional legal assistance. These barriers
could create a thick procedural wall between the judicial
system and an individual, thus effectively denying justice
and the administration of due process. 
Although cases where the violation of due process
requirements occurs seem to be rather exceptional, their
very presence implies that, in order to ensure proper
access to justice and to promote the efficient use of mech-
anisms, certain clarifications in the national legislation of
some countries have to be made. Just as importantly, how-
ever, capacity-building efforts to train judges and public
officials, programmes to raise the technical capacity of
courts, and measures to ensure a proper basis for the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, also have to be supported.
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Perhaps the two most commonly discussed factors in
access to justice are remedies and costs. The Aarhus
Convention recognises the importance of adequate reme-
dies in article 9(4) (costs are discussed in chapter 7). If a
decision in favour of the complainant cannot result in real
action to correct a wrong, the public will not seek justice
through legal process. Thus, the power and ability of tri-
bunals to provide adequate remedies are as important as
any other aspect of access to justice. 
Powers of judges and administrators
The public will not make use of legal process unless
those making the final decision (whether judges, admin-
istrators, arbitrators or others) have the necessary powers
to make things happen in the course of proceedings and
in fulfilment of their judgements. The situation is sim-
plest in the case of administrative tribunals, even more so
in internal administrative appeals, where the goal may be
to invalidate a lower administrative decision. In such
cases, the administrative appeal body has a range of
internal levers that can be applied to make sure its deci-
sion is respected. Administrative tribunals have the
option of disciplinary proceedings against authorities, for
example, which are lax in issuing orders for project pro-
ponents to cease activities because their permit has been
invalidated. In some cases, tribunals may issue such
orders directly. 
Where it is necessary to go to court, however, or
where the administrative appeal needs to address issues
that are external to the agency, tribunals must be
equipped with stronger powers in order to reach the
larger community. Such powers may be as basic as the
power to compel someone to appear before the tribunal.
Legal experts from Moldova have pointed out that per-
sons called to court often ignore summonses, without
suffering any hardship in respect of the case itself. This
results in delays and damage to the summoned person’s
opponent, creating an incentive not to appear.101 On the
other hand, courts in many countries make full use of
their powers to compel persons to appear. Failure to
appear may result in a decision against the summoned
person in his or her absence (default), and the court may
also impose personal sanctions, including fines, or in the
most serious cases, imprisonment for contempt of court. 
The power of the court to enforce its own judgement
through contempt actions is considered a logical and
inherent power of the court in some systems, without
which justice could not be done. In other systems a statu-
tory basis may be available. In any case, such power can
only be effective in conjunction with a very real and
practical mechanism — “officers” directly responsible to
the court, who can execute a contempt judgement.
Requiring a court to appeal to a related body such as the
police for execution might place too much power and
discretion in the hands of the latter. It is important to
realise, however, that contempt powers can only be held
by fully independent tribunals governed by due process
and the rule of law, in order to ensure against the abuse
of power.
Contempt may be civil or criminal. Legal systems as
diverse as those of the US and Russia allow for the pos-
sibility of criminal liability for failure to respect a court
order. Of course, administrative tribunals usually have
far more limited powers, due to the fact that they are less
formal and employ fewer due process safeguards. Thus,
it is often necessary for administrative authorities to go to
the courts to procure orders for stronger measures.
Tribunals also must have various options at their dis-
posal to design a full and effective remedy. Traditionally,
one of the main purposes of going to a tribunal was to get
a judgement for damages. Disputes have become more
complex, however, with the result that tribunals can often
issue specific orders to remedy wrongs. In disputes over
environmental issues, damages are often inappropriate,
and time is often of the essence. Thus, the extraordinary
powers of courts and administrative tribunals have
become relatively more important — especially the power
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Chapter 6
Remedies
Brian Rohan and David Jacobstein
to issue injunctions. The Aarhus Convention recognises
the importance of injunctive relief by making specific ref-
erence to it. That and other remedies are discussed in
more detail below.
Enforcement of judgements
Legal systems must be able to ensure that the final deci-
sions of tribunals are respected and followed. There are
many issues at work in the enforcement of judgements,
which can only briefly be mentioned here. One such issue
is geographical jurisdiction. It may be difficult for a deci-
sion in a particular state or locality to be implemented out-
side that area. As international standards for access to jus-
tice become more accepted, inter alia, through the imple-
mentation of the Aarhus Convention, the enforcement of
judgements across borders (giving them full faith and cred-
it) should become easier. Another issue is whether the tri-
bunal maintains jurisdiction over the enforcement of its
judgement, or whether a complainant must use subsequent
proceedings for enforcement. But the potential for irre-
versible damage when dealing with environmental matters
is a strong argument for ensuring enhanced powers of tri-
bunals to enforce their judgements directly.
Injunctions as a remedy 
under the Aarhus Convention
What is an injunction?
An injunction is a legal mechanism, usually taken with-
in the context of a court proceeding, to require an action,
or more commonly to halt an action or set of activities
somehow connected to the court proceeding. An injunc-
tion is often a pivotal aspect of an environmental case.
Unlike commercial law disputes where one party claims
monetary damages from another party, environmental dis-
putes often involve proposed activities that, if undertaken,
would produce an irreversible environmental impact. In
such cases, monetary compensation is insufficient. The
only way that a remedy can ensure complete relief is to
prohibit the activity.102
How does an injunction work?
An injunction typically works by preserving the under-
lying situation or set of facts (status quo) until a final court
decision is issued. For example, a government or NGO
may bring a legal challenge to a developer’s plan to erect a
block of flats within a city park, claiming that the develop-
er failed to comply with public participation requirements.
However, unless the developer’s construction activities are
stopped while the lawsuit proceeds, the ultimate court
decision may be rendered meaningless.
At the beginning of proceedings, a court may therefore
issue an injunction — an enforceable order prohibiting a
specified activity, such as any further construction of the
flats. By prohibiting an action during the entire duration of a
court proceeding, an injunction ensures that complete relief
will be possible when a final decision is issued. A defendant
could not employ a strategy that seeks to delay, on the one
hand, legal proceedings through all available means while,
on the other hand, implementing its potentially illegal activ-
ity before the court could issue a final decision.
Types of injunctions: Temporary versus final
In many countries, including the UK, Ireland, Slovenia
and Austria, courts may issue both “temporary” and “final”
(or “permanent”) injunctions.103 A temporary injunction —
the primary focus of this discussion — is issued at an early
phase in the legal proceedings in order to preserve the
matter in dispute for the duration of the proceedings. A
final injunction, on the other hand, would be incorporated
into the court’s final decision, for example, ordering that a
block of flats could never be built in the location and man-
ner proposed by the developer, due to incompatibility with
green space and planning laws. In essence, the final
injunction is an aspect of the court’s final ruling, rather than
a separate, interim order. However, when appropriate, a
court may incorporate the temporary injunction into its
final ruling, in whole or in part. 
Parties involved in an injunction
Injunctions may be used among a variety of parties,
with variations from country to country. Usually, the gov-
ernment can seek an injunction when challenging a private
party’s action. Also, an NGO may seek an injunction
against a private party. In a number of countries, NGOs
may also seek an injunction against the government when
the government is the party alleged to be undertaking an
illegal action.
The broad impact of injunctions
Injunctive relief is of particular significance in environ-
mental cases. Environmental cases typically include two
components: an ecological question or fact pattern, and a set
of legal requirements. The ecological question, for example,
may be a proposed construction in an open space, or a
potential discharge of pollutants into the water or air. The
legal requirements in such a situation may include holding
public hearings, releasing information about planned activi-
ties, getting the approval of environmental ministries or
other public authorities, or performing an EIA. 
Injunctive relief, specifically a temporary injunction,
acts to prevent the alteration of the ecological status quo
while legal requirements are being scrutinised, thus
increasing the focus on these legal requirements. This
increased focus assures the integrity and validity of the
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process in each specific case, and also establishes a norm
of behaviour with all sectors of society understanding that
legal procedures are an integral part of the decision-mak-
ing process, rather than mere nuisances or formalities to be
ignored until after work has commenced.
A typical example of how an injunction can preserve
the ecological status quo and maintain focus on the legal
requirements in an environmental lawsuit is Germany Case
4 (the Nature Preserve Case). In this case, a private investor
applied in 1994 for a planning exemption to allow him to
develop a section of a nature reserve into one-family
homes and commercial buildings. He initially applied to
build 46 houses. He was at first denied permission, but
after reducing his project by half, was granted permission
by the Brandenburg State Public Administration to build in
the protected area. The conservation group NABU
opposed the development during the public participation
procedure related to the initial 46-unit proposal.
Subsequently, the group was not informed about a second
round in the public participation process related to the
revised 23-unit proposal. NABU sued the Brandenburg
State Public Administration both for failure to implement its
public participation obligations properly and for issuing an
exemption of unlawful size. The court battle was protract-
ed and the first instance decision was not issued for three
years. However, the environmental group received a tem-
porary injunction early in the proceedings, preventing any
development or construction from occurring in the nature
reserve during the entire three-year period.
NABU eventually won the case. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the injunction ensured that the victory accomplished
its objective, because the investor could not begin con-
struction while the court case was pending, and the nature
reserve remained untouched. Further, by preserving the
status quo, the injunction kept the final outcome of the case
in suspense, which increased the interest of the local com-
munity, who followed the case and saw important legal
requirements played out before them. Had construction
begun while the case proceeded, the legal proceedings
might have been easily dismissed by the public as irrelevant
to the method by which decisions are “really” made.
Injunctions also can significantly reduce overall court
expenses and greatly increase the timeliness of legal deci-
sions. Netherlands Case 2 (the “Indispensable” Pesticides
Case) clearly demonstrates these points. The case involved
a variety of pesticides that were illegal under Dutch and EU
law, but for which a special exemption was given through
a ministerial regulation, on the theory that they were “indis-
pensable” to Dutch agriculture. During the first instance
trial, the administrative court provided injunctive relief to
the plaintiff, preventing the pesticides from being used dur-
ing the spraying season. After the first instance victory, the
agricultural interests successfully lobbied for a new law to
exempt the pesticides. This was significant because any
challenge to the validity of the law would be heard not in
administrative court, but in civil court, which, for a variety
of reasons, is much less likely to grant an injunction.
As an aspect of the new law, however, there was an
administrative requirement that only those pesticides for
which new applications had been submitted would be
considered registered under the law. When the list of pes-
ticides with completed applications was published, the
plaintiff took the view that this amounted to an “adminis-
trative decision” — an affirmative act to register these pes-
ticides — and proceeded to challenge this decision in
administrative court. Informed that this case would be
heard in administrative court, and realising that another
injunction was likely, the ministry announced one day
before the hearing that none of the pesticides could be
used that year because it realised upon further review that
their applications for the new legal exemption were
incomplete.104
In order to save face, the ministry backed down in
effect from defending the new law, because it anticipated
an injunction would be granted. Clearly, the ministry was
prepared to defend the new law in civil court. With no
injunction in place, spraying could have begun, even while
the civil court case proceeded. 
Making injunctive relief a reality among all
parties to the Aarhus Convention
Recognising the unique aspects of the injunction in
environmental litigation, article 9(4) of the Aarhus
Convention specifically states that the remedies of access
to justice procedures under articles 9(1), 9(2) and 9(3) shall
include injunctive relief. However, practice and experience
with injunctive relief vary greatly throughout the region. In
many countries that are signatories or parties to the
Convention, injunctions are structured with vague provi-
sions or other procedural requirements that greatly curtail
or eliminate their effectiveness. The challenge for imple-
mentation is to ensure a coherent legal framework for
injunctive relief, so that it is available consistently and
employed effectively in all cases arising under article 9.
Obstacles to effective injunction
The case studies highlight a number of successful uses
of injunctive relief, as well as many instances of current
obstacles to effective usage. Some obstacles render injunc-
tions too expensive or financially risky, while other sys-
temic problems generally discourage their use altogether. 
Bond payment
When issuing an injunction, courts in many countries
may require the plaintiff to post a bond to cover the losses
of the party that is forced to stop its activities.105 If the
plaintiff ultimately loses its case, the bond is then used to
offset the damages. Typically, these damages are both dif-
ficult to calculate and potentially enormous, well beyond
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the means of NGOs and ordinary citizens, thus making this
requirement the single greatest obstacle to the effective use
of injunction in many UNECE countries.
In Russia, for example, there is no formula by which
the bond amount is calculated. The decision is left to the
judge’s discretion, with no guidelines to inform his calcu-
lations. There is not even a standard when the bond itself
is required: a defendant must first request it, and then the
court, in its discretion, determines whether or not to
require it. Again, there are no standards to guide the judge
in this determination. The situation is the same in other
EECCA countries, with the result that complainants are
often prevented from seeking an injunction.
Threat of defendant lawsuits
Closely related to the problem of bond requirements
is the possibility in many countries that a defendant
whose activities have been halted by an injunction may
sue the plaintiff for damages if the plaintiff loses the case.
The magnitude and uncertainty of such damages are as
onerous for complainants as the bond requirement, cre-
ating another major financial obstacle to the effective use
of injunction.
For example, in Moldova Case 1 (the Sarmi Park Case),
the first instance trial court granted an injunction at the
request of the plaintiff. However, upon appeal to the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the defendant made it
clear that, if the plaintiff requested another injunction but
ultimately lost the case, it would bring a legal action to
“request payment of damages.” Faced with this potentially
enormous financial liability, the plaintiff refrained from
requesting the injunction.106
Similarly, in Georgia Case 2 (the Vake Park Case),
lawyers representing the plaintiff hoped to secure an
injunction against a company seeking to construct a hotel
in a park in Tbilisi. However, the plaintiff feared that the
defendant would sue him for damages if the case was
eventually lost. The potential damages resulting from a
delay in completing and operating a 16-storey hotel were
unknown, but potentially enormous. For this reason, the
client refused to pursue an injunction.107
Lack of judicial capacity and independence
In addition to a lack of standards to guide consistent
practice, other common hindrances to the effective use of
injunctions include a lack of understanding about injunc-
tions within the judiciary, and a lack of judicial independ-
ence (see chapter 5 above). Judges in many countries,
especially those in courts of first instance where injunction
cases are usually heard, may be unfamiliar with its use.
While the process of appeal can and does act as an impor-
tant check on lower court decisions, appeal courts in many
countries are also faced with relatively undeveloped law
and practice regarding injunctions, making the appeal
process an unsure mechanism in ensuring the fair use of
injunctive relief. In many countries, this problem is com-
pounded by the judiciary’s unfamiliarity with environmen-
tal law in general. 
Lack of enforcement
Another obstacle that hinders effective injunctive relief
is the lack of proper enforcement of issued injunctions.
While courts issue injunctions, a bailiff, the police, or
another government official is usually responsible for
ensuring that injunctions are obeyed and that those who
violate an injunction order are punished. In several coun-
tries, however, these agents do not perform their function,
rendering the injunctions meaningless. 
In Armenia Case 1 (the Victory Park Case), injunctive
relief was not available to the Environmental Public
Advocacy Center in its fight to prevent illegal construction
in Victory Park. Furthermore, even in countries where
injunctions are enforced, this enforcement is often
delayed, resulting in needless environmental harm.108 In
the Netherlands, enforcement of an injunction issued by an
administrative court is often left to the administrative
agency with jurisdiction over the matter. If the agency is
unwilling or slow to require compliance with the injunc-
tion, the plaintiff must return to the administrative court to
compel the agency to take enforcement steps, or must go
to the civil court to ask for an order compelling compliance
with the injunction. These additional steps result in further
expense and delay before an injunction is enforced.
Strategies for effective injunctive relief
While the obstacles described above are varied and
complex, there are a number of concrete steps that can be
considered to ensure coherent and effective injunctive
relief under article 9(4). Considering the magnitude of the
obstacle to citizen advocacy posed by bond requirements
and defendant lawsuits, these provisions should be a pri-
mary target of reform.
Eliminating the bond 
and defendant lawsuit barriers
The simplest approach would be to eliminate bond and
defendant lawsuit provisions altogether in countries where
they still exist. In many countries with well-developed
injunction practice, bond requirements and defendant law-
suits are not in use. Another option is to retain these pro-
visions, but to establish fixed limits on the amount of bond
or potential defendant damage recoverable in a public
interest case. For example, in order to obtain an injunction,
a citizen or NGO could be required to post a bond of 50
minimum salaries. Such an amount, while not insignificant,
is within the ability of many public organisations and advo-
cates. Known as the “symbolic bond” approach, such an
appropriate fixed limit would serve to ensure that plaintiffs
only sought injunctions in pressing cases where they
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believe they have a strong chance of prevailing on the mer-
its in the final decision, thus addressing one concern that
the bond and lawsuit provisions were presumably
designed to alleviate.
In addition to limiting the cases in which plaintiffs
would seek injunctions, however, bond and lawsuit
requirements are also intended to address another issue.
An enterprise that is forced by injunction to cease its activ-
ities suffers large financial losses as a consequence, and is
often otherwise unable to recover these losses if it eventu-
ally wins on the merits. In seriously considering the elimi-
nation or reduction of bond and defendant lawsuit provi-
sions, this issue must also be addressed.
Many countries have responded to this problem by
developing precise legal standards for when an injunc-
tion may or may not be issued. While the wording of
these standards varies from country to country, the end
result is the same. Injunctions are used in limited circum-
stances, when the potential for irreversible harm is great,
and only after a variety of factors, including economic
impact, are considered.
In Hungary, an injunction may be issued (1) if it is
“indispensable” to avert damages; (2) to avoid a change
in the factual basis of the legal proceedings; or (3) if nec-
essary in other instances deserving special attention. If
the court finds that any one of these conditions is satisfied
prior to issuing the injunction, it must further find that the
harm caused by the injunction will not exceed the advan-
tage gained by its issuance.109 This legal test allows the
court the flexibility to decide whether an injunction is
appropriate on a case-by-case basis, while at the same
time creating a standard that each party to the proceeding
can understand and use to argue whether the injunction
is necessary.
In the US, courts have developed various methods to
balance the interests involved in an injunction proceeding.
According to the US Supreme Court, the plaintiff must
show that, if the injunction is not issued, he will suffer
“irreparable injury” and that he is likely to prevail on the
merits. However, courts must weigh carefully the interests
of both plaintiff and defendant in making their determina-
tion. Interpreting this standard, many US courts use a four-
part test: 1) the significance of the threat of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not issued; 2) the
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the
injunction would inflict on the defendant; 3) the probabili-
ty that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and 4) the
public interest.110
In the Netherlands, a large number of judges have
grappled over the years with the merits of issuing an
injunction in a wide variety of cases. Thus, according to a
Dutch environmental lawyer, a sort of “case law” system
has developed, where both judges and lawyers know the
type of case where an injunction is appropriate. The stan-
dard employed by a Dutch judge is roughly akin to the US
standard in assessing 1) whether there is justification to
take “immediate measures”; 2) whether action is necessary
to maintain a “balance of interests” that may otherwise be
altered in the absence of an injunction; 3) whether the
probable duration of the case would impede justice if an
injunction is not used; and 4) whether the plaintiff is likely
to succeed on the merits. While unwritten, the test is clear
and, most importantly, is well understood within the Dutch
legal community, which compels a high degree of consis-
tency and accountability.111
Recognising the potential impact on the party ordered
by injunction to cease an economic activity, these stan-
dards function on two levels. First, they reflect a social
choice expressed through law that, when an injunction is
employed, the risk of economic harm to the party ordered
to cease its operations will be greatly outweighed by other
important factors and therefore can be tolerated. Second,
these standards provide a consistent and transparent test
by which the legal system can determine when an injunc-
tion is appropriate. In countries using these or similar stan-
dards, bond or defendant lawsuit provisions are not
employed. The legal standards are in and of themselves the
manner in which these societies balance interests and man-
age the risk of economic harm to the defendant.
Consistently implemented, these standards thus enable the
effective application of injunctive relief in all appropriate
instances without imposing unreasonable financial bur-
dens on those plaintiffs seeking it. 
Georgia provides another approach to eliminating
bond and defendant lawsuit problems. Article 29 of the
new Georgian Code of Administrative Procedure states:
“Bringing of an action in the [administrative] court shall
result in the suspension of the concerned administrative
act.”112 Considering that an underlying administrative act
is involved in the vast majority of environmental law
cases, this provision serves as an automatic injunction. For
example, Russia Case 3 (the Shrinking Park Case),
Germany Case 4 (the Nature Preserve Case), Moldova
Case 1 (the Sarmi Park Case) and the Netherlands Case 2
(the “Indispensable” Pesticides Case) all involved an
underlying government decree, permit or other adminis-
trative act that enabled an activity potentially damaging to
the environment to occur. Under Georgian law, by begin-
ning a case in an administrative court that challenges the
underlying administrative act, the requisite legality of the
activity is also removed, thus requiring that the activity
itself ceases. This automatic injunction remains in place
until the final court decision, and, since the injunction
actually directly refers to an administrative act rather than
the economic activity enabled by such an act, there is no
bond requirement, and no possibility of a defendant law-
suit for damages. 
The above approaches provide concrete, focused
means by which bond and defendant lawsuit provisions
can be reformed in the use of injunctions. However, broad-
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er efforts are also necessary, such as focused training to
increase judicial understanding of how injunctions oper-
ate, training for court personnel responsible for enforcing
injunctions and measures to increase judicial independ-
ence so that courts are empowered to use this instrument
to its full potential. Some of these measures can be accom-
plished in the short term through revisions to specific
codes or training programmes, and others are long-term,
structural reform efforts. Both short and long-term
approaches should be employed to ensure that all coun-
tries becoming a party to the Convention can employ
injunctions that are effective and readily available. 
Damages
The main problem in the use of damage remedies in
environmental cases is that most environmental damage is
irremediable. By putting a price on natural resources and
the environment, some might think their destruction is
ensured. Nevertheless, damage remedies where incidental
loss to personal property or other interests occurs are a
very useful tool in encouraging people to bring environ-
mental cases forward. As Kramer stated:
“As it is not known how the public (general) interest
‘environment’ can best be represented in dispute set-
tlement procedures, the second-best solution consists
in counting on the selfishness of citizens and allowing
them, when defending their own interests, also to raise
arguments and provisions which serve to protect the
environment.”113
The issue of damages is one that deserves further
study. One point can be made here related to the possibil-
ity of “non-material” damages. In some Western legal sys-
tems, most notably that of the US, courts have the possibil-
ity to award punitive damages, that is, damages that are not
directly related to the actual harm caused, but are imposed
to punish particularly offensive conduct or to deter similar
behaviour by making an example. Many legal systems do
not allow the award of punitive damages. Nevertheless,
even in countries where punitive damages are not allowed,
a similar mechanism may be available. This is an award for
“moral” damages. Moral damage awards are in theory
related to actual harm suffered, and therefore are not puni-
tive, but the harm is non-material in the sense that it
involves psychological harm or moral offence. As this sort
of harm is difficult to quantify, the tribunal has wide lati-
tude in effect to determine the amount of moral damages,
and can award an amount that has the same punishing or
deterrent effect of punitive damages in other jurisdictions.
An example of such a case from Ukraine114 forms part of
the case studies. Moral damage cases also have the advan-
tage of a developed practice with respect to quantification.
Novel situations that might pose difficulties of quantifica-
tion for material damages could be at least partially
addressed through moral damage actions. Another exam-
ple from Ukraine115 involved residents of the “sanitary
zone” around a factory using extremely hazardous chemi-
cals in its operations, who learned about serious environ-
mental violations at the plant. While it would have been
difficult to prove particular exposures, it was easy to estab-
lish that the residents were placed in constant fear of suf-
fering severe health problems. The possible need to
defend against a claim for moral damages may often be an
incentive for operators of such facilities to comply fully
with environmental regulations.
Financial considerations can be an effective barrier to
access to justice in many cases. The influence of costs on
the decision whether to seek justice is obvious. Many coun-
tries have fashioned rules for the reduction of cost barriers,
including waivers and fee shifting. In addition, govern-
ments can limit the opportunities for organisations to gain
access to justice through restrictions on NGO registration.
This chapter examines some of the issues and some of the
mechanisms that have been developed to reduce financial
and other barriers to access to justice. Further information
on financial barriers related to injunction bonds and defen-
dant lawsuits appears in Part I, chapter 6 above.
Court fees 
Tariffs or court fees to initiate a lawsuit can effectively
prevent members of the public and NGOs from accessing
the courts. Court fees for administrative cases, as opposed
to civil cases, are generally not prohibitively expensive. In
some countries, such as Poland,116 the costs of administra-
tive proceedings are relatively low compared to civil pro-
ceedings, which is helpful to NGOs challenging EIAs and
bringing other kinds of administrative cases. Some coun-
tries provide for a waiver of, or reduced, administrative
fees (e.g. Estonia and Hungary), which is limited to classes
of individuals set forth in national legislation.117 In
Slovakia, environmental organisations, foundations, and
charitable and humanitarian organisations are exempt
from paying administrative court fees altogether.118
However, Croatian law specifically excludes NGOs from
such a waiver, and it is available to individuals only.119
Civil cases present a greater economic barrier than
administrative cases. Many Central European and EECCA
countries charge a percentage of damages to initiate a civil
suit (see Part 1, chapter 6 on injunctions). For example, in
Bulgaria and Hungary, court fees in civil procedure cases
are equal to 4 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of the
requested or estimated damages.120 Likewise, in Slovenia,
fees are a percentage of the value of the subject matter of
the litigation and can be quite high.121 Often, these costs
can amount to several months of the average wage. 
Administrative and civil fees are all the more onerous
for plaintiffs because they often must be paid upfront.
Although a plaintiff may be able to recover the fees should
he or she prevail in the litigation, as discussed below, the
up-front cost often prevents a party from bringing a case to
court. One case in Ukraine involving thousands of young
children in villages surrounding a mine site who were
exposed to excess levels of fluoride in their drinking water
and suffered severe health problems, could not go for-
ward.122 Even though Ukraine recently changed its law,
reducing civil court fees from 5 percent to 1 percent of
damages, initiation of this suit, where damages are high,
would be close to USD 1,000, an amount beyond the
means of the local villagers.
Clearly, these issues need to be addressed by national
legislation, and some countries have taken steps to elimi-
nate these barriers. Poland has taken steps to reduce the
burden of administrative court costs by initiating a “one-
way shift,” whereby a public authority may be ordered by
an administrative court to pay the other party’s court cost,
but public authorities are not entitled to have their costs
recovered. These are positive steps forward and other
countries can take similar steps. In order to eliminate finan-
cial barriers, each country should promulgate comprehen-
sive legislation eliminating or reducing administrative and
civil costs up-front. 
Costs of experts
Fees for expert testimony can be a financial barrier in
many cases. In some countries, such as Spain, courts may
assume the costs of experts who are necessary to advise
the court and aid it in coming to a verdict.123 Judges often
have the discretion to decide which party to a dispute
should bear the costs of experts. A creative solution on
how to arrange for the inexpensive testimony of experts
was found in United States Case 1 (the Telephone Case). In
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this case, brought by the University of Oregon’s
Environmental Law Clinic in the mid-1980s, the practical
barrier of NGOs or individuals being able to arrange expert
witnesses to testify on their side in court was overcome.
The plaintiffs faced a problem to find experts to testify on
their side about the scientific inadequacy of the environ-
mental impact statement. Several were willing to testify,
but could not spend the time or money to fly to Oregon for
the trial, and their clients could not afford to pay them even
if they had the time. The judge in this case proposed an
interesting solution — for several witnesses to testify by
telephone. At first, government lawyers objected, saying
that they wanted to be able to cross-examine the expert
witnesses in person, in front of the court. But the court
accepted the argument that the quality of a scientist’s testi-
mony and evidence has little or nothing to do with how his
face or body language appears during a court appearance.
Arrangements were made for a “telephone trial” and the
clinic put on nine of their 11 witnesses in this manner.
Legal aid
Some European countries have promulgated laws that
defray attorney fees and other costs and expenses, and
negate the disincentive to bring public interest actions. For
example, German law provides that a party may apply for
legal aid if it is unable to bear the costs of the action, and
failure to pursue or defend the matter in court would con-
travene the general public interest.124 In order to receive
legal aid, the lawsuit must have a reasonable prospect of
success and must not be deemed frivolous.125
United Kingdom Case 2 (the Agricultural Storage Case)
illustrates the benefits of free or government subsidised
legal assistance. The British legal aid scheme was replaced
in 2000 by the Community Legal Service Fund of the Legal
Services Commissions. The new system introduces addi-
tional requirements for eligibility and ensures that the max-
imum recovery of legal costs will be achieved. In the
Netherlands, members of the public can apply for free
legal assistance from the environmental branch of a public
litigation service.
Public interest environmental law organisations with
donor support operate in many Central European and
EECCA countries. Examples can be found in Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Moldova,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, among
others. They may offer free legal services to the public in
environmental cases, or in some cases may employ a slid-
ing fee scale based on the financial resources of the client.
In addition, law firms or individual lawyers in many
countries have a professional duty to provide free or low-
cost legal services to those who cannot afford them. This
pro bono requirement can be addressed in many ways,
one of which is to take on public interest environmental
cases. In some jurisdictions, care must be given to ensure
that legal requirements are met. In England and Ireland,
for example, the tort of maintenance can occur under cer-
tain circumstances where an outsider to a matter under
litigation gives support to one side or the other. Courts in
Ireland have held that the tort of maintenance does not
apply when there is a community of interests, as would
occur in most public interest cases. In cases of compen-
sation for environmental harm, however, the outcome
might be different.
Fee shifting
While court fees may present a barrier, as discussed
above, the greater cost comes if the NGO is paying attor-
ney market rates and/or if expert testimony is required, as
is often the case. In this event, financial obligations can
rise dramatically. In some countries (e.g. Moldova), plain-
tiffs must also pay witnesses to appear. Thus a party’s own
litigation costs may be very high. In addition, because
most European countries follow a “loser pays winner” sys-
tem, a losing party may be required to pay the attorney
fees and costs of the prevailing party as well. In the
American system, each side generally pays its own costs.
Each system presents obstacles as well as opportunities
for access to justice. With some legislative modifications,
as discussed below, each system can create incentives for
public interest litigation.
In the European “loser pays” system, the loser general-
ly pays the winner’s court costs and attorney and expert
fees. The most obvious difficulty with this system is, should
an NGO lose a suit, fees are often very high. While this sys-
tem deters frivolous lawsuits, it also deters meritorious law-
suits and/or suits that present novel questions, due to a
plaintiff’s fear of losing and being faced with a large fee.
Nonetheless, this system could be beneficial to NGOs
because lawyers could be encouraged to take meritorious
cases pro bono, with the knowledge that they would be
compensated if they won the action.
Several problems are presented, however, stemming
from national legislation in various countries. In Ukraine,
for example, a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure
states that, if an advocate provides legal services free of
charge, the court may order the losing party to pay the
equivalent of the cost of attorney fees — not to the pre-
vailing party, but to the state.126 Legislation in Bulgaria
presents similar barriers. There, a victorious party cannot
be awarded costs in an administrative case, and can only
recover partial fees and expenses in civil cases. These laws
negate the incentive built into the loser pays system — fee
recovery if victorious — by not allowing fee recovery for
pro bono work or only allowing partial recovery.
Even if an NGO is victorious and granted fee recovery
by the courts, implementation of the fee award remains an
overriding issue in many countries. For example, in Ukraine
Case 2 (the Oilfield Information Case), plaintiffs prevailed
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in their action but faced difficulties in collecting fees and
costs from the defendants (the State Geology Committee)
and ultimately received very little reimbursement.
The loser pays system presents opportunities for
NGOs to the extent that it can encourage attorneys to take
on pro bono cases that attorneys feel are meritorious. This
can be achieved by promulgating new legislation in coun-
tries with loser pays systems, such as Germany, which
provide for legal aid in public interest cases. In addition,
laws preventing fee collection (e.g. Ukraine and Bulgaria)
need to be revised and the implementation of a fee award
must be guaranteed.
The American system presents different opportunities
and obstacles. In the American system, each side generally
pays its own costs. Clearly, one advantage of the system is
that an NGO that is unsure of ultimately prevailing in a case
will not be dissuaded from bringing the case because of
fear of being slapped with fees.
In addition, specific legislation provides for fee shifting
in cases against the federal government that allow an NGO
or other person to recover fees and costs if they prevail
against the government, but does not permit the govern-
ment to recover fees and costs if it prevails. There are
approximately 150 federal fee-shifting statutes, including
16 major federal environmental statutes. Most of the envi-
ronmental fee-shifting statutes provide as follows:
“The court may award costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any pre-
vailing party or substantially prevailing party, whenev-
er the court determines such an award is appropriate.”
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act — which pro-
vides for fee shifting in any suit against the federal govern-
ment (not only environmental suits) — a party that prevails
against the federal government, whether defendant or
plaintiff, may recover attorneys’ fees up to a specified cap,
along with expert and other costs, if the prevailing party
can demonstrate that the government’s position was not
substantially justified.
In all these fee-shifting provisions, the stated goal of
the US Congress was to encourage citizen lawsuits in order
to achieve compliance with federal statutory policies. The
statutes seek to create an incentive for commercial and
public interest lawyers to represent citizens pro bono by
providing a structure where lawyers can be reimbursed for
their legal services if victorious. Reimbursement of fees and
costs is not guaranteed, however, and the statutes express-
ly delegate discretion to the courts to determine whether a
fee award will be granted and what the amount would be.
Thus, the American system creates an incentive for
commercial and public interest lawyers to provide pro
bono services to NGOs and citizen groups because lawyers
may recover fees for their services if victorious. However,
the cost of litigation, including the hiring of experts and
other standard expenses, which can be quite high, still
presents a barrier or disincentive to bring litigation because
these costs must be fronted by the plaintiff. In addition,
even if a plaintiff prevails, the amount of fee recovery is
within the discretion of the court and plaintiffs may not
recover all of their expenses.
These problems aside, the American system has fos-
tered public interest litigation and many public interest law
organisations have come to rely on fee shifting to sustain
their organisations. Fee shifting has been liberally allowed
by most courts in public interest litigation, granting fee and
cost recovery in cases where the parties settle in a manner
favourable to the plaintiff and in cases where the plaintiff
has partially prevailed.
Until recently, courts have even allowed fee and cost
recovery under the “catalyst theory,” whereby fee recovery
is allowed in instances where the plaintiff’s lawsuit com-
pelled the defendant to comply voluntarily with the plain-
tiff’s demands in the action. The “catalyst theory” was recent-
ly overturned by a US Supreme Court holding that voluntary
actions are not enough to compel a fee award. Instead, there
must be a court-ordered consent decree, or some kind of
judicially sanctioned change in the relationship between the
parties, in order for a court to grant a fee award.127 This case
is a big blow to American NGOs, because lawsuits may
often go on for years before the defendant “voluntarily”
agrees to change its course of action. Until now, courts
recognised that such “voluntary” action would not have
occurred but for the plaintiff’s suit and many courts granted
fees and costs based on this premise.
Both the American system and the European loser pays
system have the potential to foster public interest litigation.
The loser pays system seeks to make the winner whole and
can be implemented with a degree of flexibility that need
not discourage public interest litigation. The German law
providing for legal aid in public interest cases is an excel-
lent example of this. 
Another incentive for public interest litigation is the
“one-way fee shift.” According to this concept, which only
applies to a certain type of public interest litigation, includ-
ing environmental or human rights cases, plaintiffs can
receive costs under the loser pays system when they pre-
vail, but do not have to pay if they lose, so long as the case
had reasonable grounds. Thus, plaintiffs would not be
penalised for failing to prevail in an action that presents a
question of general public interest.
Another method is simply to create legislation that
exempts public interest plaintiffs from fee shifting alto-
gether so that NGOs would not get slapped with fees if
they lost a suit. However, in this event, NGOs would also
not benefit from recovering costs if they prevailed. Thus,
simply exempting public interest litigation from fee shifting
relieves some of the risk but does nothing to create incen-
tives for lawyers to take on public interest suits and foster
public interest litigation. The one-way shift best achieves
this result.
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In short, as with administrative and civil court fees, leg-
islation is necessary to temper the sometimes harsh results
of a loser pays system and foster the development of pub-
lic interest advocacy.
Aggregating small claims 
The pervasive and incremental nature of environmen-
tal problems often makes it difficult for them to be taken
up through traditional access to justice means. The burden
in terms of time and money in bringing forward a small
claim often outweighs the particular harm, but if numerous
small claims can be aggregated in some way, then a real
problem can be addressed. In some jurisdictions, a tribunal
can certify representatives of a particular group of persons
in similar circumstances to bring forward a case on behalf
of the group (the class action). Specific rules govern the
notification of other persons who might classify for the
group, their options for opting in or out, and the preclusive
effect of judgements in the class action vis-à-vis separate
claims, among other issues. Actio popularis (see Part I,
chapter 4) may also provide a mechanism for addressing
large numbers of small claims.
Restrictions on NGOs
Even under the Aarhus Convention, which requires
recognition of unregistered groups in some circumstances,
it is often important for an NGO to acquire the status of a
“juridical person” because without this the NGO does not
have certain rights, including the right to challenge an
administrative decision. The registration process, tax status
and other restrictions imposed on NGOs in many countries
deter people from forming NGOs. 
In Ukraine, in order to acquire the status of a juridical
person, an organisation must register with the state.
Procedures of registration vary depending on the type of
entity. Only a fully registered juridical person, for example,
can obtain a seal (necessary to make its documents offi-
cial), open a bank account, enter into contracts or be a
party to litigation. A non-registered entity does not have
any of these powers.
In order to be fully registered, an NGO must: (1) hold
a meeting of those who want to join the NGO and pass a
decision on creating the NGO; (2) create a charter; and (3)
obtain approval of this charter from the Ministry of Justice
(for National and International NGOs) or its local depart-
ment (local NGOs).
After these procedures are complete, an NGO is given
one month only to register with eight other government
agencies.128 Unless an NGO completes these procedures
within one month after its registration with the Ministry (or
local department) of Justice, the head of the NGO may be
charged with an administrative offence (misdemeanour).
Assuming an NGO gets through this process, the NGO
must submit quarterly reports on its activities to the state
tax authority and other specified bodies. 
Taxation
While NGOs in many countries enjoy preferential tax
treatment, some countries impose significant tax burdens
on NGO activities. Certain activities considered normal for
NGOs in some countries would possibly endanger tax-free
status in others. 
In Ukraine, for example, attorneys fees and costs
recovered after prevailing in a lawsuit, or the sale of a book
on environmental rights prepared by an NGO, may be
considered profitable income, and may result in the organ-
isation being removed from the Register of Non-
Commercial Organisations, which would oblige it to pay
income tax. Further, due to the restrictions of value-added
tax (VAT) law, NGOs usually do not engage in selling
goods or providing services, fearing exclusion from the
register. This prevents NGOs from raising funds through
the sale of products such as T-shirts, calendars, and other
items, a practice regularly engaged in by NGOs in many
countries. Finally, donations to NGOs are limited, since an
they must pay income tax on any portion of the donation
exceeding 4 percent of their total funds. 
In large parts of the UNECE region, however, tax laws
provide incentives for the formation of public interest
NGOs, and for individuals and corporations to provide
donations to them. These long-standing laws are fully sup-
ported by government and the citizenry and demonstrate
the important role played by NGOs in civil society.
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Citizens and NGOs in many UNECE countries are feel-
ing the impact of a disturbing new trend — they are getting
sued for presenting testimony at public hearings, collecting
signatures on petitions, filing lawsuits when environmental
and other laws are violated, or otherwise speaking out
about issues of public interest.129 These lawsuits are
referred to as “strategic lawsuits against public participa-
tion” (SLAPPs).130 SLAPPs are obstacles to ensuring that cit-
izens have access to justice and in implementing the
Aarhus Convention. This section presents a brief general
overview of SLAPPs. 
It is well documented that SLAPPs are used to deter
public participation in the US and there is evidence that the
use of SLAPPs is spreading to Canada, the UK, Russia and
Kazakhstan. It is likely that SLAPPs are used in many other
European countries, although they may not yet be recog-
nised as a specific legal tool used by opponents to public
participation. 
What are SLAPPs?
A SLAPP is a type of civil lawsuit filed against an NGO
or individual for speaking out about an issue of public
interest.131
SLAPPs are successfully used to deter people from
exercising the right to speak out about issues of public
interest and the right to ask the government to correct a
wrong. SLAPPs have an impact on the democratic process
by decreasing citizen willingness to enforce rights, to par-
ticipate in policy-making, or to act as “watchdog” over gov-
ernment agencies. The targets of SLAPPs must often
endure several expensive years of litigation before a court
rules in their favour. 
Courts in at least one UNECE country view SLAPPs as
efforts to penalise the exercise of constitutionally protect-
ed liberties. US courts that dismiss SLAPPs often cite the
petition clause of the First Amendment of the US
Constitution, which guarantees “the right to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”132
SLAPPs identified in case studies
In at least two case studies, citizens attempting to par-
ticipate in government decision-making were targets of
SLAPPs. In Kazakh Case 3 (the Excessive Fees Case), an
individual spoke out at a public hearing about pollution
discharged by a company. The citizen’s testimony con-
trasted with the testimony given by a representative of a
laboratory hired by the company. The laboratory filed a
lawsuit against the individual, claiming the individual
injured the laboratory’s reputation. Ultimately, the claim
was unresolved, but the citizen had to pay for representa-
tion in the case. Cases like this will discourage people from
speaking out at public hearings. 
In Russia Case 2 (the Nikitin Case), the Russian gov-
ernment charged a former captain in the Russian Navy with
treason through espionage, disclosure of state secrets and
other crimes for preparing a report that included informa-
tion about the possible radiation hazards of some Russian
submarines and nuclear waste storage sites. Although
Nikitin was ultimately acquitted, he spent five years fight-
ing the charges (at considerable expense). During part of
this period, Nikitin was held in custody. Even when he was
not in custody, his movements were severely restricted.
Nikitin’s case is an extreme example of the harassment cit-
izens may face for speaking out, but it is not the only exam-
ple. Certainly other citizens will think twice about advocat-
ing for the environment after Nikitin’s experience. 
Responding to SLAPPs —
SLAPPbacks
In order to deter SLAPPs, Pring and Canan suggest that
targets should “SLAPPback.” They state, “[t]he most prom-
ising prevention and cure for the SLAPP phenomenon … is
… the ‘SLAPPback’: a countersuit in which the targets turn
the tables and sue the filers for the injuries and losses
caused by the SLAPP.”133 Violation of constitutional or
other rights, abuse of process or tort claims, such as outra-
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geous conduct, are examples of legal theories that can be
used in filing SLAPPbacks. 134
Perhaps the two most common claims in a SLAPPback
are malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Many
SLAPPback cases end in settlements, so the final outcome
is not reported.135
Legislative responses to SLAPPs
One way to ensure that SLAPPs do not continue to
deter public participation is to enact anti-SLAPP laws.
Some UNECE and other countries have adopted laws dis-
couraging SLAPPs.136 It is in the interest of governments to
pass anti-SLAPP laws to ensure that citizens are able to par-
ticipate in the government decision-making process and to
stop filers of SLAPPs from misusing courts to deter citizens
from participating in government. SLAPP filers are often
trying to silence citizens and take a debate out of city hall,
where many people can participate in the discussion and
where elected officials will make a decision. Anti-SLAPP
legislation needs to protect targets without interfering with
the right to bring grievances to court.
Several groups came together to draft a model anti-
SLAPP bill for the US.137 This bill could serve as a model to
use in drafting anti-SLAPP bills in other UNECE countries.
The bill states in part:
“Acts in furtherance of the constitutional right to peti-
tion, including seeking relief, influencing action, inform-
ing, communicating, and otherwise participating in the
processes of government, shall be immune from civil lia-
bility, regardless of intent or purpose, except where not
aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action,
result, or outcome.”138
The draft bill ensures that, when a SLAPP is filed, the
target can move to ask the court to dismiss the case. The
case will be put on hold while the court determines
whether it is an illegal SLAPP case.
139
The burden of proof
is put on the SLAPP filer to demonstrate that the case is not
a SLAPP, but a legitimate attempt to petition the court to
address a grievance.140 If the court agrees that the case was
a SLAPP and dismisses the case, the SLAPP target will be
awarded the costs of litigation and attorney fees. The court
may also require the SLAPP filer to pay sanctions to deter
future SLAPPs.141 If a person is injured by the SLAPP, he or
she may seek compensatory and punitive damages from
the party that filed it.142
Protecting public participation
While SLAPPs and other methods of intimidation have
an impact on public participation in some UNECE coun-
tries and are likely to spread throughout the region, it is not
a reason to stop participating. Information has to be spread
widely about the use of these tactics so that courts will
more easily recognise them as intimidation and harass-
ment. Governments should also be encouraged to protect
public participation by making it illegal to file SLAPPs in
the first place.
The following list of conclusions and recommenda-
tions is based on the analysis and the cases received. This
list cannot cover all issues in detail and does not purport to
be applicable to all legal systems within the UNECE region.
It will be up to individual states to determine those meas-
ures that are most applicable to their situations. However,
the following items might give some indication of possible
practical, legal and institutional steps that parties and other
states may wish to take in line with the access to justice
obligations under the Aarhus Convention. They are divid-
ed according to subject matter. 
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Legal/administrative issues
1. States should assess whether cases proceed in a timely
fashion and should take measures to ensure their expe-
ditious consideration. This may include reducing
incentives for delay. 
2. Tribunals should hold authorities to a standard in
responding to claims by the public. 
3. Tribunals should treat cases seriously where authorities
do not give proper attention to complaints. More care-
ful consideration of the complaints by the authorities is
likely to be the result.
4. Tribunals should be able to dismiss cases brought by
authorities where authorities have not shown a suffi-
cient case (rather than returning the case time and
again for further investigations).
5. Courts and other tribunals should be equipped with
direct powers (backed up by officers with sufficient
resources and authority) sufficient to enable them to
administer justice effectively. This includes the possi-
bility of imposing penalties on persons who do not
obey orders to appear or who do not otherwise follow
court instructions. Penalties should be established with
a view to compel obedience to the tribunal.
6. States should take measures to improve the efficient
enforcement of judgements of courts and other tri-
bunals. The tribunals should have direct powers, as
above, but prevailing parties in disputes should also
have the assurance that the decision of the tribunal will
be followed by the losing party. Incentives for follow-
ing or ignoring decisions should be studied and meas-
ures should be taken to strengthen systems in those
countries with poor records in this respect. The option
of imposing personal liability on authorities or officers
of private enterprises must be available where neces-
sary (in extreme circumstances).
7. States should consider the benefits of allowing tri-
bunals, under certain circumstances, to issue declarato-
ry or explanatory rulings (advisory opinions), relevant
to matters under consideration before other bodies.
Where this is not allowed by law, or is not currently
employed, states should consider making the neces-
sary legal, administrative or other changes.
8. States should support further comparative work in the
field of environmental impact assessment, ecological
expertise, strategic environmental assessment, and
other forms of biosphere reflection, with a view to
assess whether the various practices in place provide
an effective means for public participation in decision-
making. This comparative work should study, inter
alia, the relationship between the various forms and
practices, and the necessity for recourse to justice.
States should be open to the adoption of new laws and
practices based on the exchange of views.
9. States should apply clearer standards in determining
when a decision-making process has potential environ-
mental impacts in order to avoid claims by the public.
10. States should enhance due process and other protec-
tions in administrative reconsideration and appeals
processes in order to provide a meaningful opportuni-
ty for justice without the need for judicial appeal
except in the most exceptional cases.
11. States should consider the establishment of tribunals
with specially trained judicial or administrative judges
with specific jurisdiction over environmental disputes. 
12. States should exchange experiences on the general
standards for due process and the effective administra-
tion of justice in their countries, covering matters such
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13. States should adopt mechanisms and practices for the
publication and/or dissemination of significant deci-
sions by courts and other tribunals.
14. States should increase the use of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms in order to reach successful
conclusions of disputes without the need for long and
expensive proceedings. Such mechanisms include
mediation, negotiation and arbitration.
Standing issues
15. Articles 9(2) and 9(3) constitute a strong affirmation
that NGOs, as well as individuals, have standing, sub-
ject to reasonable restrictions, but only if the overall
scheme continues to promote “wide access to justice.”
To make this clear, states should transpose this grant of
standing into national law. If states decide to establish
requirements for environmental NGOs that have stand-
ing under article 9(2) of the Convention, such require-
ments must be clear, consistent and fair. Standing
requirements must not be designed to discourage the
bringing of claims, but must be reasonably calculated
to reach the intended result of ensuring that claims are
brought by NGOs whose activities and purposes are
genuinely focused on environmental protection. Any
requirements that are imposed must be consistent with
the duty to provide “wide access to justice.”
16. States should provide for means to aggregate small
claims into a legally significant unit. Various mecha-
nisms may be used for this (including class actions,
representative standing and actio popularis), but the
goal should be to eliminate the financial and other bar-
riers to the use of legal means to address such claims.
17. In some systems, special judicial standing for parlia-
mentary representatives may offer an alternative for
claims where individuals may not have standing. This
matter bears further study.
Adequacy of remedies
18. To meet the obligation of providing adequate and
effective remedies, including injunctive relief, states
should evaluate the application of such remedies by
courts and other tribunals. Specifically with respect to
injunctions, states should ensure that the standards
employed by a tribunal in determining whether to issue
an injunction are clear, consistent and fair. 
19. States should establish methodologies for calculating
damages, even where these are difficult to quantify.
In systems where experts may be employed to calcu-
late damages, states should ensure that such experts
are independently certified and use objective and
neutral criteria.
20. It may be necessary in some states to specify legal tests
for causation and the calculation of damages through
new legislation. This necessity should not be an obsta-
cle to reform.
Financial issues
21. Affordable legal services must be available to
aggrieved members of the public in connection with
environmental matters falling under the Aarhus
Convention. Legal barriers to the establishment of
non-profit legal advocacy organisations should be
reduced or eliminated. Financial barriers to their oper-
ation should be reduced. Their contribution in
addressing environmental issues in society should be
recognised, including through appropriate legal and
tax status. States should consider public funding of
environmental advocacy organisations, and also of
other related organisations, such as NGOs with scien-
tific or technical environmental expertise.
22. Registration and tax rules for NGOs should be simpli-
fied. In general, they should be reduced to ministerial
oversight to ensure that the activities of these organi-
sations are legitimate according to their publicly
declared purpose.
23. Bond requirements in injunction cases and other cases
should be reduced. Rather than applying financial bar-
riers to discourage the bringing of actions requiring
injunctive relief, specific legal tests for injunctions
might prove to be more effective and fair, without los-
ing the benefits to society of enjoined illegal behaviour.
There should be a re-examination of where the risks
involved in applications for interim injunctions in envi-
ronmental cases should fall. Where financial guaran-
tees are required, consideration should be given to the
establishment of a public interest fund to guarantee
interim injunctions in the public interest.
24. As legal costs increase and opportunities for funding
become scarce, legal systems should be adjusted to
provide incentives for bringing successful cases in the
enforcement of environmental laws. Mechanisms
might include “one-way” shifting of fees and costs, tak-
ing into account the public interest.
25. Legal and administrative costs imposed by courts and
other tribunals should be published according to a
detailed schedule. Such costs should be easily under-
stood and quantifiable at the outset of the proceedings.
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Systemic and capacity issues
26. States should dedicate substantial resources towards
publicising successful environmental cases, in order to
educate citizens about the effective use of environmen-
tal rights. States should also establish programmes of
general education about the use of environmental rights.
27. States should embark on training programmes for
judges, prosecutors, administrators and others who
might be involved in environmental cases.
28. It is clear from the cases arising that further work is
required in the area of improving public participation
mechanisms. This will in turn reduce the number of dis-
putes arising that require recourse to legal and adminis-
trative justice mechanisms further down the line.
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The right to a healthy 
environment in Europe
In the 1998 publication, Doors to Democracy1 — a sur-
vey of trends and practices in public participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making in most of the UNECE region —
a large number of countries were found to have a constitu-
tional right to a healthy environment. Within Europe, the
regional differences were remarkable. Four out of five juris-
dictions surveyed in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central
Asia, 12 out of 17 jurisdictions in Central and Eastern
Europe, and a substantially lower proportion of countries in
Western Europe had such a right (Western European con-
stitutions tend to be significantly older).2 Historical factors
played a role. In countries directly affected by Chernobyl,
for example, the formulations include specific rights of
access to environmental information and to compensation
for harm (e.g., Belarus, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and
Moldova, mainly dating from 1991-92). 
The content of such a right is by no means settled. A
number of courts in many parts of the world have given
interpretations of the meaning of a right to a healthy envi-
ronment. Courts have affirmed the right to a healthy envi-
ronment in the Philippines, Costa Rica, Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, India and Pakistan.3 Fitzmaurice, for exam-
ple, sketches three main schools of thought relating to the
right to a healthy environment. These three main schools
may roughly be characterised as follows: 
• The right to a healthy environment is a fundamental
human right upon which all other rights depend.
• The right to a healthy environment is not a funda-
mental right, but rather a right deriving from other
human rights.
• No right to a healthy environment exists. 
Moreover, proponents of a right to a healthy environ-
ment disagree on whether such a right is an individual
right, a group right or a “third generation” right.4
There is a movement in Europe towards the recogni-
tion of the right to a healthy environment in one form or
another. Jurisprudence in Belgium,5 Slovenia, Hungary
and Georgia and on the pan-European level through the
European Court of Human Rights has begun to define
environmental rights. Thus, the right to a healthy envi-
ronment or the right to “home” in Europe begins to
approach the various definitions of the right to a healthy
environment as it is being shaped by jurisprudence in
other parts of the world. 
In at least one of the cases reported in this handbook,
the connection was made between basic rights and envi-
ronmental rights. In Georgia Case 2 (the Vake Park Case),
the court appeared to be disposed towards accepting the
arguments of the plaintiff that illegal activities affecting the
natural heritage of the people were human rights viola-
tions under the Georgian Constitution. Unfortunately, the
case was withdrawn due to threats to the plaintiff and his
family before a final decision upholding the arguments
could be made.
Another case from Georgia has raised an interesting
aspect of rights and duties with respect to nature. Some
legal systems treated nature as consisting of specific natu-
ral resources to be exploited. Nature protection often took
the form of a kind of “sustainable use” of such resources in
principle, whereas the reality was often of unrestricted
exploitation. In Georgia Case 1 (the Defence of National
Park Case) interpreting the Georgian Constitution, citizens
resisted the dedication of certain territories as national
parkland, claiming that the nature protection regime would
prevent them from using the land, invoking the basic
human right to use the natural environment, as well as the
right to live in a healthy environment. While such a case
could arise from a conflict between traditional practices
and the value of undisturbed nature, in the Georgian case
it appears to be based on a desire to preserve opportuni-
ties for illegal exploitation. This in turn raises the question
of the difficulty to protect the environment when people
have trouble meeting basic economic needs.
Chapter 1
Rights and duties towards 
a healthy environment
Stephen Stec
The decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in
the case of the National Association of Ecologists (see
appendix B) may be based on a social or collective right to
a healthy environment. Constructions of social or collective
rights often emphasise the duties that correspond to the
rights. In this case, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia
interpreted the constitutional right for a healthy environ-
ment found in article 72 of the Constitution in order to
determine whether the plaintiffs (NGOs and individuals)
had a right to challenge the legality of a development plan
for a small enterprise zone near an environmentally sensi-
tive area. The standing of the NGO was recognised on the
basis of the Environmental Protection Act, which imposed
a duty to protect the environment upon professional and
other NGOs established for the purpose of environmental
protection. While this is in itself significant to the question
of open standing for NGOs (see Part I, chapter 3), the more
interesting question related to the individuals. In interpret-
ing article 72, the court held that all persons have an inter-
est in preventing damage to the environment, and that this
interest is not limited to the area where they reside, but
encompasses a broader area. The “interest” to prevent
damage to the environment resembles a duty to protect the
environment, and the court provided the necessary legal
grounds for the discharge of the duty.
Jurisprudence pointing towards a so-called “third gen-
eration” right can be found in the Protected Forests Case
(see appendix B) before the Constitutional Court of
Hungary. This case, dealing with the constitutionality of an
amendment of a 1992 law on the privatisation of agricul-
tural land that had the effect of “reprivatising” land that had
previously been declared protected, involved two consti-
tutional provisions. The first of these constitutional provi-
sions, article 18, was a rather conventional declaration of
the right to a healthy environment. The second, article
70/D, provided for a human right to the highest possible
level of physical and spiritual health. In a well-reasoned
decision, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared that
these two constitutional rights, taken together, were “third
generation” constitutional rights, that is, neither collective
nor individual rights, but rights that nevertheless could be
enforced. In drawing an analogy to the right to life on the
basis that environmental resources are limited, most envi-
ronmental damages are irreversible, and the environment
is the basis for all life, the court interpreted articles 18 and
70/D to place an obligation on the state to provide legal
and institutional guarantees for an objectively high level of
environmental protection.6 Thus, if at any time the state
guaranteed a certain level of environmental protection, it
could not be withdrawn arbitrarily. Such protections could
only be diminished in proportion to upholding other con-
stitutional rights or values. This furthermore implied, in the
court’s view, that the rights found in the Constitution, in an
appropriate case, could be the basis of a cause of action to
require the state to maintain high objective standards of
environmental protection.7
An understanding of the right to a healthy environ-
ment — somewhere between a general collective or
social right — and a duty to ensure an objectively high
level of environmental protection, arises out of jurispru-
dence in Belgium. There, the tribunal of first instance of
Antwerp considered a case where citizens brought an
action to prevent the operation of a waste incinerator.8
The judge sustained the action. In dismissing a third-party
claim in the same case, the judge later drew out the rela-
tionship between his decision and the right to a healthy
environment, stating:
“[I]f the government, in the implementation of its policy,
comes into conflict, or threatens to come into conflict,
with the fundamental rights of the citizens to a dignified
existence in a healthy and safe environment, it must
review this policy because the government should not
seek legitimacy in itself, but in the promotion, safe-
guarding and protection of the interests of its citizens,
whose health and safety it should give priority.”9
The judge was considering a decision that flew in the
face of various expert reports and the findings of a com-
mittee led by a respected professor. Under such circum-
stances, the decision to permit the operation of the incin-
erator was held to be a violation of the right to a healthy
and safe environment. Furthermore, the standing of citi-
zens to bring the action in the place of the authorities who
failed to act was discussed in terms of the right to a healthy
environment. According to the judge, statutory develop-
ments in Belgium that granted standing to NGOs in envi-
ronmental matters (see Part I, chapter 3) helped to shape
the meaning of the right to a healthy environment by defin-
ing the terms of “action” by members of the public in
defence of environmental issues. The New Municipal Act
(article 271) gave a right to citizens to take up municipal
matters where the authorities failed to act. These provi-
sions together were held to grant standing to ordinary citi-
zens to bring forward matters related to the environment
where municipal authorities do not act.
In the Lopez Ostra case,10 Guerra v. Italy (see appendix
B) and Hatton v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg began to define the “right to respect for pri-
vate and family life, and for home” found in article 811 of
the European Declaration on Human Rights12 in a way that
closely resembles a right to a healthy environment as it is
being shaped elsewhere (see next chapter). 
It can thus be seen that jurisprudence is a major factor in
the shaping of the right to a healthy environment in the
UNECE region, even though there is not yet a common
understanding of this right. A “middle ground” is developing
where, under certain circumstances, an individual may have
a legally recognisable interest in a healthy environment. 
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Aarhus rights and procedures
contributing to the right to a healthy
environment
The Aarhus Convention represents a “giant step for-
ward”13 in the quest to strengthen citizens’ environmental
rights. The objective of the Aarhus Convention is found in
its first article. Article 1 states:
“In order to contribute to the protection of the right of
every person of present and future generations to live
in an environment adequate to his or her health and
well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of
access to information, public participation in decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental matters
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”
While referring to the right to a healthy environment,
the Aarhus Convention deals primarily with the mostly pro-
cedural rights of access to information, access to decision-
making and access to justice. Article 1 instructs parties in
how to take steps to guarantee the basic right of present
and future generations to live in an environment adequate
to health and well-being. In so doing, it establishes the
linkage between practical, easily understandable rights,
such as those relating to information and decision-making,
and the more complex collection of rights included in the
right to a healthy environment.14
Article 1 also concretises the role of the state in helping
to reach this goal. Under the framework of the Aarhus
Convention, it is up to the party to provide the necessary
administrative, legal and practical structures to guarantee
the rights of access to information, public participation in
decision-making and access to justice in environmental
matters. This represents a new approach to the role of the
state. Instead of solving all of society’s problems itself, the
state acts as a sort of referee in a process involving larger
social forces, leading to a more organic and complete
result. According to this view, once transparent and fair
processes have been worked out, the main role of the state
is to provide the necessary guarantees to maintain the
framework. The Aarhus Convention provides a set of min-
imum standards to parties to guide them in how to protect
the right to a healthy environment. 
The main mechanism for guaranteeing the rights con-
tained in the Convention is the access to justice pillar. By
backing up the procedural and substantive rights concern-
ing access to environmental information and public partic-
ipation in environmental decision-making with legal, insti-
tutional and other guarantees, parties will provide the
structure for discharging their responsibility to help people
to overcome the significant current challenges to achieve
sustainable development. 
Both the right to a healthy environment and the proce-
dural rights in the Aarhus Convention are constantly evolv-
ing. It is important, therefore, to place the Convention in
the context of the changing shape of the right to a healthy
environment, as well as the developing international law
on sustainable development. 
Several reference points are found in the Convention’s
preamble, including the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio
Declaration, the World Charter for Nature, and others.15
While the right to a healthy environment was recognised
earlier in other regions of the globe, the Aarhus
Convention appears to be the first hard-law text to recog-
nise the rights of future generations. The International
Court of Justice has used similar language in recognising
that the very health of generations yet unborn is represent-
ed by the environment.16 The Aarhus Convention takes this
jurisprudential recognition a step further and moulds it into
an international legal instrument. The three pillars that
make up the fundamental structure of the Convention are
essential to the achievement both of the right to a healthy
environment, and also, no less important, of the possibility
for individuals to fulfil their responsibilities towards others,
including future generations.
Nowhere are these connections made more apparent
than in actual cases. Perhaps the most well-known of such
cases is the case of Nikitin (Russia Case 2), the Russian
navy reservist acquitted of espionage charges after almost
five years of proceedings. His alleged crime was providing
information to the public about potential dangers to pres-
ent and future generations resulting from activities of and
accidents by the Russian nuclear submarine fleet. His
acquittal was a vindication of civil and environmental
rights, as well as the proper functioning of the Russian
courts according to the rule of law. The case of Guerra v.
Italy is an example where the lack of environmental infor-
mation alone was connected to the very right of a family to
choose how to live.
Basic human rights related to the environment and
basic civic responsibilities are interwoven, but both the
rights and the responsibilities may remain unfulfilled as
long as persons lack the capacity to act in civil society. The
role of the access to justice pillar is a critical one. It involves
the establishment of proper institutions, the guarantee by
the state of clear and transparent frameworks for action,
and the judicious exercise of state power to ensure the
proper functioning of the well-established mechanisms for
empowerment towards sustainable development that are
the subject of the Convention. 
C H A P T E R  1 :  R I G H T S  A N D  D U T I E S  TO WA R D S  A  H E A LT H Y  E N V I R O N M E N T
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 75
PA R T  I I : R E L AT E D  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  I S S U E S
The European Court of Human Rights serves as a
supranational judicial body for the protection of human
rights provided by the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The
Convention empowers the court to receive applications
from any person, NGO or group of individuals claiming
to be the victim of a violation by a state-party of the rights
set forth in the Convention. 
Although this represents a unique opportunity for
individuals to seek protection of their rights, the jurisdic-
tion of the court extends only to matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention and its
protocols. Thus, access to the court is quite limited, espe-
cially with regard to environmental matters, as the text of
the Convention does not contain an explicit reference to
the environment.
Nevertheless, the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights shows that it can grant standing and recog-
nise a breach of human rights resulting from severe
environmental pollution. The court has clearly admitted
the existence of a link between the environment and
human rights, although this was not proclaimed by the
Convention itself. 
Thus, while the access to justice provisions of the
Aarhus Convention directly govern environmental
matters, they are not covered by the European
Convention on Human Rights. Either “procedural” rights
provisions (such as article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights — right to a fair trial) must be used,
which give access to the court regardless of the substan-
tial matter of the suit, or specific rights must be
interpreted so that environmental concerns are taken into
account (such as article 8 — right to respect for private
and family life, article 10 — freedom of expression, and
article 2 — right to life). 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed
the position that “severe environmental pollution may
affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from
enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their
private and family life adversely without, however, seri-
ously endangering their health”.17
The first environmental case resolved in favour of peti-
tioners was Zander v. Sweden (1993). The applicants’ land
was adjacent to a waste-tip. Analyses made in 1979
revealed that the waste had polluted the applicants’
drinking water as a result of which a ban was placed on the
use of the water, and municipal drinking water was
temporarily supplied instead. Subsequently, the permis-
sible concentration of the relevant pollutant in the drinking
water was raised and the applicants’ supply of municipal
drinking water was stopped. A company’s application to
the licensing authority for a permit to dump waste on the
tip was granted and requests by the applicants that such a
permit must be conditional upon the company taking
precautionary measures to avoid further pollution were
rejected, apart from an obligation to provide the applicants
with safe drinking water should the concentration levels of
pollutants in their own water exceed permitted limits. The
applicants’ only right of appeal against the licensing
authority’s decision was the government, which dismissed
the appeal. The applicants complained that they had been
denied a hearing before a tribunal in the determination of
their civil rights, in violation of article 6(1) of the
Convention. The Court held unanimously that there was a
breach of article 6(1)18 and awarded non-pecuniary
damages of SKR 30,000 to each applicant, as well as SKR
145,860 toward their court expenses.
Article 6(1) is an important remedy that may be used if
the access to justice provisions of the Aarhus Convention
are not guaranteed by national law. However, a few issues
must be highlighted with regard to such claims. In consid-
ering complaints based on the violation of article 6(1), the
Court must ascertain whether there was a dispute over a
right recognized under domestic law. The dispute can also
be genuine and serious: it must relate not only to the actual
existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of
its exercise. Finally, the result of the proceedings must be
directly decisive for the right in question.19
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Chapter 2
Environmental human rights protection in
the European Court of Human Rights
Andriy Andrusevych
Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994) is probably the most well-
known and cited case of the European Court of Human
Rights where environmental pollution was recognised to
result in the violation of a human right. A waste treatment
plant was built close to the applicant’s home in a town with
a heavy concentration of leather industries. The plant
began to operate without a license, releasing fumes and
odours that caused health problems among local residents.
The applicant alleged breaches of articles 8 and 3 of the
Convention, and claimed compensation for damage and
reimbursement of costs and expenses under article 50. The
court held that there was a breach of article 8 (right to
respect for private and family life) and awarded damages,
as well as expenses and costs.
Two aspects of this case are relevant from the access to
justice point of view:
• the exhaustion of national remedies (which is the
requirement to file a complaint with the European
Court of Human Rights under article 35(1) of the
Convention); and
• the submission of statements and medical reports
(forming grounds for the complaint) not to the nation-
al Spanish courts, but instead directly to the European
Court of Human Rights.
The first aspect concerns one of the most common
obstacles to access to justice: duration of the administrative
and judicial proceedings. The court held that “it was not
necessary for the applicant to institute ordinary criminal
and administrative proceedings since the special applica-
tion for protection of fundamental rights lodged with the
Audiencia Territorial was an effective, rapid means of
obtaining redress in the case of her complaints relating to
her right to respect for her home and for her physical
integrity, especially since that application could have had
the outcome she desired, namely closure of the waste
treatment plant.”
The second important aspect is that, if the administra-
tive or judicial review process lasts long, new facts and
evidence can appear while the complaint is being consid-
ered by national courts or by the European Court of
Human Rights. In Lopez Ostra v. Spain, the court consid-
ered government objections in this regard unfounded and
said that “where a situation under consideration is a
persisting one, the Court may take into account facts occur-
ring after the application has been lodged and even after
the decision on admissibility has been adopted.”
Following Lopez Ostra, other environmental cases
soon appeared, such as Guerra v. Italy (see appendix B),
where the court held that the petitioner’s right under article
8 of the Convention had been infringed even though there
was no showing of potential physical harm. Rather, the
authorities had failed to provide necessary environmental
information to the applicants so that they could be prop-
erly informed about environmental risks from a chemical
factory. This case is also interesting because the court left
open the consideration of a claim under article 2 of the
Convention (right to life). The court stated that, “although
the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain
from such interference: in addition to this primarily nega-
tive undertaking, there may be positive obligations
inherent in effective respect for private or family life.” 
A 2001 decision by the court, Hatton and others v.
United Kingdom (application no. 36022/97), goes further
than Lopez Ostra and Guerra to apply article 8 to the
quality of the inquiry that a government must undertake in
decision-making that affects “private and family life”.20
Applicants living near London Heathrow airport claimed
that a 1993 scheme instituted by the airport significantly
increased the noise levels to which they were subjected
during the night, causing ill health in violation of their
rights. The case turned on the UK government’s argument
that, in instituting the 1993 scheme, a balance had been
struck between private interests and economic interests,
according to article 8(2) of the Convention.
The court focused on the government’s limited research
into the nature of sleep disturbance before the scheme was
put in place, as well as on the poor quality of government
research into the economic benefits of night flights. The
court found that the government had failed to generate
adequate information and to undertake the research neces-
sary to justify its contentions. Given this, the government
was found to have “failed to strike a fair balance” between
the applicants’ rights and a state economic interest in the
implementation of the 1993 scheme.
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In 1993, Canada, Mexico and the US signed the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) — also called the NAFTA Side Agreement. The
agreement established a unique procedure for citizen
complaints to a supranational body about non-enforcement
by a party of its environmental law. While not without its
critics, it is probably the only quasi-judicial forum on inter-
national level designed especially for consideration of
environmental complaints, and it represents an important
achievement of contemporary international environmental
law in the sphere of access to justice.
As provided by article 1 of the NAAEC, the objectives of
are to:
• foster the protection and improvement of the environ-
ment in the territories of the parties for the well-being
of present and future generations; 
• promote sustainable development based on coopera-
tion and mutually supportive environmental and eco-
nomic policies; 
• increase cooperation between the parties in improving
the conservation, protection and enhancement of the
environment, including wild flora and fauna; 
• support the environmental goals of NAFTA; 
• avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers; 
• strengthen cooperation on the development and
improvement of environmental laws, regulations, pro-
cedures, policies and practices; 
• enhance compliance with and enforcement of environ-
mental laws and regulations; 
• promote transparency and public participation in the
development of environmental laws, regulations and
policies; 
• promote economically efficient and effective environ-
mental measures; and 
• promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
The agreement provides for a special institutional
mechanism designed to facilitate and oversee its imple-
mentation by the parties — the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The procedure of
citizen submissions on enforcement matters is covered by
articles 14 and 15 of the agreement. Together with the
Citizen Submission Guidelines, these articles provide the
legal basis for the submission and consideration of citizens’
complaints.
In general, the procedure is as follows. Any NGO or
person can lodge a submission to the secretariat, asserting
that a party is failing to enforce its environmental law effec-
tively. If such a submission meets certain admission
requirements, the secretariat determines whether the
submission merits requesting a response from the party
concerned (the country against which the submission was
filed). After the response from the party, the secretariat can
inform the council that developing a factual record is
warranted. If the council so instructs, the secretariat
prepares such a factual record, which can then be made
publicly available by another decision of the council.
One criticism against this procedure is that “environ-
mental law” is narrowly defined. Another criticism is that a
party may not be held to have failed to enforce its envi-
ronmental law where the action or inaction in question by
agencies or officials of that party: 
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in
respect of investigative, prosecutorial, regulatory or
compliance matters; or
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters
determined to have higher priorities.
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Chapter 3
Access to justice at the international level:
Citizen enforcement under the 
North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation
Andriy Andrusevych
Valid submissions may not extend to legislative steps,
e.g. adopting new regulations, even if adoption of the
new legislation suspends the implementation of the old
legislation.21
For a submission to be considered it must meet certain
technical requirements. Once the submission has success-
fully passed this stage, the Secretariat determines whether
it warrants a response from the concerned Party. In
deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat
shall consider whether: 
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organiza-
tion making the submission; 
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other
submissions raises matters whose further study in this
process would advance the goals of the Agreement; 
(c) private remedies available under the party’s law have
been pursued; and 
(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from reports in the
mass media.
With respect to point (a), the guidelines provide that, in
considering whether the submission alleges harm to the
person or organisation making the submission, the secre-
tariat will consider, among other factors, whether the
alleged harm relates to the protection of the environment
or the prevention of danger to human life or health (but
not directly related to worker safety or health), as stated in
article 45(2) of the agreement.
This definition of harm is broad enough to allow for
submissions concerning the protection of the environment
and natural resources without proof of individual harm.
This was the approach of the secretariat in the Cruise Ship
Pier Project submission.22
With respect to point (c), the guidelines do not require
exhaustion of national remedies. In some cases a mere
attempt (or reasonable efforts) to use private remedies was
enough to meet this requirement.23
If the secretariat decides that the submission merits a
response from the party, it informs the party about the
submission by sending a copy to the party, together with
any additional information.
The response from the party shall be sent within 30
days (in exceptional circumstances, 60). The considera-
tion process can be terminated if the party advises the
secretariat that the matter is the subject of a pending judi-
cial or administrative proceeding. The guidelines define
this as follows:
(a) a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
action pursued by the party in a timely fashion and in
accordance with its law. Such actions comprise: medi-
ation; arbitration; the process of issuing a license, per-
mit, or authorization; seeking an assurance of volun-
tary compliance or a compliance agreement; seeking
sanctions or remedies in an administrative or judicial
forum; and the process of issuing an administrative
order; and 
(b) an international dispute resolution proceeding to
which the party is part.
According to secretariat case-law, only proceedings
that are designed to culminate in a specific decision, ruling,
or agreement within a definable period of time may be
considered as falling within this provision. Activities that
are solely consultative, information-gathering or research-
based in nature, without a definable goal, are not sufficient
to trigger the automatic termination clause.24 Moreover, the
party must provide evidence that the proceedings are
ongoing and meet the requirements.
In addition, the guidelines provide that the party may
include in its response whether environmental policies
have been defined or actions taken in connection with the
matter in question.
Following this stage, the council may instruct the secre-
tariat to compile a factual record. The votes of two of the
three council members are required for such a decision.
That is at least one of the factors that has led to a very small
number of decisions on the preparation of factual records.
By the end of November 2001, only eight out of 31 submis-
sions resulted in a council instruction to the secretariat to
prepare factual records.25 The final factual record may be
made public by the two-thirds vote of the council. This is
the end of the process. As such, it has a similar force to
decisions of an ombudsman. By the end of January 2002,
two factual records had been completed by the secretariat,
approved by the council, and made public.
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1 Doors to democracy, four volumes, op. cit.
2 See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, annex I.
3 See Cameron, James & Abouchar, Juli, The status of the precautionary
principle in international law, in Freestone and Hey, The precautionary
principle and international law: The challenge of implementation, The
Hague: Kluwer, 1996, p 48, nn. 62-69.
4 See Fitzmaurice, op cit., pp. 910-11 and accompanying footnotes. Also
Mahoney, K.E. & Mahoney, P. (eds), Human rights in the 21st century,
Dordrecht, 1993. See especially the articles by Trinidade and Handl.
5 See President of the Tribunal of First Instance of Antwerp, April 20, 1999,
unreported.
6 See also Shemshuchenko, Y., Human rights in the field of environmental
protection in the draft of the new Constitution of the Ukraine, in Deimann,
S. & Dyssli, B. (eds), Environmental rights: Law, litigation and access to jus-
tice, London: Cameron May, 1996, pp. 33-40. The author states on p. 35:
“the human right to a healthy environment is actually the right of an indi-
vidual to demand the maintaining of ecological standards, set up by law.”
7 In the subject case, the fact that no provision had been made in the
amendments to offer such a level of protection once the forests were to
have passed into private hands was evidence that the state had failed in its
basic responsibility to ensure an objectively high level of environmental
protection. Thus, the court invalidated the amendments.
8 Pres. Trib. Anvers, 2 fevrier 1999, en cause de: S.G., P.M. et co. c/
I.S.C.R.L., Kluwer Editions Juridique Belgique, Amenagement-
Environnement, 1999/3, 228, overruled on other grounds.
9 President of the Tribunal of First Instance of Antwerp, April 20, 1999,
unreported.
10 20 E.H.R.R. 277, 1995.
11 Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended. Ibid., p. 230. Article 8,
entitled Right to respect for private and family life, states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence; and (2) There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of nation-
al security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
12 The European Declaration on Human Rights is now applicable in most
of the countries in the UNECE region.
13 In the words of Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the UN. See
Foreword, Implementation guide, op. cit.
14 Thus, it addresses one of the shortcomings in the establishment of the
right to a healthy environment — that is, the lack of effective implementa-
tion. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9.
15 The background of the Aarhus Convention and in particular the links
made by its preamble are treated in greater detail in Implementation guide,
op. cit., especially pp. 12-13, 16-17.
16 Opinion of the ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
1996, pp. 241-242.
17 Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1995) 20 E.H.R.R 277, paragraph 51.
18 Article 6(1) of the Convention states: “In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
19 E.g., see Skarby v. Sweden (A/180-B): (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 90, paragraph
27.
20 As the case is still pending in the Grand Chamber, the judgement has
not yet become effective and will do so only upon final judgement by the
Grand Chamber of the ECHR. See Teßner, Dirk, Night flights at London
Heathrow violate human rights, 1 ELNI Review 29, 2002, for a detailed
handling of the case.
21 See the Spotted Owl submission by Earthlaw, Submission A14/SEM/ 95-
001/06/14(2).
22 See Recommendation of the secretariat to council for the development
of a factual record in accordance with articles14 and 15, SEM-96-001, June
7, 1996.
23 Ibid.
24 SEM-97-001/B.C. Hydro recommendation of the secretariat to the coun-
cil, April 27, 1998.
25 See Stanton Kibel, Paul, Awkward evolution: Citizens enforcement at the
North American Environmental Commission, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10769,
2002.
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Case Studies
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The cases that follow were generated during the devel-
opment of the handbook. These case studies were submit-
ted by national focal points for the Aarhus Convention in
response to a request from the government of Estonia (the
Access to Justice Task Force lead country), and by inde-
pendent, non-governmental lawyers and NGOs in response
to announcements made by the project team. 
The announcements soliciting case studies requested
that case studies be submitted in a standard format. Case
study authors were encouraged to provide commentary,
and were required to take into account the views of all par-
ties and stakeholders involved. A standard letter was pro-
vided for this purpose. 
In addition, most of the case studies were submitted to
comments by members of the Project Steering Committee
and were further developed according to a predetermined
template. Virtually all case studies provided by countries
have been included in the handbook. Of those provided
by NGOs and lawyers, the selection criteria included rele-
vance to the Aarhus Convention, geographical scope and
the range of subjects covered. The goal was to have cases
from as many countries and on as large a range of subjects
as possible. A number of the cases from Central Europe
and the EECCA region were generated during a Sub-
Regional Case Study Development Meeting held in Lviv,
Ukraine, June 4-5, 2001. 
Case studies were collected until July 2002 and were
current at this time.
The analysis of each case study was written by the
respective authors and submitters. Every effort was made
to clarify the issues found in each case, through dialogue
with the authors and revision of the studies, and the cases
were edited to ensure consistency. In addition, the cases
submitted by non-governmental lawyers and NGOs were
transmitted to the Aarhus Convention focal points in the
subject countries for commenting. Nevertheless, it is virtu-
ally impossible to verify all aspects of cases coming from a
variety of sources in such a wide and diverse geographical
region. Thus, the editor and the states and organisations
involved in the publication of the handbook cannot
assume responsibility for the content or for any views
expressed in the cases. 
Appendix B, entitled, “Other cases and background
materials,” consists of significant cases and relevant mate-
rial that have been identified in the course of research in
the development of the analytical part of the handbook,
but which for one reason or another could not be fully
developed according to the methodology above. These
cases are generally presented in original form, often
abridged, but unedited. In some instances, summaries of
the cases have been written especially for the handbook.
Case study methodology
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Table of cases
Cases
COUNTRY AND  CASE NAME AARHUS CONVENTION KEYWORD
NUMBER PROVISION 
Armenia
Case 1 Victory Park Case Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Right to public participation, remedies
Article 9(4)   
Austria 
Case 1 Enns River Road Case Article 9(2) Legal standing  
Belgium 
Case 1 Representative Article 9(2) Legal standing
Standing Case    
Case 2 Special Procedure Article 9(2) Legal standing
Case    
Case 3 Organisational Mission Article 9(2) Legal standing
Standing Case      Article 9(3)   
Bulgaria 
Case 1 Pirin Mountain Case Article 9(2)(b)  Improper procedure for public 
participation  
Case 2 Elshitza Case Article 9(3) Improper procedure for public 
Article 9(4) participation/injunctive relief     
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Cases
COUNTRY AND  CASE NAME AARHUS CONVENTION KEYWORD
NUMBER PROVISION 
Czech Republic 
Case 1 Sumava National Article 6(4), Article 9(2) Legal standing
Park Case         Article 9(3), Article 6(3)  
Case 2 Gravel Mining Case Article 9(2) Legal standing
Case 3 Bohemian Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Lack of judicial review
Highway Case Article 6(4)       
Georgia 
Case 1 Defence of National Article 9(2) Sufficient interest/financial and other
Park Case  Article 9(5) barriers        
Case 2 Vake Park Case Article 9(1), Article 9(2) Legal standing/financial and 
Article 9(3), Article 9(5) other barriers           
Germany 
Case 1 Waste Fuel Plant Case Article 9(4) Legal standing/injunctive relief  
Case 2 Experts’ Documents Case Article 9(1) Improper procedure for public 
Article 9(2) participation       
Case 3 Windmill Case Article 9(2) Legal standing  
Case 4 Nature Reserve Case Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Legal standing/injunctive relief    
Article 9(4)   
Case 5 Baltic Sea  Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Legal standing/injunctive relief    
Motorway Case Article 9(4)   
Case 6 Elbe Case Article 9(2) Legal standing/injunctive relief    
Article 9(3)   
Hungary 
Case 1 Balaton Highway Case Article 9(2), Article 9(4) Legal standing       
Case 2 Metal Plant Case Article 9(1) Access to information  
Kazakhstan 
Case 1 Petrol Plant Case Article 9(4) Improper procedure for public 
participation  
Case 2 Waste in the Article 9(3) Legal standing/enforcement of law    
Caspian Case Article 9(4)   
Case 3 Excessive Fees Case Article 9(4) SLAPPs/barriers to effective public 
participation  
Lithuania 
Case 1 Extra-Judicial Proceeding Article 9(3), Article 9(4) Extra judicial procedure
Case         
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Cases
COUNTRY AND  CASE NAME AARHUS CONVENTION KEYWORD
NUMBER PROVISION 
Moldova 
Case 1 Sarmi Park Case Article 9(1), Article 9(2) Access to information/public 
Article 9(3), Article 9(4) participation/injunctive relief    
Netherlands 
Case 1 Oily Bird Case Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Legal standing       
Case 2 “Indispensable” Article 9(3), Article 9(4)   Legal standing/injunctive relief/
Pesticides Case  financial and other barriers    
Poland 
Case 1 Highway and Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Improper public participation procedure
Housing Case Article 9(4)   
Russia 
Case 1 Water Works: A Case  Article 9(2), Article 9(3) Improper public participation 
in Progress Article 9(4) procedure/remedies            
Case 2 Nikitin Case Article 2(3), Article 3(8)  Access to information/fair, equitable 
Article 9(4) and timely procedure          
Case 3 Shrinking Park Case Article 9(2)(b), Article 9(3) Legal standing/injunctive relief/
Article 9(4) access to information            
Serbia and Montenegro 
Case 1 Silver Plate Case Article 9(3), Article 9(4) Enforcement of administrative decisions   
Case 2 Zvesda Cafe Case Article 9(3), Article 9(4) Enforcement of administrative decisions  
Case 3 Cacak Case Article 9(2) Improper procedure for 
public participation 
Spain 
Case 1 Nuclear Files Case Article 9(1), Article 9(4) Financial, time and other barriers    
Article 9(5)   
Case 2 Aznalcollar Waste  Article 9(3), Article 9(4) Financial and other barriers    
Dam Case Article 9(5)  
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COUNTRY AND  CASE NAME AARHUS CONVENTION KEYWORD
NUMBER PROVISION 
Ukraine
Case 1 Ukrainian Right to  Article 9(1) Access to information    
Know Case Article 9(4)   
Case 2 NGO Right to  Article 9(1) Access to information    
Information Case Article 9(4)   
Case 3 Pyrogovo Villagers Case Article 9(3) Legal standing/remedies  
Case 4 Troublesome Cafe Case Article 6, Article 9(2) Improper procedure for public 
Article 9(4) participation/remedies    
Case 5 Access to  Article 2, Article 4 Access to information    
Information Case Article 9(1)   
United Kingdom 
Case 1 Lappel Bank Case Article 9(4) Legal standing/injunctive relief  
Case 2 Agricultural Storage  Article 9(4) Financial barriers    
Centre Case Article 9(5)   
United States 
Case 1 Telephone Case Article 9(2) Insufficient information for effective 
Article 9(4) public participation       
Cases
The Victory Park Case
Residents seeking to stop ongoing construction of a
large development in order to secure their rights to partic-
ipate in decision-making on the project, faced considerable
obstacles in attempting to use the courts.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2), (3) and (4) 
Key issues
• Standing
• Injunctive relief 
• Unbiased and objective approach of judges 
Case study details
Cited case name: The Proposed Development of Hotel in
Victory Memorial Park, Yerevan City, Armenia 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Two citizens, residing near Victory Park,
Yerevan City
Plaintiffs’ representation: Environmental Public
Advocacy Center, Armenia
Defendants: General architect, Golden Palace Hotel
Complex; Republic of Armenia, Prime Minister
Background facts 
In the city of Yerevan, Armenia, Victory Park is a
revered place of natural beauty and civic pride. Established
in 1945, the multi-acre park serves as a memorial to World
War II veterans and a home to numerous species of plants
and wildlife. On this long designated protected area, all
development and construction are prohibited except for
those projects approved for “functional” purposes. 
In 2000, Yerevan Municipality authorities approved a
preliminary proposal for the construction of the Golden
Palace, a large hotel complex situated on park grounds.
On October 9, 2000, however, the mayor of Yerevan
issued a resolution stating that a construction permit
would not be granted until an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) of the project had been performed,
reviewed and approved by officials.
Under Armenian law, any proposed development
equal to or more than 1,000 square metres must have an
EIA. In this, the proposed project qualifies. In addition, EIA
regulations require that the assessment entail a three-stage
public hearing in which interested parties can evaluate the
EIA and advise the ultimate decision-making.
Despite this, on October 11, 2000, only two days after
the mayor’s order, the general architect overseeing the
project ordered the beginning of construction. In response,
the General Prosecutor’s Office warned the architect that
commencing construction was illegal. Nevertheless, con-
struction continued.
Residents located near Victory Park filed a lawsuit
against the architect.
Procedural history 
Enlisting the legal representation of the Environmental
Public Advocacy Center (EPAC), the residents filed a com-
plaint before the court of first instance, asserting that the
architect proceeded with construction in violation of EIA
regulations. In doing so, the architect had denied the resi-
dents the opportunity to participate in proceedings regard-
ing the hotel development and its impact on the environ-
ment and community. Further, in order to preserve avail-
able remedies throughout the proceedings residents
requested an injunction to halt further construction.1 The
court denied the residents’ request for an injunction.
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After more than two months, the hearing of the case
began. The architect, however, did not attend, sending
instead a certificate asserting that the commencement of
construction was valid. In short order, the court dismissed
the lawsuit without addressing the merits of the claim.
Final outcome 
Construction onsite continues. An EIA and attendant
public hearing have not been performed.
Related actions and campaigns
Using the Internet and the Caucasus Environmental
NGO Network (CENN), information has been disseminat-
ed about the illegal construction and its potential conse-
quences.
Access to justice techniques 
Plaintiffs attempted to stop construction and ensure
EIA proceedings by filing a lawsuit and requesting injunc-
tive relief. In preparation of the lawsuit, EPAC organised
strategy meetings with other NGOs, mass media, architects
and representatives of the General Prosecutor’s Office.
Based on the meetings, EPAC sent interrogatories (official
questions) to the mayor, the prime minister and the gener-
al prosecutor regarding the facts of the case and alleged
violations of law. For example, EPAC requested that the
mayor provide information on the following:
• the Mayor’s resolution on hotel construction;
• whether an EIA had been carried out;
• the conclusion of the EIA (if one had been carried out);
and 
• whether public meetings were held concerning the
project, as required by EIA rules.
Based on this information, EPAC then assembled its case.
Case study analysis
Like many nations, Armenia has several laws on the
books that grant citizens access to justice in the form of
NGO standing, public hearings and judicial review. As this
case study illustrates, however, printed laws need to be
enforced in practice by government officials and the
courts.
In the instant matter, EIA rules state precisely that proj-
ects such as the one at issue require an EIA and that the
public has a right to participate in the proceeding. Yet the
court balked at issuing an injunction that would preserve
that right by halting construction. It is common for the
court not to issue injunctions in environmental matters,
given its lack of familiarity with environmental laws.
However, it is in these matters where they are most often
required. If injunctions are to become a viable “access to
justice” tool, then courts must rise to the challenge and see
their value.
Aiding in this process would be the reforming of
another matter arguably present in this case — the non-
independence of the judiciary. Particularly in environmen-
tal cases, where judicial review of government actions is
common, the judiciary must see itself not as an arm of the
government authority but rather as a neutral conduit
through which citizens and the government can resolve
differences. The most common example of this problem is
in the area of public participation. Similar to injunctions,
procedural rights to participate and be informed are essen-
tial “access to justice” tools. In the instant case, the court
did not go far enough to preserve this right. Instead, it sac-
rificed the public’s participatory rights in the interest of
“efficiency” and appeasing well-heeled interests. 
If access to justice laws are to have any significance, the
courts of Armenia and elsewhere must do more to bring
them into the light of the courtroom.
Contacts 
Aida Iskoyan, Environmental Law Professor
President, Environmental Public Advocacy Center (EPAC) 





E-mail: epac@arminco.com, aidaisk@arminco.com 
Vardan Grigoryan, Erna Tadevosyan, 
EPAC lawyers
Address as above
Tel/Fax: +37-41-530-669 (w) 
Tel: +37-41-539-255 (alt)
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Enns River Road Case
Plans to construct a road along the Enns River would
cut through areas that are under the protection of the
Natura 2000 regime. Various stakeholders used different





• Public participation during the preparation of execu-
tive regulations and/or generally legally binding nor-
mative instruments
• Access to administrative and judicial review procedures
Case study details
Cited case name: Planned construction of new road
along riverside of Enns River
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Local communities, several people from the
region and their groups, citizens’ group “NETT”
Defendants: Government of the province of Styria
Third-party intervenors: WWF Austria, Vogelwarte
association for bird protection
A special investigation procedure was initiated by the
European Commission against the Government of Austria,
based on complaints submitted by WWF Austria and other
interest groups.
Background facts 
The construction of a road along the Enns River was
under discussion for 25 years. At first a motorway was
proposed, and then it was downsized to a regular Federal
road (Bundesstrasse). The old road led through cities and
villages of the region. The new road was planned to be
located far away from where people live, close to the
waterside, cutting through a protected area with endan-
gered species of birds.
Since Austria became a member state of the European
Union, huge parts of the location came under the protec-
tion of the Natura 2000 regime.
The opinions of people from the region were divided
over the project, and it became a complicated issue both
politically and legally. The final decision had not been
taken as of late 2001, but it appeared likely that the road
would never be constructed.
Procedural history 
For the construction of the road, according to Austrian
legislation, several legal acts and administrative decisions
were necessary:
1) a ministerial decree (Verordnung) defining the exact
location of the road (similar to the building permit);
2) a local government decision (permit) according to the
nature protection law of the province of Styria;
3) an “exceptional” decision legalising the road construc-
tion in the protected area (contrarius actus to the act
granting protection status);
4) a water consent/permit, as the road was planned very
close to the riverside and several dwellings of land
owners could have been affected; and
5) an expropriation of the farmers and other affected land
owners not willing to sell the land required for the proj-
ect, and the ecological compensation measures.
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With regard to (1), groups opposing the construction of
the road brought a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court of
Austria, but did not succeed. The decree was still in force.
The law on federal roads was very restrictive when it
came to legal standing issues: No legal standing for neigh-
bours, citizen groups or NGOs. The reason citizens
addressed the Constitutional Court of Austria and not the
Administrative Court was that the Administrative Court was
only competent for complaints against individual decisions
of administrative authorities, not against ministerial decrees.
In terms of (2), the decision, according to the appli-
cable law, could only be issued for a limited period of time
and had expired. There was no valid permit according to
the nature protection law at the moment. Taking into
account the developments of the last years (Natura 2000,
LIFE project) a positive decision appeared to be most
unlikely in late 2001. The nature protection law of the
province of Styria granted no legal standing for neigh-
bours, citizens of the region or NGOs, so these groups
could only act through contacts to politicians and other
forms of lobbying. 
Regarding (3), the contrarius actus was to be set by the
local government of Styria. The “Ombudsman for nature”
(Umweltanwalt) of the province of Styria had legal
standing in the procedure and brought a lawsuit to the
Administrative Court, but the remedy was unsuccessful.
NGOs and citizen groups had no legal standing in the
procedure.
In point (4), the authority responsible for the road
construction first claimed that a water consent would not
be necessary and started construction of a bridge
(Sallaberger Brucke). Expertise later brought evidence that
the whole infrastructure project would need a water
permit. Finally a water consent procedure was started, but
never came to a successful end. The Administrative Court
ruled twice that the permit was granted illegally. The
Federal Water Law of Austria gave legal standing to neigh-
bours and all persons whose (water) rights could be
affected. WWF Austria and other groups and organisations
established good cooperation with affected persons and
together they twice brought a lawsuit to the Administrative
Court and were successful in both cases. As of late 2001
there was no water consent for the project.
With regard to (5), the nature consent (as long as it had
not expired) obliged the road construction authority to set
ecological compensation measures. To carry them out
specific pieces of land were needed, but owners were not
willing to sell and an expropriation procedure was initi-
ated. The land owners went to the Administrative Court,
which ruled that, according to existing legislation, expro-
priation for ecological compensation measures was not
possible. It soon became clear that the road could not be
built legally without setting these ecological compensation
measures. The expropriation issue therefore became the
major obstacle for the project.
Final outcome
The court decided that the water consent was granted
illegally and the expropriation was not possible. Thus
there was no possibility to carry out the project under the
current legal situation. In the meantime the law was
changed (Lex Ennstal). According to the new provisions,
the expropriation for ecological compensation measures
would be possible, after carrying out an EIA. But politi-
cians finally decided against the project and found a
different solution (improvements along the existing road),
although the decree fixing the line of the road (the building
permit) still existed at the date of writing the case. One of
the main reasons a (political) change was needed was that
since Austria became a member state of the EU the Natura
2000 system became legally binding. But the most impor-
tant factor to the success was the consequent work of
NGOs and citizens’ groups providing information, exerting
political pressure and using all possible legal remedies.
Related actions and campaigns
Since Austria became a member state of the EU, a new
obstacle was raised for the people in favour of the road
construction: The Natura 2000 system. The WWF and other
groups objecting to the road project referred to the respec-
tive EU legislation at an early stage to stop the project. It
was proven that an endangered bird species
(Wachtelkonig) lives in the project area. A comprehensive
complaint was sent to the European Commission, which
initiated investigations against the Austrian government.
Parallel to this, a LIFE project was carried out in the region
to raise awareness.
Access to justice techniques
Neither the water law of Austria nor the nature protec-
tion law of the province of Styria gives a right to the
authorities to expropriate land from the owners for this
specific case (ecological compensation measures).
The wells of the land owners next to the project
terrain were threatened — giving the land owners legal
standing in the procedure and proving that the consent
was granted illegally.
Case study analysis
The main obstacles to access to justice were related to
the high fees for the lawyers for appeals to the Constitutional
Court and the Administrative Court in Austria. This money
was provided, among others, by WWF Austria.
Close cooperation between local residents and people
from the region, the WWF, the European Commission and
other parties involved was an important element in the
success of the case.
Using the water consent procedure — where local resi-
dents have legal standing — to bring forward all relevant
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arguments, and opposing the expropriation by using all
possible remedies, were key elements contributing to the
success of the case.
At least as important as the legal remedies was the
information to all people involved (local, regional and
federal politicians) about the facts based on scientific
evidence put on the table by NGOs and citizens’ groups.
Comments of participants in the process
“The whole very long story showed that legal standing
of neighbours and other persons likely to be affected
was the prerequisite for the successful fight for the
environment. A future legal standing of NGOs and citi-
zen groups would be a very big step ahead. These
groups then would not be dependent on co-operation
being established with neighbors/affected persons and
could act independently and in addition to them. I
think that implementation of the Aarhus Convention in
the Austrian legislation could help or even guarantee
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Representative Standing Case
What is considered to be a “personal” and “direct”
interest in order to have access to any court in Belgium, be
it administrative, civil or criminal, varies from one proce-
dure to the next (and sometimes from case to case), in






• Criteria for defining a direct and personal interest
Case study details
Cited case name: Council of State,2 September 11, 1981,
No 21.384, A.S.B.L.3 Werkgroep voor milieubeheer
Brasschaat Supreme Court, November 19, 1982, S.A.
Sipedic vs. A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer
Brasschaat
Parties involved
In front of the Council of State: 
Plaintiffs: A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer
Brasschaat 
Defendant: The Flemish Region4
In front of the Supreme Court: 
Plaintiff: S.A. Sipedic 
Defendant: A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer
Brasschaat.
Background facts
The matter concerned the designation of the
“Eikendael domain” (located in Brasschaat) as being of
high ecological value.
An enterprise (S.A. Sipedic) that owns the Eikendael
domain wished to build apartment blocks for elderly
people in the area. The spatial planning regulation was
modified in order to change the designation of the
Eikendael domain and thus allow the construction of the
apartment blocks. 
The A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer Brasschaat,
wanting to protect the area, contested this new spatial
planning regulation. 
Procedural history
In front of the Council of State
In order to challenge an administrative act in front of
the Council of State, and according to the case law of the
Council of State,5 the plaintiff must prove a direct and
personal interest. 
In an environmental context, and regarding individ-
uals, the personal and direct interest is determined with
respect to the proximity between the (potential) effects of
the administrative act and the individual. What is consid-
ered to be a personal and direct interest thus varies from
case to case, depending, inter alia, on the nature of the
activity authorised by the act (hence, 150 metres between
the activity and the residence of the individual may be
close enough in one case, and too far away in another). 
Regarding environmental associations, the Council of
State either examines whether the association is consid-
ered to be “representative,” as in the present case, or
assesses whether the association’s statutory goal is suffi-
ciently specific and likely to be affected by the
administrative act in question (see Belgium Case 3). The
Council of State sometimes combines the two criteria.
In this case, the Flemish Region asked the Council of
State to assess whether a non-profit organisation, whose
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statutory purpose is defined by the founding members
themselves, may be considered to have a personal and
direct interest in challenging an administrative act in front
of the Council of State, and, if so, what distinguishes such
an action from the actio popularis. 
The Council of State replied that:
• Non-profit organisations may defend a public interest,
and may define for themselves the level and the nature of
the interest they wish to defend (freedom of association).
• The protection of the environment is a public interest.
• In order to be able to challenge an administrative act in
front of the Council of State, the non-profit organisation
only has to fulfil one condition: it must be considered
representative of the group whose interests it claims to
defend. According to the Council of State, that condi-
tion is fulfilled if the assent (“adhesion”) of the mem-
bers of the group is so large that it may be assumed that
the points of view of the organisation coincide with the
points of view of the members of the group the organ-
isation claims to represent. This assumption must be
rebutted by the adverse party (in the present case, the
Flemish Region failed to rebut the assumption, and
A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer Brasschaat was
thus considered to be representative and was granted
access to the Council of State).
In front of the civil courts
Pending the outcome of the annulment procedure in
front of the Council of State, the A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor
milieubeheer Brasschaat asked the civil courts (the presi-
dent of the court of first instance) to suspend the spatial
planning regulation.6
The president of the court of first instance considered
A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer Brasschaat to have
a sufficient interest because the organisation pursues the
protection of the environment of Brasschaat and the
Eikendael domain (located in Brasschaat) maintains its
designation of “high ecological interest.” The court of first
instance suspended the regulation. 
S.A. Sipedic lodged an appeal against the decision, but
the Court of Appeals, on March 12, 1981, confirmed the
decision of the court of first instance. 
S.A. Sipedic filed a complaint in front of the Supreme
Court, contesting whether A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor
milieubeheer Brasschaat should have been granted
standing and access to justice under the suspension proce-
dure since, according to S.A. Sipedic, a statutory purpose
cannot be considered to be a personal and direct interest.
The Supreme Court agreed with S.A. Sipedic and
declared that a personal and direct interest of a legal
person only includes its own material and moral rights
(reputation), and not its statutory purpose. The Supreme
Court ruled that even if the organisation may be consid-
ered to have a personal and direct interest in another
context (i.e. the annulment procedure in front of the
Council of State) this does not imply that it has a personal
and direct interest in front of the civil courts. The Supreme
Court thus reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court has confirmed its standpoint
several times since, both regarding civil and criminal cases.
Final outcome
Though the Council of State granted access to the
A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer Brasschaat, the
latter failed to convince the Council of State that the spatial
planning regulation was illegal. The regulation was thus
not annulled.
The inferior civil courts suspended the regulation, but
as explained above, the Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sions. In short, the apartment blocks were constructed.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
The NGO used parallel proceedings to attack the
spatial planning regulation before the Council of State and
the civil courts. 
Case study analysis
This case presents an obstacle to non-profit organisa-
tions wishing to challenge environmentally harmful acts in
front of the Belgian civil and criminal courts. As explained
above, in determing whether an NGO has standing, the
Council of State uses a representative criterion. The
Council of State does not, however, specify the “group”
that the organisation is supposed to represent.
With regard to the Supreme Court, a personal and
direct interest of a legal person only includes its own mate-
rial and moral rights (reputation) and not its statutory
purpose. The A.S.B.L. Werkgroep voor milieubeheer
Brasschaat tried to convince the Supreme Court that, since
it had been granted access to the Council of State for the
annulment procedure, it should also be granted access to
the civil courts for the suspension procedure. The Supreme
Court clearly refuted the argument: the fact that the associ-
ation has been granted access to the Council of State does
not imply that it should have access to the civil courts. This
position of the Supreme Court was confirmed a few years
later, in a similar case,7 where an environmental associa-
tion tried to convince the Court that access to the Council
of State under the annulment procedure is a personal
(procedural) right, the effectiveness of which should be
protected by the civil courts through the suspension of the
contested act pending the outcome of the annulment
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procedure.8 The Supreme Court replied that the alleged
procedural right is not enough to counterbalance a
“proper” (substantial) right (i.e. the right to construct,
granted by the authorisation in question). Some authors
have interpreted the position of the Supreme Court to
mean that an environmental association might be granted
access to justice in front of civil courts if the adverse party
does not assert a “proper right.” The Supreme Court has
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Special procedure
Residents joined with a non-profit environmental
organisation to make use of a specific procedure (action en
cessation) that the legislature introduced in order to over-
come the obstacle detailed in Belgium Case 1, resembling





• Procedure for judicial review
Case study details
Cited case name: President du tribunal civil de Namur
(President of the civil tribunal of Namur), referes,10 July
31, 2000, Aeroport de Bierset 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: S. Tassier et al. 
Defendants: S.A. Societe de developpement et de promo-
tion de l’aeroport de Bierset, the Walloon Region, S.A. TNT
Express Worldwide, S.A. C.A.L. Cargo Airlines 
Third-party intervenors (for the plaintiffs): ASBL
Inter-Environnement Wallonie
Background facts
The legislature introduced a specific procedure by law
on January 12, 1993, resembling the suspension procedure
for certain non-profit environmental organisations (as well
as for the public attorney and for administrative authori-
ties). However, in order to have access to this specific
procedure, the environmental organisation has to fulfil
several conditions: 
• It must be a Belgian registered non-profit organisation
(A.S.B.L.) — this excludes international NGOs.
• It must have existed for at least three years.
• The organisation’s statutory goal must be related to the
protection of the environment and its by-laws must
specify the territorial coverage of the organisation
(local, regional, national).
• The organisation must prove that the actual activities of
the organisation correspond to its statutory goal.
People living around the Bierset airport (in the
Walloon Region), supported by the A.S.B.L. Inter-
Environnement Wallonie (the most important
environmental organisation in the Walloon Region), asked
the president of the court of first instance to prohibit all
take-offs and landings between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. in order
to reduce the noise created by the aircraft.
Procedural history
The defendants (the three enterprises detailed above
and the Walloon Region) objected to the standing of the
plaintiff (a natural person) and the intervening parties (incl.
A.S.B.L. Inter-Environnement Wallonie), contending that
they did not have a personal and direct interest in the case.
Regarding the legal person (A.S.B.L. Inter-Environnement
Wallonie), the defendants referred to the case law of the
Supreme Court (see Belgium Case 1) according to which
an environmental organisation may not rely upon its statu-
tory purpose for access to the civil courts.
The president of the first court of instance replied that:
• The civil courts have jurisdiction over personal rights
(droits subjectifs);
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• The right to a healthy environment, as provided for in
the Belgian Constitution (article 23), is not a personal
right per se, but is “illustrated” (the president’s own
word) by other norms, such as the law of January 12,
1993 creating the special procedure for environmental
organisations (see introduction to the present case);
• The A.S.B.L. Inter-Environnement Wallonie may have
access to the normal suspension procedure since the
organisation would have been granted access under
the special procedure and the legislature, by creating
this special procedure, recognises the importance of
collective interests. 
Final outcome
There was no appeal of the decision of the president of
the court of first instance of Namur, since he found that the
matter was not urgent, and thus that he did not have the
authority to prohibit flights under the emergency procedure. 
Related actions and campaigns
Parallel to the suspension procedure described above,
the plaintiffs (and other persons) also filed a classic
liability claim in front of the court of first instance of Liege,
which decided, on February 9, 2001, to grant standing to a
large number of the plaintiffs. The decisions (CFI and
Court of Appeals) were still not publicly available as of
August 2002, and the case was still pending before the
Court of Appeals. 
Access to justice techniques 
Access to justice of A.S.B.L. Inter-Environnement
Wallonie was linked to the constitutional right to a healthy
environment, linked in turn to the procedural right created
by the law of January 12, 1993.
Case study analysis
Because of the strict conditions for applicability of the
specific procedures, few environmental organisations have
actually managed to make use of the procedure. By
creating the special procedure, the legislature clearly
avoided approval or disapproval of the case law of the
Supreme Court. In principle, therefore, environmental
organisations still do not have access to the “normal”
procedures. But the creation of this special procedure has
encouraged some inferior courts to bypass the case law of
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Organisational Mission Standing Case
Three NGOs caused the Council of State to examine
how the statutory goal of an organisation, which must be
sufficiently specific and likely to be affected by the admin-
istrative act in question, could confer standing to challenge
the act.
Relevant Aarhus provisions





Cited case name: Council of State, July 7, 2000, no
88.687, A.S.B.L. Reserves naturelles, A.S.B.L. Aves,
A.S.B.L. WWF-Belgium 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: A.S.B.L. Reserves naturelles, A.S.B.L. Aves,
A.S.B.L. WWF-Belgium 
Defendant: the Walloon Region
Background facts
The spatial planning regulation of Liege was modified
by the Walloon Region in order to allow the installation of
a landfill site on an area called Sur Hez. This area is of great
biological interest, namely for the special kind of frog
(crapaud calamite) that lives there.
Three environmental organisations, wanting to protect
the area, asked the Council of State to suspend the spatial
planning regulation. 
Procedural history
In order to be able to contest the spatial planning regu-
lation likely to threaten a protected frog species, the
plaintiffs — three environmental associations — tried to
prove their personal and direct interest before the Council
of State as follows:
• The A.S.B.L. Reserves naturelles – whose statutory goal
is to promote nature conservation, especially through
the creation of natural reserves – owns several natural
reserves close to the area in question.
• The A.S.B.L. Aves — whose statutory purpose is to pro-
mote nature conservation, and in particular wild bird
protection — has shown a great interest in frogs.
• The A.S.B.L. WWF Belgium — whose statutory purpose
is to promote, in Belgium as well as in other parts of the
world, the conservation of fauna, flora, sites, waters,
soils and other natural resources — is interested in the
area because it is home to many protected species.
More generally, the plaintiffs asked the Council of State
to consider principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and article 9
of the Aarhus Convention. 
The Council of State replied that:
• The first part of the statutory purpose of the A.S.B.L.
Reserves naturelles (promoting nature conservation) is
not distinct from the general interest and therefore can-
not be regarded as a personal and direct interest,
whereas the second part (creating and protecting natu-
ral reserves) is not relevant to contest the spatial plan-
ning regulation, since the A.S.B.L. Reserves naturelles
has not acquired land and created natural reserves in
the area likely to be affected by the regulation.
• The first part of the statutory purpose of the A.S.B.L.
Aves (conservation of wild fauna) is not distinct from
the general interest and therefore cannot be regarded
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as a personal and direct interest, whereas the second
part of the statutory purpose (protection of wild birds)
does not cover the protection of frogs.
• The statutory purpose of WWF Belgium — to promote,
in Belgium as well as in other parts of the world, the
conservation of fauna, flora, sites, waters, soils and
other natural resources — is not distinct from the gen-
eral interest, and WWF Belgium did not prove that the
frog in question (crapaud calamite) is a threatened
species (in which case WWF Belgium might have a suf-
ficient interest11).12
The Council of State thus did not refer to the represen-
tative criteria (see Belgium Case 1), nor did it consider
article 9 of the Aarhus Convention. The Council of State
only examined whether the statutory purpose of each
organisation was considered to be sufficiently distinct from
the general interest and sufficiently close to the matter
concerned (birds/frogs), to find, in the present matter, that
none of the three environmental organisations fulfilled
these conditions.
Final outcome
None of the three environmental organisations was
granted access to the Council of State. The landfill site
came under construction.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Case study analysis
This case entails considerable uncertainty: What might
be considered to be a personal and direct interest of an
association varies — as with natural persons — from one
case to the other. The statutory purpose of an organisation
often does not help to establish its interest.
Comments of participants in process
The lawyer of the three environmental organisations
said that, had Belgium ratified the Aarhus Convention and
had the Convention been in force, then the Council of State
might have concluded differently (although the case
concerned a regulation and not an individual act cf. article







Limited opportunity for judicial review and narrow
interpretations of procedural rights hindered NGOs’ efforts
to halt development in Pirin Mountain National Park until







Cited case name: Protection of Pirin Mountain
National Park
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Association for the Wild Nature — Balkani
(AWN), Centre for Environmental Information and
Education (CEIE), Eco Club 2000, Bulgarian Bird
Protection Association, ecological association “For the
Earth,” non-governmental association Green Balkans
(collectively “NGOs”)
Defendant: Ministry of Environment and Waters (MOEW)
Third-party intervenor (for defendant): Municipality of
Bansko JULEN, interested investor
Background facts 
Pirin Mountain National Park, located in southern
Bulgaria, is a UNESCO natural site (one of only 18 such
sites in Europe protected under the Convention for
Protection of the World Natural and Cultural Heritage).
Over the past 10-15 years several attempts have been
made to build ski resorts in the area, including some that
would extend into the national park. Before 1998, several
of these efforts were successful. In 1998, however, the
Protected Areas Act (PAA) was passed designating national
parks as protected areas and prohibiting the construction
of new sport facilities (article 21, para.1 of PAA). Consistent
with this act, the national park was operated under a
management plan regulating growth and use of the park. 
The Municipality of Bansko, located adjacent to the
park, had a thriving winter tourism industry and sought to
develop a ski resort complex that would extend to portions
of the Pirin Mountain located within the park. The devel-
opment plan for this complex — The Plan for
Development of Ski-Zone-Centre Bansko (“the Plan”) —
directly contravened the park management plan. 
Providing for the clear-cutting of 60 hectares of pine
trees and dwarf pine, the Plan was submitted to the MOEW
for an environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 2000. In
July 2000, MOEW granted conditional approval of the Plan.
Three conditions (paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the deci-
sion) required that Bansko supply missing data and
information within the EIA. In effect, MOEW’s acceptance
of the Plan, which legally must turn, in part, on a complete
EIA, was already granted and awaited necessary changes
to become official.
MOEW never made amendments to the Plan or made
the EIA report publicly available, nor did the agency
invite citizens or NGOs to participate in the decision-
making process.
Procedural history 
NGOs filed a complaint before the Supreme
Administrative Court (court of first appeal), seeking
to challenge MOEW’s decision. In asserting their
claim, NGOs made the following legal arguments: 
• The Plan contravened the national park’s management
plan in that proposed activities within the protected
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area as well as outside the area would endanger sever-
al protected species of animals and plants. Further in-
park development would destroy protected habitats of
pine trees and dwarf pines. 
• MOEW’s conditional acceptance of the Plan was in
violation of EIA procedures that state if an EIA is
incomplete, the report must be sent back to the sub-
mitting party.
• In accordance with the Environmental Protection Act
(EPA), MOEW’s decision at this stage of review should
have been considered a “positive EIA decision” and not
an “approval” of the Plan. MOEW’s acceptance of the
Plan was premature.
The court dismissed the claim, given MOEW’s instruc-
tions to amend the EIA, holding that a final decision had
not been made and thus the NGOs’ lawsuit could not yet
be reviewed on administrative appeal.
In February 2001, upon word that paragraphs 11, 12
and 13 were fulfilled and MOEW had approved the Plan,
two of the NGOs, the Association for Wild Nature (AWN)
and the Centre for Environmental Information and
Education (CEIE), resubmitted their complaint before the
Supreme Administrative Court.
In addition to the prior arguments, the two NGOs
asserted that the approval process was invalid because
the MOEW never submitted the amended version of the
Plan and the EIA report to public discussion (article 23a
of the EPA). 
The NGOs requested that the court hear the testimony
of independent experts who would address the amended
Plan and EIA report, in particular whether they met
MOEW’s conditions and whether the Plan would lead to
the destruction of protected species and habitat. 
On July 12, 2001, the court ruled in favour of MOEW.
In its decision, the court stated the following:
• While some plants, animals and habitat would be
destroyed, the development would not lead to the
destruction of an entire species nor impede the repro-
duction of these species.
• Clear-cutting would occur but to a minimum extent.
• The court stated that the Plan did not contravene the
park’s management plan, but rather replaced it (this is
arguably a mistake of fact — the proposed Plan only
refers to a portion of the national park to be used in
conjunction with development outside the park).
The court did not address the claims that MOEW’s EIA
was invalid for wont of proper participation procedures.
The court’s only reference to the topic was to say that the
original EIA was submitted for public discussion. It failed
to discuss the amendments to the Plan or the EIA.
Final outcome 
On July 10, 2001, two days before the court’s decision,
the Bulgarian Council of Ministers conceded the right to
use part of the national park to Bansko. Under this deci-
sion, the conceded portion of the park, considered
exclusive state property, was leased to Bansko as conces-
sionaire. That party is obliged to invest in the park and
after a certain period (20-30 years), the park reverts to state
ownership.
The two NGOs submitted an appeal of the court’s deci-
sion to a higher court (cassation appeal). The appeal was
rejected by the Administrative Court in September 2001.
The motives of the Appeals Court (consisting of five
members of the Supreme Administrative Court) were
similar to those formulated by the court of first instance.
The case was still pending in 2002, however, because
the MOEW submitted to separate EIA procedures of all the
ski runs in the Plan after the approval of the Plan for
Development of the Pirin Mountain — Region Bansko.
These procedures finished with EIA decisions, issued by
the MOEW. These decisions were appealed in the
Supreme Administrative Court and the Court had not
pronounced its decisions. 
Meanwhile, the MOEW adjusted its procedures from
the end of 2001 to stipulate — in some of its decisions
containing conditions — that the decision will enter into
force (and will be published) after the conditions provided
in the decision are fulfilled. However, the MOEW has not
applied this approach to all EIA decisions, which still
required clarification (this is the question of the equal
application of the law to the different persons). 
Related actions and campaigns
The NGO community started a campaign to lobby the
MOEW to stop the concession procedure. In July 2001,
NGOs and several other organisations requested an open
meeting with MOEW officials to discuss the matter. The
meeting took place on August 10 and yielded valuable
information that was used in the appeal. But there was no
resolution of the matter.
In addition, in July and August 2001, and again in 2002,
NGOs organised a series of press conferences, and other
meetings and campaigns to promote their position.
Access to justice techniques 
NGOs challenged the government’s decision through
participation in approval proceedings, administrative
appeals and by filing legal complaints for judicial review. 
In the course of judicial review, NGOs requested that
the court review the EIA report independently, rather than
relying solely on the testimony of the government agency.
Towards this end, NGOs offered the testimony of experts
and their own findings.
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Case study analysis
Both the court’s refusal to hear expert testimony inde-
pendent of MOEW and its failure to address possible
procedural violations bring into question the degree to
which the court was independent in its review.
Moreover, the court’s erroneous conclusion concerning
citizens’ right to review amended documents and partici-
pate in attendant discussions suggests that participatory
rights have yet to move to the forefront as essential issues
in judicial reviews.
Contacts
Parties to the proceeding
Hristo Bojinov, Director
National Service for Nature Protection 
E-mail: bojinov@moew.govrn.bg 
Vania Grigorova, EIA Expert
National Service for Nature Protection 
E-mail: vaniagr@moew.govrn.bg
Author of case study
Alexander Kodjabashev, Attorney at Law
Ecological Association Demeter
E-mail: kodjabashev@mbox.cit.bg
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Elshitza Case
Substantive violations of the EIA rules were ignored
by the court of first instance and a request for an injunc-
tion to stop the illicit activity was rejected despite clear
evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
Relevant Aarhus provisions




• Fair, timely and equitable review procedures
Case study details
Cited case name: Angel Petrov v. Marin Blaguiev —
tradesman by profession
Elshitza case — lawsuit against illicit waste transporta-
tion and storage initiated by the local initiative committee
with the District Court in Panagiurishte.
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Angel Lazarov Petrov on behalf of the Elshitza
local committee
Plaintiff’s representation: Ecological Association
Demetra
Defendants: Marin Vassilev Blaguiev — tradesman by
profession
Third-party intervenors (for the defendant): Eco
Elshitza Llc, Elshitza Village; Niciola Pushkarov Institute
for Soil Information
Background facts
A waste sedimentation basin existed near the village of
Elshitza. During the 20-30 years prior to the case, it had
served the copper mine Elshitza. After the completion of
the deposits, the mine stopped operating and the sedi-
mentation basin became a reclamation project. Several
proposals had been submitted, and after the EIA was
conducted one project was selected. It provided a clay
sealing layer followed by a soil covering and forestation
with acacia and other suitable tree species. The project
kicked off in early 1999, but was stopped soon after. The
Ministry of Industry shifted its support to another project
which called for sealing the waste copper sediments with
so-called “soil cement” (polymeric material) and then
covering it up with stabilised sewage sludge originating
from Plovdiv’s wastewater treatment plant. The project was
proposed by Marin Blagiev who was issued a waste trans-
portation and storage permit by the Ministry of
Environment and Waters (MOEW) on February 22, 2000.
The identification code of the waste cited in the permission
was 19.08.05, which classified it as non-hazardous. 
In Plovdiv, the second largest city in Bulgaria, several
factories do not have wastewater treatment plants and
regularly discharge industrial wastewater in the city
sewage system. For this reason, the sewage sludge from
the plant was deemed the seventh largest hazardous waste
substance in the country in 1997.
When the new project for transportation, storage and
use of this waste to fertilise grazing land near the village
Elshitza began without an EIA or public participation,
some Elshitza inhabitants founded a local initiative
committee to oppose the government’s decision.
Procedural history
The chairman of the committee, Angel Petrov, filed a
personal complaint stressing the violation of his human
rights as a hedge against eventual objections concerning the
standing of the committee. The claim was lodged at the
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Panagjurishte District Court against the executor of the
project. The main thesis was that the defendant had inten-
tionally misled the MOEW in its permit application by
claiming the sewage sludge from the Plovdiv treatment
plant was not hazardous. The defendant knew that the
Plovdiv plant treated both city and industrial wastewater
because some of the local factories did not have their
own plants. 
The plaintiff asked the court to invalidate the permit
and to order the defendant to cease the transportation and
storage of the dangerous waste near the Elshitza village.
The court was also asked for an injunction prohibiting
continued transportation of the sludge in order to prevent
further damage, but this request was rejected.
During the proceedings an ecologist conducted a
chemical analysis and confirmed the conclusions of several
preliminary experts’ reports that the sewage sludge was
hazardous according to national legislation.
The court ignored these conclusions and did not take
into account the law approving the annual report of
MOEW for 1997. Instead, the court granted the defendant’s
assertion that the absence of a special section for
hazardous waste treatment in the plant proved that the
sewage sludge was not hazardous. The claim was rejected
and the defendant submitted a demand for excessively
high court expenses.
The third-party intervenors had been called to join the
process in order to help the defendant without having any
particular interest. They did not help substantially, but their
absence caused the hearings to be postponed several times
while the defendant was continuing the waste transporta-
tion activities.
During the hearings, the ecologist changed his
conclusion in favour of the defendant. The court did not
raise the question of false testimony even though the
expert clearly gave contradictory explanations for the
same facts.
The permit was issued without an EIA or public partic-
ipation in the decision-making process in contradiction of
the Environmental Protection Act and the Regulation for
Environmental Impact Assessment. The EIA was
completed by the time the project wrapped up, but the
MOEW had refused to stop the activity. 
In the proceedings, it was claimed that the issuing of
the permit was legally defective in several ways:
• The new project did not have a complete EIA proce-
dure, and a public participation procedure had not
occurred before the issuing of the permit.
• The MOEW did not take into account that the Plovdiv
wastewater treatment plant treated not only ordinary
city wastewater but some industrial water as well. The
latter contained many hazardous substances because
some of the factories discharged directly into the
sewage system without pretreatment.
• The MOEW did not take into account its annual report
for the state of the environment for 1997 approved by
the Parliament and published in the National Gazette.
In this report, the MOEW pointed out that Plovdiv’s
wastewater plant was the seventh largest dangerous
waste site in Bulgaria at the time. One of the motives
for the waste transportation from the vicinity of Plovdiv
was to solve a major ecological problem of the village
where the waste was initially stored.
Final outcome 
During the first instance proceedings, waste transporta-
tion and storage continued. 
The plaintiff appealed the first instance court judge-
ment before the Pazardjk Regional Court, but the second
instance proceedings had not begun by mid-2002. The
reason for the delay was a gap in procedural rules
concerning the delivery of the subpoenas and other
messages, including judgements, to the litigants.
In addition, during five months of proceedings, the
Supreme Administrative Court still had not delivered
subpoenas to the MOEW or Marin Blagiev’s company.
Related actions and campaigns
The members of the Elshitza committee made every
effort to stop the project. They met with members of
Parliament, two successive environmental ministers,
local authorities and journalists. The committee members
staged campaigns for civil disobedience. They managed
to persuade the mayor of Panagjurishte to issue an ordi-
nance to stop the waste transportation, which was
shortly thereafter rescinded by the regional governor.
Access to justice techniques 
The committee filed a complaint at the Panagjurishte
District Court against the holder of the waste transportation
and storage permit. However, it also filed complaints with:
• the MOEW to cancel the permit and to compel the
defendant to stop the waste transportation; and
• the Supreme Administrative Court against the MOEW. 
Case study analysis
The first instance court neglected clear, substantial viola-
tions of the law — the EIA was not carried out as required
by article 20 of the Environmental Protection Act and the
Regulation of the EIA; the proposed new project was not
discussed publicly; and the permit was issued in violation of
a law defining this particular waste as hazardous. All of these
were reasons to invalidate the permit.
The court refused to issue an injunction against the
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illegal activity, giving the defendant the opportunity to
cause further environmental damage during court proceed-
ings. The law defining hazardous waste was ignored along
with other facts proving the presence of hazardous
substances in the sewage sludge stored near Elshitza. 
The civil procedure is not geared to dispatch cases with
major public interest because the terms provided are not
clearly defined and defendants can prolong the procedures
in many ways. In particular, the gap in procedural rules
concerning delivery of subpoenas and other documents
allowed litigants to prolong cases without justification.
Contacts 
Michael Kodjabashev, Attorney at Law 
Ecological Association Demeter




16 Skobeleb Blvd. Entr.2
Sofia, Bulgaria
Tel: +35-92-526-956
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Sumava
Czech NGOs seeking judicial review of state logging
practices in Sumava National Park were blocked by rigid
standing requirements failing to recognise an NGO’s broad
environmental interests as actionable.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 6(3) and (4), 9(2) and (3)
Key issues
• Administrative standing 
• SLAPP suits
• Review of public participation in decisions on specif-
ic activities
• Environmental and human rights protection 
Case study details
Cited case name: Logging in the Core Zone of the
Sumava National Park
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Hnuti DUHA (Friends of the Earth Czech
Republic — hereafter NGO)
Plaintiff’s representation: Environmental Legal Service,
a public interest legal organisation
Defendants: Sumava National Park Authority, adminis-
trator of Sumava National Park; Czech Ministry of
Environment — reviewing authority for appeal against
first-level decisions
Background facts
From 1998-2001, the Sumava National Park Authority
(“Sumava”) logged throughout an area within the park
designated as Zone 1, or the most strictly protected zone in
terms of conservation. The stated justification was control
of bark beetle infestations. Despite the logging, the beetle
population expanded, spurring increasing protests from
environmental and inter-governmental groups, including
the IUCN and WWF, that the tree-cutting actually
contributed to the infestations.
In seeking permission to log in Zone 1, Sumava’s Forest
Management Department (forest maintenance body)
requested a permit from Sumava’s State Administration
Department (forest supervisory body) pursuant to the
Czech Forestry Act. According to the Act, the decision to
log could come only through an administrative procedure,
in which interested parties could apply to participate in the
proceedings and offer recommendations in the course of
decision-making. However, the party requesting permis-
sion to log and the party making the final decision are, in
fact, departments within the same governmental body. 
In cases like these, delays in initiating public proceed-
ings are common. Moreover, when a party seeks an appeal
of the State Administration Department’s decision, the
department typically overrides any injunction, citing time
pressures and the urgency to begin logging. 
The Ministry of Environment (“Ministry”), which
oversaw the Sumava Park Authority, consistently
supported the park’s logging policy and handling of the
approval proceedings.
In 1998, in order to expand logging operations beyond
Zone 1, the Sumava Park Authority requested from the
Ministry an exception to the legal protection regime of
specially protected species of plants and animals provided
for in the Landscape and Nature Protection Act. According
to this Act, exceptions are possible only when another
public interest overrides the wish to protect designated
species. The Ministry granted the exception stating that the
logging operation was itself an act of environmental
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protection and therefore no conflict existed with the aims
of the Act.
Hnuti DUHA (Friends of the Earth Czech Republic), a
regional environmental NGO, filed administrative
complaints in response to both the Ministry’s granting of
the permit and the Sumava Park Authority’s approval of
logging in Zone 1. 
Procedural history
Every year when Sumava Park managers applied to
log in Zone 1, the NGO participated in the attendant deci-
sion-making proceedings.
In response to the park authority’s approval of
logging, the NGO filed administrative appeals to the
Ministry. Each year, the following assertions were made:
• Procedural Violations — The conflict of interest in hav-
ing park authorities decide whether park managers can
conduct logging prevented independent decision-mak-
ing and was in violation of the Czech Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Moreover, the NGO asserted that
delays in initiating public proceedings, suppressing
information, and the commencement of logging amid
judicial appeals also contravened the APA.
• Environmental Substantive Violations of Law — The
approval of logging in Zone 1 was in violation of the
Sumava National Park Act and Landscape and Nature
Protection Act. 
Each year, the Ministry ruled in favour of Sumava
authorities. Subsequently, the NGO filed complaints
before the High Court in Prague, reasserting the above
arguments and the following: 
• undue prejudice by the Ministry in allowing logging to
commence; and
• denial of the right to a fair administrative hearing in vio-
lation of Declaration of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, article 36. 
Ministry exceptions to the Landscape 
and Nature Protection Act for logging
The NGO filed a complaint before the High Court in
Prague, seeking judicial review of the Ministry’s decision to
allow an exception to the Landscape and Nature Protection
Act for logging purposes. To have its complaint considered
by the court, the NGO argued that, as the Ministry had a
duty to “act/proceed according to law,” the right must
therefore exist for participants in related decision-making
processes to ensure that this duty is carried out, citing
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The High Court did not grant the NGO standing,
holding that “the rights of NGOs could not have been
violated, because NGOs have no substantive rights in
similar administrative processes.” The court further added
that violating the law in itself does not constitute interfer-
ence with the substantive rights of NGOs. 
Using its constitutional right to bring a complaint to the
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic against interfer-
ence with basic constitutional rights, the NGO filed an
appeal asserting a violation of the Declaration of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, article 36 (right to a fair
trial). The NGO argued that a substantive right existed in
the right to a lawful decision-making process (again citing
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
The Constitutional Court ruled against the NGO,
holding that participants in such matters have only “proce-
dural rights,” which do not include the right to a lawful
decision-making process.
Additionally, the NGO filed a complaint with the
National Environmental Monitoring Agency and later filed
a criminal complaint against the responsible employees of
the Sumava National Park Authority. 
Final outcome 
In response to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the
NGO filed a complaint with the European Court of Human
Rights (application) under article 34 of the European
Convention of Human Rights, asserting that the Czech
court acted in violation of article 6, section 1 of the
Convention — denying it a right to a fair trial. The
complaint was refused. 
The National Environmental Monitoring Agency found
that there was a violation of law and imposed a financial
penalty on the responsible bodies. The criminal
proceeding was still ongoing in August 2002. 
Related actions and campaigns
In 1999, Hnuti DUHA organised a three-month, non-
violent blockade of Zone 1. The Environmental Law
Service provided legal counsel to participants and repre-
sented eight of the accused in settlements with authorities.
In ensuing lawsuits, the law service defended the individ-
uals. Misdemeanour proceedings against the individuals
eventually ended due to the statute of limitations. 
In 2001, members of the Czech Parliament, dissatisfied
with the Sumava National Park Authority’s actions,
proposed reducing the area of the national park. In the
meantime, the Environmental Law Service (ELS), the
NGO’s legal counsel, prepared an alternative bill
proposing exclusion of Zone 1 from logging, while
addressing the factors motivating the clear cuts. Neither bill
was passed and the matter was expected to be taken up by
the new Czech government formed in July 2002.
PA R T  I I I : C A S E  S T U D I E S
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N114
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
Access to justice techniques 
The NGO attempted to challenge the government’s
decision through participation in approval proceedings,
administrative appeals, and by filing legal complaints for
judicial review. The case was finally appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights. In related actions, the
NGO filed criminal complaints.
Case study analysis
To hold that citizens only have a procedural right to
participate in proceedings but no vested interest in seeing
that the procedures are lawful is to frustrate the very
purpose of citizen involvement. The right to speak alone is
an empty grant to citizens and a substantial barrier to
accessing justice. By their rulings, the courts relegate
citizen participation to a “feel good” gesture rather than
allowing it to be an effective safeguard and check on
government action. 
Contacts (Environmental Law Service): 
Concerning administrative processes 






Concerning complaint to the European
Court of Human Rights
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Gravel Mining Case
A Czech NGO seeking judicial review of state logging
practices in the Sumava National Park was blocked by
standing requirements that failed to recognise an NGO’s
broad environmental interest as a basis for standing.
Relevant Aarhus provision
• Article 9(2) 
Key issues
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
• Administrative Standing
• Extraordinary legal remedy/review
Case study details
Cited case name: Village Nedakonice v. Gravel-Mining
Company Sterkovny Ostrozska Nova Ves 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Village Nedakonice
Defendants: Gravel mining company Sterkovny
Ostrozska Nova Ves; Regional Czech Mining Office 
Third-party intervenors: Environmental Law Service
(ELS), an environmental public interest legal organisation;
citizens association of Nedakonice community (not a party
to lawsuit)
Background facts 
Beginning in 1997, Nedakonice, a village along the
Czech-Slovakian border, contested the proposed develop-
ment of a gravel mining operation by Sterkovny Ostrozska
Nova Ves (Nova) next to the village. Amid constant objec-
tions from village authorities and residents, Nova took its
proposed mining operation through the required three-
step assessment and permitting process.
During the first stage, conducted in 1998, the mining
company filed its claim to a mineral deposit and sought to
prevent any other development on the subject property.
According to Czech regulations, the Ministry of the
Environment and the Regional Czech Mining Office
oversaw this stage, conducting an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) of the site. In addition, it had become the
unstated policy of mining officials that only mining compa-
nies were permitted to participate in this first stage —
regardless of the site’s proximity to a community.
In 1999, the case entered its second phase in which the
boundaries of the mining site were defined by the Regional
Czech Mining Office. According to regulations, nearby
municipalities and residents had a right to participate in
determining the surface area of the mining operation.
However, similar to stage one, the Mining Office seldom
allowed public participation in practice. In previous cases,
the Mining Office had stated that because mining does not
officially take place after this stage, substantive rights are
not actually affected. 
During the first two stages, plaintiffs sought to partici-
pate in the proceedings and ultimately sought judicial
review of the decisions of the Mining Office (the case did




Plaintiffs filed an extraordinary appeal before the
Central Czech Mining Office, challenging the granting of
Nova’s mineral deposit claim.13 Plaintiffs claimed that
denying nearby residents the opportunity to participate in
the proceeding violated their right to a fair trial by an inde-
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pendent and impartial court or other state body and the
right to demand protection of their rights, citing the
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, articles
11(4) and 36(1). In addition, plaintiffs asserted that the
owners were in fact affected by the establishment of the
mining claim in that it foreclosed all other uses of the land. 
The Central Czech Mining Office dismissed the appeal.
The plaintiffs did not appeal. 
Stage Two
During stage two, only the Environmental Law Service
was able to take part in the proceedings. Curiously, while
an NGO was able to participate in a proceeding concerning
the proportions of surface area of the operation, mining
officials ruled that the matter would not affect the village of
Nedakonice and therefore they could not participate.
Two strategies were pursued in appealing this ruling:
1) Plaintiffs appealed this decision on behalf of the
village before the Central Czech Mining Office. The appeal
was summarily dismissed.
Subsequently, plaintiffs brought an appeal before the
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, asserting that
the Mining Office’s denial of participation violated article
100 of the Constitution (right of communities to self-
government) and the Declaration of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms, article 36(1) (right to fair trial) and article
36(2) (“when a state administration body affects one’s
rights, that person make seek judicial relief”).
In 2000, the Constitutional Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
complaint, holding that a complaint should be submitted
upon a final decision in the proceedings (i.e. when a final
decision on issuance of a permit had been made). 
2) In a separate complaint before the Central Czech
Mining Office, concurrent with the first, plaintiffs asserted
that, in denying the village from participating, mining offi-
cials violated the Landscape and Nature Protection Act, the
Water Pollution Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and
constitutional legislation. In 2000, the Czech Mining Office
dismissed the appeal.
Final outcome 
Plaintiffs brought an administrative appeal of the latter
decision, a matter that was still pending as of July 2002.
The Constitutional Court’s decision dismissing ELS’s
complaint was the final decision on the appeal of the area
determination. The parties planned to challenge the third
stage (commencement of mining activities) decision if it
permitted the mining to take place.
Related actions and campaigns
Plaintiffs prepared leaflets for local citizens
concerning legal protection of proprietary rights and
rights to public participation in decision-making. 
In addition, ELS, besides providing legal aid, advised
the village on how to increase the natural value of its
surrounding countryside via revitalisation. In this effort, it
enlisted the Moravian Regional Museum in Brno, which
wrote a biological monitoring study for the territory in
question and assisted in developing an outline of the
overall revitalisation project.
Access to justice techniques 
Plaintiffs attempted to challenge the government’s deci-
sion through participation in approval proceedings and
administrative appeals and by filing legal complaints for
judicial review at each stage of the approval process. They
used the interesting legal tool of the extraordinary legal
remedy to collaterally challenge the legality of a decision.
Case study analysis
Denying nearby villages and their residents the right to
participate in any stage of a mining permit proceeding
sends a strong signal that public participation rights may
still be a hollow promise in the Czech Republic. Mining
officials’ refusal to grant local residents the opportunity to
be heard points to a government agency still beholden to
private interests — a problem that can only be resolved in
court. Plaintiffs’ appeals and lawsuits, while proceeding
unsuccessfully at the moment, will pave the way for
greater access to justice by the precedents they establish
and the citizens they motivate.
Contact 








Hindered by not being able to seek judicial review until
the tendering of a final decision on a massive highway
project, environmental NGOs employed various strategies
at essential preliminary stages that would have benefited
from judicial scrutiny. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 6(4), 9(2) and (3)
Key issues
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
• Administrative review procedure
• Adequate and effective remedies
Case study details
Cited case name: Building of the D8 motorway through
protected areas in northern Bohemia
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Children of the Earth Czech Republic, an envi-
ronmental NGO
Plaintiffs’ representation: Environmental Law Service, a
public interest legal organisation
Defendants: Ministry of Environment; Road and
Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (RMD), the
state body responsible for building and maintaining high-
ways; District Office in Usti nad Labem, responsible for the
administrative procedure in issuing building permits
Background facts 
In 1963, the communist government approved a plan
for the construction of new highways throughout the
former Czechoslovakia, including the proposed D8
Motorway, which was never constructed. However, in
1993, four years after the Velvet Revolution, Czech officials
resurrected the highway plan as a way to boost the
economy. The D8 Motorway was part of the new plan. 
Prior to 1993, however, the land through which the D8
Motorway would run was designated as the Ceske
Stredohori Protected Area. The planned highway would
also traverse the Krusne Hory Nature Park.
Under the Czech Nature and Landscape Protection Act,
highway construction was prohibited in designated
protected areas, except for limited exceptions granted by
the Ministry of Environment for the promotion of “public
interest.” Citing economic factors, the Ministry granted an
exception for the D8 Motorway, allowing approval
proceedings for the project to commence. As Czech law
requires that the District Planning Office grant permission
for the construction of a proposed route through a nature
park, this permit was applied for and granted. 
The Children of the Earth CZ and the Environmental
Law Service (“NGOs”), two regional environmental NGOs,
opposed these decisions. However, judicial review of the
Ministry’s decision or any other decision during prelimi-
nary proceedings was not permitted according to Czech
administrative law. Only final permit decisions could be
reviewed by the Administrative Court. As a result, the
NGOs’ only recourse was to participate in every stage of
the proceedings leading to a final decision and attempt to




In 1994, officials conducted EIAs for the two crucial
sections of the D8 Motorway that traversed the designated
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protected area and nature park. The NGOs participated in
this process, filing a complaint that officials were breaching
EIA procedural rules and refusing to assess alternate routes
around the areas. Most importantly, officials were
conducting EIAs for individual segments of the highway
only. The NGOs asserted that to understand the full envi-
ronmental impact, an EIA for the entire proposed highway
should be conducted.
The NGOs’ objections mirrored similar complaints
made nationwide throughout the 1990s. However, offi-
cials failed to act on their concerns. In the absence of a
final decision, judicial review of the EIA proceeding was
not possible.
Ministry’s exception to the Nature and
Landscape Protection Act (1998-2000)
In 1995, the RMD asked the Ministry of Environment for
an exception from the prohibition of building a motorway
in the Ceske Stredohori Protected Area. This was very
significant, as an exception to the Nature and Landscape
Protection Act had never before been granted for a highway
project. The administrative procedure that followed was
crucial to the motorway project and ended with the Ministry
denying the permit in 1998. However, the RMD appealed to
the minister and the refusal was reversed. In 2000, the
Ministry issued the exception from the law. 
The NGOs had delivered testimony asserting that the
public interest in protecting the natural resources in
Ceske Stredohori was more important than the interests
served by constructing a motorway through the area. In
the issued exception, the Ministry rejected this opinion,
stating that the motorway was in fact in the public
interest, of greater importance than keeping the protected
area free of highways. 
Again, judicial review of the Ministry’s decision was
not an option given that an overall decision on the
highway had not yet been made.
Permission to traverse Krusne Hory Nature
Park (1999-2000) 
In this procedure, the District Planning Office had to
consider the extent to which the planned motorway would
interfere with the landscape character of the park and to
consider feasible alternate routes. NGOs testified in this
proceeding, making concrete suggestions and alternative
solutions, which were set aside. The District Planning
Office approved the planned route in 1999 and the Ministry
affirmed this decision in 2000. 
Construction placement permission (2000-
present) 
According to procedure, permission to begin a
highway project is issued by the District Planning Office
and is conferred one segment at a time. Typically, the
granting of a construction permit — the final decision — is
a routine decision influenced heavily by the preceding
stages. The NGOs testified against permit approvals for the
two segments crossing the protected area and nature park. 
The NGOs lost their case against permitting construc-
tion on the segment through the nature park. The permit
was issued in the spring of 2002, but the NGOs’ appeal
against this decision was still pending in July 2002. The
NGOs’ main argument was that an international EIA proce-
dure was required pursuant to the ESPOO Convention
because this section of motorway was next to the border
with Germany. In addition, they claimed that there were
potential conflicts between the plan and EU environmental
law, especially the Habitats Directive (92/43EEC). 
Final outcome 
The NGOs planned to file a complaint before the
Administrative Court when finally able to seek judicial
review. Their hope is that the highway would be
rerouted into a tunnel beneath the protected area. They
also held out the prospect to go to EU authorities with a
complaint about violation of EU law after the Czech
Republic’s accession.
Related actions and campaigns
• Children of the Earth and other local NGOs conducted
several non-violent demonstrations.
• Children of the Earth ordered several expert studies to
explore alternate routes and improvements to the exist-
ing plan. These were mostly ignored by officials. 
• As construction of the motorway was to be partly
financed by the EU, NGOs planned to notify responsi-
ble EU authorities that the motorway would cross a
protected area that was a candidate for a listing on the
EECONNECT network. 
Access to justice techniques 
While NGOs fully used their participation rights, they
also attempted to challenge interim decisions. 
Case study analysis
Administrative review of interim decisions was unavail-
able. In the Czech legal system, administrative review is
only available after the rendering of a final construction
location permit. This fails to take into account the fact that
a myriad of important decisions happen along the way to
the final decision. The instant case clearly illustrates this.
For example, the EIA conducted in the first stage and the
Ministry’s exception in the second are junctures where the
possibility of judicial review would at least prove helpful.
Each of these steps informs decisions made in the next.
Thus, if citizen participants and other interested parties
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observe a flaw in reasoning or law by the government, the
courts can be used to correct such a mistake. Restrained by
appropriate standards of review, this potential involvement
of judicial scrutiny at essential stages would increase
overall efficiency and ensure that decisions are grounded
in law and truly mirror the public interest. 
Contacts 
Participants in proceedings 
Miroslav Patrik
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Defence of National Park Case
In the Tbilisi Regional Court, hearings of administrative
cases take too long (sometimes more than a year) because
judges are overloaded. This court has one appellate court
chamber with only six judges. There are no regulations to
speed up this procedure. Other obstacles include legal
expenses and standing barriers.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2) and (5)
Key issues
• Temporary stays
• Standing (sufficient interest)
• Financial and other barriers 
Case study details
Cited case name: National Park Without Land 
Parties involved 
Plaintiff: Emzar Chachanidze, chairman of the activist
group
Defendant: The State Committee of Georgia for Land Use
and Protection
Defendant’s representation: Legal Society Association
Third-party intervenor: WWF Georgia
Background facts 
In 1995, the Cabinet of Georgia issued Bill 447
concerning the creation of Borjomi-Kharagauli National
Park. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was involved in the
process of creating the park. According to an agreement
between the governments of Georgia and Germany, the
creation of the national park was to support employment
and improve the social security of the residents of the
Borjomi-Kharagauli region.
On January 12, 2000, the Local Authority (Gamgeoba) of
the Kharagauli District issued a notice concerning the allo-
cation of land to the national park. On July 5, 2000, the State
Committee of Georgia for Land Use and Protection issued an
administrative act approving the local authority’s notice and
determining the procedures of the land allocation.
Emzar Chachanidze organised a meeting of farmers
from local villages and told them that the creation of a
national park would limit their rights to logging and
hunting, as well as their traditional use of grasslands. Most
of the arguments of Chachanidze were misinterpretations
of the aims of the National Park Project. The farmers organ-
ised into a group of activists with Chachanidze as chairman
and began a campaign against the park. (A big part of the
local population of Kharagauli District supported the
creation of the national park). 
Procedural history 
On August 2, 2000, Chachanidze challenged the
administrative act of the State Committee of Georgia for
Land Use and Protection in the Tbilisi Regional Court. The
plaintiff tried to prove that the administrative act on alloca-
tion of land for the national park violated the rights of the
local population and that representatives of local villages
had not been involved sufficiently in the decision-making
process by the State Committee of Georgia for Land Use
and Protection. He asked the court to abolish the act on
allocation of land to the national park.
The Tbilisi Regional Court transferred the suit to the
Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court. 
To prove his sufficient interest in the case, the plaintiff
used the following arguments: 
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• Because of the act on allocation of land for the nation-
al park, herders were not able to use traditional grass-
lands and the resident citizens could not use the forests
to cut firewood. 
• The Kharagauli District is a high mountainous region
and, according to the Constitution, the state has to pro-
vide maximum social support to the population of high
mountainous villages. 
• The state is limiting the population’s rights.
Consequently, the administrative act violates the legal
rights of citizens and has to be abolished.
The judge found the plaintiff’s arguments to be accept-
able and based his decision on them. On March 30, 2001,
the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court pronounced the
abolishment of the administrative act on the allocation of
land to the national park.
The Legal Society Association (LSA) was requested by
the WWF to help the State Committee of Georgia on Land
Use and Protection to file an appeal against the decision
of the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court. LSA was not
entitled to appeal the court decision as an NGO because
it was not a party involved in the case. LSA received
power of attorney from the chairman of the State
Committee of Georgia for Land Use and Protection (the
chairman of this committee is a state minister of Georgia,
Mr. G. Arsenishvili). 
Neither the State Committee of Georgia for Land Use
and Protection nor the Legal Society Association had
funding for this case. LSA provided free legal support to the
land-use committee, taking an appeal to the Tbilisi
Regional Court on May 18, 2001, in hopes of reversing the
Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court decision ordering the
administrative act to be abolished.
Standard on appeal
To reverse the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court deci-
sion, according to the Procedural Code, LSA had to prove
on appeal that:
• the plaintiff did not have a sufficient interest in this
case; and/or 
• the court had inadequate legal support for its decision,
therefore the decision was illegal and groundless.
LSA intended to argue the following on appeal.
Standing
According to the Administrative Procedural Code of
Georgia (article 22), an administrative act can be appealed
in court only when this act has an impact on the personal
legal rights of the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff has to prove
his sufficient interest in the case.
In court, the plaintiff claimed to be the chairman of the
activist group of the local community, but he had no power
of attorney from them. Consequently, he was representing
only his personal interests. The plaintiff resided in the
Kharagauli District, but he was not a herder and the deci-
sion did not impact his rights. Furthermore, reasonable use
of traditional grasslands and limited cutting of firewood for
the local population in the territory of the national park
(according to official statistics, these limits were more than
enough for the resident farmers) were to be allowed. The
plaintiff never applied to the park administration for
permission to cut firewood and therefore he was never
refused. The plaintiff’s personal rights were thus not
violated by this act, and he did not have a sufficient
personal interest.
Inadequate legal grounds for decision
Alternatively, LSA could prove that the District Court had
inadequate legal support for its decision and, accordingly,
the decision was illegal and groundless. As the legal associ-
ation asserted in its appeal, Georgia has a special law about
social economic and cultural development of high moun-
tainous regions. This law lists all such regions in Georgia,
and the Kharagauli District is not among them. So the
Kharagauli District is not a high mountainous district and the
judge erred when he based his decision on this argument.
Fees
Court fees for the appeal were not substantial and the
state committee paid them in advance. LSA could have
had a problem if the court fees were more because the
state committee did not have its own budget. The plaintiff
did not have this problem because, according to article
9(4) of the Administrative Procedural Code of Georgia,
failure to pay court fees by a physical person does not
hamper the consideration and decision of a case.
According to article 47 of the Civil Procedural Code of
Georgia, a judge can exempt a citizen from court fees.
NGOs, public agencies and other organisations do not
have such a privilege and have to pay court fees. Advance
payment is usually required. 
The Tbilisi Regional Court had not yet held hearings on
this case as of August 2002. 
Final outcome
In August 2002, the case was before the Tbilisi Regional
Court awaiting a hearing of the appeal. The Krtsanisi-
Mtatsminda Court decision was temporarily stayed pending
the Tbilisi Regional Court’s decision on the appeal.
Related actions and campaigns
None
Access to justice techniques 
This case is quite interesting as it involves access to
justice techniques used by both parties in the suit. For its
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part, LSA was trying to prove that the plaintiff did not have
sufficient interest in this case (despite the fact that he was
exercising participatory rights in the name of “indigenous”
interests) and that the court was wrong in its finding that
the Kharagauli district was a special mountainous region. 
The agency appealing the lower court decision could
succeed in convincing the higher court to grant a stay of the
lower court’s judgement pending resolution of the appeal.
Case study analysis
The case study reflects a situation in which the greater
long-term public interest is subsumed by the short-term
(and possibly unfounded) interests of the local community.
The main problem of the local population in the
Kharagauli District concerning the establishment of the
Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park, practically speaking,
was the desire to have the right to use natural resources
illegally (illegal harvesting of timber, hunting, use of
pastures). Establishment and clear demarcation of the
boundaries of the national park would prevent these
actions of the local population. The existing economic and
social conditions in Kharagauli District (as well as in other
parts of Georgia) promote this kind of illegal demand.
Comments of participants in the process
“This case is the most unusual case in my practice.
Usually, I support citizens and local communities
against public agencies, but in this situation I support-
ed a public agency to protect a national park against
members of the public. Access to justice in environ-
mental matters may have its reverse side. The right to
use the natural environment is a constitutional human
right in Georgia along with the right to live in a healthy
environment. Actually, in this case each party could
use access to justice methods intended for environ-
mental cases by the environmental and procedural leg-
islation of Georgia. I think that in this situation, the
interests of the national park were more important for
the environment than the interests of part of the local
community (farmers from the bordering villages).
Probably if the local community had more accurate
information about the creation and management of the
national park, the national park would not have had
problems with them.”
— Merab Barbakadze
“The WWF Georgia Country Office is directly involved
in implementation of the German-Georgian ‘Borjomi-
Kharagauli Open Programme,’ which is run by the
German Bank KfW and which in turn is based on the
December 21, 1998, framework agreement between
the governments of Georgia and the Federal Republic
of Germany on financial cooperation concerning
Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park. Within this frame-
work, the WWF Georgia Country Office is carrying out
the responsibilities of the implementing unit. One of
the objectives of the German-Georgian ‘Borjomi-
Kharagauli Open Programme’ is to set the boundaries
of the national park. That is why the WWF Georgia
Country Office, in terms of the case study ‘National
Park Without Land,’ could be considered both an inter-
ested and affected party.”
— Nugzar Zazanashvili (representing the WWF
Georgia Country Office as an interested and affected
party) 
Contacts
Merab Barbakadze, Executive Director
Legal Society Association







Nugzar Zazanashvili, Deputy Director,
Conservation Projects Coordinator
WWF Country Office Georgia
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Vake Park Case
A citizen started a successful challenge of a permit for
construction of a hotel in a protected park that was granted
without informing the public or giving an opportunity for
participation, but withdrew before final success as a result
of harassment and intimidation.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(1), (2), (3) and (5)
Key issues





• Harrassment and intimidation
Case study details
Cited case name: Vake Park Case
Parties involved 
Plaintiff: George G.
Plaintiff’s representation: Legal Society Association
Defendants: The Tbilisi Local Authority and Lazi XXI Ltd.
Third-party intervenor: Department of Monument
Protection of the Ministry of Culture
Background facts
One of the acute environmental problems facing
Georgia in recent years is increased construction in parks,
gardens and their surroundings, despite a law that bans
such activities. Lazi XXI Ltd. received permission to
develop a part of Vake Park in 1996 by constructing a 16-
storey hotel with supporting facilities and, in 1998,
obtained the property deed. Permission to begin construc-
tion of the hotel was issued in November 1999, without
providing information to the general public and citizens
(or NGOs), giving them no chance to get involved in the
decision-making process. The cost of the project was esti-
mated at USD 15 million, though it was never discovered
how Lazi XXI Ltd. intended to finance the project. In
December 1999, the citizens of Tbilisi discovered these
facts when construction began on the territory of the old
Vake Park. Public protests did not resolve the situation. 
Procedural history 
The Legal Society Association (LSA) launched an inde-
pendent investigation which determined that, on the basis
of the Law on Cultural Heritage, Vake Park was part of
Georgia’s cultural heritage. All activities that could nega-
tively affect its condition should be banned in Vake Park
and its surroundings. Furthermore, privatisation of parts of
the cultural heritage of Georgia could be a violation of
Georgian law, as well as violating certain rights defined by
the Georgian Constitution, article 37(3, 5),14 and the Law of
Georgia on Environmental Protection, article 6(a, b, c, f).15
Under Chapter XLIV of the Civil Procedure Code
(1999), only citizens were entitled to sue regarding admin-
istrative acts, and only in cases where the act directly
affected their legal rights. Thus, NGOs did not have
standing to challenge administrative acts, and it was there-
fore necessary to find a Vake District resident that could be
recognised as a plaintiff with standing. A person (George
G.) was proposed by Friends of the Earth Georgia. 
LSA submitted the suit just before the Civil Procedural
Code was superseded on January 1, 2000. The suit was
submitted to the Regional Court of Tbilisi, but after the
coming into force of the new General Administrative
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Code and Administrative Procedural Code on January 1,
2000, the case was transferred to the District Court of
Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda.
During the first preparatory court hearing, the problem
of time limitation in which to bring the action was
resolved. LSA proved that the plaintiff had no information
about the issuance of the administrative act (the permits
were never published), and had no chance to be involved
in the decision-making process, a violation of his legal
rights. According to article 361(2), chapter XLIV of the Civil
Procedural Code of Georgia, time limitations for citizens’
rights to appeal in court must be counted from the day
when a citizen is informed about his right to appeal to
court. Additionally, the citizen must be given the name and
address of this court. Thus, the limitation of action should
have been counted from the day the plaintiff received an
official copy of the permits from the administrative agency
in response to his letter of inquiry. The judge ruled in
favour of the plaintiff on this point.
On the basis of the Procedural Legislation of 1999, the
plaintiff had the right to ask the court to issue a permanent
injunction invalidating the permit for reconstruction.
However, if the plaintiff lost the case, the developer would
require compensation for damages from the plaintiff.
Therefore, the plaintiff would have chosen not to seek a
permanent injunction. However, under the new
Administrative Procedural Code, article 29, challenging an
administrative act results in an automatic injunction
suspending the act. This was applied in the present case.
Final outcome
The judicial proceeding had great resonance with the
general public. Due to the consequent media investiga-
tions and public reaction against the hotel construction, the
local authority took effective action. The permit for
construction was withdrawn and the senior architect (the
public servant who issued the permit) of Tbilisi was
dismissed. However, LSA wanted to overturn the privatisa-
tion act as well. 
Success seemed to be at hand when an unforeseen
complication developed. The plaintiff withdrew the suit,
explaining that unknown persons had terrorised his family
and demanded that he back down. The plaintiff refused to
pursue the suit. Under article 22 of the new Administrative
Procedural Code, any person (including an NGO) can chal-
lenge any administrative act, provided that it can prove a
sufficient interest. That was almost impossible in this case,
and LSA could therefore not initiate a new suit as an NGO.
LSA hoped to find a new person to serve as a plaintiff with
standing. However, the problem with time limitation
remained. 
Case study analysis
The case was remarkable in that the rules for standing
changed in the middle of the case. In 1999, NGOs were not
entitled to sue regarding administrative acts. Under
Chapter XLIV of the old Civil Procedural Code, only citi-
zens were entitled to sue regarding an administrative act,
and only when the administrative act violated the citizen’s
legal rights. The plaintiff had to prove a sufficient interest
in the case and that his rights had been violated. The plain-
tiff had to pay court costs and overcome the barrier of the
time limitation for bringing an action. The court held that
the public agency did not inform the plaintiff about his
right to appeal the administrative acts to court.
NGOs also have problems with court costs. According
to article 9(4) of the Administrative Procedural Code of
Georgia, failure to pay court costs by a physical person
does not hamper the consideration and decision of a case.
NGOs have no such privilege and have to pay court costs
(usually advance payment is required). LSA did not have
funding for this case. It provided free legal service and
Friends of the Earth Georgia paid the court costs. 
Intimidation and harrassment of the plaintiff were unfor-
tunately successful in this case, and no action was taken to
prevent this from happening or to punish the perpetrators.
The standing of the NGO to challenge the administra-
tive acts in its own right, under the new Administrative
Procedural Code of Georgia, has been greatly enhanced
by the coming into force of the Aarhus Convention, since
the NGO would not have to prove a sufficient interest to
have standing.
Comments of participants in the process
“We achieved some results in this case, including
having the permit for construction withdrawn and
ending construction activity. But we were not
completely successful because the plaintiff dropped
his suit. This outcome might never have happened if
under our legislation, NGOs were entitled to sue
regarding administrative acts without proof of suffi-
cient interest. Once the Aarhus Convention is
enforced, environmental NGOs will not have this kind
of access to justice problem, because based on article
9 of the Aarhus Convention we will no longer need to
prove sufficient interest.” 
— Merab Barbakadze, lawyer from the Legal Society
Association.
“Vake Park is part of the cultural and environmental
heritage of Georgia. In this regard, the value of the
lawsuit against construction of the hotel cannot be
underestimated. Despite the fact that the court never
issued a final decision, the case put pressure on local
authorities to take effective action against violations
of law. The problem of finding a plaintiff with
standing is the main issue for Georgian environmental
NGOs. Too often we have been unable to initiate a
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court case because we cannot prove a sufficient
interest in the case. Finding citizens to serve as plain-
tiffs with standing creates lots of problems for them
(because of problems with the community or black-
mailing) as well as for us, as we are never sure how
far he or she will go. With the Aarhus Convention
having entered into force on October 31, 2001, the
problem will hopefully be solved.” 
—Manana Kochladze
Contacts
Merab Barbakadze, Executive director
Legal Society Association
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Waste Fuel Plant Case
The court’s treatment of a local resident’s suit seeking
to enjoin the development of a waste-fuelled facility illus-
trates how the advantage of broad standing in
environmental suits can be negated by narrowly construed




• Administrative and judicial review procedure
• Injunctive relief
• Duration of the proceedings
• Financial barriers (“loser pays” principle and the con-
sequence of court costs to individual litigants) 
Case study details
Cited case name: Interim injunctive relief Claim:
Mannheim Higher Administrative Court (VGH), ruling
dated June 29, 1994 (File No 10 S 2510/93), Neue
Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht <NVwZ> 1995, 292 ff.
Legal Action: Mannheim Higher Administrative Court,
judgement dated June 28, 1995 (File No 10 S 2509/93),
Neue Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht <NVwZ> 1996, 297 ff.
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Seven individuals living in Ulm and Neu-Ulm
(“residents”) within a radius of 1.5 to 3.5 kilometres from
the planned location of a waste-fuelled power plant
Defendants: The State of Baden-Wurttemberg
Third-party intervenor: Zweckverband, an association of
regional and local authorities that applied for the develop-
ment permit and operated the waste-fuelled power plant
Background facts 
On February 28, 1992, an association of regional and
local authorities (Zweckverband) belonging to the Alb-
Donau District and the Municipality of Ulm submitted an
application to the Regional Administration (Regierung-
sprasidium) for a development permit for a waste-fuelled
power plant. The plant in question was a stationary instal-
lation for the combustion of waste not subject to
compulsory monitoring. The plant was to be built in an
industrial district of Ulm and would have had an annual
total capacity of 111,000 tonnes.
Following the usual procedure for official announce-
ments, the application and the planning documents were
laid out for public inspection in the municipalities of Ulm
and Neu-Ulm on May 29, 1992 and in the neighbouring
communities of Blaustein, Erbach and Illerkirchberg on
June 9-10, 1992. Residents then filed objections that were
included on the agenda of public hearings on the matter
and deliberated over during the hearing in Ulm from
November 26 to December 5. Importantly, relevant proce-
dural provisions stated that only objections, duly filed
within the required period in the administrative procedure,
could subsequently be asserted in court. As a general prin-
ciple, any objections not filed within the required period
could no longer be brought before the administrative
courts (preclusion).
On September 22, 1993, the Regional Administration
approved the permit for the waste-fuelled power plant,
while simultaneously dismissing the objections that had
been filed against the project. Furthermore, the administra-
tion declared the permit to be immediately enforceable.
Such a decision — declaring an administrative act to be
immediately enforceable — was an exception to normal
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proceedings. Generally, actions and other appeals against
administrative procedures, such as those entered by resi-
dents, served to halt enforcement of an administrative
decision until found to be lawful by a court. 
Hence, in this case, the recipient of the permit was able
to begin construction of the plant despite residents filing
legal objections.
Procedural history 
On October 21, 1993, the plaintiffs brought an action to
annul the permit before the Mannheim Higher
Administrative Court. In addition, residents also filed an
application to reverse the “immediately enforceable” decla-
ration and halt development of the site pending final
judgement, pursuant to §80a paragraph 3 and § 80 paragraph
5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure [VwGO]).16
Subject of appeal
Residents asserted that the development permit
infringed upon their procedural and substantive rights,
particularly their right to physical safety, and contended
that the air pollutants emitted by the plant posed a threat to
their health. In the proceedings for interim injunctive relief,
the plaintiffs also asserted that there was no prevailing
interest in immediately enforcing the development permit,
since the waste-fuelled power plant was unlawful. 
Final outcome 
Neither the application for interim injunctive relief nor
the action itself was successful. In addition, no appeals
were lodged in this instance. Subject to VwGO §132 and
133, appeals against the judgements of the Higher
Administrative Court are possible only via recourse to the
Federal Administrative Court. Unlike resolutions of the
administrative court, no objections may be filed against
resolutions of the Higher Administrative Court in interim
injunctive relief proceedings (VwGO §152 paragraph 1).
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
When contesting a development permit, a party does
not have to appeal first to those authorities that have
rendered a permit decree. Thus, as in this instance, a party
may directly seek judicial review by the court of such
decree. Additionally, in this case, residents also sought
injunctive relief — suspending the declaration of imme-
diate enforceability and halting development of the facility.
Case study analysis
In this case, the following three issues, generally arising
in environment-related actions by individuals or associa-
tions, are of particular relevance:17
• whether the legal standing or right to apply is limited to
the asserted infringements of subjective rights;
• what the scope is of judicial control of substantial law
(control breadth) within the context of examining justi-
fication; and
• what the intensity is of judicial control of substantial
law — or “control depth” — within the context of
examining justification.
The case study outlined here illustrates the interactions
between the right to action, the scope of control and the
density of control. Whereas the right to legal action, which
is often problematic in environmental cases, does not
hinder access in this concrete case, the scope of examina-
tion is confined to those rules that serve to protect third
parties. On the other hand, as is often the case in environ-
mental actions, the density of control is very high. 
Moreover, the case is also instructive because, in addi-
tion to the action for annulment, it also involves interim
injunctive relief proceedings. Even for this provisional
ruling, the court undertook a summary examination with
a high density of control. If the contested administrative
act (e.g. the development permit of a plant) was found to
be unlawful in a summary examination of this kind,
within the context of interim injunctive relief, the court
could have decreed that the administrative act should not
have been enforced until a final decision on the main
issue had been reached. 
Standing 
German law primarily grants access to justice to those
individuals who are able to assert that their individual
rights (e.g. health, property, etc.) will be violated by an
administrative decision. Typically, if the administrative
decision concerns granting planning permission for an
installation, all persons affected by the potential harmful
effects of the plant will have such a right to legal action. For
this reason, the right of action, as a general rule, does not
pose a serious hurdle for access to justice for this group of
potentially affected individuals. 
In this instance, the right of action was found to be
valid, both for the proceedings for interim injunctive
relief,and for proceedings pertaining to the main issue. In
each case, the plaintiffs contended that they were exposed
to health risks as a result of air pollutants that would be
emitted by the plant. In this respect, they referred to §8
paragraph 3, sentence 2, no. 3 of the Waste Avoidance and
Management Act (Abfallgesetz) and §5 paragraph 1, no. 1
of the Federal Emission Control Act (BImSchG), which
state that plants must be constructed in such a way that no
harmful environmental impacts or other risks to the
general public and neighbourhood are incurred. These
provisions are recognised to protect third parties, since
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they serve to avoid risks and since the “neighbourhood” is
explicitly cited as the protected subject. 
Given this, it was sufficient for the plaintiffs to assert that
the plant posed a risk to their health and, in turn, substan-
tiate their claims. Such an infringement of rights appeared
plausible, since the plaintiffs resided within the area of
impact of the plant (at a distance of 1.5 to 3.5 kilometres).
Against this background, the Higher Administrative Court
ruled by a narrow majority that the infringement of the
plaintiffs’ rights due to the possible health risks “could not
be excluded from every legal angle.”
Injunctive relief
In the context of reversing an order of “immediate
enforceability” as a means of interim injunctive relief,
German courts generally examine two factors:
• The order for immediate enforceability must comply
with the formal requirements (i.e. it must be made
explicitly, in writing, and with adequate justification). 
• From a substantive point of view, there must be a par-
ticular (public or private) interest in enforcement that
outweighs the private interests of the possible affected
parties (VwGO §80a paragraph 3 and §80 paragraph 5).
Focusing on the latter, the interest of the affected
parties in suspending immediate enforcement generally
outweighs enforcement of the decree if the underlying
administrative decision is unlawful. Consequently, the
success of the party seeking such injunctive relief turns on
the party’s likelihood of success on the merits of its claim.
In this, the action is likely to be successful only if the court
finds that the rights of the plaintiff have been infringed in a
manner likely to lead to the annulment of the administra-
tive decision. (VwGO §113 paragraph 1, sentence 1).
In this instance, the residents’ application for injunctive
relief was denied because the court found that the “inter-
ests” of the association of local and regional authorities
(Zweckverband) outweighed the interests of the public
represented by the nearby residents. In short, while finding
that the relevant environmental statutes illustrated the
possibility that environmental rights would be infringed
and thus created a right of action, the development permit
would not likely infringe upon those rights.
In making this determination, the court examined the
relevant legal aspects at length, but confined its assertion
of the facts to a rough examination. More specifically,
regarding the scope of examination, the court confined
itself only to the consideration of those provisions
protecting third parties, failing to construe broadly poten-
tial infringement of residents’ (i.e. the public) interests by
allowing development.
First, the court examined the existence of an effective
statutory basis for the development permit and whether
there were any procedural errors committed in issuing the
order. Tellingly, procedural provisions designed to protect
the interests of the general public, as opposed to third
parties, were disregarded. Moreover, the court held that
any procedural errors that may have been committed were
immaterial and would not have led to an infringement of
the plaintiffs’ subjective rights had the intended purpose of
the violated procedural provision been achieved through
other means.
When examining the substantive lawfulness of the
development permit, the court initially ascertained
whether the provision in question was designed to protect
a third party. It then conducted an extensive and detailed
investigation into whether this provision to protect a third
party had been violated, as a result of which the rights of
the plaintiffs had been infringed. In this respect, the court
consulted expert reports (some of which had been
commissioned by the court itself, and others by the parties)
and scrutinised the statements they contained, for
example, with regard to measurement techniques and
dispersal forecasts. 
Duration of the proceedings
Given the complexity of the matter and the size of the
approved plant, the duration of the proceedings would not
appear to be unusual, especially since the court was
required to obtain and evaluate a large number of expert
reports. Eight months elapsed between the submission of
the applications for interim injunctive relief and the court’s
decision, and another 20 months elapsed between the
action being brought and the judgement. 
It should be noted, however, that in most environ-
mental cases, where the Higher Administrative Court does
not have jurisdiction in the first instance, a Lower
Administrative Court must first be consulted. Furthermore,
the duration of the proceedings would have been consid-
erably longer had there been an appeal to the Federal
Administrative Court. 
Costs of the proceedings
Under German law, the costs of the proceedings are
borne by the unsuccessful party (VwGO §154 paragraph 1),
or if both parties are partially successful, the costs shall be
shared accordingly (VwGO §159). If, however, there are
multiple unsuccessful parties, court costs are generally
divided equally, unless a different apportionment of costs
is indicated by the particular circumstances (VwGO §159). 
The costs of the proceedings are calculated according
to the value of the claim in dispute. The importance of the
matter is decisive when determining this value, and is
determined at the discretion of the court18 (§13 of the Court
Costs Act [GKG]). Proceedings relating to interim injunctive
relief are independent from the proceedings pertaining to
the main issue. As a general rule, for proceedings relating
to interim injunctive relief in accordance with §20 para-
graph 3 of the Court Costs Act (GKG), the amount in
dispute is calculated as a fraction of the value of the
proceedings pertaining to the main issue (§20 paragraph 3
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of the Court Costs Act [GKG]). 
While not applicable in this case, in the event of an
appeal to the Federal Administrative Court, higher court
costs and legal fees would have been incurred. Additional
costs are also generated if an appeal before the adminis-
trative authorities is implemented prior to bringing action. 
In the instant case, the amount in dispute was set at
DEM 70,000. Consequently, the cost was DEM 3,100 for
the proceedings pertaining to the main issue and the
proceedings relating to interim injunctive relief.19 In
addition to the court costs for interim injunctive relief
and the action for annulment, lawyers’ fees were also
incurred, plus any compensation for witnesses and
experts, where applicable.
As evident in this case, the costs of complex environ-
mental cases, particularly those involving large-scale
projects, are often a de facto obstacle to access to justice.
Given this and in light of German law, legal aid assistance
provides a possible solution. A general requirement for the
granting of legal aid is that the lawsuit must have a reason-
able prospect of success and must not be deemed wanton
(VwGO §166 and §114 of the Code of Civil Procedure
[ZPO]). Furthermore, the parties must be needy. In the case
of natural persons, this is determined according to their
income and available assets (ZPO §114 and §115). Finally,
domestic legal persons or organisations with the capacity
of being party to legal proceedings may apply for legal aid
if neither they nor parties financially involved in the
lawsuit are able to bear the costs, and failure to pursue or
defend the matter in court would contravene the public










A recognised nature conservation association partici-
pating in a development permit procedure following the
amendment of planning documents, whose request for
access to “relevant expert reports” was not fulfilled, sought
to annul the issued development permit on the grounds
that its participatory rights were infringed and such infringe-
ment could not be remedied in a supplementary hearing.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(1) and (2)
Key issues
• Review of denial of access to information
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
Case study details
Cited case name: Development permit section 2.5:
Hearing relating to the construction of a train track exten-
sion between Erfurt and Leipzig/Halle 
Ruling by the Federal Administrative Court: Dated
November 12, 1997 (File No 11 A 49/96), Federal
Administrative Court ruling (BVerwGE) 105, 348 ff.; Neue
Zeitscrhift fur Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 1998, 395 ff. 
Parties involved
Plaintiff: NABU Landesverband Sachsen-Anhalt, a recog-
nised nature conservation association under federal law
(§29 paragraph 2 of the Federal Nature Conservation Act
[BNatSchG]).
Defendant: The Federal Republic of Germany, repre-
sented by the Federal Railways Authority (FRA) 
In this case, the nature conservation association
claimed the infringement of its own rights, specifically its
right to participate in development permit procedures (§29
of the Federal Nature Conservation Act [BNatSchG]). As
such, this was not a legal action taken by an association to
assert substantive environmental interests, but a so-called
altruistic legal action by an association.20
Background facts
On May 11, 1995, the regional administration in Halle
initiated plans to conduct a hearing to discuss the possible
issuance of a development permit for the construction of a
train track extension from Erfurt to Leipzig/Halle. In a letter
dated June 19, 1995, the regional administration invited
NABU to participate in the proceedings and sent the rele-
vant planning documents indicating the project’s potential
effects on nature conservation interests to the organisation. 
Subsequently, NABU raised a number of objections to
the development permit and requested access to other
documents in a letter dated August 14, 1995. 
At the public hearing on November 8, 1995, NABU
once again explicitly requested access to various docu-
ments, including, in particular, an expert report by the
planning office “O” referring to a survey of natural
features of the surrounding countryside. NABU also reiter-
ated its objections to the project that were stated in the
August 14 letter.
A development permit was granted on June 25, 1996.
In it, the Federal Railways Authority rejected NABU’s
application to view the files. The development permit also
stated that the project planners, in order to counteract the
objections lodged, had made amendments to the planning
documents laid out for public inspection. The amend-
ments concern, inter alia, the accompanying landscape
management plans, including replacing 18 of a total 100
pages in part 1 of the accompanying landscape manage-
ment plan, 169 of a total 214 pages in part 2, and 49 of a
total 68 pages in part 3, annex E. The total land affected by
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the landscape management measures was reduced from
1,036,5471 to 1,032,6922 hectares. In all, the amendments
affected more than 50 percent of the total land area.
Finally, rather than completely transforming arable land
into extensive grassland, under the amendments, part of
the arable land was now to be placed under groundwater
protection-oriented management.
According to the development permit, the amended
planning documents were sent to the relevant authorities
and private individuals who would be affected by the
amendments, either for the first time or more severely than
before. The document indicated that opinions had been
requested and that the opinions received had been
addressed. No new date for public discussion was set
according to the development permit.
Procedural history
NABU brought legal action against the development
permit at the Federal Administrative Court (the court of first
instance according to §3 paragraph 1 of the Act on
Acceleration of Traffic Infrastructure Planning [VerkPBG])
on September 4, 1996. In the complaint, NABU sought to
annul the development permit of June 26, 1996 and,
secondly, asserted that the development permit was
unlawful and thus not enforceable.21
NABU based their claims on the contention that the
development permit was unlawful because it infringed its
participatory rights in accordance with §29 of the Federal
Nature Conservation Act (BnatSchG). In particular, §29 of
the Federal Nature Conservation Act (BnatSchG) states
that recognised nature conservation associations must be
given an opportunity to express their views and have
access to the relevant expert reports in development
permit procedures for projects which involve impairment
of nature and landscapes. 
In support of its claim, NABU argued that the defen-
dant failed to notify the plaintiff of the amendments to the
accompanying landscape management plans and failed to
give the plaintiff an opportunity to voice its opinions, even
though the major and qualitative amendments to the plan-
ning documents would have necessitated its renewed
participation. In particular, key parts of the accompanying
landscape management plan had been altered, with impli-
cations for other elements of the development permit. The
modified plan’s value to nature conservation was substan-
tially inferior to the original version, it claimed, since its
compensatory effects were much lower. The plaintiff
further alleged that a number of compensatory and
replacement measures had been downgraded to such an
extent that there was no longer any significant beneficial
effect for the ecosystem. The plaintiff would have rejected
these subsequent amendments had it been aware of them
and given the opportunity to do so.
It was further alleged that NABU had not been granted
access to all relevant expert reports as requested in its
appeal dated August 14, 1995. All the documents in ques-
tion, the plaintiff contended, were “relevant expert reports”
as per the definition of §29 paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the
Federal Nature Conservation Act [BNatSchG], because they
were important for an assessment of nature and landscape
conservation. Had NABU been aware of the required docu-
ments, it argued, it would have extended its opinion to
include other aspects addressed in the documents. 
NABU contended that its lack of participation could not
be remedied by a supplement to the development permit
or supplementary proceedings. Therefore, the permit was
unlawful, the group argued.
Final outcome 
The plaintiff’s main charge — that the development
permit should be annuled due to defects in the proceedings
— was rejected. However, the subsidiary charge — that the
development permit was unlawful and not enforceable due
to the procedural infringement — was affirmed.
According to the court, denial of NABU’s participatory
rights was a sufficient infraction to render the develop-
ment order illegal and not enforceable. In this, the court
ruled that NABU’s participatory rights had been infringed
in two respects:
1) The railway authority infringed upon NABU’s
participatory rights by denying it a further opportunity to
voice its opinions once the development permits had
been amended, despite being obliged to do so (§29 para-
graph 1, sentence 1, no. 4 of the Federal Nature
Conservation Act [BNatSchG]). As a general principle, a
single hearing would suffice to accommodate a nature
conservation association’s participatory rights, since
nature conservation associations are not “general compan-
ions” of the development permit procedure. Nevertheless,
the participatory rights of nature conservation associations
are not mere formalities. Instead, there is a need for a
“substantial” hearing. On the basis of this, it may become
necessary to give nature conservation associations a
second opportunity to voice their opinions, despite
having already been duly consulted. 
Whether a second opportunity to offer an opinion is
required turns on the overall purpose of a particular party’s
participation. In matters such as the instant case, nature
conservation associations serve a valuable role by
supporting authorities with expert knowledge and by
providing a check ensuring that nature and landscape
conservation interests are considered in proceedings.
Consequently, this “participation of expert knowledge”
necessitates renewed participation if the permit itself is
altered in a manner that affects nature conservation inter-
ests.22 Moreover, a second hearing is required if the nature
conservation authorities are to be given another opportu-
nity to voice their opinions because the modified
development permit affects their scope of action, either for
the first time, or to a greater extent. 
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In this case, the court felt that these requirements for
the repeated participation of the plaintiff had been met.
Additional nature conservation issues were raised as a
result of the amendments to the envisaged land use. In
quantitative terms, the changes affected about 50 percent
of the land area. In qualitative terms, the changes affected
the overall concept of the compensatory measures.
Whereas the desired intent was originally to dispense
largely with agriculture in favour of grassland, under the
amended development permits formerly arable land would
continue to be used to an even greater extent. In the face
of such far-reaching amendments, the defendant would
not be able to determine, without once again consulting
the plaintiff, whether the altered development permit still
complied with nature conservation regulations. Moreover,
the defendant itself evidently assumed that the interests of
third parties and other authorities would be more severely
affected by the amended development permits, because
contrary to its comments in the development permit, it did
in fact consult the responsible nature conservation author-
ities once again. Consequently, it would also have been
obliged to consult the plaintiff once again, and was wrong
not to do so.
(2) The court also ruled that the railway authority
infringed upon NABU’s participatory rights by failing to
grant the plaintiffs access to the expert report by office “O”
(§29 paragraph 1, no. 4 of the Federal Nature Conservation
Act [BNatSchG]). Although §29 paragraph 1 of the Federal
Nature Conservation Act (BNatSchG) does not grant
comprehensive rights of free access to all the files in the
development permit procedure, it does grant the special
additional right of access to “relevant expert reports.” This
not only includes reports by experts formally consulted
under the Law on Administrative Procedures (VwVfG), but
also expert statements by third parties, albeit only to the
extent that such reports refer to “relevant” issues. 
In this case, “relevant” reports are those that “refer
directly to nature conservation legislation or landscape
management interests, but not to other issues on which the
nature conservation associations would not be expected to
give an opinion.” Accordingly, the Federal Railway
Authority should have granted NABU access to the expert
report by the office “O” that referred to a survey of the
corridor of countryside along the new section of track and
thus directly addressed conservation matters within the
text of the report.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported
Access to justice techniques
Plaintiffs used the courts to challenge a decision based
on a substantially amended proposal, and in particular
attacked the failure of the authorities to include the NGO
in new proceedings and to provide necessary expert
reports.
Case study analysis
The court’s ruling underscores the importance of incor-
porating rights to consultation within the body of
environmental statutes. In this matter, the court needed to
find procedural violations of the Law on Administrative
Procedures (VwVfG) given that §29 of the Federal Nature
Conservation Act (BNatSchG), expressly provides a “quali-
fied right of consultation” thus taking precedence over any
related administrative law provisions. Thus, the effect was
not merely to annul the order but to make it illegal on its
face. As held by the court, the legislature has “subjectified”
the public interest in nature conservation and landscape
management in order to facilitate a more widespread
involvement in the development permit procedure.
Contact 
Trial representative of the Plaintiff:
Kruger, Attorney
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Windmill Case
A broad right to action directly conveyed by an envi-
ronmental statute allowed a nature conservation
association to bring suit against developers solely on the
basis of conservation interests and without the need to







Cited case name: Development permit: Potsdam
Administrative Court, judgement dated August 7, 1997 (File
No 1 K 3417/95), NuR 1998, 675 ff.
Parties involved
Plaintiff: A recognised nature conservation association
(“association”) (§63 paragraph 1 of the Brandenburg
Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG] in conjunction with
§29 paragraph 2 of the Federal Nature Conservation Act
[BNatSchG])
Plaintiff’s representation: Attorney Jurgen Schindler-
Clausner
Defendant: The Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Regional Planning (“Ministry”), the
authority that issued the licence under landscape protec-
tion law (§19 paragraph 2 of the Brandenburg Nature
Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG])
Third-party intervenor: Private investor, seeking to
exclude a property for a wind power facility from
protected conservation area 
Background facts 
A private investor initiated plans to construct and operate
a wind power station in Westhavelland, a conservation area
placed under temporary protection amid proceedings to
grant permanent protection status. Given that permanent
protective status had yet to be conferred, the investor applied
to exempt the site from the conservation area.23
The lower countryside authority forwarded the
investor’s application to the Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Regional Planning, stating that in
its opinion, the application should be refused. The Ministry
also consulted the regional offices of the recognised nature
conservation associations, which likewise rejected the
project at this site. 
Despite this, the Ministry approved the project in an
administrative decision dated July 12, 1995. In approving
the project, the Ministry relied extensively on expert
reports submitted by the investor that stated that the risk
to birds from a wind power station were minimal. In addi-
tion, according to the reports, disfiguration of the
landscape would also be minimal and, though large in
scale, the facility would not obstruct views within public
access areas of the tract. 
The Ministry also based its decision on the assumption
that the investor’s application for exemption would be inter-
preted as a licence and, consequently, would be subject to
use limitations in accordance with §19 paragraph 2 of the
Brandenburg Nature Conservation Act (BbgNatSchG).
Procedural history 
The plaintiff brought legal action against the develop-
ment permit of the wind power station at the Potsdam
Administrative Court. The plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that
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the defendant had failed to satisfy the principle of official
investigation, and in particular, had neglected to examine
satisfactorily the impacts of the wind power station on the
site’s function as a feeding, resting and sleeping area for
numerous species of birds.
Final outcome 
The court deemed that the association had standing to
bring its suit and, subsequently, the association succeeded
on the merits of its claim. The association’s suit resulted in
the annulment of the Ministry’s administrative decision
approving the wind power station.
Access to justice techniques 
The association initiated a judicial review of the
Ministry’s decision. From documents available on the case,
it is not possible to deduce whether preliminary proceed-
ings were also held. However, it is likely, given that it is
generally necessary to lodge an appeal for administrative
review (§68ff. of the Code of Administrative Procedure
[VwGO]) before bringing a suit for annulment.
Related actions and campaigns
None
Case study analysis
The association’s right of action derived from a provi-
sion under the land law expressly addressing an
association’s standing rights (§65 of the Brandenburg
Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]). Notable within
most of the Lander, including Brandenburg, is that an asso-
ciation has a right to take action not merely upon
demonstrating individual harm, but more broadly in
conjunction with affected conservation interests. Accord-
ingly, a nature conservation association that is recognised in
Brandenburg in accordance with §29 of the Federal Nature
Conservation Act [BNatSchG] may bring legal actions in
administrative courts challenging decisions by the land
administration without having to establish that its individual
interests or rights have been infringed upon.24
More specifically, in order for a recognised association
to bring suit in the absence of demonstrated individual
harm, the following elements must be established: 
• The association must assert that, as a result of the adop-
tion, rejection or omission of an administrative act, the
provisions of the Federal Nature Conservation Act
(BNatSchG), the Brandenburg Nature Conservation Act
(BbgNatSchg) or other legal provisions adopted on the
basis of these acts have been violated.
• The administrative act or the omission thereof must
involve subject matter related to the purposes of the
association. (§63 paragraph 2, no. 1 or 2 of the
Brandenburg Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]
or §29 paragraph 1, no. 3 or 4 of the Federal Nature
Conservation Act).
• The duties and goals of the association as set out in its
articles of association are affected by the administrative
act or ommission.
• The association has exercised its participatory rights in
accordance with the Federal Nature Conservation Act
(BNatSchG) or the Brandenburg Nature Conservation
Act (BbgNatSchutzG), or has not been given an oppor-
tunity to express its views. 
In terms of improved access to justice, this framework
is ideal for allowing NGOs additional opportunities for
challenging administrative decisions with clear environ-
mental and community-wide consequences. In the instant
matter, had the association been required to demonstrate
harm to individual rights, it may not have been able to
challenge the Ministry’s decision. Like many decisions
with environmental impacts, the only parties with
apparent rights of standing were the government and the
private developer. By expanding the traditional basis for
standing through the above framework, however, the
association, and others like it, are given the means to
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Nature Reserve Case
A nature conservation association was denied non-
privileged and relevant expert documents in the course of
a public hearing on the building of a train track. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
Articles 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• NGO standing 
• Interim injunctive relief
• Review of public participation in the decisions on
specific activities
Case study details
Cited case name: Nature Reserve Markische Schweiz
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Naturschutzbund (NABU), a recognised conser-
vation group 
Defendants: Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection
and Regional Planning, the State of Brandenburg and a
private investor 
Background facts 
In 1994, a private investor brought a petition before the
Regional Planning Board of the State of Brandenburg to
exempt a protected area from the Markische Schweiz
nature reserve. The investor sought to build 46 single-
family and semi-detached homes for commercial use. 
The public administration of the State of Brandenburg
granted the investor a permit to develop the land on the
condition that he reduce the size of his project. The investor
then developed plans for 29 home units and the public
administration approved the project at a second hearing,
exempting the necessary land from the nature reserve.
NABU, a recognised regional conservation group,
participated in the initial proceedings as a “necessary”
party. At these proceedings, NABU opposed the 46-unit
development plan. However, it was not called upon to
participate in the second proceeding, where the 29-unit
plan was presented and approved.
During the same year, NABU filed a complaint with the
Administrative Court of Frankfurt/Oder (State of Branden-
burg) asserting that the proceeding and subsequent
approval were not valid, given the group’s absence as a
“necessary” party.
Procedural history 
In filing its complaint, NABU requested interim injunc-
tive relief suspending development until resolution of the
lawsuit. Relief was granted and construction was halted for
the duration of proceedings — a period of three years. 
In 1997, the Administrative Court ruled partly in favour
of NABU, holding that public authorities erred in not
allowing NABU to participate in the second proceeding,
since the revised plan represented a substantial change
that required all necessary parties to have been repre-
sented at the proceedings.
In Germany, however, such a ruling seldom cancels
the relevant decisions. In the instant matter, the authorities’
decision was only modified. The court ruled that a 25-unit
plan, rather than one of 29 units, was proper under existing
regulations. 
NABU appealed this decision to the Higher
Administrative Court of the State of Brandenburg. 
Final outcome 
In 1998, the Appeals Court reversed the lower court’s
decision, holding that the licence granted by the authorities
141
Germany Case 4
PA R T  I I I : C A S E  S T U D I E S
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
was unlawful and the development plan did not qualify the
land as exempt from protected status.25 The investor’s
development plan was denied.
Related actions and campaigns
The case involved the local public through newspaper
coverage and public meetings. 
Access to justice techniques 
In seeking judicial review of the Brandenburg
authority’s decision, NABU exercised a right of standing
guaranteed to associations. To this date, this right of
standing exists in 13 of Germany’s 16 Lander and extends
only to matters at the Lander level.26
Case study analysis
Ensuring participation remains difficult. In the instant
matter, the fact that the court did not render the
authority’s decision void in the absence of NABU — a
necessary party — signals that there are still limits to
using the courts to ensure public participation. 
Contact
Michael Zschiesche
Department of Public Participation and Environmental Law
Independent Institute of Environmental Concerns







Baltic Sea Motorway Case
In filing a judicial complaint against a massive govern-
ment highway project, an environmental NGO obtained an
order temporarily halting construction and established a
judicial precedent that will aid in resolving environmental
cases in the future. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• NGO standing
• Interim injunctive relief




Cited case name: Baltic Sea Motorway A 20
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Bund fur Umwelt und Naturschutz (BUND), a
recognised conservation group
Defendant: State Office for Road Construction and Traffic,
State of Schleswig-Holstein 
Third-party intervenor (for the plaintiff): Natur-
schutzbund (NABU) 27
Background facts 
Government officials sought to begin an expansion
project along a sub-section of the Motorway A 20, the
Baltic Sea Motorway, in the German State of Schleswig-
Holstein. Part of the German Unification traffic
development programme, the project was a special priority
of the federal government. However, the proposed route
also included a 6.3-metre section of the Wakenitz Valley
reserve, an area that qualified under EU law as a protected
flora and fauna habitat. 
After an attempt failed to settle differences between the
government and environmental NGOs, the German envi-
ronmental NGO, BUND, filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin
the government from continuing with the project. 
Procedural history
BUND filed a complaint before the Federal
Administrative Court in Berlin asserting that procedural
violations and practical considerations rendered the
project void.28 In addition, BUND requested interim injunc-
tive relief, halting construction during the duration of
summary proceedings.
In asserting that procedural violations had occurred,
BUND stated that officials issued important public docu-
ments either late or with limited accessibility. In addition,
the planning authority denied an inspection of substantial
documents during hearing procedures, and modified docu-
ments several times without allowing NGO participants to
review the changes or take part in subsequent discussions. 
In questioning the reasonableness of the project and
planning process, BUND asserted that officials had not
demonstrated a sufficient need for the project. Moreover, the
road extension as planned ignored less intrusive alternate
routes and made no provisions for reducing noise pollution
or ensuring efficient building and maintenance costs. 
On the matter of injunctive relief, in March 1997 the
court ruled in favour of BUND. In its ruling, a key issue was
that the area qualified for protected status under European
law (EEC Directive on the Protection of Birds and Flora and
Fauna Habitat). As held by the court, officials could not
adequately ensure that, if construction were to begin, the
area would not be damaged prior to an official designation
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of the area as flora and fauna habitat. Moreover, if
construction were allowed, BUND’s legal claims would
immediately become moot. BUND did not have to post a
bond nor did it face the possibility of damages if it lost on
its claim. The injunction remained in place until the court
issued a final decision on the merits.
Final outcome 
In May 1998, the Federal Administrative Court lifted the
injunction and, addressing the merits of the case, ruled in
favour of the government. In making its decision, the court
had to clarify whether the area in question, which was not
yet officially protected under EU law but nevertheless qual-
ified for such protection, should be excluded from the
project. Second, the court had to determine whether the
EEC Directive on habitat had direct effect or not.
The court ruling suggested a compromise, stating that,
while EU law was not violated and the expansion project
could continue, this was justified only because a tunnel
could be dug under the qualifying area. 
With very limited options for an appeal, BUND
requested a review of the decision by the Federal
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The court did not grant a
review, citing that no constitutional rights were violated. 
Related actions and campaigns
In preparing for the lawsuit, BUND enlisted the serv-
ices of many volunteers and coordinated with other NGOs.
The federal authority in Schleswig-Holstein strongly
promoted construction of the motorway and conducted a
large media and public relations campaign.
Access to justice techniques
Judicial review by a federal administrative court was
the only recourse available to BUND. As an environ-
mental association, however, BUND’s standing to bring a
legal claim was limited to making allegations of violations
of environmental law. 
Under German law, the condition of granting NGOs
broad standing for undifferentiated harm limits the
claims that they can make. If an environmental associ-
ation bases any or all of a claim on non-environmental
matters, the judge is instructed to ignore those
grounds.
Case study analysis 
In the instant matter, BUND’s claim against the project
hinged equally on economic, noise and logistic consider-
ations. However, the court appraised the claim solely on
the basis of environmental law considerations. Seeing
that EU law did not yet fully apply and that a tunnel
allowed for less invasive expansion, the claim was
defeated.
Despite ultimately failing on the merits, the case
demonstrates the importance of filing judicial complaints
in response to questionable government procedures and
actions. That BUND successfully halted construction of a
federal highway project (without risk of financial liability)
illustrates the power of using the courts to secure citizens’
rights. The strategy used in this case now serves as a model
for other citizens and NGOs in limiting questionable
highway and construction projects. 
Further, motivated by BUND’s environmental claims,
the court created a legal precedent for handling potential
flora and fauna habitat areas in Germany that strengthens
natural resource protection. 
The case also shows that limitations on appeals reduce
citizens’ access to justice. A substantial limitation on the
effectiveness of this suit was that the administrative court
ruling could not be appealed. Under German law, federal
administrative court decisions are final. Such absolute
authority given to one court directly contravenes the spirit
of the Aarhus Convention by limiting citizens’ ability to
have the merits of their legal claims fully appraised through
interpretation and evaluation of the interpretation. This
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Avoiding public participation in a proceeding by offi-
cials underscores the importance of citizen suits, injunctive
relief and the right to appeal all judicial decisions. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• Standing
• Interim injunctive relief
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
Case study details
Cited case name: Construction site on the Elbe River
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Bund fur Umwelt und Naturschutz (BUND), a
recognised conservation group; Sachsen-Anhalt, a state group
Defendant: German Federal Republic, Administration of
Water and Navigation 
Background facts
In the instant matter, federal officials proposed and
approved a federal construction project on a site on the
Elbe River. Describing the project as maintenance of a
federal waterway, the federal government contended that
official proceedings involving the pubic were not neces-
sary.29 Accordingly, citizen groups, including BUND, were
not informed of the project nor did they participate in any
dialogue with government officials before construction.
Given this, German law holds that BUND and other
members of the public do not have standing to challenge the
project because they were not participants in a public hearing. 
Procedural history 
BUND filed a complaint before the Federal
Administrative Court in Berlin asserting that because the
project involved a federal waterway (Elbe), an approval
process involving the public was required. Thus, the
approval process chosen was invalid and the decision to
begin construction void. In this, BUND also requested
interim injunctive relief, halting construction throughout
the duration of a summary procedure.
On October 19, 2000, BUND’s request for injunctive
relief was submitted to the court. 
Final outcome 
On October 27, 2000, the court rejected BUND’s
request for relief, affirming the classification of the
construction as a maintenance project and upholding the
related proceedings. According to the court, the approval
process was not chosen with the intent to avoid citizen
participation and thus BUND’s claims were without merit.
The administrative court’s decision could not be appealed.
The construction project was approved.
However, the court’s awarding of injuctive relief,
halting construction of the road, made a considerable
impression on the public. The signal was that it was
possible for environmental interests to win in court against
infrastructure expansion efforts. 
Related actions and campaigns
The case involved the local public via newspapers and
public meetings. 
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Access to justice techniques 
The only legal strategy available to BUND was to seek
judicial review of the decision by a federal administrative
court. In this, BUND had to assert that the approval process
was chosen in order to avoid public participation and there-
fore deprive BUND the necessary standing to bring suit.
Case study analysis
The instant case illustrates a typical technique used by
governments and private parties to avoid public participa-
tion in decision-making. Generally, a private investor
interested in developing or using a site will approach the
government to discuss the scope and details of the opera-
tion. Under German law, such a dialogue is guided by the
“principle of cooperation.” Too often, however, the
investor is seeking an expedited approval process and the
government acquiecses by initiating a licensing proceeding
that limits or eliminates environmental impact assessments
and public participation. Further, the agreed scope of the
project will often be smaller on paper than originally
proposed but, in the end, is easily amended in order to
increase the size of the project. All of this occurs beyond
the reach of citizen involvement and control.
Most problematic is the fact that the public, having not
participated in the proceedings, cannot file a lawsuit to halt
the project. Under German law, public participation in a
proceeding is a prerequisite to bringing a legal claim
regarding the matter. If, however, a citizen or association
can demonstrate that the format of the proceedings was
chosen with the purpose of eliminating public participa-
tion, a lawsuit on the matter will be upheld.30
Filing a complaint is a critical tactic in ensuring more
consistent public participation. The instant matter illus-
trates the importance of filing a complaint in court to
challenge administrative proceedings designed to elimi-
nate public participation. As is evident in this case, the
results will surely not always be successful, but citizens
must continue to pressure officials to protect participatory
rights. Citizens must not tolerate false administrative proce-
dures or put up with the avoidance of public participation. 
Judicial examination of the nature of the project at
issue and the government’s rationale for proceeding as it
did is the best means of ensuring public participation.
A substantial limitation on the effectiveness of this suit
was that the administrative court ruling could not be
appealed (see also Germany Case 5). 
The avoidance techniques illustrated by this case
underscore a continuing problem in German jurispru-
dence. Effective legal mechanisms, such as notice and
comment requirements, need to be developed and consis-
tently applied by officials. They must be monitored by the
public and enforced by the judiciary. That a project can
escape public scrutiny and involvement simply by giving it
a different label signals the need for reform.
Continued scrutiny in the courts is one of the most
effective means of accomplishing this. 
Contact 
Michael Zschiesche
Independent Institute of Environmental Concerns
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The Balaton Highway Case
A narrow interpretation of standing for environmental
NGOs prevented them from seeking judicial review of
actions and decisions with clear environmental impacts. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• NGO standing (sufficient interest)
• Publicly accessible decision 
• Financial barriers
• Review of public participation in decision-making
Case study details
Cited case name: Somogy Nature Conservation
Organisation v. Ministry of Traffic, Telecommunication
and Water Management of Hungary
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Somogy Nature Conservation Organisation
(Somogy County, Hungary), environmental NGO and affil-
iate of the Hungarian Birdwatcher Society
Plaintiff’s representation: Environmental Management
and Law Association (EMLA)
Defendant: Ministry of Traffic, Telecommunication and
Water Management of Hungary
Third-party intervenor (for the defendant): State
Highway Management Company31
Background facts
The Hungarian government had long planned to build
a highway connection between Budapest and the Adriatic
Sea, along the southern shore of Lake Balaton. Throughout
the 1990s, several government resolutions were passed
and proposals made towards realising this link. Until that
time, the highway, known as the M7, extended only
partially from Lake Balaton. 
In 1993, the State Highway Management Company
(SHMC) petitioned the Traffic Inspectorate General for a
permit to lengthen the M7 highway. 
SHMC proposed two alternate plans for the expansion
of the M7. The first plan (called “A” after the Hungarian
word alagut, meaning “tunnel”) bypassed villages near the
lake through a tunnel. The advantage of this plan was the
conservation of wildlife and natural habitats, while the
disadvantage was concentrated pollution at the ends of the
tunnel in inhabited areas. The second plan (called “V” after
the Hungarian word volgyhid, meaning “viaduct”) would
cut through a 100-hectare forest. Its advantages were less
pollution for inhabited areas, while the obvious disadvan-
tage was the clear-cutting of a large area of woodland.
In public hearings on the matter, the mayors and
village councils of neighbouring communities supported
the “V” version, while the plaintiff, the Somogy Nature
Conservation Organisation (SNC), favoured the “A”
version, or at least opposed the “V” version.
In 1996, the Inspectorate issued a permit allowing the
expansion of the M7 to move forward with the “V” version.
Procedural history
SNC then filed a complaint before the Ministry of
Transport, Telecommunication and Water Management
(Ministry), the superior administrative agency on such
matters, seeking administrative review of the Inspectorate’s
decision to issue a permit.
The Ministry rejected SNC’s claim, stating that the
group lacked sufficient standing. The Ministry’s ruling
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turned on two points. First of all, there was no need to
involve an environmental NGO, since the state environ-
mental and nature conservation agencies took part in the
permitting process.
Second, the matter was not an “environmental” case as
defined by the Hungarian Environmental Protection Act;
therefore no NGO standing was conferred.
Subsequently, SNC filed a second complaint, this time
before the Capital Court of Budapest, seeking judicial
review of the Inspectorate’s decision. In similar form, the
Capital Court dismissed the case, holding that SNC lacked
standing in such matters.
SNC appealed to the Supreme Court in 1997 and again
in 2000, seeking an extraordinary judicial remedy. On both
occasions, the court dismissed SNC’s claim for lack of
standing. In the latter decision, the Supreme Court detailed
its standard for granting standing to environmental NGOs. 
Final outcome 
The Supreme Court’s decision precluded an environ-
mental NGO from challenging government decisions in
matters not explicitly involving Hungarian environmental
laws. Concurrent with this decision, several similar high-
level judicial decisions on standing were also issued, each
systematically refusing to grant NGOs standing in cases
with environmental relevance, but not directly concerning
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) or environmental
audits.32 Thus, proposed activities with clear environmental
impacts, though governed by other bodies of law, were
beyond the reach of those groups most qualified to chal-
lenge government decisions affecting the environment.
Concerning the highway, the plan to build the orig-
inal “V” version was not implemented, and a new
alternative requiring less deforestation and costing less
was being considered.
Related actions and campaigns
SNC filed a complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor,
requesting that action should be taken against the
construction permit. The prosecutor’s office refused the
application, referring to the Act on Prosecutors, which
prevents prosecutors from taking action while a lawsuit is
proceeding.
SNC also conducted a mass media campaign to raise
awareness of the environmental problems involved in
extending the M7 highway.
Access to justice techniques
In challenging the Inspectorate’s decision, SNC’s only
recourse was to file an action before an administrative or
capital court, pursuant to Chapter 20 of the Hungarian Civil
Procedural Code.
In addition, SNC cited a lower countryside town court
decision in asserting that standing had been established for
NGOs in such cases. 
Case study analysis
The Supreme Court’s ruling took a narrow view of
what constitutes environmental matters that trigger
standing for NGOs. Hungary’s guiding provision on
standing, article 3 paragraph 4 of the Act on Administrative
Procedure, requires that a party must have a right or legiti-
mate interest affected by the case. Referring to this law, the
Court held that environmental NGOs have a legitimate
interest only in those matters directly involving “environ-
mental” statutes, “environmental” impact assessments, or
“environmental” audits.33 In this, the Court hinged standing
on terminology rather than on impact. 
The instant matter illustrates the fact that a host of
matters, while not labelled “environmental” as such, clearly
have environmental consequences. The “legitimate interest”
of NGOs that the Court claimed to uphold should be no
different than between matters labelled as environmental
and those simply having environmental consequences.
Financial barriers
A positive aspect of the case is that all the proceedings
were almost free of charge for the plaintiff, since —
according to article 5 of Act no. 93 of 1990 on
Administrative Fees — NGOs are exempt from administra-
tive or court fees.
A second positive element was that the legal services
provided to SNC were provided free of charge by EMLA, an
environmental public interest legal organisation. Their
model of pro bono legal services should be supported and















Allami Autopalya Kezelo Rt.




PA R T  I I I : C A S E  S T U D I E S
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N148
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
Author of case study 
Csaba Kiss, Environmental Attorney







H U N G A R Y  C A S E  1
PA R T  I I I : C A S E  S T U D I E S
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N150
Metal Plant Case
The denial of a local resident’s access to environmental
information on a metal waste facility on the grounds that
the individual did not have standing in any lawsuits




• Judicial review of denial of access to information 
• Standing
• Financial barriers
• Judicial interpretation and precedent
Case study details
Cited case name: Kovari v. Environmental Inspectorate of
Northern Hungary
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Istvan Kovari, resident of Sajokeresztur
Plaintiff’s representation: Environmental Management
and Law Association (EMLA)
Defendant: Environmental Inspectorate of Northern
Hungary
Background facts
In 2000, Istvan Kovari, in his private capacity, filed a
request before the Environmental Inspectorate of Northern
Hungary to access environmental information related to air
and noise emission data of BEM Co., a metal waste repro-
cessing plant. The Inspectorate refused the request, stating
that Kovari lacked standing in any of the cases related to
BEM Co.’s emissions.
Procedural history 
In 2001, Kovari filed a complaint before the local City
Court of Miskolc, seeking a court order to require the
Inspectorate to provide the information. 
Kovari based his claim on Act no. 63 of 1992 (Freedom
of Information of Public Interest), which allows any person
acting in the public interest to seek a court order for the
provision of information. Importantly, the burden rests
with the holder of the information to prove why a refusal
of information is lawful or well founded.
At the heart of his complaint was the argument that
access to information should not be reserved solely for
those with standing in a related matter, but should be avail-
able to all in promoting the public interest. Moreover, the
decision to provide information should not turn on
whether the information relates to a private company or on
who paid for the collection and processing of the informa-
tion in question.
At a hearing held on September 5, 2001, the City Court
of Miskolc ordered the defendant to disclose the requested
information.
The defendant appealed the first level judicial decision,
stating that the requested information served as a basis for
making administrative decisions, and thus the preparatory
nature of the information prevented its disclosure.
On November 13, 2001, the Borsod-Aba uj-Zemplen
County Court upheld the first level court’s judgement, and
ordered the defendant to disclose the requested informa-
tion. The court also construed the notion of information
used in preparing a decision, and interpreted it in a narrow
sense, giving priority to transparency and disclosure.
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Final outcome 
While the final decision was still pending, the
Inspectorate voluntarily provided part of the air emission
data. The last piece of the requested information was deliv-
ered by the defendant to the plaintiff via mail. The costs of
litigation, however, had still not been transferred to the
plaintiff from the defendant by August 2002.
Related actions and campaigns
Ecological Institute for Sustainable Development
Miskolc, an environmental NGO supporting Kovari in his
suit, participated in an environmental impact assessment of
BEM Co. 
In August 2000, local residents also filed a complaint
with the ombudsman concerning the process of granting
BEM Co.’s permit and complaining about the shortcomings
of the EIA process. 
Access to justice techniques 
Kovari filed a lawsuit as soon as his request was denied
in order to compel judicial review of the Inspectorate’s
policy on information access.
Case study analysis
The instant case reveals the advantage of filing a
lawsuit in response to the government refusing to provide
access to information. While the decision was pending, the
Inspectorate voluntarily provided some information.
Perhaps more significantly, the court defined concepts and
established precedent for the interpretation of the appli-
cable information law as a result of the lawsuit. Thus, the
benefits of the lawsuit will extend beyond Kovari himself
and may be used by other citizens and NGOs in future. 
Given that the lawsuit was filed by an individual there
was a minimum court fee. If an NGO were to initiate a
similar lawsuit, there would be no fee. Because fees in
such matters are either nominal or non-existent, there is
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An NGO challenged a municipality issuing a permit for
the construction of a petrol station without allowing expert
testimony representing public interest concerns to be
heard during hearings on the proposed station.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
• Independent environmental expert testimony
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Asian and American Partnership
(“Partnership”), NGO 
Defendant: Almaty City Government 
Background facts 
The Akim (local government) of Almaty initiated a
proceeding to construct a petrol station in a densely popu-
lated district of Almaty. During the course of the
proceedings, the Akim refused to hear any environmental
expert testimony addressing potential environmental harm
stemming from construction of the station. The station was
subsequently constructed.
Procedural history 
On behalf of individual Almaty citizens opposed to the
construction of the station, the Partnership filed a lawsuit
against the city government seeking to halt construction of
the station. 
The court ruled in favour of the city, stating that the city
was reasonable in deciding that environmental expert testi-
mony was not necessary in the light of existing documents
and the deliberations already made by the city. Further, the
court found no clear evidence that the station posed an envi-
ronmental threat justifying the need for construction to be
halted in the absence of environmental expert testimony.
Final outcome 
Despite the court’s ruling, a settlement agreement was
reached in November 2000 between the owners of the
petrol station and the Partnership, allowing for several envi-
ronmental safeguards to be implemented at the station.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
The Partnership attempted to participate in administra-
tive proceedings concerning the construction by offering
expert testimony to counter the government’s expert.
Upon being denied, judicial review of the city’s decision
was sought. Despite losing the case, the NGO was able to
influence the final plans.
Case study analysis
The case underscores a continuing lack of procedural
rights to public participation in administrative hearings.
Both the decision of the city to deny expert testimony
countering the city’s assertions and the court’s affirmation
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Waste in the Caspian
A local NGO’s efforts to enforce existing environmental
laws against a drilling company were made more difficult
by a lack of guiding precedent and an absence of a consis-







Plaintiff: PU Caspiy — XXI (PU)
Defendant: Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating
Company (OKIOC)
Background facts 
From July 1999, OKIOC discharged 36-38 tonnes per
day of unfiltered waste into shallow waters of the North
Caspian Sea.
Subsequent monitoring revealed that areas adjacent to
the discharges were highly toxic and posed a threat to
surrounding aquatic plantlife and wildlife.
OKIOC’s discharges took place in a state sanctuary
zone within the Caspian Sea. 
Procedural history 
PU submitted several letters to the local procurator
(prosecutor) of Atyrau requesting that relevant provisions
of special environmental regulations for the sanctuary
zone, as well as provisions of the 1997 Law on Specially
Protected Areas, should be enforced against OKIOC.
In response to PU’s complaint, a panel of prosecutors
confirmed that OKIOC had in fact unlawfully discharged
pollutants into the protected zone, but refused to bring an
enforcement action against the company. Instead, the
panel merely issued a declaration that such discharges
should cease, as they were in violation of the Law on
Specially Protected Areas.
Final outcome 
No further action was taken nor was OKIOC made to
pay damages for environmental harm caused by its actions.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
PU pursued its only option for legal action — seeking
the representation of its interests by the local procurator. 
Case study analysis
In this matter, PU lacked the ability to bring a suit
directly against OKIOC. Instead, PU’s only option was to
petition the local panel of prosecutors to represent its
interests against the company. Such reliance is problematic
in terms of environmental law enforcement where prose-
cutors lack precedent and expertise to guide them in
bringing suits. 
Furthermore, prosecutors, as arms of the state, are
often influenced by other interests and will therefore often
not enforce laws aggressively. If PU had had a procedural
right to bring suit directly as an environmental association,
the result might have been different. 
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Ibragim Kushenov, Chairman 






An NGO representative was not shielded from legal
action for comments made at a public hearing.
Furthermore, the public prosecutor defending the repre-
sentative demanded excessive fees for legal services,
despite the court’s failure to resolve the matter.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 3(8) and 9(4)
Key issues




Plaintiff: LTD Monitoring, environmental monitoring
laboratory
Defendant: Ms. Chernova, representative, Caspiy
Tabigaty (NGO)
Defendant’s representation: Atyrau Public Prosecutor
Office
Background facts
On April 7, 2000, at a public hearing in conjunction
with an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of a local
development project, Ms. Chernova, representing the NGO
Caspiy Tabigaty, asserted that the company seeking
permission for the project heavily polluted the site. 
Chernova’s remarks stood in sharp contrast to earlier
testimony by LTD Monitoring, a laboratory hired by the
company to conduct environmental monitoring onsite.
LTD Monitoring testified that no increases in discharges of
pollutants were observed. 
To defend herself against LTD Monitoring’s claims,
Chernova sought representation by the Atyrau Public
Prosecutor.
Procedural history 
The director of LTD Monitoring filed a lawsuit in May
2000, in the Atyrau City Court against Chernova alleging
that her remarks damaged the business reputation of the
laboratory. The laboratory sought KZT 1 million (USD
7,000) as compensation for “moral harm” done to the
company by Chernova’s statements. 
After seven months and the calling of several
witnesses, the City Court failed to resolve the claim and
on December 31, 2000, ruled the matter closed without a
decision. 
Final outcome 
Despite the absence of a court ruling, the Public
Prosecutor required a fee of KZT 20,000 (USD 141) from
Chernova for its representation.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
Chernova pursued her only viable option for legal
defence — seeking representation by the local prosecutor. 
Case study analysis
Chernova’s statements regarding pollution onsite
should not be permitted to be a source of litigation. When
speaking in the course of a public hearing, those making
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comments that are neither slanderous nor libellous should
be granted immunity from potential lawsuits. 
In this matter, Chernova’s testimony directly related to
the EIA and thus was relevant and proper. Allowing parties
to bring lawsuits against individuals for such comments
made during public hearings prevents greater public
participation. For fear of having to go to court and paying
significant fees, those who should otherwise testify at hear-
ings will not.
The excessive fee required of Chernova for her repre-
sentation is an additional hurdle to public participation and
access to justice. In this matter, the fee should have been
either reduced or waived given the subject matter of the
suit and Chernova’s status as an NGO representative. In
addition, a fee shifting or fee forgiveness scheme should be
used when, as here, the party suing has not succeeded on
the merits and is in a better financial position than the
defendant.
In sum, requiring that individuals and NGOs pay
extreme fees with no opportunity for fee shifting or waiver
prevents socially important litigation from being filed. In
addition, as illustrated in this case, it also makes it difficult
for individuals and NGOs to defend themselves for having
participated in public decision-making.
Contact
Chernova, Director





The extrajudicial procedure to challenge acts and omis-
sions by public authorities that contravene provisions of
the national law may provide an excellent remedy for
denials of the right of access to information of members of
the public. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(3) and (4)
Key issues





Cited case name: Complaint of Residents, dated June 8,
2000 (registration no. 2000/05).
Parties involved 
Plaintiffs: Resident 1 and Resident 2
Defendants: Public officials of the ministries of
Environment and Health in the early procedure, and later
the ministries of Environment and Health themselves
Background facts
On April 17, 2000, Resident 1, on behalf of the residents
of Zemieji Sanciai region of Kaunas appealed to the
Ministry of Environment to assess the actions of two public
officials of the Kaunas Region Environmental Protection
Department (REPD), when they adjusted the detailed terri-
torial plan for building a filling station at 67 A.
Juozapaviciaus Avenue. The claimant specified that para-
graphs 31-33 of the Special Provisions of the Exploitation of
Land and Forest, adopted by Resolution no. 345 of March
24, 1998, of the government of the Republic of Lithuania,
were seriously violated when adjusting the detailed territo-
rial plan. The suitability (geographic location, ecological
situation) of the land plot at 67 A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue
for building the filling station had not been assessed, and
the public officials of Kaunas REPD ignored violations of
the devised and adjusted detailed plan: 
1) The protection zone of the liquid fuel station was not
observed.
2) The distance from the underground fuel reservoir to
residential houses was shorter than is required by the
standards.
3) The detailed plan was devised on the basis of non-exis-
tent requests of residents to change the designation of
their residential houses.
The fact that signatures of over 200 residents protesting
against the building of the filling station on this land plot
had been collected was not taken into account. The
claimant, on behalf of the residents of Zemieji Sanciai
region, requested the establishment of an independent
expert commission to assess the actions of public officials
of Kaunas REPD.
The vice-minister of Environment, in letter no. 01-24-
2081 “Concerning the Actions of Kaunas REPD when
adjusting the detailed plan of the land plot at 67 A.
Juozapaviciaus av.” of May 16, 2000, answered to
Resident 1 that:
1) Kaunas REPD did not object to the consideration of the
land plot located at 67 A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue in
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Zemieji Sanciai as a place for building the filling station,
keeping the standard distances to residential houses
and other buildings.
2) It was shown in the conditions of the detailed plan of
the land plot and the main scheme drawn up by spe-
cial-purpose company Kauno Planas that the multi-
apartment house at 26 Sodu street was 50 meters away
from the filling station, which complied with the stan-
dards, and private houses at 65 A. Juozapaviciaus
Avenue and 34 Sodu street were 15 metres and 27.5
metres away, respectively. However, it was also indi-
cated in the conditions that it was only possible to build
the filling station after changing the designation of
these houses from residential to economic-commercial,
as the distance from these buildings to the under-
ground reservoir of the filling station was less than 50
metres.
3) During the design stage, designers planning the filling
station would have to conduct research on air pollu-
tion and assess the planned level of pollutants to be
discharged into the air. Kaunas REPD would make the
decision on building alternatives, according to the let-
ter, only when the project was in conformity with all
environmental requirements and when the conditions
of the detailed plan regarding the change in designa-
tion of buildings from residential to economic-com-
mercial needs were implemented.
However, no assessment was made of the actions of
the public officials of Kaunas REPD when adjusting the
detailed plan for building of the filling station at 67 A.
Juozapaviciaus Avenue, in the answer of the vice-minister
of Environment. The commission of experts for the assess-
ment of environmental violations requested by the
claimant was not established. Thus, the Ministry of
Environment violated paragraphs 6.11 and 6.13 of the
Regulations of the Ministry of Environment, adopted on
September 22, 1998, by Resolution no. 1138 of the govern-
ment of the Republic of Lithuania.
On April 17, 2000, Resident 2, on behalf of the residents
of Zemieji Sanciai region of Kaunas city, appealed to the
Ministry of Health, requesting the assessment of the actions
of Kaunas PHC when adjusting and adopting the detailed
territorial plan for building the filling station. The claimant
pointed out that, having adjusted the detailed territorial
plan, Kaunas PHC had violated paragraphs 31-33 of the
Special Provisions on Exploitation of Land and Forest,
adopted by Resolution no. 345 of March 24, 1998, of the
government of the Republic of Lithuania. In her complaint,
the claimant listed the same arguments as the ones stated
in the complaint of Resident 1 of April 17, 2000, to the
Ministry of Environment. In the opinion of the claimant,
Kaunas residents’ rights to a clean and healthy environ-
ment would be seriously violated if plans for the filling
station were approved. The claimant asked the Ministry of
Health to establish a competent commission of experts
who would assess the current situation and the violations
committed when devising and adjusting the detailed plan
for building the filling station.
The vice-minister of Health, in letter no. 31-08-2731 of
May 19, 2000, responded to Resident 2 that the commis-
sion for the assessment of the legitimacy of activities of
Kaunas PHC when approving and adjusting the detailed
plan for building the filling station was established by
Order no. 240 of May 5, 2000, of the Minister of Health.
The commission assessed the situation and presented its
findings. The Ministry of Health approved these findings.
The Certificate “Concerning the Detailed Plan for
Designing of Filling Station at 67 A. Juozapaviciaus av. in
Kaunas” of May 11, 2000, of the expert commission stated
the following violations:
1) In line with the scheme of the detailed plan, the dis-
tance from the underground fuel reservoir to the resi-
dential house at 26 Sodu street is 45 metres.
2) The submitted documents do not specify the way in
which the condition of the general plan to change the
designation of private houses at 34 Sodu street and 65
A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue to that of non-residential will
be implemented.
3) The level of traffic noise was assessed in a contradicto-
ry way.
4) The stretch between Mazeikiu street and Sodu street
was proposed to be widened in accordance with addi-
tional provisions of an initial environmental impact
assessment of the detailed plan for the land plot at 67
A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue devised by the special-pur-
pose company, Kauno Planas. Thus, the analysis of
impacts for the safety of pedestrians had not been car-
ried out.
The Commission submitted the following proposals:
1) The sanitation zone of the filling station at 67 A.
Juozapaviciaus Avenue must conform to the require-
ments of existing legal acts.
2) Additional calculations of traffic noise on Mazeikiu and
Sodu streets should be made.
3) The design should take pedestrian safety into account.
However, the letter of the vice-minister of Health did
not respond to the request to assess the actions of Kaunas
PHC when adjusting and adopting the detailed plan for
building the filling station.
PA R T  I I I : C A S E  S T U D I E S
160 H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
Procedural history
The Chief Administrative Disputes Commission
received the complaint of the claimants, Resident 1 and
Resident 2, on June 8, 2000 (registration no. 2000/05-43), in
which they asked the commission to assess the responsi-
bility of the ministries of Environment and Health of the
Republic of Lithuania when assessing the activities of
employees of institutions under their subordination:
Kaunas REPD, which is subordinate to the Ministry of
Environment, and Kaunas Public Health Centre (Kaunas
PHC), which is subordinate to the Ministry of Health.
The claimants stated in their complaint that they had
appealed to the above ministries in accordance with
administrative procedure. However, the responses of the
ministries did not satisfy them, as the ministries only stated
violations that the claimants had pointed out. The main
request of the claimants to review and assess the actions of
Kaunas REPD and Kaunas PHC when adjusting and
approving the detailed territorial plan for building the
filling station was not considered. The claimants asked the
commission to order both the ministries of Environment
and Health to assess their complaints of April 17, 2000,
exhaustively in accordance with the Law on Public
Administration of the Republic of Lithuania.
The Chief Administrative Dispute Commission
appealed to the administration of Kaunas County Office
(the institution responsible for the approval of documents
of territorial planning) and the State Territorial Planning
and Construction Inspectorate (which controls the prepa-
ration of territorial planning documents, carrying out
adjustment and public consideration procedures, and veri-
fying the conditions in these documents and their
compliance with the requirements of the summary of terri-
torial planning standards).
Letter no. S, G-595 of June 16, 2000, of the Kaunas
County Administration to the Chief Administrative Dispute
Commission asserted that “the project has been adjusted with
all institutions supervising whether the standards are being
complied with, including Kaunas RPED and Kaunas PHC,
and no comments were provided.’ The report on the public
hearing indicated that “no observations or objections to this
detailed plan were received during the public hearing.”
The head of the State Territorial Planning and
Construction Inspectorate stated in his Letter no. 04-06-07-
37-P of May 16, 2000, that the conditions of the detailed
plan of the land plot at 67 A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue
violated the requirements of Special Provisions on
Exploitation of Land and Forest, adopted on March 24,
1998, by Resolution no. 345 of the government of the
Republic of Lithuania, in that the residential house at 34
Sodu Street is within the protection zone of the filling
station, and that the distance from the liquid fuel station
and underground reservoir to the planned roadway in the
territory of the filling station at Sodu Street is insufficient.
Final outcome
The Chief Administrative Dispute Commission
concluded that, in accordance with articles 6 and 8 of the Law
on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Lithuania
and paragraphs 7.8, 7.10, and 5.3 of the Regulations of the
Ministry of Environment approved by Resolution no. 1138 of
September 22, 1998, of the government of the Republic of
Lithuania, the Ministry of Environment not only had the right
but was also required to reverse or modify the decision of the
regional environmental protection department. However,
the Ministry of Environment only stated the violations
committed by Kaunas REPD when adjusting the detailed
plan and did not take any actions to reverse the decision of
its subordinate institution.
The Chief Administrative Disputes Commission also
concluded that, in accordance with paragraph 6.26 of
Regulations of the Ministry of Health, adopted by
Resolution no. 926 of July 24, 1998, of the government of
the Republic of Lithuania, and articles 37 and 84 of the Law
on the System of Health Care of the Republic of Lithuania,
the Ministry of Health, after receiving the conclusions of
the established commission had to assess the actions of the
public officials of Kaunas PHC when adjusting the layout
scheme of the filling stations in Kaunas city and the
detailed plan for building the filling station on the land plot
located on A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue. However, this was
not done.
The Chief Administrative Dispute Commission
decided, on the basis of the factual findings and the docu-
ments presented:
• to instruct R. Alekna, the minister of health, to ensure
the assessment of the legitimacy of activities of the
head of Kaunas PHC and responsible public officials,
when adjusting the detailed plan of the land plot locat-
ed at 67 A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue in Kaunas;
• to instruct D. Lygis, the minister of environment, to
ensure that violations committed by the public officials
of Kaunas REPD when adjusting the detailed plan of
the land plot at 67 of A. Juozapaviciaus Avenue in
Kaunas and “the correction of the lay out scheme of fill-
ing stations in Kaunas city (Supplement no. 2)” have
been eliminated in accordance with the procedure
established by law;
• to instruct the ministries of Health and Environment to
notify the claimants by July 26, 2000, about the results
of the enforcement of the decision; and 
• that the decision of the Chief Administrative Dispute
Commission must be carried out by July 26, 2000, with
notification of the Chief Administrative Dispute
Commission about its implementation.
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The claimants had the right to appeal the decision of
the Chief Administrative Dispute Commission to the
Higher Administrative Court within a period of 20 days
after receiving the decision. 
The claimants also had the right to apply to the
Higher Administrative Court concerning the enforcement
of the decision of the Chief Administrative Dispute
Commission, if the institutions responsible for the imple-
mentation of the decision did not implement it within
the set time frame. 
The ministries of Environment and Health enforced
decision no. 2000/05-43 of the Chief Administrative
Dispute Commission, dated June 22, 2000. Despite this,
the claimants appealed to the Higher Administrative
Court complaining about the insufficient implementation
of the decision of the Chief Administrative Dispute
Commission. However, they later withdrew the
complaint.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques
The extrajudicial administrative procedure of the
complaint (according to the Law on Administrative
Dispute Commission of the Republic of Lithuania) was
used as it is more expeditious than a lawsuit (a complaint
shall be reviewed within 14 days after submission to the
Commission) and free of charge for the  parties involved
(claimant and the institution appealed against).
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Case study analysis
The case reveals the advantages in specific cases of
using the administrative review procedure instead of the
judicial procedure that may entail more time and financial
barriers. It also shows how the standard of review of
administrative bodies over their subordinates can be
developed through such appeals. 
Contact 
Stasile Znutiene, Chief Specialist 
Public Information Division, Ministry of Environment





The Sarmi Park Case
Citizens residing near a public park faced a series of
procedural and substantive obstacles before administrative
bodies and the courts in attempting to participate in
construction permit decisions related to the park. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(1), (2), (3) and (4)
Key issues
• Review of denial of access to information





Plaintiff: 10 residents from among 280 petitioners 
Plaintiffs’ representation: Ecolex, Moldovan public interest
environmental NGO (Environmental Public Advocacy Center,
or EPAC)
Defendants: FIFIRA, International Philanthropic Fund of
the Afghanistan War Invalids; Chisinau Municipality
Background facts 
In October 1999, construction started on tracts of land in
Sarmizegetusa Park in Chisinau, Moldova. In March 2000,
several residents in the neighbourhood of the park sought
the assistance of the Moldovan EPAC. EPAC attorneys
determined that, since construction began, the residents of
the area had been unable to get information on what was
being built and who the owners were, despite repeated
requests to the municipal authorities. In addition, the resi-
dents attempted to file a complaint in court detailing their
opposition to the decision to permit construction, pursuant
to the Law on Petitioning, but remained unable to provoke
any response from the municipality.
EPAC initially submitted a request for information
under the Law on Environmental Protection. In April 2000,
the Chisinau Municipality responded that the land in the
park had been allocated to:
1) Nazaret Company, for construction of an office build-
ing and parking lot;
2) the International Philanthropic Fund of the Afghanistan
War Invalids (FIFIRA), for construction of a 40-car
parking lot; and
3) the Union of Evangelist Churches, for construction of
a church. 
The municipality further noted that after reviewing the
citizens’ petition, they would annul the decision allotting
land to Nazaret Company.
Procedural history 
EPAC pressed the case to the higher-level government
office charged with coordinating the activities of the local
public administration, the Chisinau Prefect’s Office. In a
petition to the Prefect’s Office, EPAC urged that the deci-
sions allotting parkland to FIFIRA and the Union of
Evangelist Churches should be remanded. 
The Prefect’s Office took no action, at which point
EPAC, in accordance with the Law on Public
Administration, took legal action, challenging the decision
of the municipality in court. In addition, EPAC separately
petitioned the Chisinau Environmental Agency to order a
halt in construction because the necessary environmental
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assessment had not been undertaken. The Environmental
Agency ordered the cessation of construction.
In June 2000, EPAC’s lawsuit was submitted to the
Administrative Court of Chisinau Tribunal, naming
Chisinau municipality and FIFIRA as defendants and
requesting annulment of the municipality’s decision and
a halt to construction.
34
EPAC asserted that the residents’
procedural rights had been violated given the failure to
disclose information regarding the land allotment deci-
sion, to respond to the citizens’ petition, and to secure a
proper environmental expertise prior to starting construc-
tion. Moreover, the suit claimed, defendants committed
substantive violations of both the Law on Green Spaces,
which specifies that “constructions incompatible with the
use of green spaces will be prohibited,” and the Forest
Code, which prohibits the removal of green spaces
containing trees and bushes. Finally, EPAC alleged that
FIFIRA violated Moldovan laws by taking a larger land
surface than authorised, surrounding it with a fence, and
removing several trees. 
In its response, FIFIRA submitted documents of
approval from the State Environmental Inspectorate, the
Directorate of Control of Urban Construction, and the func-
tioning authorisation of the Chisinau municipality. 
At the onset of the court review, EPAC requested an
injunction to halt construction, which was accepted by the
court. During the trial period, construction was halted but
began soon afterwards during the appeal process.
The court rejected EPAC’s claims, on the basis that the
Land Code, while enacted before construction began, was
passed after the municipality’s decision. Moreover, in
September 2000, the municipality excluded Sarmizegetusa
Park from the listing of parks to be considered as “green
spaces,” although this occurred during the course of the trial.
In November 2000, EPAC appealed to the Appeals
Court of Moldova. Pending transfer of EPAC’s appeal to the
Appeals Court, the Ministry of the Environment investi-
gated the municipality’s actions in excluding the park from
protective status and required that Sarmizegetusa Park
must be included in the green space area of Chisinau.
Meanwhile, construction resumed on the site. EPAC did
not request a further injunction because FIFIRA threatened
that they would request payment for damages from the
EPAC if they won the case.
EPAC’s appeal was not transferred to the Appeals Court
until March 2001. Several court sessions were delayed due
to the failure of the defendants to appear. Ultimately, the
Appeals Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding
that EPAC’s claims were without merit. 
Final outcome 
EPAC’s suit was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Justice in March 2002. Since then, two hearings, in May and
June 2002, were postponed due to the failure of the defen-
dants to appear. On June 20, 2002, the Supreme Court of
Justice rejected the second appeal as groundless. At the
request of the plaintiffs, EPAC was preparing an applica-
tion to the European Court for Human Rights to appeal the
decision once more. Meanwhile, despite the decree of the
Environmental Agency to include the park as a protected
green space, construction continued at the site.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
EPAC pursued judicial review and appeals of the
municipality’s actions and applied for injunctive relief in
the court of first instance. 
Case study analysis
Obstacles to access to information
Initially, the citizens were unable to have proper or
timely access to information. When aided by the EPAC in
stating their demands, citizens were able to compel local
government compliance with laws on access to informa-
tion, but compliance clearly is a privileged exception
rather than a standard practice.
Excessive delay
Perhaps the most important obstacle illustrated by this
case is the lack of a legal requirement regulating the
appeals process or ensuring a speedy trial and decision.
This manifests itself in several ways. First, defendants are
given the opportunity to delay proceedings almost indefi-
nitely. When there are no rules detailing when a defendant
must respond, defendants can delay the start of a trial
simply by failing to send their representative to court. In
addition, once the initial court hearing is set, the case
cannot proceed without signatures from both parties. This
again offers the defendant a way to delay the trial by failing
to appear.35 While the judge can issue, in theory, a decision
without the presence of the defendant and can issue a fine
to the defendant for not appearing, this procedure is rarely
applied in practice. This would not present a significant
problem except that the defendant’s absence from court,
even when due to his own negligence, is a valid basis for
appeal. Hence a defendant can guarantee that several trials
will be necessary before a final decision can be rendered,
simply by choosing not to attend his own trial!
Another aspect of the delay of the trial process in an
appeal is that the transfer of court files and information to
the higher-level court can take many months. In this case,
one appeal required a delay of five months so that files
could be transferred to the higher court.
Injunctive relief 
The failure to provide a speedy trial, for the reasons
outlined above, is compounded by the reluctance of courts
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or administrators to issue any sort of injunctive relief.
Under the law, injunctions could have been issued by the
Inspectorate for Construction Quality, the Environmental
State Inspectorate, the municipality, or the court (notably,
the Chisinau Environmental Agency, which called for a halt
to construction, could not issue injunctions). When issued,
failure to comply with an injunction, or efforts to sell prop-
erty that is subject to a legal injunction, can be punished
with a fine of up to 25 minimum salaries. 
Most important, because there are no guidelines for
judges in issuing injunctions, there was no way for EPAC to
persuade the Appeals Court judge to issue an injunction
once his initial decision was made. Hence, in this case,
construction continued unabated even while EPAC judi-
cially challenged the permitting of construction and a state
government body issued an order of cessation.
Further, the provisions that allow for compensation of
damages due to injunctions made it almost impossible for
EPAC to press for an injunction after the first stage. In its
discretion, the court can require a plaintiff to pay damages
for the cost of the injunction to the defendant if he loses the
case. In this case, EPAC’s successful injunction ran out
before the appeals process. EPAC faced the threat of large
damage costs if it sought to renew the injunction and lost
the appeal. This obstacle represents a continued problem
in enabling citizens and NGOs to achieve injunctive relief.
The case also illustrates the impact of the denial of
injunctive relief on efforts to secure rights and interests.
Arguably, if construction were halted during appeal by an
injunction, the municipality would have recognised the
park as a green space requiring protection. The fact that
construction commenced gave the municipality latitude to
exclude the park from green space protection during the
course of the trial.
Overlap of responsibilities
The failure to define administrative jurisdictions among
various government agencies involved in a common issue
is illustrated by the conflicting and overlapping authorisa-
tions received by FIFIRA. For example, the Hydrometeo
Agency approved construction of a parking lot for 40 cars,
while the municipality authorised construction of an 80-car
lot. In case of such a discrepancy, the Prosecutors’ Office is
empowered to resolve the disagreement, but has no time
frame in which to act. 
In the instant matter, EPAC received assurances that
the Prosecutors’ Office would resolve this discrepancy at
the next municipality council meeting. Those assurances
were the only action to be taken and appeared question-
able given that representatives of the Prosecutors’ Office
rarely attend the meetings of the municipal council,
despite being legally required to attend. In sum, the effort
to coordinate permitting processes is cursory at best and
hinders effective and meaningful citizen input and the
representation of their interests.
Judgement rationale
Another significant access to justice problem is that
when a judge issues his decision on a case, he either
accepts or rejects it, but does not provide any rationale for
his decision. Holdings are provided when the case is
appealed, and even then only after the appeal is submitted. 
The effect of this is to prevent de novo review of the
matter by the Appeals Court or allow the court to question
independently whether the lower court abused its discre-
tion. Rather than allowing for an attorney to challenge the
logic of a judicial decision, the appeals stage becomes yet
another opportunity for the lower court judge to reject the
party’s case — this time for the benefit of the higher court.
This unfairly restricts the ability of lawyers to challenge
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The Oily Bird Case
A broad judicial interpretation of standing allowed a
Dutch conservation society to file suit against a shipping
company in order to recover costs from rescuing sea birds
injured by the company’s oil spill in the North Sea, on the







Cited case name: Borcea, Arrondissementsrechtbank,
Rotterdam 15 March 1991 (civil court)
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Dutch Protection of Birds Society, Dutch NGO
Defendant: Borcea, Romanian shipowner
Background facts 
In 1988, the Romanian bulk carrier, Borcea, had an
accident in the North Sea causing a large oil spill.
Consequently, coastal waters were heavily polluted and
thousands of seabirds were beached, covered with oil. The
Dutch Society for the Protection of Birds initiated an effort
to care for and remove oil from the birds, spending consid-
erable funds in the process. 
Procedural history 
The Dutch Society for the Protection of Birds filed suit to
recover costs from Borcea for removing oil from the seabirds,
as well as the operational costs of maintaining bird asylums.
The court granted standing to the Society on the basis
that preservation and protection of seabirds are common
interests and, in that, such common interests are consistent
with the aims of the Society.
Final outcome 
The Dutch Society for the Protection of Birds and the
Romanian shipowner of the Borcea reached a settlement.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques
Judicial suit to recover costs related to spill that caused
harm to the environment and without apparent individual
harm to the Society.
Case study analysis
In 1994, two articles were introduced into the Civil
Code providing standing for interest groups (articles 305a
and 305b, book 3). The necessary elements to establish
standing include: being a legal person, having relevant
objectives within the articles of association, and repre-
senting individuals with similar interests. 
Despite this, however, a party is typically eligible for
compensation only when it has demonstrated individual
interests or harm. In the instant matter, an NGO was
successfully conferred standing for the first time to seek
compensation for costs stemming solely from pure
ecological damage.
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Contact 
Janeke de Vries
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment
Rijnstraat 8
2515 XP Den Haag
Netherlands
P.O. box 20951
2500 EZ Den Haag
Netherlands
Tel: +31-70-339-3939
Public information service tel: +31-70-339-5050 
The ‘Indispensable’ Pesticides Case
Delay tactics and “forum shopping” by the Dutch
government created numerous obstacles for NGOs seeking
to challenge government decisions concerning pesticide
registration. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions




• Standard of review (forum shopping)
• Limited review of government decisions by civil courts
• Direct effect of European directives
• Financial barriers
Case study details
Cited case name: Indispensable Pesticides
Parties involved
Plaintiffs (collectively referred to as “NGOs”): Society
for Nature and Environment; Zuid-Hollandse
Milieufederatie; Union of drinking water companies in the
Netherlands (VEWIN); Drinking water company of
Europoort; Water producing company of Brabantse
Biesbosch; and Hydron Zuid Holland
Defendant: The State of the Netherlands (ministers of
Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries; Housing, Public Spacing
and Environment; Health, Welfare and Sports; and Social
Affairs and Employment)
Third-parties (not officially taking part in the
proceedings): Organisation for Agriculture in the
Netherlands (users); and Phytosanitary Organisation in the
Netherlands (producers)
Background facts 
In the Netherlands, the use and sale of pesticides are
not allowed unless they are registered under the 1962
Pesticides Law. Registration is valid for up to ten years,
after which the pesticide must be re-registered. To be regis-
tered, a pesticide must meet a number of criteria laid down
in the Pesticides Law, including environmental, user and
public safety, and product quality requirements. 
Since 1994, in the field of pesticides used in agriculture,
the Dutch Pesticides Law has mainly been a vehicle for
application of European Directive 91/414, which contains
regimes for allowing pesticides to be marketed in EU
member states. During a transitional period lasting until at
least 2003, and probably until 2007, only general require-
ments within the Directive apply to national registration
procedures. Further, these requirements apply only to
pesticides containing “already existing” substances that
have not yet been reviewed on a European level. 
“Already existing” pesticides are those that were on the
market before the directive became effective. The general
requirements in the Directive are similar to Dutch law in
that they forbid member states from registering pesticides
if they do not meet environmental and other criteria.
This case concerned several “already existing” pesti-
cides. As a consequence of earlier policies, a significant
number of pesticides were eligible for re-registration in
1999. To be re-registered, under both the EU directive and
the Dutch Pesticides Law, the holder of the pesticide had
to provide detailed information about the product. In addi-
tion, the review was done de novo (i.e., as if it were a first
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registration) and thus must again meet the criteria
described above.
During the review process, it became clear that pesti-
cides containing ingredients listed among the 20 most
harmful active substances would not meet environmental
criteria during the de novo review. Massive lobbying efforts
by farmers’ organisations were initiated to keep these
pesticides on the market. Lobbyists insisted that these
pesticides were “indispensable” to agriculture and should
be retained. In the fall of 1999, at the request of the govern-
ment, an effort was made to find a compromise.
Stakeholders involved in settlement discussions included
farmers’ organisations, pesticide dealers, producers, envi-
ronmental NGOs, and drinking water companies. In the
end, a compromise was not reached. 
In January 2000, the registration period for these pesti-
cides ended. Under pressure from Parliament, however,
the government issued an emergency regulation extending
the registration of pesticides containing 11 active
substances deemed to be “indispensable” for farming.
Section 8 of the Pesticides Law gives all “interested
parties” the right of appeal against a decision based on this
law. Under this provision, environmental NGOs are
considered to be interested parties, and several groups
thus filed an appeal against the regulation.
Procedural history
In the Netherlands, a decision by a government body
can usually be challenged in an administrative court. These
administrative courts are served by specialised judges.
NGOs filed a complaint before the Board of Appeal for
Industry and Commerce and sought injunctive relief
enjoining officials from extending the registration of the
pesticides in question. In July 2000, the Board granted relief
holding that, because the government regulation consti-
tuted a registration of pesticides without a review of the
necessary criteria, the rule was a clear contravention of law.
In its turn, Parliament immediately enacted a statute in
March 2001, explicitly allowing the pesticides at issue to
remain on the market. This countermove was effective
given that the Dutch Constitution expressly forbids admin-
istrative courts from reviewing statutes.36
Immediately afterwards, NGOs filed a civil action,
summoning the State of the Netherlands to appear before
the court in The Hague. NGOs asserted that the statute
passed by Parliament conflicted with European Directive
91/414, and thus the State had committed a wrongful act,
that is, a violation of the civil code. NGOs further requested
that the President of the Court issue an injunction barring
application of the law.
A hearing on injunctive relief was heard on May 17,
2001, and the Court promptly denied relief on May 30, 2001. 
On July 1, 2001, the vice-minister published the list of
indispensable pesticides considered registered. NGOs’
attorneys took the view that this publication implied an
official decision about a concrete group of pesticides.
NGOs filed an administrative appeal against these deci-
sions, requesting a public review of the filed applications
and questioning their completeness. In addition, NGOs
requested injunctive relief. 
Final outcome
The administrative court set a hearing date for August
9, 2001. The day before the hearing, the vice-minister
found the applications incomplete. Thus, the most impor-
tant condition in the emergency law for provisional
continuation of the registrations was not met.
Consequently, the registrations were considered termi-
nated immediately. 
Some of these decisions were appealed to the courts by
the applicants, but no injunctions were requested, so the
pesticides were effectively removed from the market. So
far, litigation started by the applicants was unsuccessful. 
The main complaint was withdrawn in December
2001, as there was no longer a concrete interest to justify
further litigation. 
There was also no more need for a civil lawsuit as every
future decision that would be taken with respect to “indis-
pensable” pesticides could henceforth be challenged in an
administrative court of law, which could then also decide
about the legality of the law. The cost of litigation made
pursuing this case unattractive in a civil court for principle.
After the enormous effort involved in designing an
emergency law and guiding it through Parliament, in
comparison to the meagre results, the government will
probably not try a second time.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
In light of limited prospects before the Civil Court in
The Hague, NGOs’ attorneys focused on application of the
emergency pesticide law. Under the law, “indispensable”
pesticides would be considered re-registered only when a
“complete” application for registration had been filed. To
be “complete,” the application had to contain proof of
indispensability and sufficient data for evaluation. In addi-
tion, the vice-minister of Agriculture had to publish those
registrations assumed to be complete and thus able to be
continued in the official gazette. 
Case study analysis
In seeking to enact emergency measures at odds with
Dutch and most probably European law, Dutch officials
had reason to stay out of court as long as possible, or at
least conduct “forum shopping” in order to delay proceed-
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ings. Under Dutch law, forum shopping is a logical tactic
given that there is a difference in the depth of the review
conducted by administrative courts and civil courts. 
Administrative courts, led by specialised judges, are
much more at ease in the field of law where they are oper-
ating. Case studies demonstrate that these courts are more
aggressive in criticising government decisions and evalu-
ating policies, facts and circumstances. Conversely, it is
rather exceptional for civil courts to hear a case chal-
lenging a government decision and therefore it is much
more reluctant to undo government decisions. In fact, civil
courts have developed a practice of “marginal” review of
government decisions. Marginal review means that a deci-
sion of a government body is only overturned if it is
manifestly unsound. For example, if the government took
into account a certain interest in making a decision or
issuing a regulation, an explanatory note within the regu-
lation stating that interest was considered is enough to
convince the court that the government’s decision-making
was reasonable. 
A civil court’s unfamiliarity with some issues and
narrow standard of review make injunctive relief difficult
to obtain. Typically, injunctive relief is granted only when
the outcome of the main procedure is fairly predictable.
Thus, in a complicated case such as the instant matter, civil
courts will be very reluctant to grant relief.
In civil court legal representation is mandatory,
requiring the services of an attorney. In addition, court fees
may be significant and, when combined with attorneys’
fees, parties are required to pay significant costs for
bringing a lawsuit. Moreover, NGOs receive no financial
support for the cost of legal actions and fee shifting is not
an option. 
Conversely, in administrative procedures, court fees
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The Highway and Housing Case
Local citizens used the courts to overcome administra-
tive hurdles to access to information and public
participation in their efforts to stop a highway from being
built near their homes. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(2), (3) and (4)
Key issues
• Fair, equitable and timely access to courts
• Standing
• Judicial review of public participation in decision-making
• Actio popularis
• Aggregation of claims
• Adequate and effective remedies
Case study details
Cited case name: Highway Development Near Muchobor
Maly Housing Development, Warsaw, Poland
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Residents of the Muchobor Maly Housing Estate 
Defendant: City of Warsaw 
Background facts 
In 1997, Warsaw officials approved building and land
management conditions as a preliminary step to issuing
construction permits for the development of a highway
adjacent to the Muchobor Maly Housing Estate in Warsaw.
Anticipating an increase in traffic and home construction,
existing residents filed individual complaints, seeking judi-
cial review of the city’s decision and a halt to construction. 
Procedural history
Residents of the housing estate separately filed peti-
tions to the Municipal Revocatory Council requesting an
administrative proceeding concerning the building and
land management conditions for the highway plan. The
council initially denied these petitions on the basis that
an individual must be a necessary party to the
proceeding or have a legal interest to have standing.37
According to the council, living in the nearby housing
estate was not enough. 
Several residents filed a complaint before the Supreme
Administrative Court (NSA), asserting that the council’s
interpretation of the Polish administrative procedure rules
was too narrow. The court agreed and ordered the council
to determine which parties had a right to participate in offi-
cial proceedings on the basis of its ruling. Subsequently,
the council stated that inhabitants living closest to the
proposed highway site had a sufficient legal interest and
thus were necessary parties. 
Those residents with standing separately filed new
complaints before the Municipal Revocatory Council,
asserting that the city’s approved building and land
management conditions should be declared invalid due to
the failure to involve nearby inhabitants in the approval
proceedings. Claimants also contended that the city’s
environmental impact statement (EIS) was inadequate,
based on its failure to meet minimum requirements of the
1995 EIS protocol of the minister of environment.
Shortcomings of the EIS included incomplete data, a
failure to address key environmental factors, a lack of
inquiry into alternate plans, and failure to address means
of minimising environmental damage.
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The council ruled in favour of the city, upholding the
decision to approve construction. In turn, the residents
appealed the decision to NSA. Attempting to file a single
appeal for the multiple claims, attorneys for the residents
drafted a single brief and affixed the signatures of the resi-
dents to the document. Under Polish law, however, a
group of individuals cannot be treated as one party or as a
class of plaintiffs. Only legal persons or the members of
formal organisations may be treated as single subjects. As
such, each resident had to appeal separately. 
On September 5, 2000, NSA again ruled in favour of the
residents, holding that the council’s approval of the city’s
building and land management conditions was erroneous
given the obvious shortcomings of the city’s EIS.
Final outcome 
The appeals court was the final ruling in this matter.
However, authorities were continuing construction.
Under Polish law, overturning the city’s building and land
management conditions does not automatically negate
building permits issued in reliance on the approved
conditions. Each building permit must be appealed sepa-
rately and as long as the building permit is in force,
construction is legal.
Related actions and campaigns
Residents organised an informal protest committee and
conducted numerous high-profile events near the
proposed construction site. In addition, the committee
requested that the EIA Commission of the Ministry of
Environment inspected the quality of the city’s EIS — an
essential step in using the inadequacy of the EIS as a legal
argument. The committee also researched and suggested
alternative locations publicly and before the court. 
Access to justice techniques
The residents’ only recourse was to: 
• establish standing as necessary parties with a legal
interest in the matter; and 
• seek judicial review of the city’s decision and the pro-
cedures followed in making that decision.
Case study analysis
In environmental law disputes, it is common for a
number of individuals to have common claims against a
single party. That the individual residents in this case were
separately able to afford and secure the services of attor-
neys, file lawsuits and lodge appeals is a rarity in situations
such as this. Where different citizens share a common legal
interest in a matter, legal expenses are all too often
extreme and will deny some individuals within that group
the opportunity to seek redress in court. Class action suits,
where individuals are joined together as one party by
virtue of subject matter or legal claim, would go far in
allowing individual citizens to pool together funds and
efforts in seeking justice. For the benefit of the court, more-
over, the principle of efficient proceedings requires that
multiple appeals should be submitted as a single document
and that the court issue a single ruling applicable to all.
Issues of fairness, applicability and damages can easily
be addressed by uniform rules. For instance, rules quali-
fying individuals for membership based on subject matter
and common issues of law would ensure that consolida-
tion is uniform and fair to the defendant. Further, class
action could be limited to a certain group of administrative
or civil matters, where multiple plaintiffs seeking relief
from a single defendant is common. Finally, rules of court
could also regulate the allocation of damages and relief
among the multiple parties.
This case also illustrates the importance of filing a
complaint in court to challenge administrative proceedings
designed to limit public participation. In filing a complaint,
residents compelled the court to examine the city’s prac-
tices in deciding who among the public has a right to
participate in proceedings. The resulting change repre-











The Water Works: A Case in Progress
The benefit of seeking judicial review is illustrated as
an NGO and several government agencies came together
to challenge a massive project in a case raising public
awareness of access to justice issues and establishing a
valuable precedent for environmental law. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
Article 9(2), (3) and (4)
Key issues
• Interim injunctive relief 
• Access to judicial review of government decisions 
• Case strategy
Case study details
Cited case name: Gudkov et al. v. State Construction
Committee of the Russian Federation
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Deputy of the Russian Federation State Duma
Gudkov; Deputy of Moscow Oblast Duma Alekseev;
Deputy of Moscow Oblast Duma Tebin; Mashkin and
Shevchenko, residents of Moscow Oblast; Regional Public
Center for Human Rights and Environmental Defense,
environmental NGO
Defendant: State Construction Committee of the Russian
Federation (Mosoblcomunstroy)
Background facts 
In 1995, Moscow officials proposed construction of a
massive water supply system involving construction
throughout Moscow and the surrounding region. Based on
its preliminary environmental impact assessment (EIA), the
Moscow Oblast Environmental Protection Committee
rejected the proposal stating that the project was environ-
mentally dangerous and economically unjustified.
However, the proposal received considerable support
from isolated government agencies and commercial and
design companies, and a massive lobbying campaign
ensured that the project continued at least through the
design stage. As a result, more than RUB 3 million (USD
150,000) in public funds was spent on project design. 
Protests against the project were widespread. Moscow
residents, local officials, NGOs and scientific experts all
voiced opposition. Residents near the Oka River, an area
that would be significantly affected by the project, were
not informed of project details nor invited to participate in
decision-making. In light of this and the broad opposition,
the Moscow Oblast Duma (Parliament), with the support of
the Moscow Oblast Prosecutor’s Office, initiated an inde-
pendent investigation in 1999, into the legality of the proj-
ect and the RUB 3 million that was spent. 
Despite this, RF Goscomecologia, the agency charged
with issuing permits for the project to commence, decided
in April 2000, that development of the project could con-
tinue, allegedly amid intense pressure from interested
high-ranking government officials. 
At the end of 2000, the Duma’s investigation discov-
ered several legal violations in development of the project.
It also found that budgetary funds were spent illegally
throughout the design stage. In addition, several significant
changes to the scope and design over the past several
years warranted a new EIA. 
Despite these concerns, RF Goscomstroy approved
permits in March 2001, for construction allowing the proj-
ect to move forward.
Procedural history 
The Regional Public Center for Human Rights and
Environmental Defense (RPC), an environmental NGO,
filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the decision by
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Goscomstroy to allow the construction of the project to
move forward. Joining RPC as co-plaintiffs in the suit were
a number of federal and local authorities opposed to the
project. Plaintiffs alleged that the approval of the project
was in violation of several environmental statutes.38
Defendants asserted that, in approving the project, they
did not violate citizen rights, and that they acted in com-
pliance with the Governmental Decree on Governmental
Expertiza, a guidance document on construction matters
without the force of law. As such, approval was an action
not covered by law and therefore was not actionable. 
A hearing date was scheduled for June 2001, and then
for October 2001, but by August 2002, the case was still in
court, as several expert examinations were required by the
court before making a final judgement.
RPC attorneys requested interim injunctive relief at the
first preliminary hearing, seeking a ruling that construction
should be halted until a final court decision. The motion
was rejected by the court.
Final outcome 
A decision was still pending in August 2002.
Related actions and campaigns
Apart from the above action, the Moscow Oblast
Prosecutor started an investigation that was still ongoing in
August 2002. The prosecutor had received numerous com-
plaints and affidavits from affected residents, regional
NGOs and deputies of the Moscow Oblast Duma.
NGOs engaged in a mass media campaign and consis-
tently filed complaints to the federal parliament.
Information was gathered and disseminated to residents
and water users of the Oka River region.
Access to justice techniques 
Understanding the Russian judiciary, lawyers for RPC
decided to divide the various demands and arguments
among the multiple plaintiffs and file them as separate
complaints. The intention was that, if the judge rejected
some of the complaints, others would still be in court.
In addition, not all documents to be used as evidence
were submitted with the complaints. Traditionally, defen-
dants have taken advantage of the time between submis-
sion of documents and the hearing to influence the court
in not accepting various materials. RPC submitted docu-
ments only a few at a time, at each hearing, in order to min-
imise the defendant’s ability to use influence and power to
corrupt the court’s decisions. Similarly, a strategy was
adopted to make motions to call on expert testimony at the
hearing itself (rather than in advance) in order to avoid
undue influence on witnesses. 
Case study analysis
The case provided an opportunity to establish prece-
dents for the treatment of legislative provisions on EIAs,
public participation, and access to information and justice.
Further, because government officials from different levels
of government were joined in the case with environmental
NGOs, the case was expected to have considerable politi-
cal impact and to raise awareness of environmental issues
within the body politic. It was also expected to contribute
to efforts to increase public awareness. The case’s high
profile will generate attention on important issues, includ-
ing the environmental impact of government decisions,
inadequate environmental citizen rights, poor environ-
mental law implementation and enforcement, and limits on
access to justice on matters both large and small.
Contact
Olga Razbash, Attorney at Law and Chairperson
Regional Public Center for Human Rights and
Environmental Defense





This case is a judicial saga in which the rights of an
individual to access and publicise environmental informa-
tion collided with lingering traditions of excessive govern-
ment control and secrecy — a tale of both the Russian judi-
ciary’s progress in ensuring justice and the long road that
still lies ahead. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 2(3), 3(8) and 9(4)
Key issues
• Fair, equitable and timely procedure
• Judicial review of classification of information (nation-




Cited case name: Russian Federation v. Nikitin 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Office of Prosecutor General of the Russian
Federation; Federal Security Bureau, Russian Federation
(RF)
Defendant: Aleksandr Nikitin 
Background facts
On October 5, 1995, the Federal Russian Security Police
(FSB), the former KGB, raided the office of Bellona, a
Norwegian NGO, in Murmansk, and confiscated the draft
version of Bellona’s report on the handling of radioactive
waste by the Russian Northern Fleet. One of the co-authors
of the report, Aleksandr Nikitin, and several other Russian
Bellona employees and contacts were brought in for inter-
rogation. Nikitin’s passport was confiscated. The materials
prepared by Nikitin as a part of the report on the Russian
Northern Fleet contained information about the radiation
hazards posed by the Northern Fleet submarines and its
run-down nuclear waste storage sites.
Procedural history 
Nikitin, a former captain of the Russian Navy, was
arrested on February 6, 1996, by the FSB and accused of
high treason in the form of espionage. 
According to the FSB, Nikitin cooperated with and
accepted payment from the Norwegian environmental
organisation Bellona to gather “secret and top secret data”
regarding the Navy’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet
and transferred this information to Bellona’s representa-
tives. FSB further charged that Nikitin’s activities went
beyond the scope of an environmental organisation, and
that these activities had considerably impaired Russian
defence capabilities.39
In his defence, Nikitin maintained that the information
was already publicly available. 
Brought to FSB’s pre-trial detention centre in St.
Petersburg, Nikitin was refused the lawyer of his choice,
Yuri Schmidt, unless he agreed to abstain from travelling
abroad for five years, and to have his telephone tapped for
an unlimited period of time. 
The Russian Constitutional Court ruled on March 27,
1996, that FSB’s conditions violated articles 48 and 123(3)
of the Russian Constitution. On March 29, Yuri Schmidt
was appointed as Nikitin’s lawyer. When studying the case
file, Schmidt discovered that the charges against Nikitin
were based entirely on secret and retroactive decrees of
the Ministry of Defence. 
While Nikitin was kept in custody, a number of high-
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ranking officials within the Russian procuracy and the FSB
stated publicly during the summer of 1996 that Nikitin was
a traitor who had damaged Russia’s defence capability.
Since he had not confessed, he was accused of “actively
counteracting the establishment of the truth.” 
In September 1996, Amnesty International adopted
Nikitin as the first Russian prisoner of conscience since the
downfall of the Soviet Union. Amnesty International assert-
ed that the case was not based on national security interests. 
FSB declared its investigation complete and officially
charged Nikitin with treason through espionage, disclosure
of state secrets, and abuse of military travel orders. This
was the first charge of treason brought in Russia since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Neither Nikitin nor his
attorneys were given access to the military decrees upon
which the charges were based. 
Nikitin was released on December 14, 1996, from cus-
tody by order of the deputy prosecutor-general of Russia,
Mikail Katushev, and placed in “city arrest,” which meant
that he could not leave St. Petersburg. Katushev stated
publicly that there was no evidence of espionage but that
continued investigation was necessary. The director of the
FSB, Nikolay Kovaliov, disagreed with Katushev’s findings. 
Katushev ordered the FSB in January 1997, to evaluate
the case once more. In particular, Katushev stated that the
following issues had to be resolved:
1) Charges should be based on existing law rather than
secret and retroactive decrees.
2) It should be ascertained whether the information pro-
vided to Bellona was in fact publicly available. 
FSB reasserted the charges against Nikitin on
September 9, 1997, based on the invalid decrees. In deter-
mining whether the data had been previously made pub-
lic, the FSB evaluated only a small number of possibilities
and ignored many possible public sources of the informa-
tion.
On April 21, 1998, the Russian prosecutor-general stat-
ed that charges against Nikitin based on the decrees at
issue were contrary to the Constitution and ordered the
FSB to drop its charges related to the alleged abuse of mil-
itary travelling orders. 
The FSB presented yet another set of charges on May
8, 1998, in which all references to the illegal decrees
were removed. 
The FSB presented its indictment on June 29, 1998, and
forwarded the case to the St. Petersburg City Court. 
On September 13, 1998, the City Court announced a
trial date of October 20, 1998. The court declared that the
charges related to abuse of military travel orders were
without merit. 
On the eve of the trial, the presiding judge, Sergei
Golets, gave Nikitin and his defence team access to the
secret and retroactive decrees. The decrees had arrived
from the Ministry of Defence the day before. 
The court stopped the trial on October 29, 1998, and
ordered additional investigation. According to the court,
the alleged charges were so vague that Nikitin would be
deprived of his right to defend himself with legal means
without more information and legal assertions supporting
the charges. The court ordered expert evaluations of the
alleged state secrets in the Bellona report and all possible
public sources of the information. In addition, the court
ordered a new evaluation of the alleged damage caused to
Russian national security. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court’s Collegium of
Criminal Cases confirmed the order of the City Court on
February 4, 1999, and returned the case to the FSB for
additional investigation. 
On April 20, 1999, the Russian Constitutional Court
ruled that it is a violation of an individual’s constitutional
presumption of innocence to remand cases for additional
investigation when the prosecution has not been able to
present sufficient evidence for a guilty verdict. In such
cases, the defendant should be acquitted. 
Nevertheless, the FSB presented new expert evalua-
tions on June 10, 1999, which like the previous expert eval-
uations, were conducted by the 8th Department of the
Russian General Staff. The experts’ conclusions on the state
secrets in the report were the same as before. However, the
amount of damages claimed was reduced from approxi-
mately USD 1 million to USD 20,000. 
The FSB presented its new charges on July 2, 1999, sim-
ilar to the previous ones and on August 28 presented its
indictment and forwarded the case to the St. Petersburg
City Court. Since the indictment quoted the parts of the
Bellona report allegedly containing state secrets, the
indictment was stamped secret. This considerably hin-
dered the work of the defence. 
The trial started in St. Petersburg City Court on
November 22, 1999. The presiding judge was again Sergei
Golets. By this time, the case was subject to considerable
international and national interest. 
In December 1999, while the trial was taking place, St.
Petersburg TV ran a series under the vignette “Tracing
Bellona,” where both Nikitin and Bellona were accused of
taking part in espionage activities. Inside the court room,
an expert of the 8th Department of the General Staff admit-
ted that its evaluation of whether state secrets appeared in
the Bellona report was based, again, solely on the secret
and retroactive decrees. 
The Court found that no crime had been committed
and acquitted Nikitin on December 29, 1999. It pointed out
that the information in the Bellona report did not contain
state secrets and declared that the indictment was a blatant
violation of the Constitution since it was based on secret
and retroactive decrees.
The prosecution appealed the decision on January 5,
2000, to the Supreme Court’s Collegium of Criminal Cases,
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claiming that it was based on an incorrect application of
the law. It demanded that the case be remanded to the City
Court and presided over by other judges. 
The Supreme Court’s Collegium accepted the case on
March 29, 2000, but postponed the hearing at the request
of the prosecutor-general, who requested to participate in
the case. 
On appeal, the prosecution substituted its initial plea
on April 17, 2000, with a request that the matter be sent
back to the FSB for additional investigation so that the “vio-
lations of the acquitted Nikitin’s constitutional rights
[could] be corrected.” The Supreme Court’s Collegium
rejected the prosecution’s plea and affirmed the City
Court’s acquittal. 
Nikitin received a new passport on May 18, 2000, replac-
ing the one that had been confiscated on October 5, 1995. 
On July 19, 2000, the Presidium of the Supreme Court
announced that it would hear the prosecutor-general’s
appeal against the acquittal on August 2, 2000. The defence
had not been informed of the prosecution’s application for
appeal. On this date, the Presidium of the Supreme Court
postponed the hearing until September 13, 2000. After a
brief court hearing, the chairman of highest legal authority
of the Russian Federation, Mr. V. Lebedev, affirmed the
acquittal of Nikitin on September 13.
Final outcome 
After almost five years, city arrest and considerable
expense, the case of Nikitin was finally settled. 
Related actions and campaigns
The authorities subsequently launched a tax investiga-
tion of the financial contributions made for Nikitin’s
defence. This was still ongoing in 2002.
Access to justice techniques 
It is difficult to refer to access to justice techniques in
this case as Nikitin was an unwilling victim, persecuted for
revealing embarrassing but truthful facts about an extreme-
ly dangerous environmental situation in the Arctic. 
Case study analysis
In order to defend himself, Nikitin made several
appeals on the basis of the Russian Constitution that set
enormously significant precedents and eventually resulted
in his acquittal. While his own deeds were heroic and his
strength formidable, all would have been lost if not for the
equal fortitude of the judges who refused to accept the
political directions of the FSB and those behind it. The
independent judgement of the courts, based on the rule of
law, was a testament to the changes in the legal system of
the Russian Federation and by extension to other parts of
the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, other cases (such as
the Pasko Case), which followed Nikitin, have demonstrat-
ed that the process of judicial reform in the Russian
Federation is a long one with many bumps along the way.
While the FSB might have lost the case, it did succeed
in sending a message to those who might wish to spread
other truths about risks to public health and the environ-
ment over which those in power are responsible.
Exercising rights to information and participation may con-
tinue to be fraught with peril in some parts of Europe.
Moreover, a further question was left unresolved by the
Nikitin Case. While the FSB eventually lost the case —
something that would have been unthinkable a generation
ago — there was no backlash against those responsible for
such a waste of time, energy and resources. Those abusing
the justice system — the FSB and those behind it — not
only went unpunished, but other parts of the state appara-
tus — the tax authorities — were mobilised to continue to
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The Shrinking Park
Citizens seeking to protect a national park filed multiple
motions for injunctive relief and sought to overturn related
city government decrees given a failure to provide citizen
access to relevant decision-making and information. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(3) and (4).
Key issues
• Direct enforcement
• Review of public participation in specific decision-
making
• Injunctive relief
• Independent judiciary 
• Financial barriers
Case study details
Cited case name: The Shrinking Park
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Residents of a district near a natural and historic
site (Sosnovskih, Startcev and Koroleva)
Plaintiffs’ representation: Regional Public Center for
Human Rights and Environmental Defense; Committee to
Protect Neskuchnyi Sad (NGOs)
Federal Prosecutor (as required by the Federal Law on
Prosecutor in Russian Federation)
Defendants: Moscow City Government
Background facts
In 1978, the Moscow City Council granted protected
status to the historically and biologically significant park,
Neskuchnyi Sad. Under national law, seizure of land with-
in designated protected areas is strictly prohibited unless
approved by the federal government. In 1994, without
such approval, the Moscow City Government issued a
decree decreasing the territory of Neskuchnyi Sad. Land
removed from protected status was then transferred to the
land development company, Compromstroy Ltd.
Compromstroy intended to construct two large build-
ings immediately adjacent to nearby residential homes and
remove more than 200 old growth trees from the sur-
rounding park lands. Despite the apparent impact to near-
by residents and the local environment, Compromstroy did
not conduct public hearings or discussion, nor did it inform
residents from nearby apartments about construction
plans. In addition, no environmental assessment was con-
ducted by the government, as required by law.
Despite large-scale public protests, the Moscow City
Government allowed construction to commence.
Ultimately, 230 old growth trees were removed, a chil-
dren’s playground demolished, and a huge concrete fence
erected around the construction site.
In response, the Committee to Protect Neskuchnyi Sad
was established and several environmental NGOs, including
the Moscow Ecological Federation, Russian Socio-Ecological
Union, Congress of Russian Communities and the Regional
Public Center For Human Rights and Environmental
Defense, developed a coalition aimed at helping citizens to
protect their constitutional environmental rights and prevent
further degradation of Neskuchnyi Sad.
Procedural history
In 1995, NGOs, on behalf of nearby residents, filed a
lawsuit against the Moscow City Government before the
Moscow City Court. In their complaint, NGOs asserted that
decrees allowing for land transfer and construction violat-
ed several citizens’ rights, including the right to:
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• a healthy environment;
• timely and adequate environmental information; and
• public involvement (participation) in environmental
decision-making (since no EIA or State Environmental
Expertiza procedures were conducted as required
under the Federal Law on Environment, the 1995
Expertiza Regulation, and the 1994 Regulation on EIA
Procedure).40
NGOs also submitted a motion for injunctive relief
seeking to halt construction until the case was resolved
by the court. In seeking injunctive relief, NGOs asserted
that construction was an environmentally dangerous
activity that would render moot the relief sought if
allowed to continue until court resolution. The court
rejected the NGOs’ motion. In 1997, the Moscow City
Court rejected the complaint. 
Citizens then appealed to the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation. The Supreme Court remanded the case
to a second court within the Moscow City Court, citing the
bias of the initial presiding court, and noting that the park’s
designation as a protected area had not been considered
by the lower court. 
In 1999, upon a rehearing, NGOs resubmitted their
motion for injunctive relief. The second Moscow City Court
rejected the motion and the complaint on rehearing. Again,
the Russian Supreme Court remanded the case back for a
third hearing.
In December 2000, the third court within the Moscow
City Court to hear the case ruled in favour of the NGOs,
acknowledging a violation of citizens’ environmental rights
and interests, and stated that the two Moscow Government
Decrees of 1994 and 1997 were illegal.
In April 2001, the Russian Supreme Court rejected an
appeal brought by Compromstroy.
Final outcome
The court decision was widely disseminated in the
mass media and on the Internet. After the final court ruling,
the Moscow City Government issued decrees that abol-
ished the prior decrees transferring land and permitting
construction. The city also promised that the construction
site will be cleaned up and 230 trees planted to replace
those removed. Involved NGOs and citizens continued to
monitor the city to ensure that the promises were kept.
Despite a favourable ruling halting construction, the
court rejected a requested order that the Moscow City
Government should be explicitly forbidden from repeating
such violations of legislation and citizens’ rights. Moreover,
no compensation was awarded for moral damages caused
by seven years of lengthy court litigation, damaging con-
struction and the government’s failure to comply with citi-
zens’ constitutional rights.
Related actions and campaigns
At the beginning of the third court hearing before the
Moscow City Court, lawyers of the Regional Public
Center submitted an additional lawsuit on behalf of a cit-
izen to cover moral damages caused to him by the activ-
ity of the defendant. This lawsuit was to be heard sepa-
rately by the Moscow City Court, but as of August 2002,
it was not yet settled.
In addition, four additional complaints were filed
before the lowest district courts of Moscow against other
related permits issued by different government agencies,
including the permit to take and manage the piece of land,
to conclude a 49-year lease, to cut 200 old growth trees,
and to dig the basin and start construction works. All of
these complaints were decided in favour of plaintiffs by the
district courts.
Access to justice techniques
Most importantly, a coalition of citizens and environ-
mental and political NGOs was established as a means of
pooling together resources to challenge the government
on an issue of common concern. In doing so, the coalition
had greater access to expert research (architectural, legal
and scientific) and expert testimony on special matters,
including land law precedents, management and construc-
tion activity, and design documentation.
In litigation, NGOs employed a procedural form of
complaint (according to chapter 24-1 of the RF Civil
Procedural Code) in order to expedite consideration of
their claims. Further, at each stage of court hearings (espe-
cially at the very first stage), motions for injunctive relief
were repeatedly submitted. In addition, all motions were
submitted in writing (pursuant to Russian civil procedure,
motions can be presented orally at the hearing). In doing
this, the court’s rejection of the motion must also be in writ-
ing and thus included in the case file for purposes of
appeal. Such a technique provided an opportunity to edu-
cate judges on environmental and human rights legal
issues — still largely unknown to judges at the time.
Finally, NGOs used precedent established by positive
decisions on similar matters before other lower district courts.
Case study analysis
Several obstacles to effective implementation of access
to justice requirements as would be provided by the
Aarhus Convention had to be overcome. First was corrup-
tion and the ignorance of public authorities about environ-
mental laws. In order to ensure transparent judicial pro-
ceedings, NGOs submitted their motions in writing and
supported their claims with existing precedent and thor-
ough expert evidence. In addition, NGOs strived to main-
tain personal contacts with “friendly” officials in order to
obtain the necessary documents concerning borders of the
park from city archives. 
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Under the Russian Civil Procedural Code there is no
“contingency” fee structure by which a plaintiff can forego
payment to an attorney until the lawsuit has been resolved.
Further, Russia is a “loser pays” jurisdiction in which a win-
ning party can have its costs recovered by the losing party,
but only when completely successful on the merits of its
claim. This represents a substantial disincentive to citizens
to enforce their environmental rights and a significant
financial burden that prevents citizens from acquiring qual-
ified professional legal service. 
In response, lawyers of the Regional Public Center for
Human Rights and Environmental Defense represented cit-
izens pro bono, covering litigation expenses through funds
from a project supported by the MacArthur and Ford
Foundations. However, without state financial support to
ensure capacity-building of civil society, such representa-
tion of citizen interests remains rare.
In all, NGOs submitted five written motions seeking
injunctive relief. That each motion was rejected signals the
courts’ continued hesitation to interfere in areas of govern-
ment influence before a final court decision. 
Contact
Olga Razbash, Chairperson
Regional Public Center for Human Rights and Environ-
mental Defense 
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The Silver Plate
A local resident participated in enforcement actions
against a bakery operating without necessary approvals.
Nevertheless, the bakery owners continued to operate






Cited case name: Srebreni Tanjir v. Secretariat for
Inspection Affairs 
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Srebreni Tanjir (The Silver Plate), a bakery
Defendant: Secretariat for Inspection Affairs, Nis
Third-party intervenor: Pera Peric, resident
Background facts
A company started bakery operations and only after-
wards initiated the procedure for collecting the relevant envi-
ronmental, health and other approvals. On July 20, 1999, a
request was submitted to establish whether environmental
protection requirements were met for the bakery operations.
On August 4, Pera Peric submitted a request to be recognised
as a party to the dispute. The bakery was situated in the same
building as Peric’s apartment (only a partition-wall separated
them). On August 9 and 23, two inspections of the premises
were carried out. In the meantime, on August 20, Peric was
granted administrative standing.
On September 8, the Secretariat for Inspection Affairs
issued a decision prohibiting the bakery activities on the
basis of exceeding noise limitations. The company appealed
against the decision to the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MOEP). On September 25, the bakery was
inspected again, and the inspectorate closed it down.
The company owners thereafter obtained a report on
the bakery’s acoustic activity by an authorised expert,
which confirmed that the noise from the bakery was with-
in the permitted limits. 
Procedural history
On December 20, 1999, the MOEP rejected the appeal
as unfounded in the light of the factual situation at the time
when the first-instance decision was made. The company
owners immediately initiated an administrative appeal
before the Supreme Court of Serbia challenging the legali-
ty of the second-instance decision. The Supreme Court
accepted the complaint filed by the company and on
October 18, 2000, issued its decision annulling the decision
of the MOEP in part on the basis of the later acoustic activ-
ity report obtained by the bakery owners.
Upon remand, the MOEP noted certain defects and
contradictions in the documents. In particular, the report
on the acoustic activity of the bakery differed significantly
from a previous report prepared by another authorised
organisation showing the volume of noise to be well
beyond the permitted limits (48.5 decibels). In light of this
situation, the MOEP decided on June 22, 2001, to engage a
third authorised organisation to measure the level of noise
in the environment. 
The results of the new measurement concluded that
the noise level exceeded the legally allowed level during
the second phase of the baking process. Further investiga-
tions revealed that the company did not have the appro-
priate building construction and functioning permits.
Based on these facts, the MOEP once again rejected the
bakery’s appeal against the decision of the Secretariat for
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Inspection Affairs.
This decision was again appealed by the bakery to the
Supreme Court.
Final outcome
Once again, the Supreme Court accepted the complaint
and annulled the decision of the MOEP. In August 2002, a
new decision of the MOEP was still expected.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
A neighbouring resident of a noisy bakery participated
in an action to inspect the bakery’s operations and in
administrative procedures to enforce applicable law. The
bakery, in turn, presented opposing scientific analyses and
successfully challenged the administrative decisions in
court. Parties used reconsideration by the same authority,
administrative appeal and judicial appeal mechanisms.
Case study analysis
The Law on Enterprises (Official Gazette of FRY, No.
29/96), article 18, stipulates that a company may start oper-
ations, perform operations and change the conditions of its
operations when the competent authority issues a decision
to the effect that it has fulfilled the requirements concerning
technical equipment and facilities, safety at work, and pro-
tection and improvement of the environment, as well as
other prescribed requirements. Accordingly, The Silver
Plate was obligated to obtain, prior to starting operations, a
decision from a relevant authority that environmental pro-
tection requirements had been met. However, establishing
the real facts regarding the noise level proved to be difficult
due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Other certified
expert institutions had to be engaged to conduct measure-
ments. This resulted in a “war of experts” and substantial
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Tenants of a building with a noisy cafe initiated enforce-
ment actions to apply noise regulations through their com-
plaints to appropriate authorities. The appeal to the court
system by the cafe owner significantly delayed action.
Relevant Aarhus provisions




Cited case name: Sloboda Co. v. Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection of Serbia
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Sloboda (Freedom), a catering company
Defendants: Department for Utilities, Housing Affairs and
Environmental Protection of the Indjija Municipality
Third-party intervenors: Tenants Assembly of the build-
ing in Bloc 63
Background facts
Sloboda operated Café Zvezda (Star) on the ground
floor of a building in Bloc 63, facility 8 in Indjija
Municipality. The tenants of the building complained
about excessive noise coming from the cafe.
Procedural history
On April 8, 1997, an inspector from the Department for
Utilities, Housing Affairs and Environmental Protection of
the Indjija Municipality went to the cafe and established
that the source of the noise was a Philips cassette recorder.
Moreover, the cafe could not produce documents indicat-
ing that the noise level was in accordance with the rules on
the permitted noise level in the environment (Official
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 54/92).
On May 21, the inspector ordered Sloboda to measure
the noise levels. As nothing was done to carry out the
order, the noise was forcibly measured on September 19,
by the inspector. It was established that the noise level
exceeded the permitted level. On November 26, the
inspector issued a decision to undertake noise protection
measures and to prohibit future operations of the cafe.
Sloboda appealed against this decision to the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MOEP).
On December 17, Sloboda had the noise level meas-
ured again by another authorised institution. Measurement
was conducted only outside the premises, as the tenants
refused to allow noise measurement inside the building
because no noise protection measures that had been
ordered, had been undertaken. The measurement showed
that the noise level was below that permitted during day-
time. On December 22, the inspector reversed his earlier
decision banning the cafe’s operation. The Tenants
Assembly appealed this decision to the MOEP.
On January 22, 1998, the MOEP rejected the cafe’s
appeal against the decision to stop the operation of the
cafe and accepted the tenants’ appeal against the later deci-
sion of the inspector certifying that environmental protec-
tion conditions were fulfilled. The MOEP annulled this
decision and sent the case back for review in order to
establish the facts of the situation.
On January 25, 1998, Sloboda initiated an administrative
dispute before the Supreme Court of Serbia. On September
16, 1998, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and
annulled the decision of the MOEP on formal grounds.
On December 7, 1998, the ministry ordered the case
to be sent back for review to the first-instance authority,
the inspector.
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On January 28, 1999, the environmental protection
inspector issued a new decision, temporarily prohibiting
the use of the cafe until it could be established that the
noise was within permitted limits. Both Sloboda and the
Tenants Assembly appealed. On March 22, 1999, the
MOEP rejected their appeals.
Meanwhile, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme
Court, Sloboda brought an action on March 3, 1999, before
the Commercial Court in Belgrade to require the MOEP to
pay compensation for damages.
Final outcome
The cafe has ceased operations. The decision of the
Commercial Court was still not issued by August 2002.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
Neighbours of a noisy cafe made complaints to the rel-
evant authorities in order to enforce applicable noise regu-
lations. The owners of the cafe, in turn, presented oppos-
ing scientific analyses and successfully challenged the
administrative decision in court. In addition, the cafe was
seeking damages from the MOEP for lost business. Parties
used reconsideration by the same authority, administrative
appeal and judicial appeal mechanisms.
Case study analysis
The tenants appealed the decision by the first-instance
authority regarding the factual situation (i.e. noise level).
Even though it was ordered that the noise level should be
measured, the lack of cooperation by different parties at
different times, coupled with a lack of enforcement pow-
ers, meant that establishing the facts proved to be a real
problem in this case. The noise was measured from outside
the cafe and the real level was hard to establish. Although
formal legal remedies were adequate, greater powers of
enforcement were needed. Because the factual situation
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Plaintiffs appealed against the approval of an environ-
mental assessment, seeking review of wrongly established
facts in the first detailed analysis, including area of land
involved, the level of dust in the air and on the ground,
noise produced by the quarry, and the safety of citizens
around the quarry.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(2) and (5)
Key issues
• Review of public participation in decisions on specific
activities
• Standing
• Reconsideration by the same authority
• Financial and other barriers
Case study details
Cited case name: In re Susica-Cacak Quarry
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Residents of Cacak Municipality
Plaintiffs’ representation: Public Legal Officer of Cacak
Municipality
Defendant: Ministry of Environmental Protection of the
Republic of Serbia
Background facts
Under article 16 of the Law on Environmental
Protection of the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia Nos. 66/91, 83/92, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94,
44/95 and 53/95), an analysis of the environmental impact
must be made with respect to all facilities and works that
may put the environment at serious risk. This analysis must
be approved by the ministry in charge of environmental
affairs and such an approval forms part of the urban plan-
ning and technical documentation. The law does not pro-
vide for public participation in the decision-making
process. The Rules Regarding Environmental Impact
Assessment (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No.
61/92) list the facilities and works for which such an analy-
sis must be made and specify how it is to be prepared and
what it is to include.
On May 13, 1998, the detailed analysis of the environ-
mental impact of exploitation of the Susica-Cacak strip
mine on particular plots from the land registry situated in
the Loznica community was made. Six days later, Putevi
Company requested the approval of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MOEP) of the detailed analysis.
Meanwhile, the residents living in the vicinity of the
quarry approached the Public Legal Officer of Cacak
Municipality for assistance. 
The Ministry gave its approval on July 27.
Procedural history
The same day (July 27, 1998) the public legal officer, as
the legal representative of a group of citizens from the vil-
lage of Loznica near Cacak, submitted a proposal to make
another detailed analysis. One basis of the proposal was
the fact that the initial analysis had not covered all of the
relevant area in the vicinity of the quarry.
In November, the Republic Inspector for Environmental
Protection ordered a temporary halt to the operations of the
Susica karst crushing plant pending the completion of the
measures provided for in the detailed analysis.
On December 14, 1998, the MOEP issued a decision
annulling the approval decision of July 27, and permitting the
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review of the procedure in light of the new facts raised by the
residents. It ordered the procedure to be renewed for an
elaboration of a new detailed analysis, having established
that there were certain illogical points in the existing analysis. 
The new analysis confirmed the findings of the previ-
ous one. On February 10, 1999, the MOEP issued a deci-
sion approving the new detailed analysis. On March 23,
1999, the Inspector established that the measures provided
for in the detailed analysis had been implemented, and on
April 30, the MOEP issued a decision noting that Putevi had
fulfilled the environmental requirements for the conduct-
ing of its activities at the Susica karst crushing plant.
On August 13, 1999, the Public Legal Office of the Cacak
Municipality, representing the residents of Cacak, appealed
against the MOEP’s approval of the new detailed analysis. 
Final outcome
On February 25, 2000, the Administrative Commission
of the government of the Republic of Serbia rejected the
appeal. From an administrative standpoint, the case was
considered closed. However, the problem of the quarry
remained prominent among the concerns of local residents
and particularly of certain NGOs.
Related actions and campaigns
NGOs continued to oppose the operation of the quarry.
Access to justice techniques 
The residents of Cacak took advantage of the opportu-
nity to get legal assistance from the Public Legal Office of
the Cacak Municipality. They used reconsideration by the
same authority and administrative appeals to try to over-
turn decisions approving the detailed analysis in an EIA. 
Case study analysis
There was no public participation in the development
of the detailed analysis. Regulations of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia did
not address public participation in decision-making
regarding the preparation of environmental assessments.
Consequently, there was no basis for the local residents to
claim that their participation rights had been violated. The
only opportunity for residents to challenge the conclu-
sions, therefore, was to appeal against the decision
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On three separate occasions, an NGO was denied
access to inspection reports prepared by a government
agency concerning several nuclear facilities. Each time the
NGO filed lawsuits to challenge the decisions, but the
courts took several years to decide the matters.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(1), (4) and (5)
Key issues
• Review of denial of access to information
• Timely and fair judicial review procedures
• Financial and other barriers
Case study details
Cited case name: EEA v. CSN (3 cases)
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: Ecologistas en Accion (EEA), Spanish NGO
Defendants: Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), the
Spanish government agency responsible for inspecting
nuclear facilities and collecting and disseminating resulting
information to the public
CASE A
Background facts
In 1998, the iron and steel company Acerinox, located
near Cadiz, accidentally released caesium-137 radiation
into the atmosphere. CSN investigated the incident and
prepared a report. EEA requested access to the report pre-
pared by CSN on December 1, 1998. CSN denied EEA
access to the report on December 21, 1998.
Procedural history
An administrative suit was filed on February 2, 1999,
before the Audiencia Nacional, a special division of the
Supreme Court established in order to reduce the caseload
of the Supreme Court and allow for more timely decisions.
Audiencia Nacional has jurisdiction over judicial chal-
lenges brought against CSN. On February 29, 2000, the
court ruled in favour of EEA and ordered CSN to make
inspection reports concerning Acerinox available to EEA.
On April 5, 2000, the state filed an annulment appeal
before the Supreme Court challenging the Audiencia
Nacional’s decision. In addition, several companies inter-
vened in support of the State’s appeal. 
Final outcome
More than two years later, by July 2002, the court had
not issued a final ruling on the state’s appeal.
CASE B
Background facts
On December 21, 1995, EEA requested access to
inspection reports from January 1992, to December 1995
on the activity of the Jose Cabrera nuclear power station
located in Zorita, Guadalajara. On January 31, 1996, CSN
denied access to the reports.
Procedural history
EEA filed a lawsuit before the Eighth Section of the
High Court of Madrid Autonomous Region on February 27,
1996, challenging CSN’s refusal to provide the inspection
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reports. Over three years later, on June 9, 1999, the court
ruled in favour of CSN, denying EEA’s request for the
reports to be made available. EEA filed an annulment
appeal before the High Court on June 29, 1999. Almost two
years later, on June 18, 2001, citing a formal defect in the
filed appeal, the High Court refused EEA’s petition for
appeal, thus sustaining the High Court’s earlier decision.
Final outcome
CSN’s decision to deny access to reports on the Jose
Cabrera power station was sustained.
CASE C
Background facts
On January 4, 1995, EEA requested access to several
inspection reports from 1993 on the activity of the Santa
Maria Garona nuclear power station, located near Burgos.
On September 21, 1995, CSN denied access to the reports,
citing the lack of Spanish transposition of Directive
90/313/EEC. It also maintained that the information
requested was an unfinished document and concerned
internal communications.
Procedural history
EEA filed a lawsuit before the Ninth Section of the High
Court of Madrid Autonomous Region on December 11,
1995, challenging CSN’s decision to deny access to reports
on the Santa Maria Garona nuclear power station. Almost
four years later, on March 2, 1999, the court ruled in favour
of EEA and ordered CSN to make inspection reports con-
cerning Santa Maria Garona available to EEA. The court
held that the requested information was neither an unfin-
ished document nor privileged internal communications
and the reports should thus be supplied to the applicant.
The state immediately filed an annulment appeal before
the Supreme Court challenging the lower court’s decision.
Final outcome
By July 2002, the case was still pending resolution of
the appeal made by the legal representative of the state.
Related actions and campaigns
EEA’s legal actions were consistently accompanied by
mass media activities aimed at raising awareness on the
issue and seeking support from the public. 
Access to justice techniques
In all three cases, the plaintiffs used the judicial
review procedure for enforcement of their right of access
to information.
Case study analysis
The excessive delay in the issuing of a final judgement
on the plaintiff’s requests reveals the court’s general non-
compliance with the Aarhus Convention requirements
related to a fair, equitable and timely review procedure on
issues related to access to environmental information. In all
three cases, CSN cited as its reason for denying public
access to the inspection reports that they were either unfin-
ished documents or, alternately, privileged data or internal
communications.41
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A Spanish NGO, filing a lawsuit against a mining com-
pany and regional government to force the clean-up of
pollution from a breached waste dam located on the
Guadiamar River, was required to post a substantial bond,
despite establishing locus standi. In addition, the excessive
length of the judicial process and the lack of court training
and resources in dealing with complex pollution control
issues prevented effective resolution of the case. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Articles 9(3), (4) and (5)
Key issues
• Direct enforcement
• Financial and other barriers (excessive bond require-
ment)
• Timeliness of judicial review
• Knowledge and capacity of judges
Case study details
Cited case name: Donana National Park
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: SEO/Birdlife and Coordinadora Ecologista
Pacifista of Andalusia (the latter since has merged with
Ecologistas en Accion), two Spanish NGOs (NGOs)
Defendants: Boliden-Apirsa, Swedish multinational cor-
poration and owner of the Aznalcollar mining facility;
The Guadalquivir Basin Authority; Ministry of the
Environment, responsible for protecting the National
Park and in general for controlling the enforcement of
environmental legislation in Spain; and the Regional
Government of Andalusia, responsible for implementing
and enforcing environmental legislation in Andalusia and
protecting Donana Park
Background facts
In 1979, Boliden-Apirsa was authorised to construct a
waste dam on the Guadiamar River to collect and treat
waste produced by its Aznalcollar pyrite mine. Several
studies conducted in the early 1980s revealed a high
degree of heavy metal pollution in the Guadiamar River,
specifically indicating the “risk of an ecological catastrophe
due to the pollution caused by cadmium, zinc, copper and
lead.” Consequently, given that 75 percent of the river
flows into Donana National Park, studies suggested that
the park was threatened. Upon Spain’s ratification of the
Ramsar Convention, Donana was listed as a Ramsar site.
In 1985, Boliden-Apirsa increased the height of the dam
in order to increase its capacity. Several more height increas-
es would follow. In 1988, NGOs filed a first complaint to the
European Commission about the potential risk to Donana
National Park posed by the Aznalcollar mining facility.
Spanish authorities responded to the Commission two years
later, stating that all prior episodes of pollution on the river
were “completely solved.” Meanwhile, Donana was regis-
tered in the Montreux Register of the Ramsar Convention.
On September 4, 1992, NGOs filed a complaint before
the Duty Magistrates’ Court requesting a judicial investiga-
tion into Boliden-Apirsa’s management of the mine. In
addition, NGOs requested an investigation into the ade-
quacy of enforcement of environmental legislation related
to mine and waste dam operations by the director of the
Andalusia Environmental Protection Agency.
On May 27, 1994, NGOs filed a complaint before the
First Magistrates’ Court of Sanlucar la Mayor against
Boliden-Apirsa, alleging that the company illegally stored
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toxic pyrite ashes from another company behind the dam.
In support of its lawsuit, NGOs subsequently submitted
documents and other evidence to the court. In addition,
the court requested information from Boliden-Apirsa and
collected its own evidence.
On January 26, 1996, NGOs filed a complaint against
Boliden-Apirsa before the director of Public Prosecution of
the Principal Court of Seville Province, regarding the leak-
age of acid waters from the dam into the Agrio and
Guadiamar rivers. Two months later, the director of Public
Prosecution of Seville forwarded all documentation to the
Second Magistrates’ Court of Sanlucar la Mayor to com-
mence judicial review.
On March 4, 1997, the Second Magistrates’ Court of
Sanlucar la Mayor ordered a stay of proceedings. Finally, one
year and one day later, almost four years after NGOs filed
their complaint to the First Magistrates’ Court of Sanlucar la
Mayor, the court initiated the collection of evidence.
On March 25, 1998, NGOs submitted a second com-
plaint to the European Union. The Commission decided
that there was not enough evidence to start an infringe-
ment procedure.
On April 25, 1998, the Aznalcollar catastrophe took
place. The dam broke and five hectare metres of polluted
sludge and highly toxic water flowed into the Guadiamar 
River, at a site only 50 kilometres upstream of the Donana
Marsh located within the park.
Procedural history
The same day, NGOs filed a complaint to the Spanish
Civil Guard against Boliden-Apirsa alleging criminal liabili-
ty for discharging sulphuric acid and heavy metals, includ-
ing mercury, arsenic and cadmium, into a hydrographic sys-
tem encompassing several rivers and the Donana Marsh.
On May 13, 1998, NGOs filed a second lawsuit before
the Second Magistrates’ Court of Sanlucar la Mayor against
Boliden-Apirsa, the Guadalquivir Basin Authority, and the
Industry and Environment departments of the Andalusia
Regional Government alleging liability for the toxic dis-
charge caused by the Aznalcollar dam breach. In addition,
NGOs asserted Boliden-Apirsa’s illegal attempt to conceal
polluted sludge.
On June 3, 1998, the Second Magistrates’ Court of
Sanlucar la Mayor requested a bond of PTA 5,000,000 from
CEPA and SEO/Birdlife as a prerequisite for admitting their
complaint and initiating the case. The NGOs appealed the
decision.
On June 9, 1998, NGOs filed a second lawsuit before
the Second Magistrates’ Court of Sanlucar la Mayor against
several authorities alleging improper clean-up activities.
On appeal of the Second Magistrates’ bond require-
ment, the Principal Court of Seville Province reduced the
bond requirement to PTA 1,000,000 on October 15, 1998.
Subsequently, NGOs filed an additional lawsuit on
November 19, 1998, before the Second Magistrates’ Court
of Sanlucar la Mayor against the Environment Department
of the Andalusia Regional Government complaining of air
pollution caused by the inappropriate removal of the
sludge during clean-up operations.
NGOs made several requests to the Second Magistrates’
Court of Sanlucar la Mayor for the collection of evidence in
relation to these suits in December.
On December 22, 2000, more than two years after the
initial Aznalcollar-Donana suit was filed, the judge ordered
a stay of proceedings, holding that, in the court’s opinion,
no parties had been found liable for causing the dam
breach catastrophe. NGOs filed an appeal before the same
court, which was denied on March 5, 2001. NGOs followed
this with an appeal to the Court of Seville Province, chal-
lenging the stay order.
Final outcome
In November 2001, the Court of Seville Province issued
a decision on the appeal filed by NGOs in March 2001, rul-
ing that there was no criminal offence involved in the dam
break, and opening a civil case for compensation. The
Andalusia Regional Government initiated a civil case for
compensation of costs incurred for cleaning up the site. 
Relevant actions and campaigns
NGOs’ legal efforts were consistently accompanied by
mass media activities, including several public demonstra-
tions.
Access to justice techniques
The plaintiffs made use of the judicial review proce-
dure, alleging the criminal liability of the company for the
discharge of hazardous substances, while making use of
the judicial review procedures available for acting against
responsible public authorities. In spite of excessive bond
requirements, the plaintiffs pursued their judicial remedies. 
Case study analysis
In the Spanish judicial system, the Second Magistrates’
Court of Sanlucar la Mayor is only responsible for “instruct-
ing” the case and preparing it for a second judge who is
competent to make a judgement. However, the court did
not have sufficient resources in terms of personnel, equip-
ment or technical support to deal with such a complex case.
This resulted in several difficulties for lawyers representing
the parties, including accessing the case record, delays
resulting from unusual timetables, and insufficient means to
photocopy records and data. Insufficient administrative
resources also caused inadequate assessment of the envi-
ronmental damage caused by the dam breach catastrophe. 
NGOs asserted that the Second Magistrates’ Court
improperly judged the case, and further, that the “instruc-
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tion” given was improper because a considerable volume
of environmental data and evidence was not properly
accepted. NGOs asserted that the judge’s finding that there
was insufficient evidence to establish liability was based on
her failure to appreciate the volume of admissible evidence
and data available.
The judge demonstrated a lack of understanding of
core issues of the case related to environmental questions
and competences, including the elements needed to estab-
lish an environmental criminal offence under article 325 of
the Spanish Criminal Code. Consequently, court decisions
regarding evidence were often inefficient — not allowing
facts and their cause/effect links to be established.
Moreover, the judge rejected many proposals made by the
parties regarding the collection of evidence that would
have alleviated this problem. Public authorities that should
have been joined as defendants were not included and the
court failed to find any party liable. 
Despite having standing, the NGOs that were party to
the suit were required to provide a bond of PTA 5,000,000
(EUR 30,050). After lodging an appeal, the bond was
reduced to PTA 1,000,000 (EUR 6,010).
Three years passed before the Court issued a decision
stating that the instruction phase should conclude because
there was no criminal offence involved. 
Contacts
Ministry of the Environment 
Abogacia del Estado
D. Jose Enrique Garcia de la Mata Caballero de Rodas
Pza. San Juan de la Cruz s/n
E-28071 Madrid
Tel: +34-91-597-6000
Andalusia Regional Government 
Secretario General Tecnico
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South Bug River Case
A citizen denied access to environmental information
concerning the development of a petrol station successful-
ly challenged the denial in court.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(1) and (4)
Key issues
• Judicial review procedure
• Injunctive relief
• Review of denial of access to information
• Adequate remedies
Case study details
Cited case name: Reznikov v. Chief Sanitary Inspector
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Yuriy Reznikov
Defendant: Chief Sanitary Inspector
Background facts 
In the city of Khmelnytsky, the construction of a gaso-
line filling station started on the bank of the South Bug
River. Yuriy Reznikov, deputy chairman of the Oblast
Society for Environmental Protection, acting in a private
capacity, requested health and environmental data from
the regional Chief Sanitary Inspector regarding the petrol
site. In particular, he requested assessments and forecasts
of health indices for Khmelnytsky citizens and air monitor-
ing results.
Reznikov was denied any information regarding the
potential environmental impact of the station, receiving
only irrelevant data with no bearing on the site or local
environmental conditions. The formal reply from the sani-
tation inspector — a common response to citizen informa-
tion requests — simply stated: “the regional Sanitary
Epidemiological Station (SES) has no materials concerning
the construction of the gas station.”
The sanitation inspector ignored all further requests for
information, in violation of Ukrainian laws on Information,
on Citizen Appeals and on Ensuring Sanitary and
Epidemiological Welfare of the Population.
Procedural history 
Reznikov filed a complaint with the Khmelnytsky City
Court asserting that denying access to the requested infor-
mation and ignoring information requests were illegal and
requesting that the court order the Inspector’s office to pro-
vide the information. Initially, the court refused to register
and consider Reznikov’s complaint. Only after increased
media attention did the court review the complaint. 
Final outcome 
On July 2, 1999, the court ruled in favour of Reznikov.
The court declared the actions of the Chief Sanitation
Inspector illegal and ordered him to provide the request-
ed information.
Related actions and campaigns
In this matter, the letter of the law combined with
media pressure initiated by Reznikov overcame traditional
access to justice obstacles. 
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Access to justice techniques 
In the instant matter, judicial review of the government
official’s action was the method chosen. However, a key to
the success of this effort was the existence of a clear right-
to-know law in Ukraine and pressure by the media on the
court to enforce the law. 
Case study analysis
As a rule, it is difficult for public organisations and citi-
zens to get required environmental information from offi-
cials. This case demonstrated for the first time that an ordi-
nary citizen of Ukraine could use the court system to defend
his or her right to access environmental information. 
The Inspector’s denial clearly violated Ukrainian laws
on Information, on Citizen Appeals and on Ensuring
Sanitary and Epidemic Welfare of the Population. More
specifically, the Law of Ukraine on Information guarantees
a broad right for citizens to information. In addition, article
4 of the Law of Ukraine on Ensuring Sanitary and
Epidemiological Welfare of the Population grants citizens
the right to true and timely information about the state of
their health, the health of the population, and possible
health risk factors and their degree. Article 7 of the Law of
Ukraine on Citizen Appeals also notes that if an informa-
tion request to a state authority refers to information out-
side its jurisdiction, the request has to be forwarded to a
corresponding body or official within five days with notice
to the citizen.
Reznikov was able to bring suit against the government
official pursuant to article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine
(1996), which confers to the individual a right to challenge
the decisions, actions or omissions of bodies of state
power, bodies of local self-government, officials and offi-
cers in court.
Generally, Ukrainian courts hesitate to review cases
against government authorities. In this matter, the court ini-
tially stated that Reznikov’s complaint would not be heard
because there were many more serious and important
cases to be considered. Such a hurdle in accessing the
courts is problematic because citizens are often illegally
denied access to information and need the courts to vindi-
cate their rights.
Contact









An NGO had to appeal to the courts after it was denied
access to important environmental information in an effort
to petition against the development of an oil field in a pro-
tected environmental sanctuary.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(1) and (4)
Key issues




Cited case name: Ecopravo-Lviv v. State Geology
Committee
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Ecopravo-Lviv, NGO Charitable Foundation
(NGO) 
Defendant: State Geology Committee
Background facts
The NGO requested environmental information from a
number of government agencies in order to become
involved in the decision to permit Boryslav Oil Inc. to
develop Stynava Oilfield in a protected water reservoir
zone. In particular, the NGO requested from the State
Geology Committee, a government agency, copies of the
license for oilfield development granted to Boryslav,
including onsite environmental information, conditions for
development in the area, potential liabilities and more.
The NGO made several requests for this information,
but they were either ignored altogether or denied.
Procedural history
The NGO filed a lawsuit against the State Geology
Committee before the High Arbitration Court. Initially, the
court rejected the complaint stating that the matter was not
within the competence of the High Arbitration Court.
Subsequently, the NGO appealed the court decision to
an Appeal Collegium of the High Arbitration Court. The
Appeal Collegium reversed the lower Arbitration Court’s
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration by the
High Arbitration Court under another judge.
The hearing was held on October 27, 1999. At the pro-
ceeding, the State Geology Committee offered the follow-
ing arguments for denying the NGO access to the request-
ed information:
• As an environmental organisation, the NGO required
only environmental data, and licensing agreements
were beyond the scope of a reasonable request.
• The NGO should have sought the information directly
from Boryslav.
• The information requested was confidential business
information and, alternately, expensive geological
information that could not be provided free of charge.
Final outcome 
The court ruled that the Ukrainian Law on Information
requires that the requested information should be provid-
ed. However, the court proposed that the committee pro-
vide the requested information of its own free will. The
court reasoned that, if it was to invoke the Law on
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Information, the committee’s initial denial would be
deemed illegal and thus the agency would be subject to a
disciplinary penalty. Reluctantly, the committee provided
the NGO with the information requested. The court
imposed expenses on the committee.
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
The NGO sought judicial review of the committee’s
denial pursuant to the Arbitration Procedure Code. In fur-
therance of its claim, the NGO cited rights to information
under the Law on Information and the Law on
Environmental Protection.
Case study analysis
The decision by the Appeal Collegium of the High
Arbitration Court demonstrated that the denial of informa-
tion to an NGO is clearly a matter for the courts to resolve.
Citing the same information laws that confer a right to
information to citizens, the court ruled that the NGO had a
right to the requested information as a matter of law.
In matters such as this, where the case involves juridi-
cal persons (i.e. NGOs and government agencies), court
fees are higher than if an individual had brought the case.
Consequently, many NGOs may decide not to pursue legal
action, despite a legal right to information. 
In this matter, the court decision to shift fee liability to
the committee demonstrates an effective means of encour-
aging NGOs to bring meritorious suits and greatly
improves overall access to justice.
Contact
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Pyrogovo Villagers Case
Residents living within a contaminated zone surround-
ing a city landfill were denied access to judicial proceed-






• Judicial independence 
Case study details
Cited case name: Citizens v. Kyiv City Administration
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: One hundred and twenty-eight (128) residents
of the village of Pyrogovo 
Plaintiffs’ representation: Ecopravo-Kyiv
Defendant: Kyiv City Administration
Background facts 
In 1957, a Kyiv city dump was established near
Pyrogovo village, 200 metres from the homes of 128 resi-
dents. Ukrainian law stated, however, that a 500-metre
buffer should be created separating the landfill from resi-
dences. In constructing the landfill, design estimates and
technical assessments were not conducted and relevant
sanitation and environmental standards were largely
ignored. Moreover, a radioactive waste plot, a gas-distribu-
tion station, and one of the biggest tobacco factories in
Europe, Reemtsma Ukraine, were situated nearby. 
Severe contamination resulted over the course of 30
years. Kyiv environmental managers reported that the
aquifers in the area were contaminated by chemicals and
radioactive isotopes at depths of 40-70 metres. In addition,
contaminated leachate extended upward to a depth of 9-10
metres, about 15 metres above protective barriers designed
to contain the leachate from spilling into the surrounding
neighbourhood. It was estimated that a heavy downpour
or thaw would likely result in the flooding of leachate into
the surrounding area.
In 1985, monitoring revealed that village wells were
heavily contaminated with heavy metals such as mercury,
lead and tritium exceeding maximum permissible concen-
trations (MPC) by ten to several hundred times. 
Initially, rather than order a resettlement, city officials
ordered new water pipelines to be constructed. Soon
thereafter, the new pipes rusted and water contamination
continued. In recent years, cancer deaths were reported in
nine out of ten houses on Krasnoznamyonnaya Street,
located near the landfill.
Later in 1985, authorities ordered the resettlement of
residents in the village. No action was taken, however.
Similar decisions were made in 1987 and 1988, but again
no action was taken.
Procedural history
In the autumn of 1999, the citizens of Pyrogovo village
requested Ecopravo-Kyiv to represent them in protecting
their environmental rights by compelling authorities to
carry out the ordered resettlement. On November 16, 1999,
Ecopravo filed a complaint on behalf of the villagers seek-
ing resettlement and damages from contamination and
prior delays in relocating.
In preparing documents for presentation before the
court, the Kyiv chief sanitation inspector produced evi-
dence that Ukrainian laws on health, sanitation and envi-
ronmental protection had been violated in the construction
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and maintenance of the landfill. In addition, the Office of
National Environmental Management in Kyiv confirmed
violations of relevant environmental regulations in the
maintenance of the site. Finally, city officials acknowl-
edged onsite air, soil and underground water contamina-
tion, that an adverse health risk was present requiring
immediate resettlement, and that the prior orders to reset-
tle had not been carried out. 
Despite these admissions, the court failed to rule
immediately in favour of the villagers. Instead, the court
ordered a stay in the proceedings so that officials could
make another decision on resettlement.
On November 25, 1999, city officials decided again to
resettle the inhabitants of the village of Pyrogovo, inven-
torying those to be relocated and offering real estate
indemnity. The court did not return to the matter until
January 12, 2000. 
Final outcome 
The Pyrogovo village residents were provided with bil-
lets for new lodgings in Kyiv and were relocated.
On February 17, 2000, the court denied the villagers’
claim for damages, stating that the claim was moot given
that officials were now relocating them. 
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
Ecopravo-Kyiv conducted several advisory meetings
with the citizens of the Pyrogovo village. In addition,
Ecopravo members visited villagers in their houses and
surveyed the dump, the private plots of the villagers and
the surrounding area. 
In order to represent the citizens, Ecopravo signed a
representation agreement with the villagers. 
In preparation of the lawsuit, Ecopravo attorneys com-
piled documents and testimony from government officials.
Given the complexity of the subject matter and documents,
NGO attorneys had several meetings with the judge.
Case study analysis
Had the court recognised the omissions of city officials
in failing to resettle the villagers earlier, the villagers would
likely have been successful in receiving compensation for
health and property damage. Unfortunately, the judicial
branch in Ukraine is not completely independent of gov-
ernment authorities. Thus, most court decisions are either
vague or the scope of recovery allowed by citizens against
the government is limited. From the nature of the proceed-
ings, it is apparent that the court purposefully delayed pro-
ceedings so that authorities could have a chance to decide
on resettlement anew, thus mooting the villagers’ com-
plaint and relieving the authorities of responsibility.
Contacts
Mykola Nychyporovych Pochynok, President










E-mail: vborys@darkwing.uoregon.edu or ecolaw@ecop.
relc.com
The Troublesome Cafe
A citizen sought a court ruling that government permits
granted without considering impacts to health and welfare
of citizens are illegitimate, and sought compensation for
damages stemming from state authorities’ illegal permitting
of a cafeteria beneath his residence.
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
• Review of public participation in specific decision-making
• Adequate remedies (moral damages)
Case study details
Cited case name: Vassylkivsky v. Shevchenkivski District
Administration; Vassylkivsky v. Dnepr-A
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Borys M. Vassylkivsky, Kyiv resident 
Plaintiff’s representation: Ecopravo-Kyiv
Defendants: Shevchenkivski District Administration in
Kyiv (SDA); and Dnepr-A
Background facts 
In 1995, SDA granted a permit to Dnepr-A to operate a
cafeteria in a building located on Artyoma Street in Kyiv.
Vassylkivsky sought the representation of Ecopravo-
Kyiv (of which he was the chairman), a public interest legal
aid organisation, and filed a complaint in the
Shevchenkivski District Court asserting that SDA’s permit
was illegal in light of several existing regulations.
Specifically, Vassylkivsky claimed that SDA ignored exist-
ing building, fire prevention and sanitation rules in allow-
ing the operation of a cafeteria beneath his residence that
was inadequately equipped and noisy.44
Procedural history 
In his complaint to the Shevchenkivski District Court,
Vassylkivsky sought a ruling that decision-making without
consideration of public concerns is illegitimate and that the
decision in this case should be declared invalid. In turn,
SDA replied that the decision-making process in granting a
permit to the cafeteria was mindful of citizen concerns and
thus valid.
During the proceedings, the court found that SDA made
no inquiries into whether the cafeteria was adequately
equipped for food preparation and sanitation or whether
the plans were modified to accommodate the interests and
concerns of residents, including Vassylkivsky, who lived
above the cafeteria. In addition, SDA was unable to pro-
duce any official project documents regarding the request-
ed refurbishment of the premises, as required by law.
In 1997, given these findings, the court ruled that SDA’s
decision was illegitimate since SDA failed to collect the
proper documents and did not consider the interests of
nearby residents in light of the intended purpose of the
refurbishment. 
Subsequently, Vassylkivsky filed an additional lawsuit
seeking compensation for “moral damages” inflicted by the
operation of the illegitimate cafeteria.
The court again ruled in favour of Vassylkivsky, hold-
ing that moral and physical damage resulted from the cafe-
teria activities approved by SDA. However, the court
rejected Vassylkivsky’s damage calculations as speculative.
Final outcome 
Based on the court ruling, SDA reversed its prior deci-
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sion and halted operation of the cafe until necessary meas-
ures were enacted to accommodate the interests and con-
cerns of residents within the building. 
The civil suit for moral damages was not resolved. 
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
Vassylkivsky used the courts to invalidate a decision
that was not in accordance with the law. He employed the
assistance of Ecopravo-Kyiv attorneys.
Case study analysis
SDA’s actions in this matter illustrate the continued dif-
ficulty citizens have in participating and enforcing their
interests in official decision-making processes. To be sure,
the existing laws cited in this matter provide substantive
requirements that a government agency must abide by.
However, what are needed are regulations with more spe-
cific and definite requirements guaranteeing that citizens
are consulted and their interests are taken into account.
Furthermore, citizens must be given ample opportunity to
speak at hearings, particularly when the matter directly
affects them or their property. 
Finally, while the court sided with the citizen in this
matter, courts continue to limit the scope of relief available
to a citizen when seeking compensation from the govern-
ment. In addition, courts will often show greater flexibility
towards the government in terms of claims unsupported by
evidence and interpretations of ambiguous laws. 
Contacts














Protection of NGOs’ right of access to information was




• Review of denial of access to information
• Commercial confidentiality
• Defences to information requests (formulated in too
general a manner)
Case study details
Cited case name: Ecopravo-Lviv v. Brodyvodocanal (case
no. 4/2436-31/197)
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Ecopravo-Lviv, a charitable foundation
Defendant: State Communal Enterprise Brodyvodocanal
Background facts
On May 23, 2001, Ecopravo-Lviv requested information
from the communal enterprise Brodyvodocanal regarding
the boundaries and sanitation protection zones of ground-
water intake, plans for providing good quality water, plans
for systematic laboratory control of water quality, and the
state of relevant water resources. In a letter dated May 31,
2001, Brodyvodocanal refused the request, stating that arti-
cle 30 of the Law on Information does not designate the
information requested by Ecopravo-Lviv as publicly avail-
able information.
Procedural history
In July 2001, Ecopravo-Lviv filed a lawsuit in the
Economic Court in the Lviv Region requesting the court to: 
1) declare the denial of the information request as unlaw-
ful and in violation of Ecopravo-Lviv’s rights; 
2) oblige Brodyvodocanal to provide the necessary infor-
mation; and 
3) require the defendant to pay court fees. 
In the writ, Ecopravo-Lviv cited the Constitution of
Ukraine, laws of Ukraine on Environmental Protection and
on Information, and the Aarhus Convention.
The case commenced on August 7, 2001.
Brodyvodocanal sent its response to the court stating that,
according to article 4 of the Aarhus Convention, it can
refuse to turn over information if the request is not well
grounded or is written in too general a form. It also assert-
ed that, according to article 30 of the Law on Enterprises,
the information requested was commercial information,
not environmental information, and was not referred to by
the Cabinet of Ministers on the list of registers that are not
considered as a commercial secret. 
On November 1, 2001, the first court session was held
where both parties presented their arguments. Not only
Ecopravo-Lviv, but also Brodyvodocanal referred to the
Aarhus Convention.
It was necessary for Ecopravo-Lviv to prove in court that: 
• as an environmental public organisation it did not have
to state in the information request the reasons for
requesting the environmental information; 
• its request was not too general; and 
• the information requested was public information. 
Arguments were stated in the memorandum given to
the judge, and included the following.
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As an environmental public organisation, Ecopravo-
Lviv did not need to state reasons for its environmental
information request. An absence of a reason for requesting
the information could not be interpreted as “writing a
request in a general form.” 
Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that every-
one has a right to collect, use and disseminate information
in written, oral or other form. Article 50 of the Constitution
guarantees the right of free access to information on the state
of the environment and a right to disseminate such informa-
tion. Such information cannot be held secret. 
According to article 4 of the Aarhus Convention, public
authorities should give environmental information to any
member of the public in the frame of national legislation
without requiring the member of the public to state an
interest. Article 9 of the Water Code of Ukraine foresees the
direct duty of organisations to inform the population on
the state of water, and on measures taken to improve the
state of water. Article 11 of the Water Code of Ukraine fore-
sees the right of NGOs to receive information on the state
of water, sources of pollution and water usage, and plans
and measures on the use of waters and on the restoration
of water resources. Article 21 of the Law of Ukraine on
Environmental Protection establishes the right of environ-
mental NGOs to receive information on the state of the
environment, sources of pollution, and plans and meas-
ures concerning the environment. 
The information requested was public (i.e. not a com-
mercial or state secret). As the defendant did not claim that
the requested information was a state secret, it was only nec-
essary for Ecopravo-Lviv to prove that the requested infor-
mation was not a commercial secret. According to the
Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the list of
documents that are not a commercial secret, documents that
permit an activity or type of activity cannot be considered
commercial secrets. The document under which
Brodyvodocanal’s licence to provide water was granted,
was a permit for specific water usage under article 29 of the
Water Code of Ukraine. Some of the information that was
requested by Ecopravo-Lviv would be found in such permit. 
Information contained on forms for state reporting
requirements could also not be considered commercial
secrets. Some of the information requested was required to
be reported to the state by Brodyvodocanal, under article
24 of the Water Code and the Order of the State Committee
of Statistics. Finally, information on environmental pollu-
tion could not be considered commercial secrets. Some
information requested was information on water pollution.
Finally, according to the Law on Information, the Law
on Enterprises, and the Order of the Main Revision
Committee, the head of an enterprise must determine the
content and volume of information considered a commer-
cial secret, and the means for protecting its confidentiality
(taking into account relevant legal provisions). Even if the
information requested could have been a commercial
secret, the head of Brodyvodocanal never designated this
information as a commercial secret. 
Final outcome 
On November 9, 2001, at the second court session, the
court ruled in favour of Ecopravo-Lviv in full, requiring
Brodyvodocanal to hand over the necessary information,
and pay the state fee of UAH 85 (USD 16) and technical
expenses of the arbitration procedure of UAH 69 (USD 13).
Three days later the court issued an order on compulsory
implementation of the court’s decision.
In December 2001, Brodyvodocanal handed over the
information. On January 29, 2002, Ecopravo-Lviv
addressed the Brodov Judicial Administration to request
execution of the requirement to pay the court fees. On
March 5, 2002, Brodyvodocanal paid the court fees of UAH
154 (USD 30).
Related actions and campaigns
The plaintiff placed articles in the mass media and in
the Environmental Advocacy Bulletin.
Access to justice techniques
Ecopravo-Lviv applied to the courts to compel the state
enterprise to provide the requested environmental infor-
mation. It also asked the court to order the defendant to
pay the court fees.
Case study analysis
Under the legislation of Ukraine, information on envi-
ronmental protection cannot be considered a commercial
secret, although not all environmental information is
exempt. The legislation of Ukraine does not clearly pro-
vide that an NGO can request information without giving a
reason. The legal argumentation had to be made in court.
Giving a legal memorandum to the court with a
detailed analysis of the legislation with citations can sub-
stantially help to achieve a positive result for the plaintiff.
Contact










Sofia Vankovich, Assistant to the Vice-President
Legal Clinic Programme
Ecopravo-Lviv
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The Lappel Bank Case
Seeking interim relief to stay development of a wetland
and wild fowl breeding area pending a final judgement on
the merits of its claim, a British NGO faced exceedingly
narrow judicial standards making interim injunctive and
declarative relief difficult to attain. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(3) and (4)
Key issues
• Direct enforcement
• Standing (sufficient interest)
• Injunctive relief
• Financial and other barriers (excessive bond require-
ments)
Case study details
Cited case name: Regina v Secretary of State for the
Environment, ex parte Royal Society for the Protection of
Birds (Port of Sheerness Ltd, Intervenor)
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB),
British NGO
Defendant: Secretary of State for the Environment (the
secretary), UK minister primarily responsible for environ-
mental protection
Third-party intervenor: Port of Sheerness, commercial
port facility; the United Kingdom, France, and the
Commission of the European Communities participated in
proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
Background facts 
Lappel Bank, 22 hectares of intertidal mudflat, is part of
the Medway Estuary and Marsh system, a large wetlands
area serving as a breeding ground, migratory route and
wintering area for substantial numbers of wildfowl and
water species, including two species listed on Annex I of
the European Union’s wild birds directive. Lappel Bank
itself provides feeding and sheltering grounds for a num-
ber of waders and wildfowl (although none listed in Annex
I of the directive). 
In December 1993, the Secretary of State for the
Environment decided not to include Lappel Bank within a
Special Protection Area (SPA) that was to be created under
the wild birds directive, encompassing the remainder of
the Medway Estuary and Marsh system. Pivotal to this deci-
sion was the fact that Lappel Bank bordered the Port of
Sheerness, the fifth largest commercial port in the UK. The
secretary concluded that the need to promote commercial
viability of the port outweighed the area’s conservation
value. The decision was intended to safeguard the contin-
ued viability of the Port of Sheerness, a significant contrib-
utor to the economy of the surrounding area suffering from
high unemployment. 
Procedural history
The RSPB requested judicial review of the secretary’s
decision by the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division of the High Court, seeking to have the decision
quashed on the grounds that it contravened the wild birds
directive, as the secretary was not entitled to exclude
Lappel Bank based on economic considerations. The
Divisional Court refused the application in July 1994, and
the RSPB appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
In August 1994, a majority of the Court of Appeal upheld
the decision of the Divisional Court and the RSPB subse-
quently appealed to the House of Lords. By order of
February 9, 1995, the House of Lords stayed the proceedings
pending a preliminary ruling from the European Court of
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Justice (ECJ) on the issue whether the Secretary of State for
the Environment was entitled, under the wild birds directive,
to consider economic factors in making a decision. 
Pending a final determination of the case, RSPB
requested interim declaratory relief, conferring temporary
protected status to Lappel Bank and halting any develop-
ment. The House of Lords refused the RSPB’s request.45
Primary among the reasons for the House of Lords’ refusal
was the stated inability and unwillingness of RSPB to com-
pensate the Port of Sheerness for losses resulting from the
imposition of interim relief. Regardless of the intended
benefit of a halt in development, such a delay could result
in considerable commercial losses to the Port of Sheerness
and thus the House of Lords would not grant interim relief
in the absence of RSPB providing a “cross-undertaking” in
damages. In support of its ruling, the court stated that, had
the RSPB sought an interim injunction rather than a decla-
ration, they would undoubtedly have been required to give
such an undertaking as a condition of being granted relief. 
The Advocate-General gave his Opinion on March 21,
1996 and the Court issued its judgement on July 11, 1996.
The matter then returned to the House of Lords.
Final outcome 
Following the Advocate-General’s conclusion, ECJ
ruled that member states were not authorised to take into
account economic requirements when designating SPAs
under article 4 of the wild birds directive. The ECJ held
that article 4 provides for the special protection of birds
that are the most endangered in the Community (Annex I
species) or constitute a common heritage (migratory
species). Citing existing precedent, ECJ ruled that, given
the particular vulnerability and importance of these class-
es of birds, the ornithological criteria laid down in para-
graphs (1) and (2) of article 4 must be the sole determi-
nants in classifying SPAs.46
Despite RSPB succeeding on the merits, however, Lappel
Bank was destroyed before final judgement was given. 
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
RSPB’s choice to seek judicial review of the secretary’s
decision is the most commonly used means to challenge
decisions of a public nature made by public bodies. In order
to bring proceedings for judicial review, an individual or
organisation must show that it has a “sufficient interest” in
the matter concerned. UK courts tend to construe broadly
what constitutes a sufficient interest in environmental cases,
especially in relation to proceedings brought by NGOs. This
case is a positive illustration of such liberal rules on standing
in that RSPB’s interest in the case arose from the environ-
mental and conservation implications of the decision, not
from any direct private interest in the site itself. 
Case study analysis
Had the House of Lords granted interim relief, the
destruction of Lappel Bank prior to a final determination
would almost certainly have been avoided. While it is
undoubtedly appropriate for national courts to retain dis-
cretion on whether interim relief should be granted in a
particular case, the approach taken by the UK courts in this
and other environmental cases underscores the conse-
quences of unduly restrictive interpretation of when such
relief should be granted.
Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention requires proce-
dures covered by the Convention to provide “adequate
and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as
appropriate.” Foremost, in terms of environmental cases,
the approach taken by UK courts in determining whether
to grant such interim injunctive and declaratory relief is
unduly restrictive in that it focuses heavily on the availabil-
ity of a cross-undertaking in damages by the party seeking
interim relief (usually the environmental NGO) rather than
examining a totality of factors, including the environmen-
tal interest at stake.
In cases where the applicant is seeking interim relief,
such as an injunction to maintain the environmental status
quo pending a final determination of the case, the UK
courts take the general approach to interim injunctions laid
down by the House of Lords in the 1975 case of American
Cyanimide v Ethicon.47 In essence, this requires the court
to determine, first, whether there is a “serious issue to be
tried” and, second, whether “the balance of convenience”
lies in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief
that is sought. 
A first stage in assessing the balance of convenience is
to determine the availability to either party of an adequate
remedy in damages. This means that, if damages would be
an adequate remedy for the applicant for interim relief, if
that party were ultimately to succeed in his claim, the court
would not order interim relief. If this is not the case (as in
many environmental cases) the court must go on to con-
sider whether, if the party opposing interim relief (such as
the developer in this case) is ultimately successful, that
party would be adequately compensated for losses result-
ing from the imposition of interim relief by a cross-under-
taking in damages from the person seeking interim relief.
Only if the availability of damages does not resolve matters
in this way will the court go on to examine the balance of
convenience more generally. If damages would be an ade-
quate remedy and the person seeking relief is in a position
to pay them, courts have taken the approach that interim
relief may be granted. In environmental cases, however,
courts have tended to take the view that, where an NGO
refuses or is unable to offer a cross-undertaking in dam-
ages, the interim relief should not be granted.
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As evident in this case, in environmental judicial review
proceedings, the challenge typically relates to a decision
authorising or permitting some kind of development or
activity with irreversible environmental consequences.
Subsequently, the purpose of seeking interim relief in such
cases is to prevent the development or activity at issue until
the case has been resolved. This may take some time, par-
ticularly if, as in this case, a referral is made to the ECJ. 
To the developer, generally, the financial conse-
quences of halting development until final determination
of the case may be significant. However, judicial review
proceedings of this type are likely to be brought by envi-
ronmental NGOs or by concerned individuals (such as
local residents) who do not have the means or are not in a
position to offer a cross-undertaking in damages to the
developer to cover the cost of imposing interim relief
should the case ultimately fail.
Consequently, if the court makes provision of a cross-
undertaking in damages an indispensable requirement for
obtaining interim relief, then interim relief will rarely be
granted in environmental cases and irreversible damage
may be done to the environment even in cases where the
applicant ultimately succeeds in showing that the decision
authorising the activity is unlawful.
Looking to avoid this conundrum, courts could take a
broader view of the criteria for granting interim relief in envi-
ronmental cases, based on an overall determination of the
balance of convenience rather than on the availability of a
cross-undertaking in damages alone. This would make it
likely that interim relief would be granted more often in
environmental cases. For example, a court could look at an
assessment of the merits of the case, the position of the par-
ties involved and the environmental interest at stake, includ-
ing the costs of destroying the environmental interest con-
cerned. It would then be in a position to grant interim relief
even where a cross-undertaking in damages is not available. 
The following factors may also be of particular rele-
vance in environmental cases. It may be argued that,
where a site has been designated for special protection, a
developer is effectively put on notice that there are likely
to be restrictions on damaging the site, and where the law
is unclear, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the
environmental interest until the position is determined.
Courts should bear in mind that potential damage to the
environment is likely to be more difficult to quantify than
potential economic losses incurred by a developer. It does
not follow, however, that the economic loss always
“trumps” environmental loss. Finally, where the applicant
for interim relief is an environmental NGO acting in the
public interest (as here) the approach to be taken to the
granting of interim relief should not necessarily be the
same as where two private interests are involved in a pri-
vate claim. 
It is not clear from the case law of the UK that the pro-
vision of a cross-undertaking in damages is an indispensa-
ble requirement for interim relief. In some cases, courts
have dispensed with the requirement because the person
seeking interim relief is impecunious. Perhaps more
importantly, in a number of leading cases, the courts
appear to have taken a broader approach to the question
of interim relief. In Films Rover Ltd v Cannon Films Sales
Ltd,48 a decision of the High Court, the judge noted, “The
principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunc-
tions … is that there is by definition a risk that the court
may make the ‘wrong’ decision, in the sense of granting an
injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the
trial … or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a
party who succeeds … at trial. A fundamental principle is
therefore that the court should take whichever course
appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn
out to be ‘wrong’ in the sense I have described.”
If this general approach of seeking whichever course
carries the lower risk of injustice is adopted in environ-
mental cases where there is a real likelihood of irreversible
damage to an important environmental interest, there
should be fewer cases where interim relief is refused even
in the absence of a cross-undertaking in damages.
Contacts
RSPB in-house legal team
Tel: +44-1767-68-0551
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Agricultural Storage Centre Case
Low-income residents seeking to compel an agricultur-
al storage centre to reduce excessive noise, vibrations and
odours overcame financial and other obstacles in pursuing






Cited case name: Smith v. John Mann International Ltd 
Parties involved
Plaintiffs: residents
Plaintiffs’ representation: Environmental Law
Foundation (ELF), UK environmental law NGO (initial pro
bono consultation: Richard Buxton)
Defendants: John Mann International Ltd, Lincolnshire
agricultural storage centre operators
Background facts
An agricultural storage centre caused serious disrup-
tion of quality of life of nearby residents, due to noise,
vibrations and odours from lorries, resulting in sleep dep-
rivation and ill health. Local residents were on a low
income and could not afford to pursue a legal remedy.
Procedural history 
Local residents approached ELF, an NGO focused on
improving access to justice in environmental matters
through community development programmes and a net-
work of environmental lawyers and technical experts. ELF
put residents in touch with an environmental lawyer who
provided a free initial consultation. With the lawyer’s assis-
tance, the residents applied for and were granted financial
assistance from the government legal aid fund, to assist
with obtaining further investigations and legal advice and
representation in court. Residents commenced a nuisance
action in Lincoln County Court.
Final outcome 
After being provided with assistance, the residents were
successful in the nuisance action before Lincoln County
Court. The operator paid damages and agreed to relocate. 
Related actions and campaigns
None reported.
Access to justice techniques 
A government-funded and administered “legal aid”
scheme provided financial assistance for legal services to
those with limited means.
In April 2000, the government’s “legal aid” scheme was
replaced by the Community Legal Service Fund of the
Legal Services Commissions. Applications for public
funding (formerly “legal aid”) from the Community Legal
Service Fund are subject to strict means and merits tests,
and full assistance or partial assistance may be granted
depending on an applicant’s financial circumstances. At
the end of a case, the Legal Services Commission is obliged
to recover its costs as far as possible. The commission will
first take account of any contributions paid by the funded
client and any costs recovered from its opponent. After
United Kingdom Case 2
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that, it will recover any remaining deficit from any property
or money recovered or preserved in the course of the
proceedings. Formally, where a funded client is wholly or
partially successful in recovering or preserving goods or
property, a “statutory charge” is enforced that converts
public funds from a grant into a loan. 
The Community Legal Service Fund has certain rules,
including: 
• setting financial eligibility limits in terms of disposable
income and disposable capital;
• requiring contributions from income and capital, if the
disposable income and/or capital are within certain
limits;
• defining the scope of the “statutory charge” on any
money and property assets recovered or preserved
with the help of funding; and
• limiting the award of costs against a funded client,
known as “costs protection.”
In addition to qualifying financially, an applicant must
also show that he or she has reasonable grounds for taking,
defending or being a party to proceedings, and that it is
reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case for
public funding to be granted. There are also rules relating
to the types of cases that are prioritised for funding. These
currently do not include environmental issues, but do
include health and social welfare.
Access to justice support from
environmental law NGOs
ELF provides information and advice on a wide range of
environmental problems covering pollution, planning, con-
servation and health. It operates an advice and referral serv-
ice providing free initial consultations and reduced cost legal
and technical advice by environmental lawyers, scientists
and academics. It also operates community development
programmes aimed at helping communities to mobilise
themselves in the face of environmental challenges.
Case study analysis
In general, the main obstacle relating to the govern-
ment’s financial assistance scheme is that statutory criteria
for funding are very strict. In ELF’s experience, very few
people have been successful in obtaining legal aid for envi-
ronmental cases. However, the new Community Legal
Service Fund has introduced a new category of “cases of sig-
nificant wider public interest,” subject to less stringent rules,
which can be expected to cover more environmental cases. 
The greatest obstacle faced by ELF is securing the fund-
ing to keep going. It survives on grants from grant-making
bodies. Despite financial difficulties, it appreciates its inde-
pendence from central and local government. It does work
alongside the Citizens’ Advice Bureau, however, which is a
network of government-funded local advice centres for cit-
izens, providing free general legal advice. Citizens’ Advice
Bureau advisors sometimes refer their clients with environ-
mental problems to ELF.
In this case, the residents’ financial obstacles were
overcome by the assistance of ELF and the availability of
government financial assistance. Residents faced addition-
al obstacles in relation to the unhelpful conduct of the local
authority over licensing hours, the local government
ombudsman and the planning authority. In all, these obsta-
cles were overcome with ELF’s support and the persever-
ance of the environmental lawyer. 
Contact









Citizens challenged a government environmental
impact statement (EIS) recommending the chemical spray-
ing of invasive species on the basis of “plain language”
requirement. 
Relevant Aarhus provisions
• Article 9(2) and (4)
Key issues
Review of public participation in decision-making on spe-
cific activities (insufficiency of EIS)
Financial and other barriers (costs of expert witnesses)
Case study details
Cited case name: Oregon Environmental Council v.
Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.,1987)
Parties involved
Plaintiff: Residents, South Salem, Oregon (residents) 
Plaintiffs’ representation: Oregon Environmental
Council
Defendants: Oregon Department of Agriculture; US
Department of Agriculture
Background facts
The gypsy moth is a European insect brought to the US
more than 100 years ago in a misguided attempt to create
a domestic silk industry. Unfortunately, the moth escaped
from a laboratory in Massachusetts and, because it had no
natural enemies on the North American continent, explod-
ed in population and damaged trees — often exfoliating
entire tracts of forest and causing millions of dollars in
damage. Since its release, officials tried multiple methods
to prevent a westward advance — from fire to bombing
areas with airplane-loads of pesticide chemicals. Nothing
worked. 
Finally, a few gypsy moths arrived in Oregon on the
west coast of the US, a state where the timber industry had
long been a major part of the economy. The US govern-
ment planned to spray with the insecticide Carbaryl
(Sevin), despite the failure of the insecticide to work else-
where. A group of residents from South Salem, Oregon
(including a family with chemically sensitive children)
sought to stop this chemical spraying and to push the gov-
ernment to use biological control methods instead.
In their legal action, the residents were represented by
the public interest legal organisation, Oregon
Environmental Council (OEC).
Procedural history 
Residents filed a complaint in the US Federal District
Court for Oregon. In the complaint, the residents asserted
that the EIS prepared by the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) in support of spraying was inadequate in two ways: 
1) It failed to discuss the health risks of the pesticides
adequately.
2) The language used in the EIS was too complicated and
hyper-technical for citizens — or even officials in
charge of decision-making — to understand. 
On the issue of language, US regulations require that
an EIS must be written “in plain language, understandable
by an ordinary person.” At trial, “readability experts,”
trained to assess the years of education needed to under-
stand a document, testified that the average reading level
in the US is equal to the sixth year in school or about 12
years of age. (Oregon was higher at eight years as the read-
ing ability level). A typical paragraph in the EIS, however,
required 17 years of formal education to be understood —
equal to a post-graduate degree.
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In cross-examining an author of the EIS, OEC asked the
author to answer how many people would get cancer from
the spray programme by referring to the risk assessment
contained in the EIS. The author was unable to answer
from the text without consultation, despite the fact that he
wrote the assessment. His ultimate response was, “If I had
15 minutes and a calculator, I could give you the answer!” 
Based on this testimony, the district court ruled in
favour of the residents, holding that an EIS that could not
be understood by the chairperson of the Harvard Physics
Department without 15 minutes and a calculator could not
be said to be written “in plain language.”
Initially, OEC faced financial difficulties in gathering
the necessary experts to testify, but these difficulties were
overcome (see below).
By its ruling, the US District Court in Oregon prevented
the use of the chemical insecticide Carbaryl for control of
the gypsy moth until new documents could be prepared
that were legally adequate. Since the insects were about to
emerge from their cocoons, there was no time to delay. 
The government appealed this decision before the US
Federal Court of Appeals. The Appeals Court affirmed the
lower court ruling in favour of the residents.
Final outcome 
After the US Court of Appeals upheld the lower court
decision, the government reluctantly decided to spray with
the biological insecticide Bacillus thuregiensis (B.t.). One
year later, the USDA proudly issued a press release, praising
its own judgement and decision-making in the use of B.t. to
control the gypsy moth. It proclaimed that the biological
control programme had been the most successful in history.
Related actions and campaigns
Residents organised a media and political campaign
against the spraying.
Access to justice techniques 
A lawsuit was filed in the US District Court in Oregon.
Case study analysis
This case reveals a problem common to environmental
decision-making — highly technical language preventing
citizen involvement and understanding. Under US law, the
EIS is designed to be a means by which the public can
engage in the decision-making process and later under-
stand how an activity may affect their health and activities. 
When the language of an EIS is so technical that it can-
not be understood by the average citizen, it has the same
effect as having not been conducted. In terms of access to
justice, being able to understand the relevant laws and
guidelines is as important as their actual development. 
The residents also had to overcome financial barriers in
this case. Several experts were willing to testify but could
not afford to go to Oregon, and the residents could not
afford to pay their hourly rates. The federal judge proposed
that necessary witnesses testify by long-distance telephone
instead of travelling to Oregon. The government opposed
this, contending that cross-examination must be done in
person, but the court held that the quality of a scientist’s tes-
timony and evidence has little or nothing to do with how his
face or body language appears during a court appearance.
Consequently, arrangements were made for a “telephone
trial” in which nine of OEC’s 11 witnesses testified by tele-
phone. The clerk of the court set up a speaker telephone in
the middle of the courtroom. When it was time for a witness
to be called, the witness gave an oath of truthfulness as usu-
ally done when present in court in person. Lawyers for each











1 The guiding statute on injunctive relief, Civil Procedural Code of RA, Art.
97 states that the Court, through solicitation of an interested person, under-
takes remedies (injunctive measures) to ensure a lawsuit, and should take
such matters where the failure to do so would make impossible or more dif-
ficult the enforcement of a judicial act. The guarantee of a lawsuit is per-
mitted in any stage of a court procedure. As a guarantee of a lawsuit the
civil code stipulates that the Court may prohibit the defendant from doing
some actions.
2 The Council of State is the main administrative court in Belgium. It judges
the legality of administrative acts (individual and regulatory), and has the
power to annul an illegal act. Since 1989/1991 (two laws were adopted,
the latter expanding the powers of the Council of State), the Council of
State also has the power to suspend an act, pending the outcome of the
annulment procedure. 
3 A.S.B.L. or association sans but lucratif is a non-profit organisation regis-
tered under Belgian law.
4 Belgium is a federal state, consisting of three communities and three regions.
Environmental competences are to a large extent attributed to the regions.
5 The law merely states that the plaintiff must have an interest, without
specifying the characteristics of that interest (art. 19 of the co-ordinated
laws on the Council of State). 
6 As indicated above (note 1), the Council of State did not have the power
to suspend administrative acts until 1989/1991. 
7 Supreme Court, 25 October 1985, A.S.B.L. Neerpede blijft vs. Commune
of Anderlecht.
8 As indicated earlier, the Council of State did not have the power to sus-
pend administrative acts until 1989/1991. 
9 But some inferior civil courts grant access to justice to environmental
organisations to protect their procedural rights (right to partipate; access to
justice in front of the Council of State) if the adverse party does not assert
a ‘proper’ (substantial) right. 
10 Referes is the normal civil emergency procedure, referred to above,
Belgium Case 1, point 4, as opposed to the “special” procedure set in place
for environmental organisations; cf. above introduction to the present case.
11 The Council of State referred implicitly to its case law of August 11,
1989, n°32.953, Wellens et al., according to which national environmen-
tal organisations may have a sufficient interest in challenging an adminis-
trative act likely to threaten a rare protected species.
12 It should be noted, however, that the frog in question is protected under
Walloon law.
13 Extraordinary legal remedy allows anybody to seek review of alleged
violations. This is done as an alternative to claiming an “action in the pub-
lic interest,” because appellate bodies can easily refuse the latter claim.
14 Constitution of Georgia, Article 37: 3) Everyone has the right to live in
a healthy environment and use natural and cultural surroundings. Everyone
is obliged to protect the natural and cultural surroundings; and 5)
Individuals have the right to complete, objective and timely information on
their working and living conditions.
15 Law of Georgia on Environmental Protection, article 6: 
Citizens are entitled to: a) live in an environment that is harmless (safe) for
his or her health; b) use the natural surroundings; c) obtain the full, objec-
tive and timely information on the state of the environment, where he or
she lives; and f) take part in decision-making process and in the examina-
tion of this decision in the scope of environmental protection.
16 According to VwGO §48 paragraph 1, no. 5, the Higher Administrative
Court [VGH] has jurisdiction in the first instance for disputes concerning
development permit procedures for waste combustion plants, both in the
case of actions for annulment and in the case of applications for interim
injunctive relief.
17 In examining legal claims, German courts generally distinguish between
an examination of admissibility and an examination of justification. First,
the court investigates the admissibility of an action or other applications.
Only when the charge is found to be admissible will the court investigate
the justification of the action or application (i.e. the substantive legal situ-
ation). As such, access to justice depends upon this examination of admis-
sibility. It comprises certain formal requirements, such as the competence
of the court, and in particular, the right of action/right to apply. The right of
action or right to apply (§42 paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative
Procedure [VwGO]) is only valid if the plaintiffs are asserting the infringe-
ment of their own rights, and such an infringement of rights is at least
deemed plausible. The plaintiff must assert the infringement of a subjective
public right which, in addition to protecting the interests of the general
public, must at least aim to protect the plaintiff’s own rights.
This approach (limiting the judicial review to an infringement of the
plaintiff’s own rights) has certain implications, not only within the context
of examining admissibility, but also in the examination of justification, in
that it determines the extent of examination by the court (control breadth):
The court confines itself to examining those provisions which protect third
parties. In the case of actions for annulment, as in this instance, the court
will annul the contested administrative act “provided the administrative act
is unlawful and the rights of the plaintiff are thereby infringed” (§113 para-
graph 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure [VwGO]). Infringements
of rules not designed to protect the plaintiff will be disregarded and will not
lead to the annulment of the official decision. This is of particular signifi-
cance for infringements of procedural provisions that, in many cases, are
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not designed to protect individuals but instead serve solely to protect the
interest of the general public in a meaningful and expedient organisation
of proceedings.
The limitation of access to justice and the narrow scope of examina-
tion contrast with the high density of control (control depth) of the judicial
review. The intensity of the administrative law review is comparatively high
in Germany. It even allows the court, in some cases, to review discretionary
or prognostic decisions by the administration, whereby limits and other
standards specified in administrative provisions are often used as yardsticks
(cf. also 6A(3)).
18 If approximate values are available for the interests of the plaintiff, these
shall be decisive. The general figure of DM 8,000 cited in §13 of the Court
Costs Act [GKG] may only be used as a basis in the absence of approximate
values. A working party of judges has prepared a catalogue of guideline
values for jurisdictional amounts, which is updated and amended at regu-
lar intervals (printed in: Redeker/von Oertzen, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung
- Kommentar, 13th edition, Stuttgart 2000, §165, margine number 19ff.)
19 Calculated in accordance with § 11, paragraph 2 and in conjunction
with Annex 1 to § 11, paragraph 1 of the Court Costs Act [GKG]
20 In Germany, to date, altruistic legal action by an association has only
existed at Länder level (see point 1 below) (i.e. only in order to appeal
against measures by the Länder administration). At the Federal level, no
altruistic legal action by an association has thus far existed under valid law
(see point 2 below); at present, the Federal Nature Conservation Act only
regulates the rights of recognised nature conservation associations to par-
ticipate in certain administrative procedures and measures which involve
impairment of nature and landscapes, and the prerequisites governing the
recognition of such associations (§29 of the Federal Nature Conservation
Act [BNatSchG]). According to §29 of the Federal Nature Conservation Act
[BNatSchG], an association is recognised as having the right to participate
in development permit procedures if (1) the main purpose of the associa-
tion, as defined in its Articles of Association, is to promote, for non-profit
purposes and not for a limited period of time only, the cause of nature and
landscape conservation; (2) its scope of activity covers at least the territory
of one of the Federal Länder; (3) there is sufficient evidence that the asso-
ciation is able to pursue its objectives adequately (based on the type and
scope of its activities, as well as on its members and capacity); (4) it is
exempt from corporate income tax because of its non-profit character; and
(5) entry is open to anyone who supports the association’s objectives.
However, according to a draft Act to Amend the Federal Nature
Conservation Act [BNatSchG] (see point 3 below), an (altruistic) legal
action by recognised nature conservation associations will be introduced at
Federal level. As such, in future, and subject to certain requirements, recog-
nised organisations will also be able to take legal action against various
measures, including those of the Federal administration, with the claim that
the provisions of environmental legislation are infringed.
Point 1: Rights to legal action by an association are provided in the fol-
lowing Länder acts: Berlin (§39a of the Nature Conservation Act
[NatSchG]), Brandenburg (§65 of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]),
Bremen (§44ff. of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]), Hamburg (§41
of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]), Hesse (§36 of the Nature
Conservation Act [NatSchG]), Lower Saxony (§60c of the Nature
Conservation Act [NatSchG]), Rhineland-Palatinate (§37 of the Landscape
Management Act [LPflegeG]), Saarland (§33b of the Nature Conservation
Act [NatSchG]), Saxony (§58 of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]),
Saxony-Anhalt (§52 of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]), Schleswig-
Holstein (§51c of the Nature Conservation Act [NatSchG]), und Thuringia
(§46 of the Nature Conservation Act) [NatSchG]).
Point 2: Additionally in this context, associations are authorised to take
action if they themselves are the owners of property — for example, in the area
of impact of a (potentially) environmentally harmful plant — even if the prop-
erty was acquired for the sole purpose of obtaining the right to take action.
Point 3: http://www.bmu.de/fset800.htm. 
21 In the case of development permit procedures, there is no need to lodge
an appeal before bringing a legal action (§74 paragraph 1, sentence 2 in con-
junction with §70 of the Law on Administrative Procedures [VwVfG]). This is
an exception to the normal procedure, whereby the lodging of an appeal
(§68ff. of the VwGO) is generally required before bringing a legal action.
22 Renewed participation is also necessary in the case of an unaltered plan
if the planning authority feels it necessary to conduct fresh investigations
concerning nature conservation, integrate the results into the procedure,
and base its planning decision on this — cf. Federal Administrative Court
ruling [BVerwGE] 87, 62, 70ff.
23 According to §22 of the Brandenburg Nature Conservation Act
[BbgNatSchG], territories may be designated as conservation areas by
means of legal ordinance. According to the provisions of the ordinance, pro-
hibited actions include those that alter the character of the area, damage the
ecological balance, disfigure the landscape, impair the enjoyment of nature
or otherwise contravene the purposes of special protection. The legal ordi-
nance determines the subject of protection, the protective purpose, and the
orders and prohibitions required in order to attain goals of protection. 
Where the territory has not yet been designated a conservation area but
is intended to be designated as such, an area may be temporarily protected
for a period of three years, which may be extended by one year, if the
intended protective purpose is deemed to be threatened by changes.
According to the more detailed provisions of the legal ordinance or court
order, any actions deemed likely to alter the subject of protection perma-
nently are prohibited in the protected area (§27 and 28 of the Brandenburg
Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]). However, an exemption from the
prohibitions under the Brandenburg Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]
may be issued subject to certain preconditions (§19 of the Brandenburg
Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]).
In addition, ordinances designating conservation areas may allow for
licenses for certain activities within an area. However, the licence may be
issued only if the intended action does not contravene the intended pro-
tective purpose, and is insignificant (§19 paragraph 2 of the Brandenburg
Nature Conservation Act [BbgNatSchG]). 
24 According to §29 of the Federal Nature Conservation Act [BNatSchG],
an organisation is recognised if (1) the main purpose of the society, as
defined in its Articles of Association, is to promote, for non-profit purposes
and not for a limited period of time only, the cause of nature and landscape
conservation; (2) its scope of activity covers at least the territory of one of
the Federal Länder; (3) there is sufficient evidence suggesting that the asso-
ciation is able to pursue its objectives adequately (based on the type and
scope of its activities, as well as on its members and capacity); (4) it is
exempt from corporate income tax because of its non-profit character; and
(5) entry is open to anyone who supports the association’s objectives.
25 German law holds that only small projects used for public purposes can
exempt land otherwise designated as protected. The land in question failed
on both counts.
26 A right of standing for associations does not exist at the federal level in
Germany. However, the draft of federal natural law suggests possible standing
in matters involving federal projects (e.g. federal highways and waterways). 
27 Given the cost and scope of the case, NABU and BUND signed a con-
tract of collaboration according to which BUND would be the only party
officially bringing the suit. The public, however, perceived both groups as
parties to the suit. 
28 Under German law, the Federal Administrative Court has jurisdiction
over cases concerning traffic projects in the context of reunification.
29 Under German law, only development projects involving federal water-
ways require public participation. 
30 As evident in the The Nature Reserve Case, however, a successful ruling
that the proceedings were unlawful in the absence of public involvement
will often void the decision made at the proceedings.
31 Joined as a “friend of the defendant,” the State Highway Management
Company was the developer and financial manager of the proposed con-
struction project. This status is used for parties who have a legitimate inter-
est in the outcome of the proceeding. The court must make a resolution on
accepting someone as a friend of the plaintiff, or of the defendant.
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32 In the instant matter, although it involved a highway project, an EIA was
not required prior to construction because the law on EIAs only entered
into force after the filing of the first application.
33 In addition to the EIA law, NGO standing may be granted pursuant to
article 98 paragraph 1 of the Environmental Protection Act, which states
that “associations formed by citizens for the representation of their envi-
ronmental interests and other social organizations not qualifying as politi-
cal parties or interest groups - and active in the impact area - shall be enti-
tled in their area to the legal status of being a party to the case in environ-
mental protection state administration procedures”. 
34 Separately, the EPAC began proceedings against the Union of Evangelist
Churches, which had not undertaken any construction activities at the time
of the trial.
35 EPAC surmounted this obstacle by taking a subpoena from the judge
containing a signature line and bringing it to the defendant, thereby forc-
ing the defendant to sign and authorise the case to begin.
36 The only exception is if the statute is contrary to an international agree-
ment, including European law.
37 Under the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure, individuals can par-
ticipate in proceedings as a matter of law if they are a necessary party, or
have a legal interest.
38 Relevant legislation includes articles 42 of the RF Constitution, chapter
24 of the RF Civil Procedural Code; articles 11-13 of the RF Law on
Environmental Protection; and State Environmental Expertiza Rules (regu-
lated by the Federal Law on Environmental Expertiza, adopted by the
Russian Parliament in 1995).
39 See Jon Gaulslaa, An overview of a breach of fundamental human rights
and internal Russian law. Working paper, University of Oslo, Norway,
1988, <www.bellona.no/imaker?id=10052&sub=1>.
40 The complaint was based on articles 42, 24, 28 of the RF Constitution;
on articles 11-13 and 40-42 of the RF Law on Environmental Protection; on
chapter 24 of the RF Civil Procedural Code ( right to appeal to court deci-
sions or actions of authorities that violate citizens’ rights).
41 This case study was drafted with input by Carlos Martinez-Camarero
and Luis Oviedo-Mardones, pro bono lawyers of Ecologistas en Accion.
42 The company no longer operates in Spain.
43 Ms. Sanchis-Moreno drafted this summary, using information from
<www.nodo50.org/ecoloand/aznal3.htm> and <www.seo.org/es/campa-
nias/doniana.html>. Information was also supplied by Carlos Martinez-
Camarero of Ecologistas en Accion.
44 According to articles 4 and 11 of the law of Ukraine on Sanitary and
Epidemiological Welfare of the Population, citizens have a right to condi-
tions of home and rest that are safe for health and life. Accordingly, pro-
posals for the expansion and refurbishment of facilities are subject to com-
pulsory sanitary-epidemiological examination. Under article 15 of the
same law, government officials are required to take into account the need
to maintain living conditions most favourable for the improvement of pub-
lic health in making decisions regarding expansion and refurbishment of
facilities. Finally, article 5 of the law of Ukraine on City Construction
requires that the interests of citizens who use buildings and spaces adjacent
to or a part of the construction area must be provided for during the
approval process.
45 The issue of interim relief had not been referred to the ECJ and was not
addressed by the Court. The Advocate-General noted that, despite its
impact on the enforcement of national provisions designed to implement
Community environmental law, this issue had not been referred for guid-
ance to the ECJ and advised the Court not to address it (paragraph 10 of
the opinion).
46 Referring to C435/92 Animaux Sauvages and other cases on point, ECJ
noted that article 2 of the directive, referring to economic interests, did not
constitute an autonomous derogation in terms of designating SPAs. The
Court noted that, having regard to its judgement in Leybucht Dykes, article
6(4) of the habitats directive (which by virtue of article 7 of the habitats
directive applied to SPAs) widened the grounds for encroaching on the area
of a designated SPA to include economic and social grounds. It also noted,
however, that article 7 of the habitats directive only amended article 4(4)
of the wild birds directive and had not amended paragraphs (1) and (2) of
article 4. Thus, economic requirements did not enter into consideration at
the stage of classifying an SPA and could only be taken into account in the
circumstances set out in article 6(4) once the site was already designated.
47 Reported at [1975] 2 WLR 316.
48 Reported at [1987] 1 WLR 670, see page 680.
PA R T  I I I : E N D N OT E S
218 H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
I N T R O D U C T I O N
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 219
Appendices
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 219
A P P E N D I C E S
220 H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 221





Economic Commission for Europe
Committee on Environmental Policy
Working Group for the Preparation of the First Meeting of
the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters
(First meeting, Geneva, 28-30 November 2001)
Workshop on access to justice in
environmental matters under the
Aarhus Convention
Introduction
1. At their second meeting, the Signatories to the UNECE
Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters established a Task Force on
Access to Justice, to be led by Estonia, to support the
implementation of the third pillar of the Convention
(CEP/WG.5/2000/2, para. 47). Following the sugges-
tion of the Signatories, the Task Force held a workshop
in Tallinn, Estonia on 17-19 September 2001. The
Governments of Finland and the Netherlands provided
financial assistance for the workshop to match the
Estonian funds.
2. The workshop was attended by 52 participants, acting
in their personal capacity, from governmental and non-
governmental organizations from the following coun-
tries and organizations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Germany,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania,
Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, European Commission,
American Bar Association Central and Eastern
European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), Regional
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
(REC), the European ECO Forum and the
Environmental Law Association of Central and Eastern
Europe and Newly Independent States (GUTA
Association), the American Embassy in Estonia,
Estonian Green Movement and Coalition Clean Baltic.
3. Mr Allan Gromov, Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of
the Environment, Estonia, welcomed the participants to
the workshop. Estonia had been working for over two
years to prepare the ratification of the Convention in
August 2001 with the assistance of the Government of
Denmark to whom Mr Gromov expressed his gratitude.
He also thanked the Governments of Finland, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom and ABA/CEELI
who had contributed to the workshop and the prepara-
tion of the handbook and expressed his best wishes for
a successful workshop.
4. Ms Sofie H. Flensborg, from the secretariat, gave a brief
update on the status of the Convention and the current
developments under its auspices. Seventeen countries
had ratified the Convention which would enter into
force on 30 October 2001. The first meeting of the
Parties would be likely to take place during autumn
2002, although no decision had been taken so far. A
preparatory meeting for the first meeting of the Parties
had been scheduled for 28-30 November 2001 to which
the results of the workshop would be reported.
Appendix A
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5. The representative of the lead country for the Task
Force, Ms Rita Annus, Estonia, reminded the workshop
of the mandate given to the Task Force by the second
meeting of the Signatories. The Task Force should focus
on good practice and should provide a forum for
exchange of practical experience – it should not engage
in refining the legal framework of the Convention. The
aim of the workshop would be to provide an opportu-
nity for sharing practical experience and to refine the
concepts in the draft handbook. In addition, there
would be a possibility to discuss possible further activi-
ties of the Task Force. She also introduced the agenda
for the workshop and some questions that had been
prepared in advance of the workshop.
6. As a representative of the main donor for the project on
the draft handbook on access to justice, Ms Jayne Boys,
United Kingdom, raised some points of importance to
the UK. She emphasized the support of the UK to the
Aarhus Convention and to the handbook project.
Sharing practical experience on what works best had
proven to be a good method in the case of the
Newcastle Handbook on public participation and Ms
Boys expressed the hope that the actual cases in the
draft handbook could be a useful basis for discussions
at the workshop and that these discussions would help
in shaping the handbook. She thanked the people who
had contributed to the drafting process and invited
other people to submit comments and additional mate-
rial for the finalization of the handbook.
7. Mr Hannes Veinla, Chair of the Environmental Law
Department, Faculty of Law, Tartu University, Estonia,
gave a presentation outlining the issue of access to jus-
tice in the Aarhus Convention. He focused on the char-
acteristic features of article 9 and the purpose of access
to justice both in general and in the context of the
Aarhus Convention. He then raised some of the key
issues of implementation, such as institutions, standing,
remedies and costs. He concluded by emphasizing that
every person should have access to a simple, brief and
effective procedure for obtaining protection by a court
or an alternative body against acts and omissions that
affect any of the rights established under the
Convention and national law.
8. Mr Stephen Stec, REC, coordinator of the project of the
handbook, gave an introduction to the process of the
development of the draft handbook, underlining the
fact that the time available to prepare the draft had
been very limited and that a lot of editing and review-
ing was still necessary. The draft handbook was in two
parts, an analytical part and an appendix of case stud-
ies. He explained the process for the collection of case
studies – 43 cases in total had been submitted – but also
emphasized that more countries needed to submit
cases and that the cases also needed more work. He
expressed his gratitude to the partner organizations in
the project, namely ABA/CEELI, the Environmental
Law Alliance Worldwide (E-LAW), GUTA Association
and European ECO Forum, and to others involved in
the work of the Task Force.
9. Ms Cairo Robb, United Kingdom, reiterated the man-
date of the Task Force which emphasized that it should
focus on practical implementation and should provide
models, concrete solutions and problem-solving
approaches in the implementation of article 9. She
highlighted some parts of the handbook such as the
chapter on access to justice in public participation
cases, the section on injunctive relief and the part on
SLAPP suits. As to the case studies collected for the pur-
poses of the draft handbook, article 9, paragraph 3,
seemed quite lightly covered whereas many cases illus-
trated issues in relation to article 9, paragraph 2. She
emphasized that the workshop should focus on the les-
sons that could be learned, both from the case studies
and from exchanges of experience, which could then
be reflected in the conclusions of the workshop.
10. The workshop organized its discussion in three smaller
groups each facilitated by one of the participants. The
smaller groups based their discussions on the draft
handbook and on the questions which had been circu-
lated in advance of the workshop. After each session,
the smaller groups reported their conclusions back to
the plenary.
I. Good practices identified
11. The main conclusions of the workshop are reflected
below. In the discussions of the different topics, it
became clear, taking into account the broad geograph-
ical scope of the UNECE countries, that different coun-
tries had different legal systems and that the contexts in
which access to justice under the Aarhus Convention
needed to operate were diverse in terms of legal and
democratic traditions, as well as social, cultural and
economic conditions. Therefore any conclusions on
what can be learned from examples raised in the dis-
cussion in the workshop need to take this into account.
Furthermore, even though the workshop had a wide
representation of UNECE countries, it is likely that
given the short time available, the need to simplify the
examples and problems of language and terminology,
not all existing examples of good practices were actu-
ally discussed and presented at the workshop itself.
The following conclusions should be considered in the
light of these limitations.
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12. These conclusions are therefore a list of good examples
that countries can use as a starting point when looking
for examples of experiences in a particular field. They
can then investigate in more depth how the example
works, for instance by taking up bilateral contact with
the workshop participant from that particular country.
Furthermore, where concrete examples exist to illus-
trate the good practices suggested, or other good prac-
tices, these should be provided for the final version of
the handbook, if they are not already there. Efforts
should be made to ensure that all good practices listed
below are adequately described in the final version of
the Access to Justice Handbook.
A. Procedures — Article 9, paragraph 1
Review bodies
13. The question of the body to which a member of the
public can appeal a refusal of access to information
was considered in several sessions of the workshop. In
the United Kingdom (England and Wales) a Freedom
of Information Commissioner had been appointed to
consider cases of denial of full access to information.
The Commissioner was open to any person and his or
her decisions were binding on the public authorities in
question. In Estonia, there was a Data Protection
Inspectorate which was an independent body provid-
ing a procedure which was quick, low cost and easily
accessible. In Slovakia, a new Commission for
Environmental Information had been established
under the Ministry of Environment to consider these
types of cases; it had independent members of both the
judiciary and NGOs. In Ukraine, there were expedi-
tious appeals procedures for these cases coupled with
the possibility of claiming disciplinary penalties. (See
also paras. 33 to 39 below on Review Bodies.)
Time frames
14. Concerning good practices for preliminary reconsider-
ation and administrative review procedures with
respect to cases concerning refusal of access to infor-
mation, the question of time frames was considered.
The obligation of the European Parliament, Council
and Commission to internally reconsider an application
for access to information within 15 days of the submis-
sion of the complaint (confirmative application) was
considered to be good practice. Furthermore, a num-
ber of countries had one month in general for adminis-
trative (non-judicial) reviews; this was the case in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia and also other countries.
15. Concerning judicial review, six months from the appeal
to the judicial system and until the final decision by the
court, as is the target in England and Wales, seemed to
be a good example of a timely judicial procedure.
Another suggested good practice would be to reduce
deadlines for refusal of information to allow the appli-
cant to go forward with the complaint or appeal as
soon as possible.
General
16. From the discussions, it seemed that the non-judicial
review mechanisms were more efficient, timely and
cheaper than court procedures, but that the court pro-
ceedings should be kept in place.
B. Procedures — Article 9, paragraph 2
Standing
17. There was a variety of ways in which the countries had
dealt with the question of standing in relation to cases
falling under article 9, paragraph 2, consistent with the
Convention’s objective of providing wide and effective
access to justice. In Ukraine, every citizen could com-
plain about alleged violations of rights under article 9,
paragraph 2, which seemed to be good practice. In the
United Kingdom (England and Wales), the determina-
tion of ‘sufficient interest’ is left to the discretion of the
court, which can interpret this flexibly enough to
include not only NGOs, but also other citizens’ organi-
zations and residents and community groups as well as
individual citizens.
Review bodies
18. In Denmark, the Environmental Appeals Boards were
established by law. These Boards were independent
from the Ministry, delivered what were considered to
be high quality binding decisions and were therefore
considered to be an example of good practice. (See
also paras 33 to 39 below on Review Bodies.)
C. Procedures — Article 9, paragraph 3
Standing
19. For an NGO to have standing in cases under article 9,
paragraph 3, in certain countries such as Belgium, cer-
tain criteria should be fulfilled, but once an NGO had
proven to fulfil these - for instance that protection of
the environment should be the objective stated in the
charter or the bylaw of the NGO - it would have stand-
ing in all environmental cases.
20. Actio popularis existed in some countries, such as the
Netherlands and Spain. The practical experiences with
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actio popularis were that it was rarely used in Spain but
used quite often in the Netherlands.
Constitutional rights
21. In many countries, for instance Hungary, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Slovakia, Spain, Yugoslavia and
Ukraine, the public had a constitutional right to a healthy
environment and in some countries also an obligation to
protect the environment. Following from this constitu-
tional right and, where applicable, obligation, there was
a right of standing in the constitutional court in cases of
alleged violation of the constitutional right.
Criminal proceedings
22. In a few countries, like Spain and the United States, it
was possible for NGOs to challenge companies for vio-
lation of the environmental legislation directly in crim-
inal proceedings. In the case of Spain, the NGO might
have to join the public prosecutor in the case but fur-
ther investigation was required to clarify this point.
Citizen enforcement
23. In the UK, while the main responsibility for enforce-
ment lay with the authorities, in cases of nuisance, leg-
islation provided that where the local enforcement
authority had not acted, any person may ask the local
court to make an order requiring a polluter who was
causing a statutory nuisance to abate the pollution. If




24. Rules and practices on injunctive relief seemed to be
very different in different countries. Examples of good
practice were identified in the Czech Republic and
Germany, where a complaint in relation to a license or
permit automatically suspends the decision taken by
the public authority. In other countries, such as
Hungary, the United Kingdom and the United States,
injunctive relief is possible in certain circumstances. In
some countries, the criteria are specified in the legisla-
tion, whereas in others the criteria were developed in
court practice.
25. In Germany, no bond was required to obtain an inter-
im injunction and the defendant was not entitled to sue
for damages even if they won the case. In other coun-
tries, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, in environmental cases in the wider public
interest, the court had discretion to require only a nom-
inal bond (for example 1 USD) or no bond at all.
Timely procedures
26. To prevent lengthy court proceedings, case manage-
ment techniques and timetables to be followed in court
cases had been developed in some countries, like the
United Kingdom (England and Wales), the United
States and the Netherlands.
Mechanisms to avoid abuse 
of the legal system
27. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom
(England and Wales), there were generally very strict
time limits for bringing a case to the court where the
case involved a challenge to a decision of a public
authority. A court claim would have to be brought
within three months after the final decision of the pub-
lic authority.
Damages
28. The question of damages was considered to be rele-
vant in some cases. In Ukraine, there was a regulation
on how to calculate damages, whereas in most coun-
tries, it was left to the discretion of the judges/courts.
29. The practice in Ukraine and Russia to provide for moral
damages in environmental cases was considered to be
a good example of an effective remedy of redress.
Enforcement
30. Mechanisms to enforce court decisions were consid-
ered to be essential. In Belgium (Flanders), there was a
possibility to issue instant penalties for non-compli-
ance with court decisions and in United States, each
day of violation of the court decision was considered to
be a separate criminal offence of contempt of the court.
31. Imposing criminal responsibility on government offi-
cials who concealed environmental information, as for
example in Russia and Kazakhstan, was considered to
be an effective remedy as regards access to information.
32. Strict liability of entities carrying out hazardous activi-
ties was felt to be important because it shifted the bur-
den of causation and was an appropriate allocation of
the burden of risk. In some cases, strict liability was
combined with requirements on operators to establish
insurance funds or other financial guarantees to ensure
that judgments against them could be enforced.
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E. Review bodies and other bodies
Main review bodies
33. In most countries, the main review bodies under article
9, paragraphs 1 and 2, were the courts. However, some
good examples of other independent and impartial bod-
ies were mentioned in relation to article 9, paragraphs 1
and 2 (see paras. 13 and 18 above). In Sweden a specif-
ic Environmental Court had been established, which had
jurisdiction in environmental law cases. Independence
and impartiality of the main review bodies
34. The independence of review bodies other than courts
of law was in most cases secured by the statute or the
law by which the body had been established, e.g. the
Danish Appeal Boards. Financial independence was
secured by separate budgets for the bodies.
35. The independence of the courts was secured through
the appointments procedures, providing job security
for judges, (e.g. higher judges are appointed for life or
until retirement, and may only be removed in excep-
tional circumstances), providing adequate remunera-
tion of judges, ensuring independence of funding for
the judiciary and the independence of the judicial hier-
archy from the main decision-making government
departments.
36. It was considered important that courts and other inde-
pendent bodies operated transparently. This could
include providing annual reports on their activities,
including statistics on numbers and types of cases, and
publication of their decisions, for example on the
Internet.
Reconsideration by a public authority
37. The existence of a reconsideration procedure was con-
sidered an important means to avoid or solve disputes
at an early stage. Where a procedure for reconsidera-
tion by a public authority existed in the context of arti-
cle 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, it seemed to be good prac-
tice that the administrative review would be performed
by a different person than the one who made the deci-
sion in the first instance.
Ombudsman
38. In most countries, and in the European Union, there was
an ombudsman institution, which seemed to be good
practice, even if during the discussions it became clear
that the institution would be quite different in different
countries. Usually, ombudsmen would be independent,
appointed by the Parliament and only responsible to the
Parliament. In most countries, everybody had the right to
complain to the ombudsman. In some countries, like
Hungary, there were more ombudsmen dealing with dif-
ferent issues. Some ombudsmen dealt specifically with
issues such as human rights and freedom of information.
Other ombudsmen dealt only with cases of mal-adminis-
tration. In some countries, e.g. Spain, the ombudsman
would have to deal with all complaints whereas in oth-
ers, they had the discretion to decide whether they want-
ed to address a specific case or not, e.g. in Denmark.
While decisions of most ombudsmen were non-binding,
the publicity given to ombudsman cases and reports
could help to ensure that decisions of the ombudsman
were taken seriously. However, the ombudsman in
Moldova was able to issue legally binding decisions.
Mediation
39. In some countries, mediation existed as an alternative
to more formal action. While this was not suitable for
all types of dispute, it could provide an accessible no or
low cost option in some cases. Availability of mediation
services could reduce the need for the use of more for-
mal mechanisms for access to justice, such as litigation
in the courts. This could be especially useful in local
and neighbour disputes.
F. Overcoming financial barriers
Legal aid schemes
40. Most countries had legal aid schemes to assist individ-
uals when they seek access to justice before the courts,
which were considered to be a good means for over-
coming financial barriers. These schemes could cover
some or all of the following: initial investigation costs,
court fees, attorney fees for advice and for representa-
tion in court, and expert fees. The assistance could be
financial or could be in the form of direct provision of
services. In most countries, the assistance was only
available to individuals, and usually would depend on
the financial situation of the applicant. In some cases,
the assistance would also depend on the chances of a
successful outcome for the plaintiff in the court case.
However, a good example of extended access to legal
aid seemed to be the German system, where NGOs
could also apply for financial assistance in higher
courts and the supreme court without having to show
chances of a successful outcome.
41. Even where legal aid schemes were available, it was
considered important to provide other mechanisms to
overcome financial barriers which still existed for those
not eligible for legal aid.
Initial investigation prior to court action
42. A robust state-run environmental regulatory and
enforcement system could play a significant role in
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investigation and information gathering prior to court
actions. It was considered to be good practice that the
implementation of the access to environmental infor-
mation provisions of the convention enabled citizens
to obtain such information at no or low cost.
Court fees
43. In some countries, such as Spain, free access to courts
was available in some cases, whereas in others, like the
United States and Hungary, only a low nominal fee was
necessary to start a case in front of the court, and in yet
others, like the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, the court
fee could be waived or reduced, inter alia, depending
on the income of the plaintiff, even if the lawsuit was
unsuccessful.
Attorney fees
44. A practice of pro bono lawyers was quite developed in
the US but less available in Europe. In Hungary and the
Ukraine certain NGOs specialized in providing free
legal advice in environmental cases. In some countries,
certain NGOs always had the right to a free lawyer. In
other countries, groups of lawyers existed to promote
special types of cases, such as environmental cases. In
some proceedings there was no requirement to be rep-
resented by a lawyer, and so attorney’s fees could be
avoided altogether. This was the case with the Danish
Environmental Appeals Boards and the Netherlands
Administrative Courts.
Expert fees
45. Some good examples of how to overcome barriers
posed by expert fees were identified. In Spain, a judge
could decide that the court itself should cover expert
fees. In one of the Spanish courts, a toxicologist had
been employed directly by the court to help in techni-
cal matters. In some countries, it was left to the discre-
tion of judges who should pay expert fees. The cre-
ation of new public interest networks and support for
existing ones could help to reduce the need for and the
cost of experts.
General support to public interest NGOs
46. The provision of tax deduction incentives for private
donations, as in Germany and the UK, was regarded as
a good example of helping NGOs to overcome finan-
cial barriers in general, which in turn could have bene-
fits on access to justice. In Spain, Hungary and the
United States, there was a possibility of more
favourable tax rules for public interest NGOs them-
selves. Some governments, for example Germany and
the Netherlands, annually gave funds to NGOs, includ-
ing environmental NGOs whose projects could lead to
court actions. In some countries, the court could order
that the fine of a polluting company be paid directly to
NGOs with the objective of environmental protection;
that was the case in Germany and Uzbekistan. Some
participants in the workshop felt that under the Aarhus
Convention, it should be the general objective to
reduce fees or give free access to court to public inter-
est NGOs.
Financial certainty and cost shifting
47. In certain cases it was not just the absolute costs of
bringing an environmental action that created a finan-
cial barrier, but also the uncertainty in relation to the
costs – especially the risk of having to pay the other
side’s costs where fee-shifting was practiced. It was
considered good practice to be able to provide more
certainty from the outset to those bringing actions in
the public interest. In Germany, for example, there
were fixed maximums for the costs of certain types of
actions. In the United Kingdom, it was possible for a
judge to make a pre-emptive costs ruling at the outset
of a case that the applicant bringing a case in the pub-
lic interest would not be held liable for the other side’s
costs, even if the applicant were to lose.
48. At the end of a case, in some countries such as the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the judge had a
discretion to limit the amount of the other side’s costs
that a losing applicant would have to pay in the light of
the nature of the case and the conduct of the defendant.
General
49. A good practice to overcome financial barriers to
access to justice in general was considered to be the
use of non-judicial mechanisms as they were generally
cheaper and less time-consuming. Good quality of
administrative decision-making reduced the needs to
go court and thus the number of court cases, which
was likely to save costs for all parties.
G. Overcoming other barriers and other
issues not addressed in other sessions
Capacity building
50. Capacity building was identified in both smaller work-
ing group sessions and in plenary as key to good prac-
tice in implementing the access to justice provisions
under the Convention. This could take the form both of
capacity building at home, and in partnership projects
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with other states. Partnership projects could be partic-
ularly important where states shared a reliance on a
specific common natural resource. It was felt important
that the needs of different target groups, such as judges
and lawyers, government officials, NGOs and the gen-
eral public were all addressed. Strengthening capacity
in relation to access to justice under the Aarhus
Convention would have a positive effect on other areas
of law. It was noted that a lot of the elements necessary
to increase the capacities were already available – what
was needed was political priority and adequate
resources.
Capacity building of government officials
51. The handbook was considered to be addressed to gov-
ernment officials, whom it was intended to assist in
identifying possible elements of good practice.
Capacity building of judges and lawyers
52. It was felt that the knowledge of the judiciary and
members of other review bodies should be improved
through training and workshops on the issues liable to
arise in environmental cases. One way of ensuring this
was identified in Sweden, which had a specific
Environmental Court whose judges specialized in envi-
ronmental cases. What was important was that training
and, where necessary, technical assistance were avail-
able to those judges likely to come across relevant
cases. The UK system of justices clerks, who assist and
provide advice to Magistrates, was presented as an
example of a way of channeling environmental expert-
ise into the judiciary. Training for lawyers was also con-
sidered to be good practice. This could be done in con-
junction with university courses, and could involve stu-
dents’ participation in university environmental law
clinics as in the Ukraine. It was also regarded as impor-
tant that all lawyers had access to court decisions, and
it was considered good practice for courts to publicise
their decisions, and especially for Supreme Courts to
publish all their decisions, for example on the internet
as is done in Estonia, Russia and the United Kingdom.
Public awareness
53. It was felt useful to share experience on public aware-
ness campaigns, even if they concerned another topic.
The use of electronic tools was emphasized as a good
solution to reach the public. The public seemed not to
be aware of their environmental rights in many coun-
tries. Statefunded public advice centres, such as the
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux in the United Kingdom and
university law clinics existing in Estonia and the
Ukraine, could be used to educate and assist the pub-
lic in relation to their environmental rights. Good prac-
tice included strategies which took a long term
approach to awareness-raising, to ensure that the effect
of the awareness-raising campaign would be carried
forward. For this reason it was important to take
awareness raising seriously, to plan it carefully, and to
involve NGOs and other community groups in spread-
ing the message.
54. Fostering constructive relationships between the differ-
ent actors was regarded as good practice. For example,
in Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the
Parliament and NGOs had entered into a special agree-
ment on the implementation of the Aarhus Convention
and through this were able to disseminate information
quickly through these outlets. Similar agreements had
also been signed at the local level. In Georgia, the
Environment Ministry held regular national and region-
al Saturday morning meetings with NGOs.
II. Next steps — future activities 
of the task force
55. The participants at the workshop felt that it was impor-
tant that the work of the Task Force continue, and dis-
cussed what the possible next activities should be in
terms of finalization of the handbook and other activities.
Handbook
56. Concerning the handbook, it was agreed that the draft
handbook should be finalized taking into considera-
tion the findings of the workshop. The lead country,
Estonia, would take the lead in the process of finaliza-
tion. Participants would be invited to submit written
comments on the handbook to Estonia and would also
be invited to submit more details on specific identified
good solutions to certain problems. The deadline for
submission of comments would be communicated to
the participants as well as to the Focal Points to the
Aarhus Convention.
Questionnaire
57. One of the findings of the workshop was that the legal
systems throughout the UNECE region were very dif-
ferent and that it was therefore quite difficult to assess
the usefulness of the models and examples identified at
the workshop and in the draft handbook. Taking this
into consideration, the lead country informed the par-
ticipants of its intention to circulate a questionnaire to
all countries which would help to gather general infor-
mation on the legal systems of access to justice in the
different countries. The questionnaire would be sim-
ple, easy to complete and not designed with the inten-
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tion of conducting an in-depth analysis of the legal sys-
tems. The survey would provide background material
which would help in the understanding of the differ-
ences in legal systems in the region.
Other proposed activities
58. On the basis of the understanding that the handbook
would be mainly addressed to government officials
and others involved and responsible for the implemen-
tation of the Convention, it was considered to be
important for the Task Force to also assess and address
the needs of other target groups such as the public,
lawyers and judges.
59. Some participants felt that a next step could be for each
country to do an analysis of its legal and practical sys-
tems in place on access to justice. Such an analysis
could use the findings of the workshop and the hand-
book to identify priorities for improvements.
60. The lead country invited all participants to consider fur-
ther financial and other contributions to the future
work of the Task Force. Some participants indicated
that they would look into the possibility of providing
such support.
III. Closure of the workshop
61. The participants expressed their gratitude to the lead
country for the organization of the workshop, and the
lead country thanked all participants, facilitators, rappor-
teurs, the interpreters and the secretariat for their efforts.
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Czech Republic: 
Parallel public participation 
in the national EIA system
Source: Pavla Jindrova, Centre for Community
Organising, Plzen
Editor’s note: An alternative source of authority
can actually be established when members of the
public set up their own parallel public participation
proceedings that would meet high standards of fair-
ness and accuracy.  This can have a major impact
on the quality of the official process, acting as a con-
trol mechanism that works in many ways like tradi-
tional access to justice mechanisms. 
Parallel public participation in EIA —
justification
A variety of domestic and international studies indicate
that the Czech EIA Act (No. 244/92 Coll.) does not require
effective public participation in the EIA procedure. In the
Czech EIA practice several limitations on public access to
full participation can be found.
1. There is no public debate about the scope
of EIA documentation (scoping).
The content of EIA documentation — alternatives and
impacts to be studied when assessing the proposal — is
determined by the developer (developer decides on alter-
natives to be studied) and the EIA expert hired by the
developer (deciding on the impacts to be assessed within
EIA documentation). This first and most important deter-
mination of the scope of the EIA cannot be influenced by
affected municipalities or affected citizens. The competent
government authority has a limited right to influence the
scope of an EIA, yet this right occurs only in the later stages
of the EIA process. 
During five years of applying the Czech EIA Act not a sin-
gle officially organised public scoping process took place.
2. The public has limited opportunities to
inspect EIA documentation properly.
EIA documentation is made available to citizens for 30
days for inspection, copying, and providing written sub-
missions. The notification about the availability of EIA doc-
umentation for “public review,” however, is done only by
putting an official announcement on the noticeboard of the
specific authority — an information means that reaches
extremely low proportions of local inhabitants. There is no
requirement for public notification about EIA documenta-
tion in the local and regional media. 
Citizens who managed to learn about the opportunity
to inspect EIA documentation can have access to it at the
designated office of the municipal administration and may
provide written comments. Interested citizens can also
make copies of EIA documentation, but only if they can
afford the copying costs, which is usually not the case.
Preparing written comments on EIA documentation —
usually very complex and extensive documents — after a
simple inspection at the office of the administration is an
extremely difficult, if not impossible, task.
The combination of the above features of “public par-
ticipation” makes the thorough public review of EIA docu-
mentation almost non-existent. The practice proves that
interested citizens usually do not learn about their oppor-
tunities to inspect EIA documentation and even if they do
learn about it — usually through very informal channels —
they are not able to provide qualified comments on such
complex expert material. Both the public as well as com-
petent governmental and municipal authorities thus miss a
key opportunity for proper public review that could be
done in a timely and non-confrontational manner.
3. Public comments that do not provide
technical findings, but rather express values
and general concerns, are not considered in
the review of EIA documentation.
EIA documentation and the public’s comments are
reviewed as part of the preparation of the expert opinion.
Appendix B
Other cases and background materials
This expert opinion is prepared by an EIA consultant who
has not take part in the preparation of EIA documentation
that he or she is expected to review. This person is select-
ed by the relevant government agency and directly paid by
the developer. The consultant is not expected to evaluate
concerns that are not of a strictly technical/scientific
nature. Although the EIA Act requires a social impact
assessment as part of EIA documentation, this requirement
is largely ignored.
This leads to many EIA experts immediately judging
non-technical concerns about the proposal as irrelevant,
and concentrating on the technical comments provided by
statutory consultant and NGOs, if they were able to pres-
ent sophisticated arguments. Non-technical concerns of
ordinary affected persons are openly ignored and this fact
is acknowledged when the findings of the EIA expert opin-
ion are presented to the public.
4. Citizens are frustrated by the public
hearing on the EIA expert opinion 
The structure of the EIA procedure forces citizens to
provide their substantive comments at the last stage of the
EIA process — within the public hearing on the proposed
EIA expert opinion. Though this last stage of the EIA
process openly reveals public concerns, it provides very
limited opportunity to influence the whole decision-mak-
ing process within the EIA. Comments raised during this
public hearing — comments which relate to alternatives,
and environmental or socio-economic impacts of the pro-
posed development — cannot really be considered since
the EIA process is in its final stage. 
At the end of the EIA procedure, concerned and moti-
vated citizens are left frustrated, and feeling that their com-
ments were not considered in an appropriate manner. One
of the major consequences of this kind of “public partici-
pation” in the Czech EIA system is thus growing public
cynicism about the value of individual contributions
towards environmental protection.
Parallel public participation in EIA — 
Basic principles
Based on the above observations, the Public
Environmental Assessment Centre (Plzen), and later also the
Centre for Community Organising (Plzen), developed gener-
ic guidelines for organising parallel public participation in
EIA. The methodology is based on a presumption that, if
developers and state agencies fail to do so, NGOs can take
the initiative and organise their own participation opportuni-
ties that would provide more favourable participation. 
In practice, NGOs that learn (either through formal or
non-formal channels) of the beginning of the EIA proce-
dure can undertake specific steps.
1. Organise local coalition of various local
interests groups
The NGO contacts local NGOs, local members of par-
liament and other groups (labour unions, church groups,
etc.) in the affected municipality and asks them to jointly
initiate a proper public debate about the proposed devel-
opment. Local institutions supporting the idea can form
an informal coalition of various local interest groups with
the common aim to notify potentially affected citizens in
detail about the proposal and invite citizens, external
experts and the local media to the parallel public partici-
pation opportunity.
2. Organise parallel commenting within the
EIA process
The local coalition can easily organise parallel public
hearings, which can be initiated at any stage of the EIA pro-
cedure. Such hearings can effectively consider the scope of
EIA documentation (scoping meeting) or EIA documenta-
tion itself.
The local coalition invites the proponent and the
expert who prepared the EIA report and asks them to pres-
ent their findings to the public.  If they do not accept the
invitation, the coalition or NGO presents the documents
about the proposed activity and the EIA findings itself. The
hearing is typically focused on:
• health impacts;
• ecological impacts; and
• socio-economic impacts.
The presentation of each category of impacts is fol-
lowed by thorough public questioning and submission of
comments. All comments are recorded and, if necessary,
voting takes place to show the level of support for the
comment among participating members of the public. 
The coalition can also prepare an interactive EIA exhi-
bition, including a series of posters summarising key infor-
mation about the proposal and can exhibit this at the
entrance to the venue place where the hearing is held.
Newcomers to the process can thus quickly learn about the
discussion and provide immediate comments. The exhibi-
tion also provides important background information dur-
ing breaks in the public hearings.
3. Submit public comments as part of the
official submission process 
The comments gathered during the parallel public par-
ticipation process are provided to the authorities in the
form of an official submission.
4. Initiate the social impact 
assessment process
Social impact assessment (SIA) — potentially one of
the most important tools for the evaluation of non-envi-
ronmental concerns within the EIA procedure — is gener-
ally not used. SIA involves the examination of a proposed
activity with respect to, among others, cultural, social, eco-
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nomic or aesthetic concerns. The NGO or the local coali-
tion can request an SIA or undertake one itself.
C. Parallel public participation in EIA —
Practical illustration
The above process has been tested on the proposed
Recreational Park Rajcherov. This proposal was initiated in
early 1994 by a Dutch company that intended to build a
large recreational park (270 hectares) in the middle of the
south Bohemian woodlands. The proposal was backed by
a promise to invest USD 100 million into this very poor
region. The proposed development enjoyed very strong
political support, mainly due to the personal involvement
of the relatives of the local mayor as well as of the head of
the Regional Office. It was further backed by explicit sup-
port in the local media, which responded positively to the
large public relations campaign launched by the developer.
In spring 1994, the first information about the EIA study
for the proposed development was leaked to the regional
media. Local NGOs found that the proposed park would
destroy the habitat of nine critically endangered and 27
endangered species and would have a major impact on the
natural reservation that bordered the area of the proposed
park. The location of the park — in the middle of a forest,
without roads or infrastructure — would also have a major
impact on the development of local infrastructure.
NGOs with very limited hope of successful participa-
tion in the EIA at the time, asked the Centre for Community
Organising for help. A parallel public participation process
was suggested as the most effective option. It resulted in
the following concrete outcomes:
• Association Rajcherov was formed, consisting of 42
local NGOs and local academic institutions that sup-
ported a detailed public review of the proposal.
• A total of six public hearings were held to review EIA
documentation in all concerned local communities
within the two-year EIA process.
• Three sociological surveys and a socio-economic
assessment were prepared by the Association
Rajcherov in order to map and analyse general public
comments about the proposal.
These outcomes proved to have numerous benefits for
the NGOs that organised the process. In particular, it
helped Association Rajcherov to:
• obtain new data and expertise;
• identify (both from the attendance at the hearing as
well as from the comments that were voiced) the gen-
eral feelings of the community towards the proposal,
— and make further moves based on this knowledge;
• identify key supporters and opponents of the
Associations’ actions; and
• gain substantial political power.
The parallel public participation process resulted in
sufficient public pressure to cause the EIA process to be
restarted three times — three versions of the EIA docu-
mentation were consequently produced by the developer.
The developer was strongly backed by the local mayors
and the regional administration, and resisted public pres-
sure to withdraw from the project.
The whole EIA process lasted for more than three
years. It resulted in more than 300 pages of public com-
ments on the proposal. 
D: Parallel public participation in EIA —
Further ideas 
Parallel public participation in EIA works. The Centre for
Community Organising also used this approach in urban
transport planning in Plzen and Prerov where it proved to be
successful in both instances. In both cases, EIA documenta-
tion was returned to be redone because citizens had an
opportunity to express their concerns about inadequacies.
The Centre for Community Organising suggests that
NGOs, instead of being involved with the elaboration of
expert submissions in the EIA process, should systematical-
ly organise parallel public participation processes, includ-
ing parallel public scoping and public hearings on EIA doc-
umentation. By doing so they take the initiative and estab-
lish a procedure that provides the public with far better
opportunities to participate than the standard procedure. It
also allows NGOs to control the public participation
process and to play a part as the major organiser of public
debate about the proposal, a position which gives them
political support as well as additional information that they
would never have been able to gather by their own means.
The systematic application of parallel public participa-
tion can be replicated in practically every EIA system, and it
pays off. However, experts are needed as it must be profes-
sionally applied and systematically developed. Major NGOs
that deal with EIAs are therefore encouraged to train their
own experts to be able to use this procedure effectively. 
Contact
Centre for Community Organising
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Denmark: 
The ombudsman, an institution with
far-reaching consequences
Source: http://www.ombudsmanden.dk (excerpts)
Editor’s note: The Nordic countries made a joint state-
ment on the applicability of the ombudsman as a mecha-
nism for access to justice under the Aarhus Convention
during the convention negotiations.  While not meeting
all the formal requirements of the convention, the
ombudsman can provide a quick, effective and inexpen-
sive alternative means of achieving environmental  justice
in a given case.
In 1953 the Danish Constitution included a provision that
the Folketing (parliament) should elect at least one ombuds-
man. Motivated by the growing influence of the civil service,
the aim was to create improved guarantees for “the proper
exercise” of the state’s civil and military administration. The
Constitution empowered the Folketing to lay down more
detailed rules for the activities of this new institution. 
The institution of the Danish ombudsman had its origin
in the Scandinavian social structure of the 1950s. The rela-
tionship between citizen and state was predominantly gov-
erned by laws passed by the Folketing. The slow legislative
procedure came under pressure from an increasingly com-
plicated society, and gradually the Folketing had to leave
more and more decisions to the public administration. 
A crucial aspect of the institution of the ombudsman
was that, from the very outset, the Folketing allowed the
office to adapt to developments, thus preventing it from
becoming set in a 1950s form of regulating relations
between state and citizens. The intention is to adapt the
ombudsman and his functions to the latest developments
in the relationship between the public administration and
citizens. If the ombudsman’s control is to be effective and
beneficial to citizens, it must be extended to all authorities
that regulate the circumstances of citizens. 
Between Folketing, public administration 
and citizens 
The Danish ombudsman occupies a position midway
between the Folketing, the public administration/ministers
and citizens. With limited legal powers, the ombudsman is
supposed to ensure the “proper exercise” of administrative
powers. To understand how it was possible for the
ombudsman to become an important part of Denmark’s
judicial setup, it is necessary to look at the post’s relation-
ship to the Folketing, the public administration and citizens. 
The ombudsman and the Folketing 
After each election, the new Folketing elects an
ombudsman who is to “oversee the administration” on its
behalf. The Folketing may dismiss the ombudsman if it
loses confidence in him or her, but this has never occurred.
The ombudsman has to report to the Folketing, both in the
form of an annual report, and in connection with specific
cases of errors or deficiencies of major importance.
Furthermore, the Folketing lays down the general provi-
sions governing the ombudsman’s activity. 
On the other hand, the Act states that the ombudsman
is independent from the Folketing, for instance, when
deciding whether complaints are to be subjected to actual
investigation. The ombudsman is not allowed to be a mem-
ber of the Folketing. He hires and fires his own staff and he
may request to be relieved of office at six months’ notice. 
Formally, the ombudsman has limited powers. The
Folketing was unwilling to bring in an institution that could
defer or alter the decisions of the public administration. The
ombudsman’s supervision is subsequent, and the office’s
true power springs from its relationship to the Folketing. 
Furthermore, the Folketing has largely delegated the
task of giving substance to the concept of “the proper exer-
cise of administration” to the ombudsman. Through com-
ments, the Ombudsman has tried to develop general basic
principles for the correct exercise of administration. The
ombudsman has laid down requirements for the handling
of cases and these have later been incorporated into
Danish Administration Acts. The ombudsman has also indi-
cated how the public administration is to arrange its work
so that the processing of cases does not drag on unneces-
sarily, as well as generally how the administration ought to
act to strengthen its relationship of trust with citizens. 
In interpreting laws, the ombudsman has always
stressed the intentions of the Folketing. Great importance
has also been attached to human rights and the Danish
Constitution. In specific cases, the ombudsman had an
opportunity to express an opinion about the general prac-
tice of Danish government agencies. In a case concerning
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the ombudsman pointed out that, in
areas covered by constitutional law, there is a duty upon the
authorities when using their discretion to take into account
citizens’ exercise of their liberties and, to the greatest extent
possible, to avoid placing obstacles in the way of liberty.
The ombudsman and citizens 
Although the Act refers to the parliamentary ombuds-
man, it is in many contexts more appropriate to speak of
the citizens’ ombudsman. 
For citizens, the protection provided by the ombuds-
man is primarily in freedom to complain. It costs nothing,
and there are very few conditions to be met. Decisions
must be final before a complaint can be made, and com-
plaints, which must not be anonymous, must be submitted
to the ombudsman within one year. 
The ombudsman decides whether to actually investi-
gate a complaint and, if so, what to investigate. In other
words, the ombudsman is not bound by the complainant’s
allegations. The ombudsman then starts to proceed in the
matter, unless the complaint is groundless or trivial,  assess-
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ing the complaint and the prospects for being able to help
the complainant. If there is no such prospect and, in addi-
tion, there is no sign that the authorities have dealt with the
matter wrongly or have made an incorrect decision, the
ombudsman may dispense with the lengthy process of ask-
ing the authorities for a statement. The ombudsman then
writes directly to the complainant explaining why no fur-
ther action is being taken in the matter.
After deciding to investigate a case, the ombudsman
sends the complaint to the authority concerned asking for
the relevant documents to be sent along with a statement.
The complainant is given an opportunity to comment on
the statement from the authority, after which the case is
ready for the ombudsman’s assessment. Citizens may be
given free legal aid if litigation is inevitable and their
income is low. 
The ombudsman 
and the public administration 
The public administration primarily interacts with the
ombudsman during the investigation of complaints.
Through these complaints, the authorities are given the
opportunity to get a thorough and impartial legal appraisal
of their decisions, their handling of cases, and the adminis-
tration in general. The ombudsman’s efforts to develop
general principles for public law have proven to be impor-
tant to the public administration. 
Investigations made on the 
ombudsman’s own initiative 
The Folketing has given the ombudsman the liberty to
initiate investigations independently. In these cases, where
there is no complaint by a citizen, the ombudsman may
have identified issues in the public domain, sometimes as
a result of press reports, which require closer investigation.
In 1993, “own initiative” investigations totalled 139. 
“Own initiative” cases may aim to investigate whether
it is necessary to help a citizen in a particular case. The
opportunity to initiate cases has been used by the ombuds-
man, particularly for investigating more general questions
or issues of principle that complaint cases do not necessar-
ily raise. In this way the ombudsman has had the opportu-
nity to keep track and influence the general development
of relations between the administration and citizens. In
recent years, “own initiative” investigations have been
extended in a way that meets the need for general investi-
gations to a greater degree.
For example, in 1988 the ombudsman asked the
Department of Private Law for access to 70 files. The
Department of Private Law deals with administrative mat-
ters concerned with, for instance, separated and divorced
parents’ access to their children and with possible mainte-
nance obligations. In these 70 cases, the authorities had
made almost 150 decisions. 
The ombudsman’s investigation was concluded with a
full report of 130 pages. Citizens, the Department of Private
Law and other authorities were able to read about the
ombudsman’s scrutiny of the legal problems and issues
involved. The ombudsman also made conclusions about
the way the authorities had dealt with the cases and about
their procedure in general. 
The report concluded that the Department of Private
Law had decided the cases in accordance with the spirit
and letter of the law, and that the administration had made
an effort to make allowance for the personal situation of
the parties as was required in cases of this character. The
report was well received by the public administration and
by politicians, and projects of this kind have since become
an important part of the ombudsman’s input.
Estonia: Estonian Society for 
Nature Conservation and 
Estonian Green Movement v. 
the Ministry of Economy
Source: Press release (edited)
Editor’s note: This case, started too late to be included
in the case study section, is one of the first to seek to apply
the Aarhus Convention directly in a court of law.
March 27, 2002, Tallinn
A court case began today in the Tallinn
Administrative Court between two environmental NGOs,
the Estonian Society for Nature Conservation and
Estonian Green Movement, and the Ministry of Economy.
The essence of the case is the inactivity of the
Ministry, which refuses to carry out an environmental
impact assessment of the Action Plan for Estonian Oil-
shale Based Energy for 2001-2006. According to
Estonian law the assessment should be done for any
big programme that could have nationwide or regional
environmental impact.
The most significant is that the Court has agreed to
begin the procedure on the basis of the Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
(Aarhus Convention). The court recognised that,
according to the convention, the environmental NGOs
would not have to prove that their rights or interests
have been violated.
Most probably this court case is a world precedent,
because the Convention only entered into force on
October 30, 2001. It should be mentioned that only
two European Union countries have ratified the con-
vention to date.
The fact that the Court agreed to process the case
on the basis of the Convention, does not mean victory
yet. Discussion about the interpretation of the law will
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follow whether or not the verdict will need proof of the
violation of the rights of the NGOs. This will be the
next step in creating a precedent.
European Commission: 
Appeal of Friends of the Earth 
to the European ombudsman
Source: Peter Roderick, Friends of the Earth
In 1999, Friends of the Earth asked the European
Commission (DG XI) for copies of two studies that had
been conducted for the Commission into the UK’s transpo-
sition of the habitats directive and various waste directives.
The Commission provided copies of the studies, but with
page after page blacked out in thick ink. 
Friends of the Earth appealed to the secretary-general
of the Commission, as required by the Code of Conduct
concerning public access to Commission and Council doc-
uments attached to Commission Decision 94/90/EC. The
secretary-general upheld the Commission’s refusal to pro-
vide full copies.
The argument of the Commission was that the docu-
ments fell within the exception of “protection of the public
interest (court proceedings, inspections and investigations).”
In respect of the study on waste directives, DG XI also argued
that the exception “for the protection of the Commission’s
interest in the confidentiality of its own proceedings”
applied, but the secretary-general dropped this argument.
In 2000, Friends of the Earth appealed to the European
ombudsman against these refusals. It argued that the doc-
uments were studies, not investigations, and that the dem-
ocratic accountability of the Commission meant that the
public should be entitled to see an objective independent
study on compliance with environmental law conducted
for it. It also argued that the Commission was acting incon-
sistently with the Aarhus Convention.
In March 2001, the ombudsman ruled that the
Commission was guilty of maladministration in refusing to
provide full copies of the report and gave the Commission
until June 30, 2001 to respond. The ombudsman ruled that
“it is reasonable to regard these reports as Commission
documents, to which the rules of Decision 94/90/EC
should apply,” and went on to state as follows:
“An interpretation of the scope of ‘inspections and
investigations’, as suggested by the Commission, could
preclude public disclosure of any document held by
the institution which might be relevant for its role of
guardian of the treaty under Article 211 of the EC
Treaty. Accordingly, whole categories of documents
whose content relates to member states’ compliance
with Community law, and hence which may give fac-
tual or legal elements to the Commission in order to
consider instituting infringements in the future, could
be barred from public access …
The Ombudsman therefore considers that the excep-
tion based on inspections and investigations should
only be applied when the requested documents have
been drawn up in the course of an investigation con-
nected to an infringement proceeding. The two reports
in this case were commissioned prior to any investiga-
tion, and with a view to solely considering the options
available to the Commission (paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7).”
Further information
The ombudsman’s press release can be found at:
<www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/release/en/2001-03-20.ht
m>. The ombudsman’s draft recommendation can be
found at: <www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/
000271.htm>.
This case illustrates the continuing democratic deficit in
the Commission, and the importance of the public contin-
uing to seek to hold it accountable. 
Court of Justice of the European
Community: Stichting Greenpeace
Council et al v. European
Commission (C-321/95P)
The European Commission decided to finance the
construction of two fossil-fuelled power stations on the
Canary Islands. A group of applicants, including
Greenpeace, brought an action under article 230(4) of the
EC Treaty, contesting the legality of the operations in
Spain, as no EIA had been conducted as required by EU
law. The applicants pointed out that the Commission was
restricted from financing activities that contravened
Community legislation and policies under article 7 of
Council Regulation 2052/88.
The Court of First Instance, Case T-585/93, [1995] ECR
II-205, ruled that the applicants had no standing to bring an
action under article 230(4) as they had no individually
recognisable concern distinguishable from that of the
whole community. The Court ruled that an association
could contest a Community act only if it represents indi-
viduals who themselves fall under the scope of article
230(4), or if special circumstances exist that sufficiently
individualise the association.
On appeal before the Court of Justice, Case C-321/95,
[1998] ECR I-1651, the applicants claimed that the test used
by the Court of First Instance should not be used in cases
relating to environmental matters, as the environment is a
common good. Alternatively, they argued that the right to
be informed and to participate in an EIA procedure, which
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had been abrogated under the circumstances of the case,
gave them an individual right to go to court.  The Court did
not accept these arguments, upheld the decision of the
Court of First Instance, and furthermore stated that the
rights under the EIA directive would be fully protected by
the national courts of Spain.
The Greenpeace case met with substantial criticism.
For a summary of the issues involved and a discussion of
the questions raised, see Report: Complaint procedures
and access to justice for citizens and NGOs in the field of
the environment within the European Union (Tilburg
Univ, MinVROM Netherlands, April 2000), pp 37-40.
France: French NGO celebrates 
Natura 2000 court ruling
Source: Environment Daily 1029, July 12, 2001
Editor’s note: This case could potentially fall under
Aarhus Convention article 9(3) and involves an attempt
by a French NGO to overturn a decision in contravention
of EU environmental law.
France’s highest administrative court has blocked
development of a Natura 2000 candidate site in Alsace. The
ruling, announced on Wednesday, represents the first time
that the French legal system has recognised the jurisdiction
of the 1992 EU habitats directive.
The ruling suspends authorisation granted earlier this
year by the agriculture ministry to plant vines at a site in the
High Rhine region and is being interpreted as a blow to
various parties, including hunters and landowners, who
have been fighting the Natura 2000 process.
The agriculture ministry argued that development
plans should not be blocked because the site in question is
one of several hundred whose nomination for inclusion in
the EU-wide Natura 2000 conservation network was
recently struck down on a technicality (ED 25/06/01
<www.environmentdaily.com/articles/index.cfm?action=a
rticle&ref=10165>).
The court dismissed this argument, concluding that the
scientific basis of the environment ministry’s site nomina-
tion was sound, and therefore the technical hiccup in the
nomination process was not of consequence.
The case was brought by France Nature
Environnement (FNE), a network of environmental NGOs.
An FNE spokesperson told Environment Daily that the rul-
ing was an important step toward improving France’s
implementation of the habitats directive. 
Contacts






The press release may be found at <www.france-
nature-environnement.org/pdf/CP2%20conseil%20natu-
ra2000.pdf>.
Hungary: The protected forests case
Source: S. Stec, work in progress (footnotes omitted)
Editor’s note: This case is an example of the role of
jurisprudence in particular cases brought by NGOs and
environmentally aware members of the public, in the
development of interpretations of environmental rights. It
is relevant to article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
The protected forests case before the Constitutional
Court of Hungary had its origins in the process of privati-
sation of nationalised property following the changes in
1989. In 1992 the Hungarian parliament passed a law on
the privatisation of agricultural land that contained provi-
sions concerning the break-up of agricultural cooperatives
and the distribution of land to their members. The law pro-
vided for various exceptions to what was to be privatised.
Non-privatisable lands included national parklands, areas
protected by international agreement, and other protected
natural territories, unless such lands were already under
certain forms of cultivation. Those forms of cultivation that
put protected lands back into the privatisable category
included many forms of agriculture and viniculture, but did
not include cultivated forests. Farmers who wished to gain
ownership of cultivated forests under the regime reacted to
the legislation by lobbying for inclusion of cultivated
forests among the types of cultivated lands that could be
privatised even while protected. Parliament gave in to the
farmers and amended the law to allow cultivated forests to
be privatised as well. This prompted a group of unnamed
citizens to petition the Constitutional Court to declare that
the amendment to the law violated the two environmental
rights found in the Hungarian Constitution.  
The first of these constitutional provisions, article 18,
was a conventional declaration of the right to a healthy
environment. The second, article 70/D, provided for a
human right to the highest possible level of physical and
spiritual health. In a well-reasoned decision, the Hungarian
Constitutional Court interpreted these two constitutional
rights as “third-generation” constitutional rights. Taken
together they were declared by the court to be neither col-
lective nor individual rights. While not basic rights, neither
did they simply impose a constitutional task on the state
that the state could implement freely as it wished. In choos-
ing the term “third generation constitutional right,” the court
drew an analogy to the right to life on the basis that envi-
ronmental resources are limited, most environmental dam-
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age is irreversible and the environment is the basis for all
life. Articles 18 and 70/D must therefore be interpreted, in
the opinion of the court, in a way that places an obligation
on the state to provide legal and institutional guarantees for
an objectively high level of environmental protection. Thus,
if the state guarantees a certain level of environmental pro-
tection at any time, it cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily. Such
protections could only be diminished in proportion to
upholding other constitutional rights or values. This fur-
thermore implied, in the court’s view, that the rights found
in the Constitution, in an appropriate case, could be the
basis of a cause of action to require the state to maintain
high objective standards of environmental protection.
In the case at hand, the interest of the members of the
cooperative to receive compensation through ownership
was not comparable to the interest in protecting the forests.
The court did mention that the ownership of the forests
was not the key issue. In principle the forests could be pri-
vatised, but if so the obligations of the owners would need
to be strengthened, and the state would have to continue
to guarantee the objectively high level of protection of the
forests. The fact that no provision had been made in the
amendments to offer such a level of protection once the
forests passed into private hands was evidence that the
state had failed in its basic responsibility of ensuring an
objectively high level of environmental protection. Thus,
the court invalidated the amendments.
The opinion distinguished between an individually
enforceable basic right and its “opposite” — an affirmative
but generalised duty of the state. But it did more than this,
asserting a “third way,” the third generation constitutional
right that gives some constitutional substance to the state
duty — that is, some oversight by the people over how the
duty is carried out. The right to a healthy environment,
according to this view, is “actually the right of an individ-
ual to demand the maintaining of ecological standards, set
up by law.” Through appeal to such third generation con-
stitutional rights, the public thus may influence particular
objective means for environmental protection in various
ways. These include direct challenges to the constitution-
ality of laws as in the present case, but also in other ways,
such as participation in environmental decision-making
and standard-setting by authorities. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has extremely lib-
eral standing rules. Any individual may bring an action
before the court to challenge the constitutionality of an
existing or newly enacted law at any time, regardless of
case or controversy requirements. In this case the initiator
of the suit — an unnamed group of environmentalists —
stood far in the background of what was in fact a declara-
tory judgment. In other jurisdictions, standing can be an
issue requiring intensive scrutiny. Hungary’s open standing
provision allows for quick, direct and inexpensive access
to the Constitutional Court.
Hungary: The ombudsman as a tool
for access to justice using an
independent and impartial body
established by law
Source: Magdolna Toth Nagy, Regional Environmental
Center for Central and Eastern Europe
In Hungary, Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of
Personal Data and Disclosure of Public Interest established
the institution of the data protection commissioner (or
ombudsman) to protect the constitutional rights of citizens
to the protection of personal data and to oversee the dis-
closure of data of public interest. The ombudsman is elect-
ed by the parliament for a period of six years. The first elec-
tion took place in 1995, the second in 2001. The ombuds-
man’s duties include, inter alia, the monitoring of the
implementation of laws on data-processing and of the con-
ditions for the protection of personal and public interest
data. The ombudsman must also give opinions or present
proposals on draft legislation or the modification of legis-
lation related to data protection or freedom of information.
His opinion is also sought for each category of official
secrets, observing whether or not the processing of data is
unlawful and, if so, requesting the data controller to dis-
continue the processing of the data. The data controller is
obliged to take the necessary measures without delay and
to inform the ombudsman in writing and publicly within 30
days of the occurrence of unlawful data-processing, the
identity of the data controller, the categories of data
processed and the status of the unlawful processing. He or
she also examines any complaints lodged, and is entitled to
change the classification of secrets, to request information
on any matter, and to inspect any documents and records.
The authorities have to report annually to the ombudsman
on requests for information that have been denied and the
reasons for such refusal.
Anyone may approach the ombudsman with a claim
that his or her rights were violated through the processing
of personal data, or through access to data of public inter-
est, or in the case of a potential violation, except when a
particular case is in the course of judicial procedure. If his
or her request or appeal is refused, the applicant may still
appeal to the court. 
The opinions or recommendations of the ombudsman
are not legally binding. However, they constitute an impor-
tant tool to remedy infringements of rights to public access
to information. The authorities responsible for handling
the data or information are obliged to cooperate with the
ombudsman to remedy an unlawful situation. If they do
not cooperate, the ombudsman has a right to appeal to
their higher level administrative authority. Through mak-
ing unlawful actions or activities public, the ombudsman
also uses the tool of transparency and publicity to put pres-
sure on those not respecting the legal requirements in
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question. The advice of the ombudsman is usually fol-
lowed by measures taken by the public authorities: for
example, correcting the unlawful acts or activities or
amending their regulations and laws. If the advice is not
followed, the unlawful act may be challenged in court. 
In the past five years, the ombudsman has been asked
several times to give an opinion about the interpretation of
“public interest information.” Some of these cases are
briefly described below. The recommendations suggest a
practice that is governed by a presumption in favour of the
disclosure of information.
Recommendations on handling data related
to environmental protection fines
In 1997, a group of citizens lodged complaints with the
ombudsman regarding an information request on data
related to environmental protection fines levied by envi-
ronmental inspectorates. The applicants requested infor-
mation from 12 local inspectorates, employing an identical
request for the total amount of fines levied in 1997, how
the money was spent, the names of the fined companies,
and the amount of the fine imposed in each case. The
responses, however, were quite diverse. The majority of
the inspectorates declined to supply some of the data,
either without specifying any legal grounds for the refusal
or citing the civil code on personal rights and referring to
business secrets. The entirety of the information was dis-
closed only by one authority. The fees charged for supply-
ing the data also varied to a maximum of 1,500 percent.
The ombudsman, based on Act No LXIII of 1992 on the
Protection of Personal Data and Disclosure of Public
Interest, made it clear in his findings that the requested
environmental information was “data of public interest”
that could be disclosed to anyone.  He stated: 
“[B]usiness secrets” mean any fact or information …
related to the management of business affairs which
the parties concerned have an appreciable interest in
keeping confidential ….  The business secret is a legal
instrument in the service of protecting fair competi-
tion. The accessibility of information on hazards
caused by violating environmental protection regula-
tions … forms an integral part of the constitutional
freedom of information. The public disclosure of a
well-defined range of pertinent information is of vital
interest. The decisions of bodies charged with moni-
toring the legality of business enterprise constitute
data of public interest. Information relevant to activi-
ties violating provisions in force and inflicting serious
damage on the environment amounts to “certified
public data” not simply because such activity may
have an impact on the population irrespective of
national borders … but also because in a remarkable
number of cases it implies irreversible harm or damage
that can only be repaired at an extraordinary cost.
Citing business secrets should not be allowed to give
immunity to those guilty of violations.
In his recommendation, the ombudsman proposed that
the National Environmental Inspectorate and the 12
regional environmental inspectorates should regularly
publish or make publicly accessible the list of those com-
panies causing damage to the environment, including the
type of pollution and the amount of fines imposed. Since
the regional inspectorates have to report every quarter to
the central authority on such activities and on the fines
imposed, this information is available. Consequently,
when supplying this information, they should not charge a
fee in excess of covering copying and mailing costs. The
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional
Development and the local governments are obliged to
provide information on the spending of collected fines
periodically, as well as upon request.
Recommendation on the publicity of
concession contracts
Another example was related to a submission of an
NGO (the Hungarian Automobile Club’s Legal Protection
Committee) on whether the information contained in a
concession agreement constituted data of public interest.
The contract, signed by the Ministry of Transport,
Telecommunications and Water Management and the First
Hungarian Concession Motorway Rt. (ELMKA), involved
the construction and operation of the M1/M5 motorway.
The applicant believed that the business interests of either
the ministry or the company could not take precedence
over the interests of disclosure.
The ombudsman asked the minister of Transport,
Telecommunications and Water Management to explain
his position on the issue. On behalf of the minister, the
administrative state secretary explained that the concession
agreement was an institution of public law. As such, it
could not be regarded as data, and did not fall under Act
LXIII of 1992. In the official’s view, concession agreements
were governed by the same rules that apply to any other
type of contract: the information contained in them can
only be disclosed to a third party when there is no contrary
provision in the contract. The motorway tender contract
included a provision that the information contained in it
was a business secret. 
The ombudsman emphasised that the right to access
data of public interest and the right to freedom of informa-
tion are fundamental constitutional rights. Citizens and their
organisations cannot monitor local government functions
unless they are in possession of an appropriate measure of
information on how they are run. The right to access data
of public interest and the right to the protection of business
secrets may come into conflict when public bodies enter
into business relations with private companies. Thus, in
APPEND IX  B :  OT H E R  C A S E S  A N D  B AC K G R O U N D  M AT E R I A L S
H A N D B O O K  O N  AC C E S S  TO  J U S T I C E  U N D E R  T H E  A A R H U S  C O N V E N T I O N 237
their management of public funds, the bodies of the state
and local government often come into possession of busi-
ness secrets. In such cases priority must be given to disclo-
sure to the extent that it allows for transparency in the use
of public funds. Private companies applying for funds or
entering into any other business transaction with the state
or local government that involves public funds, have no
choice but to accept restrictions on their business secrets. 
The ombudsman proposed clarifying amendments to the
Concessions Act that would make it clear to all parties to the
concession procedure, including bidders and bodies of state
or local government, which data they are liable to disclose.
The ombudsman invited the minister of Transport,
Telecommunications and Water Management to guarantee to
the plaintiff and any other interested person the opportunity
to inspect the terms of the concession agreement in question.  
For further information
See Cases of freedom of information: The first three
years; 1998, and Act No LXIII on Protection of Personal
Data and Disclosure of Data of Public Interest on the web-
site of the Hungarian ombudsman at <www.obh.hu>.
Italy/Council of Europe: 
Guerra v. Italy, European Court 
of Human Rights  
Source: ECHR case summary (edited)
Editor’s note: Judicial interpretation of the right to
respect for private and family life on the European level
has brought it increasingly close to interpretations of the
right to a healthy environment on the national level (see,
for example, the protected forests case).
The case concerned article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and a family who lived in the
vicinity of an industrial facility that produced fertilisers.
Authorities failed to respond to several requests for infor-
mation concerning the environmental risks faced by the
family.  The court held that the inactivity of the authorities
violated the right to respect for private and family life pro-
tected by article 8.
The Ministry for the Environment and the Ministry of
Health had jointly adopted conclusions on the safety report
submitted by the factory. They had provided the prefect
with instructions about the emergency plan, which he had
drawn up in 1992, and measures required for informing the
local population.  However, the district council concerned
had not received any document detailing the conclusions
by December 7, 1995.
In this case, the applicants had waited until production
of fertilisers had ceased in 1994 for essential information
that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and
their families might run if they continued to live at
Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to danger in the
event of an accident at the factory.
In its decision, the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights held that severe environmental pol-
lution might affect individuals’ well-being and prevent
them from enjoying their homes in such a way that would
affect their private and family life adversely. The direct
effect of toxic emissions on the applicants’ right to respect
for their private and family life meant that article 8 was
applicable.  
Applicants complained not of an act by the state but of
its failure to act.  As the objective of article 8 was essentially
that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interfer-
ence by public authorities, it did not merely compel the state
to abstain from such interference —  in addition to this pri-
marily negative undertaking, there might be positive obliga-
tions inherent in effective respect for private or family life.
In the present case all that had to be ascertained was
whether national authorities had taken the necessary steps
to ensure effective protection of the family’s right to
respect for its private and family life. The court unani-
mously concluded that the respondent (the state) had not
fulfilled its obligation to secure the applicants’ right to
respect for their private and family life.
Romania: Saran v. Public Health
Inspectorate of Dambovita 
Source: original court record
Editor’s note: The Aarhus Convention, with its broad
definition of environmental information, may help to shift
the burden of establishing what is public information from
the member of the public, as exemplified by this case, to the
authority refusing to disclose the information.
Dambovita Tribunal, Section for Commercial and
Contentious Administrative Matters, Decision No. 759,
April 30, 2002:
Petitioner Teodor Saran of Targoviste brought a case
against the defendant, the Public Health Directorate of
Dambovita, complaining that his right to free access to
information of public interest was violated by the defen-
dant’s refusal to provide information on request. Petitioner
requested a copy of the original sanitary authorisation of
the functioning of the source of drinking water in Ratei,
county of Dambovita, by the Commercial Company for
Communal Housing and Transport Management, pursuant
to provisions of articles 3 and 6, and other provisions of
Law No 544/2001 and the Constitution.
The answer given by the defendant (by letter) was that
it does not communicate such information “upon the
request of natural persons.”  Moreover, the authorisation of
functioning is an administrative document of an individual
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nature and does not belong to the category of information
of public interest.
The court held that information of public interest
means any information that regards the activities or results
from the activities of a public authority or a public institu-
tion, irrespective of the form, means or manner of expres-
sion of the information. Such information is listed in article
5 of the law, which does not provide the cases in which a
request is made for the issuing of authorisations, supplies
of services and any other requests except information of
public interest.
Because issuing a copy of the original of the sanitary
authorisation of functioning does not belong to informa-
tion of public interest, the tribunal rejected the petition-
er’s request.
Slovenia: Constitutional Court case
brought by the National Association
of Ecologists
Source: Milada Mirkovic, lawyer 
Editor’s note: The Slovenian Constitutional Court
recognised the standing of an environmental NGO and
individuals to challenge the legality of a development plan
at least in part upon an interpretation of a duty to protect
the environment.  The case is a rare example of applica-
tion of access to justice under article 9(2) of the Aarhus
Convention with respect to optional provisions, in this case
strategic environmental assessment under article 7, as well
as article 9(3) (direct enforcement).
(Decision No U-I-30/95-26, 1/15-1996). An NGO,
Drustvo ekologov Slovenije, and 25 individuals began a
procedure before the Constitutional Court for evaluation of
the constitutionality and legality of a development plan of a
small business/manufacturing zone in the hinterland of
Lake Bled. The Court recognised the legal interest of the
NGO on the basis of the Environmental Protection Act, arti-
cle 4(3) (Official Gazette of the RS No. 32/93), which pro-
vides that the protection of the environment is, inter alia,
the responsibility of professional and other NGOs for envi-
ronmental protection. The Court held that the NGO was
responsible for environmental protection under the law
because it was defined in its statute as a professional asso-
ciation whose members are involved in expert work in the
research of ecosystems and their protection, as well as in
pedagogical work and activities on the popularisation of
these issues.
The court recognised the legal interest of the individu-
als on the basis of the constitutional right to a healthy
environment in which to live (Constitution, article 72).
The Court held that every person has an interest in pro-
tecting the environment, and that this interest is not limit-
ed to the environment close to the place where he/she
lives or to prevention of imminent harm. 
The court invalidated the development plan of the
small business/manufacturing zone in question because it
found it was not in accordance with the territorial/spatial
medium-term plan of the municipality and with the long-
term plan of the state. There were also some procedural
failures in the adoption of the development plan.
Contacts
Constitutional Court of Slovenia 
<www.sigov.si/us/eus-ds.html>
Spain: Spanish Court orders
telephone mast removal
Source: Environment Daily 1020, June 29, 2001
“A Spanish mobile telephone operator is to appeal
against a judge’s decision last week ordering the
removal on health grounds of a mobile phone trans-
mitter from the roof of a residential building. Thought
to be the first decision of its kind in the EU, the judge-
ment made at a court in Bizkaia, northern Spain,
requires mobile telephone operator Airtel to remove
the equipment until it can demonstrate that the radia-
tion emitted poses no health risks to residents in the
building. The judge decided that ‘reasonable grounds
exist for suspecting that the radiation from the trans-
mitter is not innocuous to people permanently
exposed to its effects.’ Residents had previously agreed
to installation of the equipment in return for financial
compensation from the company.  A spokesperson for
Airtel told Environment Daily that the company will
appeal against the verdict ‘to the Supreme Court if nec-
essary to prevent the decision establishing a legal
precedent.’ A company statement described the deci-
sion as ‘the first time in Europe a court has ordered the
removal of a legally-installed transmitter.’ A spokesper-
son for GSM Europe, which promotes international
mobile telephone communication, said she had no
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United Kingdom: R v. Sec of State
for Env. Transport and the regions
and Midland Expressway Ltd., 
ex parte Alliance Against the
Birmingham Northern Relief Road
and others
Queen’s Bench Division, July 29, 1998
Editor’s note: This case concerned the applicability of
commercial confidentiality rules under the Environmental
Information Regulations of 1992. The question concerned
a concession agreement for construction of a toll-financed
road scheme that contained commercially confidential
information. The court held that the agreement was “infor-
mation relating to the environment” and that the fact that
a document might contain genuine commercially confi-
dential information could not be used to prevent disclo-
sure of the main body of the agreement. Moreover, the
court also determined that the applicant’s purpose in seek-
ing the information was irrelevant.
United Kingdom: 
R v. British Coal Corporation ex
parte Ibstock Building Products Ltd.
Queen’s Bench Division, October 21, 1994, 1995 Env. L
R p 277
Editor’s note: Gathering information during planning
procedures can sometimes involve controversy. This case
involved the identity of an informant who claimed that
naval ordnance may have been disposed of in a mine
shaft. The permit applicant contended that the identity of
the informant was necessary in order to assess the credi-
bility of the information. Initially, British Coal refused to
identify the informant but did so after the permit applicant
initiated a court action. The applicant then sought its
costs, claiming that it was legally entitled to the informa-
tion. The court held that the identity of the informant was
not “personal information” held by the respondent and
that it was important to assess the credibility of the infor-
mation and its weight.
United Kingdom: 
The Salisbury bypass case
Source: Peter Roderick, Friends of the Earth
In 1996, the UK government was planning to build a
controversial bypass around the historic city of Salisbury.
Long after the public inquiry had finished, the Department
of Transport carried out an “induced traffic assessment
report” for the bypass. This report predicted how much
extra traffic would be generated by building the new road.
Friends of the Earth asked the department for a copy of
the report. The department refused, arguing that, among
others, the report was not “environmental information”
within the meaning of Directive 90/313/EEC and the UK’s
domestic transposing legislation.
Friends of the Earth therefore brought a judicial review
against the department. In its sworn written evidence filed
before the hearing, the official admitted that “after further
legal advice … I am advised that the induced traffic assess-
ment is capable of falling within the scope of” environ-
mental information. However, the department continued
to refuse to provide a copy, arguing that the information
related to a matter that had been the subject of a public
inquiry (and so the sub judice exemption applied) and to
confidential deliberations of the department.
Two weeks before the court hearing was due, the
Department of Transport provided Friends of the Earth
with a copy of the report, and the hearing did not proceed.
This case illustrates that public bodies can use several
arguments to prevent the public from gaining access to
information. In such cases, when faced by a court hearing,
they often change their minds. It also shows that public
bodies do not like the possibility of court judgments going
against them and will, if pushed, disclose the information
in advance to avoid a case being made in court.
United Kingdom: 
The pesticides and GM crops case
Source: Peter Roderick, Friends of the Earth 
In 2000, Friends of the Earth asked the UK govern-
ment’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for cer-
tain information regarding consents for the spraying of glu-
fosinate ammonium on crops genetically modified to be
resistant to it. Some information was made available, but
the ministry refused to specify what tests had been con-
ducted or were relied upon in the consent applications “to
establish the harmlessness of the herbicide to humans, ani-
mals, plants and the environment,” and refused to disclose
the full results of those tests. Article 14 of Directive
91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection
products on the market provides “without prejudice to
council Directive 90/313/EEC” that “confidentiality shall
not apply to … a summary of the results of the tests to
establish the substance’s or product’s efficacy and harm-
lessness to humans, animals, plants and the environment.”
The ministry argued that the information was commer-
cially confidential and that it had been voluntarily supplied.
Friends of the Earth wrote a letter before action to the
ministry saying that it was entitled to the information under
directives 90/313/EEC and 91/414/EEC. It pointed out that it
was difficult to envisage the circumstances in which environ-
mental information of the nature sought could be commer-
cially confidential. It maintained that, as the company could
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not have been given consent to spray the pesticide if it did
not provide the information in question, it cannot properly
be said that that information was supplied voluntarily. 
The ministry responded that it no longer wished to argue
that the information was voluntarily supplied, and that it was
going to write to the company to ask why the information
might meet the “strict test” of commercial confidentiality. At
the time of writing, this was where the case lay.
The case illustrates that public bodies can use several
arguments to prevent the disclosure of information, and
that in such cases the prospect of a court case is needed for
them to change their minds, albeit currently only in part. It
is also important to note that this was an extremely com-
plex case because of the nature of pesticide legislation and
the number of requests. It was only because Friends of the
Earth is a large enough organisation to be able to afford
legal advice that it was able to take the case so far. A small-
er community group or individual would not have fared
well. This underlines the need for a non-court appeal
mechanism against refusals.
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